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This PhD explored how clinicians make diagnostic decisions about autism in 
secondary care. Symptoms of autism are considered to be widely 
heterogeneous, meaning that decisions about where the diagnostic threshold 
lies can be challenging. Diagnosis in the UK is usually undertaken by multi-
disciplinary teams (MDTs) and can involve numerous stages of decision-making 
in different contexts across an extended time period. The process of diagnosis 
is complex and multi-faceted, and can be particularly challenging when cases 
are considered ‘borderline’ or where there are coexisting conditions. 
 
A qualitative approach was used in four studies. A narrative review of twenty-
one clinical guidelines was conducted (study one); observation of eighteen 
assessment team meetings on four sites was undertaken (studies two and 
three); and sixteen interviews were conducted with clinicians engaged in autism 
diagnosis (study four). The narrative review found that guidelines varied in 
recommendations for assessment procedures and provided no guidance as to 
how MDT meetings should be facilitated. Guidelines highlighted utilising clinical 
judgement, valuing experience and dealing with contradiction and uncertainty. A 
thematic analysis of observation data found that clinicians produce objective 
accounts through their situated practices and perform diagnosis as an act of 
interpretation, affect and evaluation to meet the institutional demands of the 
diagnostic setting. A discursive psychology analysis explored interaction in the 
team meetings and found a four-part narrative structure utilised to account for 
and explain potential contradictory evidence and manage uncertainty. A 
preliminary thematic analysis of the interview study found that clinicians value 
working collectively to enable them to feel confident about difficult decisions. 
Clinicians appear to be engaged in a ‘push/pull relationship’ with diagnostic 
decision-making which involves resisting or accepting patient and family wishes; 
working within time and resource constraints; and consideration of the potential 
positive and negative consequences of the diagnosis.     
 
This PhD offers an empirical contribution to the nature of practical uncertainty 
work in healthcare. Diagnosticians are charged with the burden of uncertainty in 
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autism diagnosis, and find strategies to manage this dilemma to find the best 
outcomes for their patients. Uncertainty is readily displayed in inter-clinician 
discussion, however, clinicians are compelled to deliver a clear and certain 
diagnostic outcome for patients, families and other professionals. The result of 
this translation from uncertainty to certainty is the construction of a condition 
whereby it is possible to be both part of a spectrum as well as categorically 
defined. Overall, this PhD contributes to a growing field of scholarship on autism 
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Introduction and Overview of Thesis 
 
 
‘if we think about it diagnostically 
… somewhere there is a line drawn in the sand 
… and where that line is … changes really, historically’. 
 









Autism is diagnosed when there are persistent patterns of difficulty in social 
communication and social interaction, combined with restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviour, interests or activities (APA, 2013a). Diagnosis in the UK 
is usually undertaken by multi-disciplinary teams (MDTs) and can involve 
numerous stages of decision-making in different contexts across an extended 
time period. The process of diagnosis may involve the use of clinical guidelines 
and can incorporate questionnaires, observations and rating scales, as well as 
clinical interviews about the history of difficulties and the impact of associated 
impairment on the individual and/or the family. 
 
Prevalence rates for autism have increased dramatically in recent years from 
just over 1 in 2000 in 1966 (Lotter, 1966) to about 1.1% to 1.2% of the 
population (Brugha et al., 2012; Sadler et al., 2017) although some estimates 
are as high as 3.3% (Waugh, 2019). Whilst it is understood that the apparent 
increase in diagnosis must in part be related to broadening the diagnostic 
concept of autism (Russell et al., 2015; Rutter, 2005), other factors may include 
increased awareness of the condition alongside the development of available 
services (Fombonne, 2009) as well as the decreasing age of diagnosis 
(Leonard et al., 2010).  
 
Both lay and clinical understandings of autism inform and are informed by an 
influential neurodiversity movement, increased public prominence of parent 
advocates and lobbying charities, and a proliferation of representations of 
autistic people in television, film and fiction. To meet demand and as the result 
of lobbying, legislation has been passed to ensure the existence of assessment 
and support pathways for adults (Northern Ireland Assembly 2011; Scottish 
Parliament 2010; UK Parliament 2009). This range of factors both create and 
respond to demand for support and assessment needs of autistic people and 
shape our understanding of what it means to be autistic. 
  
Research has shown that, with other conditions such as suspected heart failure, 
social factors can influence clinicians’ decisions (Fuat et al., 2003) which may 
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also impact on diagnostic rates. In psychiatric diagnosis, psychiatrists can 
employ diagnostic ‘workarounds’ offering a more benign diagnosis to reduce the 
possibility of stigma, or fudging to meet insurance requirements (Whooley, 
2010). Studies examining clinicians’ views of autism diagnosis have shown that 
they may diagnose even when uncertain - for pragmatic reasons - to secure 
best outcomes for patients (Skellern et al., 2005). Further studies suggest that 
diagnostic rates can be affected by contextual and social drivers, such as 
diagnostic resources (Mazumdar et al., 2013) or diffusion of information about 
autism through social networks (Liu et al., 2010a). Where there is diagnostic 
uncertainty, clinicians may ‘upgrade’ to an autism diagnosis if it would be in the 
best interests of the patient, trigger appropriate services, or counteract the 
limitations of diagnostic tools (Rogers et al., 2016; Skellern et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, a more positive societal view of autism achieved through a 
growing neurodiversity movement and increased positive cultural 
representations of autistic people, may determine who comes forward for 
diagnosis and why, shaping the context within which clinicians consider the 
impact of diagnosis for an individual.  
 
Deciding where the diagnostic threshold for autism lies can be problematic as 
symptoms are heterogeneous and are distributed as a continuum extending into 
the general population (Constantino, 2011; Constantino and Charman, 2016). 
Despite neuroscientific advances and significant genetic research, autism is not 
yet diagnosed by biomarkers or any test considered to provide other kinds of 
objective measures (Klin et al., 2000; Vllasaliu et al., 2016). The subject of 
assessment, human behaviour, is in itself interactive, interpretive and 
contextual, providing an additional layer of complexity. The process of 
diagnosis, therefore, is complex and multi-faceted, and can be particularly 








The PhD Study 
 
The pathway for diagnosis (noticing a difficulty, referral, screening, assessment, 
testing, feedback etc.) takes the form of a series of judgements framed and 
sanctioned by society and implemented primarily by clinicians. It is a 
classification process that frames behaviour, particularly in a psychiatric 
context, as normal or pathological. Diagnosis provides a framework which 
enables someone to fit or not fit, to explain, to seek treatment and support 
within, to excuse, to give meaning to those things in society that seem different 
and can be distressing, and to label. 
 
Whilst clinicians are, for the most part, responsible for diagnosis and for the 
labelling of a condition as one thing or another, the process of diagnosis itself is 
an interaction. It evolves with every utterance and engages a wide range of 
actors: patients, educationalists, families, health professionals in other sectors 
such as GPs and patients, as well as a range of diagnostic tools and types of 
evidence. People coming for diagnosis are experts in their own behaviours; 
cultural and medical understandings of autism merge as lay people shape how 
autism is seen in the popular imagination and clinicians find ways to categorise 
behaviours one way or another.  
 
There has been very little research undertaken on how clinicians make a 
diagnosis of autism in practice in the UK and in particular how clinicians deal 
with the uncertainties inherent to diagnosis of the condition. With a condition 
such as autism, with its breadth of behavioural symptoms and lack of 
biomarkers, resolving uncertainty may be particularly relevant in clinicians’ 
discussions about autism. Controversies about the efficacy of current 
treatments, the benefits or otherwise of early intervention in childhood 
diagnosis, the availability (or not) of local resources and support, and the 
difficulties of accurately predicting prognosis, add to the complex context of 
autism assessment. 
 
There are some exceptions to this research gap (for example, Hollin and 
Pilnick, 2018; Parish, 2019) which are discussed later in this thesis. An 
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extensive body of work examining assessment data from the US is also 
discussed and built upon (for example, Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; Turowetz 
and Maynard, 2016). This PhD study extends the research on this topic by 
exploring specific mechanisms by which clinicians make a decision together in 
the context of specialist assessment team meetings in England; exploring their 
beliefs and practices through interview; and siting the study in the context of a 
review of clinical guidelines which outlines the procedures by which diagnosis 
should be delivered. Together these contribute to building a picture of autism 
diagnosis in the UK in the early 21st century and highlights some of the 





The PhD aimed to explore social factors in autism diagnosis in secondary care; 
and to understand how clinicians collaboratively make diagnostic decisions in 
autism assessment. The thesis had the following objectives:  
 
a) To undertake a review of clinical guidelines in use in the UK and consider 
where, within those guidelines, social factors and influences are taken 
into account (study one) 
b) To document and analyse discussions made in MDT meetings (or local 
equivalent) to identify social and interactional processes (studies two and 
three) 
c) To gather views and experiences of clinicians involved in the diagnostic 
process via interviews (study four) 











The study asked the questions:  
 
1. What diagnostic guidelines are available for clinicians assessing 
children and adults for autism in the UK; and how does guidance reflect 
social factors and influences? 
2. How do healthcare professionals make diagnostic decisions in 
specialist autism assessment team meetings? 
3. How do clinicians understand autism and diagnosis in secondary 
care?  
 
Specifically, the project comprised four inter-related studies: 
 Review of clinical guidelines, existing diagnostic classifications and 
assessment processes to map the social and institutional context of 
diagnosis and identify potential social influences (study one) 
 Observation of specialist autism assessment team meetings where 
diagnostic decisions are made to identify themes (study two) and 
interactional processes (study three) 
 Interviews with clinicians involved in the diagnostic process (study four) 
 
The review of clinical guidelines covered the whole of the UK, however the 
remainder of the studies pertain to practice in England only, as responsibility for 






The study draws on sociology of diagnosis, which argues that diagnosis cannot 
be separated from wider influences of human agency and deliberation (Jutel, 
2011). A sociology of diagnosis approach challenges the taken-for-granted fit of 
diagnostic categories to their conditions and instead considers them as socially 
framed and shaped by wider social forces and interaction (Brown, 1995). 
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Clinical judgements, for example, may be seen as products of social processes 
influenced and shaped by context, discourses, human interaction and the 
particular classification framework pertinent at the time of working (White and 
Stancombe, 2003). By exploring clinician interaction in meetings this thesis 
provides insight into how clinicians ‘do diagnosis’ together. Understanding how 
clinicians draw the line between what is considered ‘typical’ behaviour and a 
pathology has far reaching consequences for individuals being diagnosed and 
their families. Furthermore, because of these consequences, we are compelled, 
as a society, to consider who we label as having a medical condition and why.  
 
The thesis takes a cross-disciplinary approach combining sociological theory 
and discursive psychological methods. Discursive psychology is an appropriate 
approach to analysing interaction in that it focusses on how talk creates action. 
Interaction in this case is considered a ‘social factor’ in its own right, in that the 
way in which interaction between people unfolds is inseparable from the 
diagnostic outcome and the broader context. In other words, how clinicians talk 
together about diagnosis, creates what diagnosis is. This, in turn, contributes to 
the creation of autism as a condition.  
 
 
Overview of thesis chapters 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapters One to Four comprise the literature 
review for the PhD study. Chapter One reviews the medical model of autism 
and of diagnosis, including examining classification systems and the diagnostic 
pathway in England. This chapter also discusses diagnostic tools, symptoms, 
aetiology and differences in the diagnostic pathway for adults and children.  
Chapter Two explores the social model of diagnosis and outlines the 
implications of taking a sociology of diagnosis perspective. This chapter 
explores the diagnosis of autism as a category, as a process and the 
consequences of diagnosis.  
 
Chapter Three considers how our understanding of autism as a condition has 
changed over time and examines research which considers the cultural, political 
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and historical conditions that shape how we understand health and illness in 
society. This chapter draws particularly on theorists who have examined how 
conditions are created and how knowledge around those conditions are 
constructed through the clinic. It discusses how we decide as a society where 
‘normal’ behaviour begins and ends and how the influences of medicalisation 
shape our understandings.  
 
Chapter Four outlines the literature on narrative in medical case construction, 
the specialist knowledge of the clinician, and diagnostic uncertainty. This review 
goes on to examine research to date on clinician interaction in multi-disciplinary 
team (MDT) meetings and how this shapes decision-making.  
 
Chapter Five outlines the methodological approach to the PhD, including the 
rationale, research question, overall study design, details of recruitment and 
ethics. This chapter describes the epistemic perspective and the rationale for 
examining the observation data discursively. Finally, it outlines details of the 
observed sites, and provides a reminder of the diagnostic pathway, tools and 
technical terms in the data. This final section provides the context for the 
articles to follow.  
 
Chapters Six to Nine comprise the central original research component of the 
PhD thesis and includes three articles for publication and one preliminary 
analysis. These articles are drawn from the four inter-related studies and 
incorporate a review of clinical guidelines as published in BMC Psychiatry; a 
thematic analytic overview of the observation data (under review); a detailed 
discursive analysis of the narrative structure of the assessment team discussion 
(under review); and a preliminary thematic analysis of the interview study.  
 
Finally, Chapter Ten draws together key findings and conclusions from the 
studies. The thesis concludes by outlining the strengths and limitations of the 
study and considering implications for theory and practice. Taken together, the 
studies which comprise the original research in this thesis contribute to theory 
around the sociology of diagnosis and provide insight into diagnostic practices 
for a particular condition, that of autism. The final discussion considers whether 
28 
 
these findings might be transferable to other conditions and makes suggestions 
for further study.  
 
 
A Note on Terminology 
 
Autism as a disorder or condition 
Autism is categorised as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in DSM-5 and ICD-
11. However, there is significant debate about classifying autism as a ‘disorder’, 
with many preferring to use the term ‘condition’ (NICE 2012). I use the term 
‘autism’ throughout to embrace the spectrum of conditions as currently defined 
in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013a) and International Classification of Diseases (ICD-
10, ICD-11) (WHO, 2018, 1993). There are also critiques of the terms ‘high’ and 
‘low’ functioning autistic people; the former dismissing a person’s needs or 
struggles, and the latter undervaluing a person’s individual strengths (Iland, 
2018). Kapp (2018) argues that ‘functioning’ is a product of an individual’s 
support network, not an inherent aspect of an individual. Therefore these are 
terms that I avoid except where I report on studies which utilise this term, either 
to critique it, or to define their participant selection.  
 
Patients, clients and people 
I have considered what term to use to discuss those coming for diagnosis. 
People attending autism assessments, and discussed by clinicians in my study, 
are not the subject of my PhD study, but clearly are central to the discussion of 
diagnosis. In a medical sense they are ‘patients’; in mental health settings, 
people are often considered to be ‘clients’ or ‘service users’. I began by wanting 
to retain the human-ness of this person (who I never met) as a person, rather 
than as a patient or client, but the repetitive ‘person coming for assessment’ 
was clumsy. Finally I decided that the term ‘patient’ was a necessary 
compromise, as I struggled to conceive of an eight-year old as a ‘client’ and 
required a term that embraced all ages. I understand the limitations and medical 
nature of this terminology and can only justify it by noting that we might all 




(as do the patients in this study). On leaving we can aim to re-assert our 
identities as more rounded human beings, labelled as something else, or not. 
 
Autistic people and people with autism 
There is a great deal of variation in the way that different stakeholders choose 
to describe autism. There has been a movement within disability activism 
towards ‘person-first language’, for example, using terminology such as ‘person 
with a disability’ in preference to ‘disabled person’, which has also been 
adopted by many health professionals (Kenny et al., 2016). However, many 
members of the autism community prefer ‘identity-first’ language, such as 
‘autistic person’, on the basis that a person cannot be separated from their 
autism (Kenny et al., 2016; Sinclair, 2013, 1993) and that foregrounding autistic 
identity recognises the value and worth of that person as autistic (Brown, 2011). 
Whilst acknowledging that there are different ways of talking about autism, in 
this thesis I use identity-first language throughout.  
 
Clinicians and healthcare professionals 
I use the term ‘clinician’ to encompass all healthcare participants in this PhD 
study. Whilst strictly and historically, a clinician is usually considered to be a 
medical doctor, here I define clinician as a member of a registered health 
profession involved in direct patient care, as each of these participants has, to 
some extent, a key role in diagnosis. I also use the term diagnostician 
interchangeably when discussing the participants in my PhD studies. The 
exception to this is in Chapter Six, a published article reviewing clinical 
guidelines for autism diagnosis, in which I use the more general term, 
healthcare professional (HCP).  
 
 
All references included in this chapter, and all other chapters, have been 


















CHAPTER ONE: Medical framing of diagnosis  
 
 
A classification is a way of seeing the world at a point in time. 
 







1.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
 
In this chapter I will outline the current clinical understanding of autism as a 
medical condition. This means, to some extent, putting aside some of the 
questions I later ask about the ways in which clusters of symptoms are grouped 
together or pulled apart to create conditions, as well as broader issues of social 
factors which shape diagnosis.  
 
I begin by discussing what diagnosis is in a medical context, and then go on to 
outline the symptoms of autism and related issues of prevalence and aetiology. 
The chapter continues by looking at changes in diagnostic criteria since the 
beginning of the classification of autism, and pathways to diagnosis for both 
children and adults in England.  
 
Here and throughout this thesis I draw on both diagnosis generally as a medical 
concept, and also specifically within conditions classified as ‘mental and 
behavioural disorders’ (WHO, 1993). Whilst there are overlapping issues in the 
diagnosis of somatic and mental disorders, there are also specific diagnostic 
issues related to mental disorders as defined in classification manuals, which 
will be addressed during the thesis. 
   
 
1.2 What is diagnosis?  
 
Diagnosis is defined as the ‘process of identifying a disorder by examining its 
signs and symptoms’ (Colman, 2009). This commonly understood definition, 
however, fails to illuminate the complexity of functions of diagnosis which 
extend beyond an apparent linear process of identifying disorders. To be 
effective, diagnosis requires cut-off points, or thresholds, whereby individuals 
can be identified as ill or well, diseased or healthy, disabled or not. Diagnosis 
facilitates a culturally shared understanding of a disorder between clinicians, 
and one that can be communicated more broadly with patients, families and the 




Diagnosis has a necessary function as a mechanism for delivering treatment 
and estimating a prognosis. Modern medicine requires a system whereby 
patients can be assured that the treatment they receive is appropriate to the 
condition; that the best available research associated with the condition is used 
as a basis for clinical decision-making; and that predictions about disease 
progression are based on evidence and experience. Society also uses 
classification for understanding aetiology and specific problems associated with 
any particular condition (Goodman and Scott, 2012). It could be argued that 
without naming the condition, there is no shared understanding. Without 
classification, illness becomes no more than a messy description of symptoms 
which may or may not mean one thing or another. Diagnosis itself, therefore, 
creates meaning around disease and disorder, as well as providing a 
mechanism for managing that disorder.   
 
To be useful, therefore, diagnosis must separate out difference: individuals with 
a diagnosis must have different symptoms from those who have different 
diagnoses, or none at all (Goodman and Scott, 2012). For the classification 
system of diagnosis to work, therefore, cut-offs should not be arbitrary, but 
based on clearly observable symptom differences. However, in 
psychopathology, as well as in some physical conditions, a threshold for a 
particular condition can be difficult to locate. Furthermore, in autism, ‘symptoms’ 
are behavioural – or, conversely, behaviours are, in themselves, interpreted as 
symptoms – thereby necessitating a judgement around when a behaviour 
becomes a symptom and in what circumstances. Our classification system, 
designed to be categorical, becomes problematised by symptoms (or 
behaviours) which operate on a dimension. Symptoms can be coded on a 
spectrum of severity (from ‘normal’ to severe) but imposing a threshold along 
that dimension can be a complicated and contradictory matter, involving a 
negotiation based on clinical judgement rather than the objective discovering of 
a fixed entity (Goodman and Scott, 2012). Clinical judgement, therefore, is 
considered to be crucial to the diagnostic assessment process (Falkmer et al., 




1.2.1 Diagnosis and biomarkers 
In somatic or physical health practices, examination of tissue, blood or urine at 
a molecular level is used to predict the presence of some specific conditions, for 
example, cardiovascular disease and hepatic (liver) disease (Kobeissy et al., 
2013). As patients, we generally have an understanding of some commonly 
used biomarkers, considered to be objective, measurable indicators of a 
condition, which are utilised in primary care or at home. For example, we 
understand that a high temperature is related to fever, and that blood pressure 
measurement is used to determine the risk of stroke. We have also become 
accustomed to imaging technologies such as x-ray, CT-scans and MRI 
(magnetic resonance imaging) as ways to evidence the link between bodily 
activity and particular conditions. 
 
The development of sophisticated screening technologies such as mass 
spectrometry, cell and tissue based DNA microrarrays, high-throughput 
screening and combinatorial chemistry (Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, 
2001) are considered to have enhanced the ability of clinicians and researchers 
to identify and utilise biomarkers. The development of accurate biomarkers is 
seen as key to the future of modern precision medicine as a way to enhance the 
efficacy of drug development, clinical care and regulatory decision-making 
(Biomarkers Consortium, 2017).  
 
However, in psychiatric conditions, there are no diagnostic tests utilising 
biomarkers currently in clinical practice (Kobeissy et al., 2013). In some 
psychiatric conditions, there are the beginnings of molecular or genetic patterns 
which may form the basis for future biomarker-based diagnostic tests. For 
example, there is some evidence to show distinct molecular and genetic 
patterns in people with schizophrenia, which may lead towards the creation of a 
blood-based schizophrenia biomarker (Lai et al., 2016). However, this has been 
critiqued by Hedgecoe (2001) who argues that the construction of genetic 
explanations for schizophrenia undermines non-genetic factors such as 
environmental influence. In dementia, whilst there are currently no blood or 
urine based biomarkers in use, structural brain imaging (CT or MRI) is 
recommended and widely used across clinical settings to rule out other causes 
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of cognitive impairment and to identify patterns of neuronal loss, which has 
positive predictive value for dementia (Ahmed et al., 2014). The use of 
biomarkers in psychopathology, therefore, is less established than in physical 
health. 
 
In autism, despite a great deal of research exploring the underlying genetic, 
neurobiological, chemical and cognitive factors that may, in the future, provide 
biomarkers in autism diagnosis, no research currently has enough evidence to 
support routine clinical use (Goldani et al., 2014; Vllasaliu et al., 2016). Some 
argue that available biomarker tests would do more harm than good, given their 
poor positive predictive value. This means that typically developing children 
may be identified as at risk, and a large number of children who go on to 
develop autism would be missed (Anderson, 2015; Anderson and Stahl, 2014). 
 
Recent research in autism has identified changes in brain growth 
(hyperextension of the cortical surface area) in pre-symptomatic children 
(between 6 and 12 months) who have a high familial risk of autism (Hazlett et 
al., 2017). The authors suggest this finding may offer a ‘proof of principle’ basis 
on which to develop potential biomarkers as predictor tools for autism in clinical 
practice (Hazlett et al., 2017). One study examined a range of potential 
biomarkers in autism including biochemical (blood serotonin, urine melatonin 
sulfate excretion) and clinical tests (head circumference, dysmorphology exam, 
digit ratio, cognitive and behavioural function) (Bridgemohan et al., 2019). The 
authors propose that a integrative approach to biomarker development might be 
fruitful in the future (Bridgemohan et al., 2019). It could be argued, however, 
that a ‘scattergun’ approach to tests with the aim of triangulating towards 
‘something’ called autism, may suggest that this ‘something’ called autism is 
simply too complex to describe as one entity.  
 
1.2.2 Critiques of biomarker development 
The use of biomarkers to identify disease has also been problematised, with 
some arguing that the belief that a condition is a ‘specific entity defined by a 
unique pathophysiology’ (Rose, 2013, p. 13) is one that should be challenged. 
More broadly, in relation to genetic biomarkers, scholars in Science and 
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Technology Studies (STS) have developed a critique of what has been termed 
‘geneticisation’ which aims to define differences between people – disorders, 
behaviours and physiological variations – primarily in terms of genetic 
explanations (Lippman, 1998).  
 
Biomarkers, particularly when used in screening, can create a new medicalised 
status of ‘potentially ill’ (Conrad, 2007, p. 138) or ‘pre-symptomatically ill’ (Rose, 
2010, p. 73) which can contribute to the expansion of the medical gaze and of 
diagnostic categories, with the resulting impact on identity, social status and 
insurability, for example (Armstrong, 1995). This in itself reinforces the idea that 
there is a person who can be defined as ‘normal’ via their genetic make-up 
which, as Rose (2010) argues, is at best elusive.  
 
Other work identifies how scientists and clinicians are not passive in their use of 
categories of genetic classification but, in their clinical practice, actively 
generate, debate and evaluate genetic classifications (Latimer, 2013; 
Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2014). The process in the clinic, therefore, 
generates knowledge about the condition, and about genetics, rather than 
engaging in a straightforward application of externally produced knowledge 
(Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). Whilst the promise of a genetic 
biomarker for autism, therefore, is sometimes considered to be the ‘holy grail’ 
required to solve the difficulties of diagnosing an uncertain condition, 
geneticisation does not necessarily solve these problems of categorisation. The 
process of geneticisation fails to challenge how we construct disease 
categories, rather it provides another mechanism for doing so. I will explore the 
question of biomarkers in the context of medicalisation in Chapter Three. 
 
1.2.3 Diagnosing psychiatric conditions 
The remainder of this chapter will consider diagnosis in the context of mental 
disorders, because, as a neurodevelopmental condition, autism is classified 
within the mental disorder categorisation structure. Whilst some of the issues 
discussed will be pertinent to physical conditions, and I acknowledge that 
physical and mental conditions cannot be artificially separated, I will confine 
discussion to mental or psychiatric conditions. 
38 
 
The diagnosis of mental and behavioural disorders is framed by the use of two 
main classification manuals, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) (APA, 2013a) and the International Classification of Mental 
and Behavioural Disorders (ICD) (WHO, 1993). The DSM is considered to be 
the main reference source for psychopathology worldwide; the ICD, although 
rarely used in the US, is considered important for clinical practice (Taylor and 
Vaidya, 2009) and is most commonly used in the UK (National Autistic Society, 
2016a). Both manuals provide operationalised diagnostic criteria (Goodman and 
Scott, 2012) for many conditions including psychiatric, behavioural and 
neurodevelopmental disorders. The diagnostic manuals, therefore, provide a 
tool for diagnosis as well as the basis for clinical guidelines and diagnostic 
measures. However, within clinical practice, diagnostic boundaries are not 
necessarily as clear cut as the manuals might suggest, with dividing lines 
between groupings of disorders potentially unhelpful and leading to patients 
meeting criteria for several closely related disorders (Goodman and Scott, 
2012). Goodman and Scott (2012) argue that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to diagnostic classification as represented by ICD and DSM. The 
advantages include that labelling a condition ensures that there is a greater 
likelihood that clinicians and researchers across disciplines and settings are 
discussing similar conditions. The disadvantage is that the criteria can be 
interpreted rigidly ‘making it easy to forget that the criteria are often built on very 
shaky foundations’ (Goodman and Scott, 2012, p. 27).  
 
Psychiatric conditions too are intertwined with environmental and social 
conditions which impact on behaviour, distress and mental wellbeing, although 
it is argued that this is common to physical conditions too. In psychiatric 
diagnosis, clinicians adopt a holistic ‘bio-psycho-social’ model (Engel, 2012) 
meaning that this broader range of environmental, biological and social contexts 
are taken into account. The identification of a single cause for a psychiatric 
disorder is rarely possible and therefore ‘risk factors’ might include adverse life 
events such as abuse or neglect at home, or bullying at school (Goodman and 
Scott, 2012). In psychiatric health practices, therefore, diagnosis is further 
complicated by the interaction of biological and environmental factors. We 
know, therefore, that the reality of psychiatric diagnosis is more nuanced and 
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1.3 What is autism?  
 
Diagnostic criteria for autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions are 
outlined in the ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) and DSM-5 (APA, 2013a). Whilst there are 
differences in the way in which autism is conceptualised between these two 
versions of ICD and DSM, I will focus in this section on the current commonly 
understood notion of autism as a ‘spectrum’ as outlined in current DSM-5 
criteria. A revision of ICD-10 has been published and will come into use in 2022 
(WHO, 2018). This eleventh revision has been aligned with DSM-5 in 
conceptualising autism as a spectrum (see Section 1.4.1). 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is diagnosed when there are “persistent 
deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple contexts” 
and “restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities” (APA, 
2013, p. 50). The first domain of social communication and interaction includes 
deficits in social-emotional reciprocity such as difficulties in turn-taking in 
conversation and responding to or initiating social interactions. It also includes 
impairments in what might be considered ‘normal’ expectations of body 
language, eye contact and facial expression in communication. In addition, 
individuals have difficulties developing and maintaining social relationships. In 
children, for example, this may manifest itself in an inability to engage in 
imaginative play or make friends.  
 
The second domain of restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or 
activities (RRBI) can include repetitive movements or speech, inflexible 
adherence to routine or unusually intense interest in specific objects or topics. It 
also includes hyper/hypo-senstivity to sensory stimuli in the environment, such 
as sound, light, texture or smell. An individual coming to the clinic for diagnosis 
is required to meet criteria in the domain of social communication and 
interaction, as well as the domain of repetitive behaviours.  
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In addition to the above, diagnostic criteria state that symptoms must be present 
in early development and must cause clinically signficant impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning (APA, 2013a). Symptoms 
should not be better explained by an intellectual disability or global 
developmental delay (APA, 2013a). However, autism and intellectual disability 
frequently co-occur, and for a co-morbid diagnosis, social communication 
should be below that expected for general developmental level. 
 
ASD is defined by diagnostic criteria as a lifelong condition, although research 
shows that some individuals with an early diagnosis of autism do not meet 
criteria for the diagnosis later in life (Fein et al., 2013; Shulman et al., 2019). 
One review identifies that this may affect between 3% and 25% of diagnosed 
children (Helt et al., 2008). Symptoms are typically seen during the second year 
of life but can be recognised earlier or later depending on severity (APA, 
2013a). Individuals can present for diagnosis in later childhood, when 
symptoms can become problematic if ‘social demands exceed limited 
capacities’ (WHO, 2018). This can take place due to changes in circumstances, 
such as moving school (Baird et al., 2011); or as adults, triggered by changes in 
environment such as leaving home. However, it is also believed that some 
adults seek assessment due to diagnosis of a relative, particularly a child, which 
then triggers a re-interpretation of their own retrospective behaviour as autistic 
(Lister, 2019). 
 
As a spectrum, ASD is heterogeneous and therefore manifestations of the 
condition can vary widely (APA, 2013a). In DSM-5, severity specifiers with 
varying levels differentiate between those ‘requiring very substantial support’ to 
those ‘requiring support’ (APA, 2013a). Impairments in social interaction and 
communication are considered to be pervasive and sustained, and assessment 
is therefore seen as being most reliable when there are multiple sources of 
information from caregivers, clinicians and patients where possible (APA, 
2013a). There is no clearly identifiable threshold for diagnosis and some 
children, whilst demonstrating autistic symptoms, fall short of the full diagnostic 
criteria. In both DSM-IV and ICD-10 there was a diagnosis of ‘pervasive 
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development disorder, not otherwise specified’ (PDD-NOS) which helped to 
classify this near-threshold group (Goodman and Scott, 2012). 
 
There are multiple clinical guidelines and protocols in use in the UK that cover 
diagnosis of ASD for both children and adults. Clinical guidelines draw from 
diagnostic criteria to support practitioners and patients in the identification and 
treatment for specific conditions (Field and Lohr, 1992). These include national 
guidelines (NICE, 2012, 2011; RASDN, 2013, 2011; SIGN, 2016) and those 
aimed at different professional interests such as clinical psychologists (British 
Psychological Society, 2016) and psychiatrists (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
2014). The breadth of guidelines suggest that there may be differences in 
recommendations for autism diagnosis, particularly in relation to specific 
disciplines. A review of guidelines in use in the UK can be found in Chapter Six.   
 
1.3.1 The meaning of autism to different actors 
Autism has gained increased public prominence and awareness in recent years. 
One large-scale general population study in Northern Ireland demonstrated that 
over 80% of people are aware of autism with over 60% knowing someone with 
the condition (Dillenburger et al., 2013). This may be due to a number of 
factors, including a broadening of the diagnostic classification of autism; 
increased political activism by the neurodiversity movement; charitable 
advocacy work by organisations such as the National Autistic Society (NAS); 
controversies around causality; as well as popular representations in media, 
literature and film. This means that a wide range of actors have an interest in 
defining and shaping the meaning of the condition. Sontag (1978) argued that 
every era has its own illness which tells us as much about the decade as the 
illness: Hacking suggests that autism may be ‘the pathology of our decade’ 
(Hacking, 2010, p. 633). 
 
Some of the actors with an interest in the meaning of autism include parents 
with a severely impaired autistic child, for whom autism can mean learning to 
live with and negotiating family relationships around a child that can seem, at 
times, to lack the very skills required to maintain those relationships. The 
meaning of autism for those families is accompanied by a struggle for 
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recognition, support and resources (Crane et al., 2018, 2016). For other actors, 
such as clinicians working in the field of diagnosis, autism can mean managing 
distress, questioning the validity of diagnostic tools in ‘atypical’ presentations, 
dealing with the pressure of providing timely assessments (Rogers et al., 2016) 
and finding strategic ways to respond to diagnostic uncertainty (Skellern et al., 
2005). Other actors active in establishing the meaning of autism include some 
adults with a diagnosis, who argue that autism is part of the ‘normal’ human 
range of diversity rather than a disorder or a deficit (Jaarsma and Welin, 2012). 
Autism can represent pride in an identity of difference, an explanation for 
difficulties experienced over many years, or a route to support and validation 
(Crane et al., 2018). Alternatively, autism can be considered a ‘profound 
disability’ requiring support and understanding, rather than an identity label 
(Clements, 2019). To other actors, autism can represent the potential 
medicalisation of a range of behaviours that might not only be considered 
‘normal’ but are valuable to society (Lorenz and Heinitz, 2014). Autism, 
therefore, can mean different things to different actors depending on their 
experience, the severity of symptoms or, as I will examine later, the family, 
social, cultural and historical context.  
 
Society perpetuates a view of disease and illness as classifiable and static, but 
autism defies diagnostic boundaries by being broad, fluid, changing and defined 
only through and by the development of what is considered a condition at any 
particular time. In this sense, our knowledge of autism is situated – by our 
experience, our environmental context, our training and education and our 
conversations. From this perspective, there is no one homogeneous definition 
of what autism is or what a diagnosis means, even amongst those who have 
first-hand experience of diagnosis. 
 
1.3.2 Prevalence 
Current estimated prevalence of autism in children and young people in the UK 
is reported at 1.2% of the population (Sadler et al., 2017) although one estimate 
in Northern Ireland is as high as 3.3% (Waugh, 2019). A study of diagnosed 
children across the spectrum in the south Thames area reported a prevalence 
of children with autism at 116 children in 10,000 (1.16%) (Baird et al., 2006). A 
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study estimating the prevalence in adults in the UK suggests a similar ratio in 
the adult population, estimated at 1.1% (Brugha et al., 2012). Autism diagnosis 
has a male to female ratio of approximately 4:1 (Green et al., 2004). 
 
Research studies suggest that prevalence figures are similar in other countries. 
A study of fourteen US sites, for example, monitoring reported behaviours 
rather than diagnosed patients, suggests prevalence is around 11.3 children per 
1,000 (1.13%), although this varies geographically between states (Centers for 
Disease Control & Prevention, 2012). Some studies show rates as high as 2.6% 
in South Korea (Kim et al., 2011) and as low as 0.39% in China (Wang et al., 
2018). A worldwide systematic review of epidemiological studies suggests a 
median prevalence of 62 in 10,000 (0.62%), and no ethnic or geographical 
differences, but with the caution that further research is needed in low and 
middle income countries (Elsabbagh et al., 2012). Different methods of 
collecting data, use of different diagnostic or screening tools and cultural 
definitions of autism may vary between or within different countries, meaning 
that the prevalence rates across studies may not be comparable.  
 
What is certain is that the numbers of those being diagnosed have increased 
greatly. The first epidemiological study of autism took place in Middlesex in 
1966 and found that 4.5 in 10,000 children (0.045%) displayed autistic 
symptoms (Lotter, 1966). This study included examining case and medical 
histories from those children who attended special schools and were already 
deemed ‘handicapped’ as well as all other children aged between eight and ten, 
described as the ‘normal’ school population. Four decades later, a study of 
children on the Special Educational Needs (SEN) register in Cambridgeshire, 
alongside parental screening of non-diagnosed school children, estimated the 
prevalence at 157 per 10,000 (1.57%) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). A visual 






Figure 1: Rise in diagnostic rates between 1975 and 2009 (Weintraub, 2011) 
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the apparent increase in diagnosis may in part be 
related to broadening the diagnostic concept of autism (Russell et al., 2015; 
Rutter, 2005), other factors may include increased awareness of the condition 
alongside the development of available services (Fombonne, 2009). For 
example, differences in prevalence estimates are marked in Northern Ireland 
(3.3% in 2019), where the Autism Act was introduced in 2011, as opposed to 
the Republic of Ireland where prevalence estimates sit at around 1% - 1.5% 
where there was no such provision made (Government of Ireland, 2018). Other 
factors may include the decreasing age of diagnosis (Leonard et al., 2010; 
Prior, 2003; Wing and Potter, 2002); and multiple or more specific methods of 
prevalence data collection, such as gathering both educational and medical 
records (Christensen et al., 2016). Others argue that there has been a 
reconceptualization of what might be considered ‘normal’ psychological 
development in children (Evans, 2013), leading to an apparent, but not actual, 
increase in prevalence. A study comparing diagnosis and behavioural traits 
within two cohorts from 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 identified an increase in 
diagnostic rates (from 1.09% to 1.68%) and also showed an increase in 
behavioural traits associated with autism amongst non-diagnosed children 
(Russell et al., 2015). Whilst this might suggest an increase in the condition, it 
may be due to other factors, such as greater teacher and parent recognition of 
potential autism symptoms in the later cohort, for example. It should be noted, 
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therefore, that although diagnostic rates have increased, this may not be a true 
reflection of an increase in autism as a condition (Fombonne, 2001). 
 
1.3.3 Co-occurrence with other conditions 
Many people with symptoms of autism also have an intellectual disability (ID), 
with about 40% having an IQ under 50, classed as ‘severe’, and a further 30% 
with an IQ between 50 and 69, classed as ‘mild’ (Goodman and Scott, 2012). In 
addition, many children and adolescents with autism also experience 
behavioural difficulties such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
and approximately 70% of people who are diagnosed are considered to meet 
criteria for at least one other psychiatric condition (NICE, 2011). Because a 
majority of people diagnosed with autism have other conditions too, it is difficult 
to be certain about what specific presenting behaviours constitute autism.  
 
Additionally, some symptoms are perceived to be similar to those of other 
conditions, such as social anxiety disorder, attachment disorder or obsessional 
personality disorder, for example (Timimi and McCabe, 2016a). Therefore, 
‘diagnostic overshadowing’ can take place with autism assessment, whereby 
the attribution of one diagnosis overshadows another (Rosen et al., 2018). For 
example, due to perceived overlapping symptoms, a proportion of young people 
receive a diagnosis of emotional or behavioural disorder before receiving an 
autism diagnosis (Mazefsky et al., 2012). Conversely, ADHD symptoms can 
overshadow those of autism, or vice versa (Rosen et al., 2018). However, some 
argue that the lack of understanding of the aetiology of autism and the 
crossover of patterns of behaviours with conditions such as attachment disorder 
make the diagnosis of autism a subjective question of semantics (Timimi and 
McCabe, 2016a). Nevertheless, these factors contribute to the complexities of 
diagnosing autism in day-to-day clinical practice. 
   
1.3.4 Aetiology and heritability 
Autism has no clearly understood aetiology - identifiable cause - although there 
are a number of risk factors which it is thought may be associated with the 
condition. Evidence for these risk factors, however, is mixed. About 10% of 
children with autism have specific genetic, neurologic or metabolic disorders 
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which may be considered to be aetiologic (Newschaffer et al., 2007), although 
those who also have an intellectual disability are more likely to show this 
association (Goodman and Scott, 2012). Other risk factors which have been 
explored include parental immigration (Keen et al., 2010; Magnusson et al., 
2012) and maternal age (Bolton et al., 1997; Glasson et al., 2004). In contrast 
one study based on parental reports found no link between maternal age and 
diagnosis (Russell et al., 2014). 
 
A meta-analysis of environmental risk factors found that advanced parental age, 
some birth complications and, to a lesser extent, maternal obesity or diabetes, 
and caesarian section were linked to autism diagnosis (Modabbernia et al., 
2017). The same meta-analysis also found limited studies on toxic elements 
such as inorganic mercury and lead, that might warrant further investigation 
(Modabbernia et al., 2017). One further study identified increased maternal and 
paternal age at birth; birth order, with being first born the greatest association; 
and having a mother born abroad as risk factors (Gardener et al., 2009). Lower 
maternal age, however, may be an access barrier rather than a risk factor 
(Russell et al., 2011), in that the age of the mother may determine whether the 
family access assessment, rather than a link with autism as a condition. I 
discuss this further in Chapter Two. 
 
Contentious debates around aetiology related to environmental changes due to 
changing lifestyles or modern technologies are still embedded in the lay 
conceptualisation of autism (Russell et al., 2010b) but are generally not 
considered to have enough scientific evidence to be considered seriously. 
Evidence linking the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine (MMR) with the onset 
of autism symptoms in the UK, whilst contributing greatly to public interest in 
autism, has been the subject of epidemiological studies which demonstrate no 
evidence of a link (Modabbernia et al., 2017; Rutter, 2005). Similarly, claims 
that autism is linked with thimerosal, a vaccine preservative, have no supporting 
evidence (Modabbernia et al., 2017; Rutter, 2005). 
 
It is generally understood that autism has a genetic base, evidenced through 
twin and family studies. Folstein and Rutter, for example, studied twins where 
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one of the pair exhibited autism symptoms (Folstein and Rutter, 1977). The 
researchers found that there was a 36% concordance rate for autism in 
monozygotic (MZ) (identical) twins compared with 0% concordance in dizygotic 
(DZ) (non-identical) twins. The researchers concluded that there was strong 
heritability, although not one that was restricted to autism. A further study 
suggested that 60% of MZ twins were concordant for autism versus 0% of DZ 
pairs (Le Couteur et al., 1995). Folstein and Rutter also noted that ‘milder’ 
versions of autism symptoms were often present in non-autistic relatives of 
those diagnosed with autism, suggesting an underlying genetic liability for 
autism which has become known as the Broad Autism Phenotype (BAP) 
(Hurley et al., 2007; Piven et al., 1997). Overall it is considered that the results 
of twin studies indicate a very high heritability of genetic determination, rather 
than environmental factors or biological damage at birth, for instance (Folstein 
and Rutter, 1977). There is, therefore, a general medical consensus that 
genetics plays a strong part in autism, despite the lack of a discovery of an 
‘autism gene’.  
 
However, others challenge both the methodology and findings of twin studies, 
citing the problems of generalising from a twin to non-twin population and 
asserting that the environmental influences on MZ twins and DZ twins cannot 
be assumed to be the same (Joseph, 2006). One study examining social 
demographic change argues that the estimated heritability of autism has been 
dramatically overstated, suggesting that twin studies rely on small convenience 
samples that cannot be inferred from more broadly (Liu et al., 2010b). 
Furthermore Liu and colleagues (2010b) argue that social demographic change 
– increased parental age – can yield genetic changes that, at population level, 
combine to contribute to increased prevalence of autism. 
 
1.3.5 Refrigerator mothers 
As I have outlined above, there have been continued debates about causation 
and risk factors for autism, including vaccination, family risk factors such as 
parental age, maternal obesity or mental health and broader environmental 
factors such as exposure to toxins. However, the debate about aetiology would 
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be incomplete without mentioning a long-standing debate about the impact of 
poor parenting.  
 
Kanner was first to make a link between autism and bad parenting, as he noted 
that the parents of the children he was treating were cold and distant (Hacking, 
2006a, 1995). However, the main drive towards the connection between 
parenting and autism was from Bettelheim who, in 1967, termed the phrase 
‘refrigerator mothers’ (Bettelheim, 1967). Hacking describes this as a moral shift 
from Kanner’s ‘feeble-minded’ children to a re-conceptualisation of autistic 
children as young people liberated by parent-blaming (Hacking, 1995). This 
neat pathologising of mothers was hard to shake off: although the thesis is 
discredited today, blaming mothers as entirely responsible for their child’s 
behaviours is a common trope. It is reflective of the move towards psychiatry at 
the time, and the expansion of the field, that social actions or behaviours began 
to be explained in medical terms. For example, Bettelheim also pathologised 
anti-war student protestors as ‘acting out an unresolved Oedipal conflict’ rather 
than considering that they might have a legitimate claim to political protest 
(Brown, 1990, p. 388).  
 
 
1.4 From childhood schizophrenia to an autism spectrum 
 
The term ‘autism’, drawing on the Greek work ‘autos’, meaning ‘self’, was first 
used in 1911 by psychiatrist Bleuler to describe the self-absorbed behaviour of 
some of his schizophrenic patients (Bleuler, 1911). It was later described almost 
simultaneously in the 1940s by Kanner as a distinct psychiatric disorder which 
he termed ‘early infantile autism’ (Kanner, 1943); and by Asperger as ‘autistic 
psychopathy’ (Asperger, 1944). Despite the fact that Kanner did not consider 
the condition to be associated with childhood schizophrenia (Nadesan, 2005), 
early infantile autism was classified under ‘schizophrenia, childhood type’ in 
DSM-I and DSM-II (APA, 1968, 1952; Manolova and Achkova, 2014). 
 
In 1972 Rutter posited that the term of ‘childhood schizophrenia’ had outlived its 
usefulness, describing the range of diagnoses this covered as ‘chaotic’ (Rutter, 
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1972, p. 315). Instead Rutter delineated childhood schizophrenia as a separate 
condition, and described autism as having ‘three cardinal features’: (Rutter, 
1972, p. 327) a failure of social development, delayed language development 
and ritualistic activities (Rutter, 1972). Autism was redefined under a category of 
‘Pervasive Developmental Disorders in DSM-III (APA, 1980) creating it as a 
separate entity from childhood schizophrenia. The redefinition also heralded 
autism’s first appearance as a distinct diagnostic classification, ‘infantile autism’, 
in 1980 in DSM-III, within a new class of disorder, pervasive development 
disorder (APA, 1980; Volkmar and McPartland, 2014). Evans argues that this 
constitutes the exact opposite of the way in which autism had been understood 
in the 1950s – as a condition with excess of hallucinations and fantasy (Bleuler, 
1911) – to one where the child has a lack of an unconscious symbolic life 
(Evans, 2013). The condition of autism now became one of behaviour, cognition 
and communication (Evans, 2013). 
 
In 1979, Asperger differentiated his concept of autism from that of Kanner’s by 
describing his four young patients as ‘very intelligent with extraordinary 
originality of thought’, whereas Kanner’s described his eleven child patients as 
‘near psychotic’ (Nadesan, 2005, p. 12). Although Kanner’s work was initially 
better known, and framed the early concept of autism, Asperger was later to 
have his name associated with a sub-section of autism through the work of 
Wing who introduced his work to a wider English-speaking audience (Wing, 
1981).  
 
Wing and Gould (1979) found that there were a group of children other than 
those that might have been identified by Kanner, with higher IQ but similar 
social impairments, and forwarded the idea that these children encompassed 
deficits which were on a ‘continuum of severity’ rather than ‘discrete entities’ 
(Wing and Gould, 1979, p. 26). In this way their influential work constructed a 
new ‘high-functioning’ category of autistic people – people with ‘normal’ intellect 
but with social impairments – those with Asperger’s Syndrome (AS). This was 
subsequently included as a sub-classification in DSM-IV (APA, 1994) alongside 
other sub-categories of Autistic Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder 
(CDD), Rett’s Disorder and Pervasive Development Disorder – not otherwise 
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specified (PDD-NOS). This development shaped the continuum between those 
with AS and the broader spectrum of autistic people (Grinker, 2015). Wing and 
Gould outlined the three features of autism as impairments in social interaction, 
impairment of verbal or non-verbal language, and repetitive or stereotyped 
activities (Wing and Gould, 1979), focussing on observable behaviour and 
creating the well-known ‘triad’ of behaviours (Evans, 2013).  
 
Rutter, Wing and Gould, therefore, were key to repositioning autism as a 
disorder of social development, shifting a focus to language development and 
considering the groups of symptoms as a ‘triad’. In doing so they re-
conceptualised childhood autism, childhood schizophrenia and childhood 
psychosis as problems of social behaviour and management (Evans, 2013). An 
outline of changes in classification of autism is at Table 1. 
 
1.4.1 Current classification of autism 
As outlined above, the classification systems in use during the course of this 
PhD were DSM-5 and ICD-10. As ICD-11 is now aligned with DSM-5, I will 
discuss two important changes that took place with the publication of DSM-5 in 
2013, which are now incorporated into the newly published ICD-11.  
 
First, although autism had been understood as a spectrum for some time, the 
umbrella term ‘Autism Spectrum Disorders’ (ASD) was first used in DSM-5 
(APA, 2013a). This new classification of ASD brought together the DSM-IV 
classifications of  Autistic Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder and PDD-NOS (APA, 2013a; Vllasaliu et al., 2016). The 
DSM-IV category of Rett’s Disorder was omitted (Harker and Stone, 2014) as it 
is now considered to have a distinct genetic profile identifiable through a blood 
test showing the presence of a MECP2 gene mutation (Neul et al., 2010). It was 
argued that the changes towards one overarching condition, rather than several 
sub-classifications, reflected a scientific consensus and had a clear empirical 
basis (e.g. Ozonoff 2012). Autism became a single condition with different 
levels of severity rather than separate disorders as outlined in DSM-IV (APA, 
1994). Today, therefore, within this spectrum, people who qualify for ASD 






DSM Classification  Subtypes ICD Classification Subtypes 
DSM-I (1952);  
DSM-II (1968) 
 
Schizophrenia Childhood type ICD-8 
(1967) 
Schizophrenia Infantile autism 




Childhood onset PDD 
ICD-9 
(1977) 
Psychoses with origins 




















Other childhood disintegrative 
disorder; 
Overactive disorder associated with 
mental retardation and stereotyped 
movements; 
Asperger syndrome;  
Other PDD: 
PDD - unspecified  
 






 Asperger’s Disorder; 
 PDD-NOS;  






Autism spectrum disorder. 
 
 
DSM-5 (2013) Neurodevelopmental 
disorders 
 Autism spectrum disorder 
 
Table 1: Evolution of diagnostic criteria and subtypes for autism 




intellectual disability, and meet DSM-5 specifiers of ‘requiring very substantial 
support’, to those who require less support, are cognitively able, and are often 
diagnosed in adulthood.  
 
In the change to DSM-5, the removal of Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) – 
considered to be differentiated from autism by there being no delay in language 
or cognitive development (WHO, 1993) –  was hugely controversial. Autism 
advocates argue that the removal of AS as a discrete diagnosis was a 
challenge to the identity of many people for whom the label is positively 
embraced (Giles, 2014; Singh, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the efficacy of the move to ‘lump’ rather than ‘split’ has been 
questioned, particularly when the heterogeneity of autism symptoms are a key 
challenge to diagnosis (Ozonoff, 2012). There is a diagnostic presumption that 
the cluster of symptoms identified for autism have a common aetiology and 
therefore are inevitably intertwined. Some argue that there should be a 
separation of the triadic behavioural symptoms – taking a ‘fractionable autism 
triad’ approach – because, cognitively and genetically, there is no satisfactory 
account that explains the diversity of symptoms in autism (Happé and Ronald, 
2008). Although a diagnostic category of autism may still be useful, it may be 
more helpful, for research purposes, to consider the condition across three 
dimensions of social interaction, communication and repetitive behaviours, 
rather than one overarching spectrum (Happé and Ronald, 2008). The authors 
argue that a fractionable approach would mean that genetic studies may have 
more success finding genes associated with specific behaviours rather than a 
whole spectrum.  
 
The second key shift in DSM-5 was a move from classifying autism as having 
three symptom domains (communication; social interaction; and restricted and 
repetitive patterns of behaviour) to two (social communication and interaction; 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities) (Wing et al., 
2011). This reduction to two symptom domains was a change from the then 
accepted notion of a symptomatic ‘triad’ which, at the time of writing is still core 




required for an ASD diagnosis, although a new classification of Social 
Communication Disorder can be diagnosed if there are no restricted repetitive 
behaviours present (APA, 2013b). ICD-11 will follow suit and collapse the ICD-
10 categories of Childhood Autism, Atypical Autism, (defined by atypicality in 
age of onset or symptomatology) and Asperger’s Syndrome (WHO, 1993) into 
an overarching category or Autism Spectrum Disorder. A table of differences 
between key criteria in DSM-IV, DSM-5, ICD-10 and ICD 11 can be found in 
Table 2. 
 
Changes in diagnostic classification demonstrate how definitions of autism have 
changed. It is argued that changes have been made based on developing 
clinical experience and research (Mahjouri and Lord, 2012; Vivanti et al., 2013; 
Yaylaci and Miral, 2017). However, given its heterogeneity and the lack of 
conclusive and singular evidence of aetiology, some have argued that 
diagnostic definitions may be shaped as much by economic, social, political and 
cultural practices of our time than in scientific developments in autism research 
(Nadesan, 2005) including conceptualisations of child development, psychiatry 
and wider cultural and social factors.  
 
1.4.2 Diagnosis in England 
The purpose of the autism diagnostic assessment is to confirm a diagnosis, to 
assess the needs of the family (or adult seeking diagnosis), to seek a cause 
where possible, to assess strengths and weaknesses of the patient and 
possible co-conditions as well as to identify necessary resources for support 
(Baird et al., 2003). In England the main diagnostic guideline in use is that 
produced by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). 
There are separate versions for children and young people (National 
Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011; NICE, 2011) 







 ICD-10 (1993) ICD-11 (2018) DSM-IV (1994) DSM-5 (2013) 
Classification Pervasive Developmental Disorders 
 
Neurodevelopmental Disorders Pervasive Developmental 
Disorders 
Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
Sub-types Sub-classifications of: 
Childhood autism; Atypical autism; 
Rett Syndrome; Other childhood 
disintegrative disorder; Overactive 
disorder associated with mental 
retardation and stereotyped 
movements; Asperger syndrome; 
Other PDD: PDD – unspecified 
 
A single diagnosis: 
Autism spectrum disorder. 
 
Differentiates autism with and 
without intellectual disability 
Sub-classifications of: 
Autistic Disorder; Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder; 
Asperger’s Disorder; Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder - Not 
Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS); 
Rett’s Disorder 
A single diagnosis: 








Restrictive, repetitive activities and 
interests (RRBIs). 
Two symptom domains: 
Persistent deficits in: 
Reciprocal social interaction and 
social communication 
Restricted, repetitive, and 
inflexible patterns of behaviour 
and interests. 
Three symptom domains of:  
Qualitative impairment in social 
interaction 
Qualitative impairments in 
communication 
Restricted repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour 
 
Two symptom domains: 
Persistent deficits in: 
Social communication and social 
interaction 
Restrictive, repetitive patterns 
of behaviour, interests or 
activities; sensory difficulties 
Age of onset For childhood autism (but not for 
Asperger syndrome) ‘functional 
impairment’ in social interaction, or in 
language use for communication, must 
have appeared by age 3 years. 
 
Onset occurs during 
development, typically in early 
childhood, but symptoms may 
manifest later. 
Symptoms must be present in 
early developmental period 
(although may not fully 
manifest till later). 
Must have been present in early 
development period; however, 




Not included Not included Not included DSM-5 includes sensory 
hyper/hypo-sensitivities 
 
Table 2: Key differences between diagnostic criteria in DSM-IV, DSM-5, ICD-10 and ICD-11       




Best practice for autism assessment is considered to be that which involves 
clinical consensus combining information from standard instruments of direct 
observation of the patient, screening and diagnostic instruments, parent/patient 
interview and additional independent information from other professionals 
and/or family members (Baird et al., 2006; Vllasaliu et al., 2016).  
 
To reach a clinical consensus for both child and adult diagnosis, guidelines 
recommend that a multi-agency team should be set up to deliver the autism 
assessment (Lai et al., 2014; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 
2014; NICE, 2011). In both adult and child diagnosis, the ‘gold standard’ of 
diagnostic decision-making, therefore, is considered to be consensus 
agreement within a multi-agency team utilising appropriate diagnostic tools and 
other related assessments (Falkmer et al., 2013; Woolfenden et al., 2011). 
Studies suggest that a multi-disciplinary assessment is important for valid 
clinical diagnosis (Huerta and Lord, 2012; Westman Andersson et al., 2013). In 
practice, there are occasions when a decision is made primarily by an 
experienced single clinician. However, a multi-disciplinary approach is required 
to develop a profile of the person and an understanding of a person’s strengths 
and weaknesses for a complete diagnostic assessment (National Collaborating 
Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). The different elements 





Multi-disciplinary approach  Diagnosis decisions should take place through clinical consensus 
 Professionals involved should be trained and competent 
 The process should be team-based and draw on a range of 
professions and skills 
Parent/caregiver interview, 
ideally using standard tool such 
as the ADI-R or DISCO. 
 
To include:  
 Prenatal, perinatal, birth, developmental and health history, family 
medical and psychiatric history 
 Focus on the development of social, emotional, language and 
communication, cognitive, motor and self-help skills, the sensory 
profile and unusual behaviour and interests (core autism symptoms) 
 Behavioural presentation across different contexts 
 Functioning at home, in education or employment 
 Adaptive skills 
 Parent-child interaction and parent coping strategies (in child 
diagnosis) 
 Hyper and/or hypo sensory sensitivities and attention to detail 
Interaction with individual 
through interview (adult), ideally 
using standard tool such as the 
ADI-R or DISCO. 
 
Additionally, self-report 
questionnaires can be used 
where appropriate e.g. RAADS-R 
 Interviews to be interactive and engaging 
 Assessment of social-communication characteristics in structured and 
unstructured contexts 
 Assessment of coping in peer environment 
 
Observation, ideally using 
observation tool such as ADOS 
 Of core autism signs and symptoms especially in social situations 
Documentation of behaviour in 
community settings 
 School reports and job performance records can indicate an 
individual’s strengths and difficulties in real-life settings  
Cognitive assessment, using 
standardised tools 




 Physical and neurological examinations (eg head circumference, 
motor function) 
 Consider genetic analysis (not as routine) (FMRI testing, chromosomal 
microarray analysis), hearing or sight tests, electroencephalography 
(for epilepsy) 
 (in children) look for signs of self-harm or maltreatment; congenital 
anomalies and dysmorphic features; skin stigmata 
Screening for co-occurring 
conditions 
 
 Through medical and genetic analysis 
 Take into account other neurodevelopmental conditions, mental 
disorders, neurological disorders, physical disorders, communication 
difficulties 
Consider differential diagnosis 
(children) 
 May include other neurodevelopmental disorders e.g. developmental 
coordination disorder; mental and behavioural disorders e.g. ADHD; 
conditions in which there is developmental regression such as Rett 
syndrome; other conditions (eg hearing or visual impairment) 
Assess challenging behaviour 
(adults) 
 Functional analysis, including identifying potential triggers or 
maintaining factors 
Assess risks (adults)  For self-harm, rapid escalation of problems, harm to others, self-
neglect, breakdown of family/residential support, exploitation or 
abuse by others  
 
Table 3: Elements in a clinical assessment of autism 




1.5 Pathways to autism diagnosis 
 
The clinical pathway for autism diagnosis in the UK differs for children and 
adults and also across health systems and trusts (Vllasaliu et al., 2016). 
Individuals can be referred directly to specialist autism assessment services in 
secondary care via their GP or health professional in secondary care (e.g. 
Community Mental Health Team); and, in children and young people’s 
assessment, the process can be triggered via a school or other professional 
involved in education or health (National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and 
Children’s Health, 2011). Initial screening, sometimes utilising screening tools 
(See Section 1.5.3), determines whether individual cases are considered for full 
comprehensive assessment. This full assessment usually involves the use of 
diagnostic tools as well as developmental history-taking and information from 
other professionals. Assessment information will usually be discussed and 
considered by a range of clinicians, coming to a consensus at a multi-
disciplinary team (MDT) meeting. MDTs are made up of a number of health 
professionals relevant to the case including consultant psychiatrists, consultant 
psychologists, nurse practitioners (who are often specialists in autism), speech 
and language therapists and paediatricians. At these meetings all assessment 
data will be considered and a diagnosis made, although some cases may 
require further assessment or advice. 
 
Rather than diagnosis being a single decision-making opportunity for 
classification, therefore, there are multiple opportunities for diagnostic 
assessment within the extended process, often in consultation with patients, 
parents/carers and other clinicians. A wide range of information is taken into 
account. Further discussion about decision-making in multi-disciplinary teams is 
in Chapter Four.  
 
1.5.1 Autism diagnostic pathway for children 
Many different pathways for diagnosing autism in children are in place (Baird et 
al., 2011) depending on local trusts and priorities. Karim and colleagues’ (2014) 
interview study shows that, across services, diagnosis for children and young 




observations, and can involve different health professionals depending on time 
or availability. Although some settings do not have specialist autism clinics 
(Karim et al., 2014) there is a requirement for there to be a diagnostic pathway 
across local agencies. Assessment is generally located within the wider 
provision for children and young people with emotional and psychological 
difficulties provided for by Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
(CAMHS) (NHS Choices, 2016). CAMHS provision includes services in early 
years and primary care (Tier 1 services) through to highly specialist services 
such as in-patient and specialised assessment and treatment services (Tier 4) 
(NHS England, 2015). Specialist multi-disciplinary teams (Tier 3) will provide 
autism assessment via an out-patient service, and where necessary, there is a 
highly specialist Tier 4 assessment process for children who may be deemed to 
be at particular risk or require intensive input. This process will take place over 
a number of days, involving a wider range of professionals, often including 
teachers and art therapists (S. Howson, personal communication, 2016). The 
NICE recommended pathway for assessment of children and young people is at 
Figure 2. 
 
In practice, many health trusts have specialist autism assessment teams and 
others channel assessment through CAMHS or a paediatric team. Different 
processes can come into play depending on the complexity of the case or 
whether, for example, a child has had primary contact with another specialist 
team such as Learning Disabilities (LD). Guidelines suggest that whilst different 
geographical areas may have different referral policies, in general younger 
children are more likely to be referred to paediatricians at a child development 
centre or to speech and language therapists, whilst older children are more 
likely to be referred to a paediatrician or CAMHS (National Collaborating Centre 
for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). Policy and practice guidelines 
suggest that early diagnosis is important as it enables early intervention 
strategies, leading to better long-term outcomes (Filipek et al., 2000; Lai et al., 
2014). ‘Earlier is better’, however, has been challenged by some researchers on 
the basis that the evidence for efficacy of treatment interventions is inconclusive 
and that there are potentially adverse effects for the child in receiving a 





Figure 2: NICE pathway for autism diagnosis for children and young people 
 
 
As outlined above, symptoms are related to social interaction, reciprocal 
communication and repetitive and restrictive behaviours or interests (NICE, 
2011). In addition, a key aspect in the diagnosis of autism in children and young 
people is that behavioural signs and symptoms are examined against what is 
considered typical development in relation to the child’s age or developmental 
level (Huerta and Lord, 2012; Lord et al., 1997). A diagnostic framework which 
takes into account what might be considered ‘typical’ child development also 
makes assumptions about what this might mean in relation to the nature of 
typicality. I consider questions around what might be considered typical or 
normal behaviour in Chapter Three. 
 
When considering the possibility of referring a child to a specialist autism 
assessment team, there are a number of interacting factors which may make 




simply to the child’s overall development, but also take into account whether 
symptoms can be accounted for by disruptive home experiences. This can 
include parental illness, cultural variations and the possibility that the child may 
have found strategies for coping which ‘mask’ symptoms, for example (NICE, 
2011). Diagnosis of autism in children can be further problematised by 
interaction with non-autistic factors such as cognitive functioning (Huerta and 
Lord, 2012). One study shows that different diagnoses can be given by different 
clinicians even within the same case (Russell et al., 2012c), leading to 
questions about the validity of the model of a discrete underlying condition 
being measured.  
 
NICE recommends that the diagnostic assessment process should commence 
within three months of an individuals’ referral to the autism team and, after 
diagnosis, plans for any support or intervention should involve the family. A 
2014 self-assessment exercise found that only 33 (22%) of local authorities 
reported meeting the NICE recommended waiting times in both children and 
adult services (Glover et al., 2014). 
 
Guidelines recommend that there should be a single point of contact, a case 
coordinator, through which the parent or family can communicate with the wider 
assessment team (NICE, 2011).    
 
1.5.2 Autism diagnostic pathway for adults 
The Autism Act 2009 was passed in order to make provision to meet the needs 
of adults with autism in England and Wales (UK Parliament, 2009). The 
resulting Autism Strategy acknowledged that services for adults were 
inconsistent and that obtaining a diagnosis could be difficult, time-consuming 
and frustrating (Department of Health, 2010). The Autism Act laid a duty on 
government to produce an autism strategy for adults, alongside guidelines for 
local authorities about the identification of those with autism and provision of 
services for the purpose of diagnosing autism in adults (UK Parliament, 2009). 
A similar process has taken place in Scotland (Scottish Parliament, 2010) and 
Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2011). Local authorities, 




adults seeking diagnosis. A key aim of the Autism Strategy was to increase 
capacity around diagnosis throughout the country, and to ensure that relevant 
information is provided to patients at the point of diagnosis to help them 
understand the condition and access local support (Department of Health, 
2010). The resulting NICE guidelines include a model care pathway to inform 
the development of referral and care pathways in local health authorities (NICE, 
2012). An outline of the NICE pathway for adults is at Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: NICE pathway for autism diagnosis for adults 
 
Referral routes to diagnosis for adults tend to come from GPs or mental health 
teams in secondary care and some teams accept self-referrals (National Autistic 
Society, 2016b). Diagnosis is based on the same symptom domains as 
children.  In addition, individuals should present with one or more of the 
following: problems in obtaining or sustaining employment or education; 
difficulties in initiating or sustaining social relationships; previous or current 
contact with mental health or learning disability services; a history of a 
Person aged 18 or over with 
possible ASD
Identification and initial assessment 
(consider using AQ-10)
Comprehensive assessment 
(for complex assessment, consider 
using AAA; ADI-R, ADOS-G, ASDI, 
RAADS-R (no LD); ADOS-G, ADI-R 
(with LD)
Planning care (care plan, risk 




Assessing needs of 
and helping family 
and carers
Assessing 












neurodevelopmental condition (including learning disabilities and Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) or mental disorder (NICE, 2012). 
 
Guidelines recommend a second opinion if there is uncertainty about the 
diagnosis. This might be caused by disagreement within the assessment team 
or between the person/family and the assessment team; lack of local expertise; 
or presence of a complex coexisting condition (NICE, 2012). 
 
The NICE recommended diagnostic pathway incorporates a process by which 
an adult, in any part of England and Wales, presenting for diagnosis has the 
opportunity for a full assessment. The assessment should be undertaken with 
specialist and highly trained clinicians working within a multi-disciplinary team, 
using diagnostic tools based on agreed criteria where appropriate, with the 
support of a family member or other informant. The assessment process should 
commence within three months of an individuals’ referral to the autism team. 
Factors from developmental history, details of past and current conditions and 
relevant documentary evidence should all be taken into account. Importantly, all 
adults receiving a formal diagnosis of autism should be offered a follow-up 
appointment to discuss their support needs and implications of the diagnosis 
(NICE, 2012). 
 
1.5.3 Diagnostic tools 
Classification criteria in DSM-5 and ICD-10 form the basis for the creation of 
screening and diagnostic tools to be used in clinical practice and research. 
Diagnostic tools primarily take the form of structured or semi-structured 
clinician-administered observational frameworks, interviews with 
parents/caregivers or adults seeking diagnosis, or a combination of the two. In 
addition, questionnaires or rating scales are used as screening tools (and can 
also be used in assessment), either administered by or with a clinician, or by the 
parent/caregiver/patient. Screening and diagnostic instruments vary for target 
sample and purpose so it is recommended the most appropriate tool should be 





Because autism is defined as a developmental disorder, assessment 
instruments take into account developmentally-caused behaviour changes 
(Vllasaliu et al., 2016). According to best practice guidelines, diagnostic tools 
should assess social functioning in a developmental context and take into 
account behaviour across a range of settings (Lord and McGee, 2001). 
Diagnostic tools utilise ratings scales based on behavioural symptoms and 
endeavour to make the diagnostic process less subjective in the absence of any 
equivalent definitive biological scales such as those used to measure physical 
conditions, such as blood pressure or temperature. There are a wide range of 
diagnostic tools available and an initial (not comprehensive) search identified 31 
tools specifically designed for autism diagnosis and screening (See Appendix 1: 
Selected Diagnostic and Screening Tools for Autism). 
 
It is recommended that diagnostic tools are not used in isolation and that the 
results of scales should be considered a guide rather than a definitive decision-
making framework (Woolfenden et al., 2011). Indeed, guidelines suggest that 
although tools are useful in gathering information in a structured way, they are 
not essential and should not be used to make or rule out a diagnosis (NICE, 
2011).  
 
Furthermore, tools which utilise parent ratings of behaviour may show different 
results than those administered by a clinician. For example, a study examining 
the use of multiple diagnostic tools found that parents of preschool children with 
good verbal skills were likely to perceive their child’s symptoms, using the ADI-
R, as less severe than clinicians utilising ADOS (Kim and Lord, 2012). This 
suggests that understanding the source of the information assessed, in this 
case, parental assessment, as well as contextual factors such as age, stage of 
development and language level, are extremely important (Huerta and Lord, 
2012). It is therefore considered that the use of multiple tools, especially with 
complex cases, may be particularly useful to increase the possibility of 
diagnostic accuracy (Kim and Lord, 2012). 
 
It is argued that diagnostic tests utilising tools should demonstrate high 




be accurate, and appropriate for all ages and ranges within the spectrum 
(Mayes et al., 2009). A high level of sensitivity means that the test will correctly 
identify patients with the condition (high true positive rate); a high level of 
specificity will enable an ability to correctly detect patients without the condition 
(true negative rate) (Greenhalgh, 1997). Diagnostic tests, even in physical 
health, are rarely 100% accurate (Greenhalgh, 1997). In addition, diagnostic 
tests should demonstrate high validity, meaning that the test should measure 
what it is intended to measure. Diagnostic tests should also be reliable, 
meaning that, over time, they should be able to deliver the same outcome, to an 
acceptable level, on a subject whose condition has not changed (Greenhalgh, 
1997). 
 
A review of diagnostic tools found that the ADOS (Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule), and the ADI-R (Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised) 
demonstrated the highest levels of sensitivity and specificity with the largest 
evidence base (Falkmer et al., 2013). The NICE review found that only ADOS 
and ADI-R met pre-defined levels of accuracy (compared to using criteria in 
DSM-IV and ICD-10) and that evidence for use of tools generally was of low 
quality (National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 
2011). This informs the generally accepted notion that the ADOS and ADI-R 
represent the ‘gold standard’ for autism diagnostic tools (Ozonoff et al., 2005). 
Other tools, such as the 3Di, a computer-aided assessment tool which 
endeavours to produce quantified symptom profiles (Skuse et al., 2004), 
showed high specificity and sensitivity but this was based on only one study and 
is therefore not yet considered the best tool available (Falkmer et al., 2013). In 
addition, some clinicians are uncomfortable with using a computer generated 
tool, even alongside clinical judgement (Clinical Psychiatrist, personal 
communication). Overall, however, evidence for the accuracy and consistency 
of diagnostic tests for autism is low, with either a lack of a wide independent 
evidence base for tools which are currently used in practice (e.g. ASD-DC and 
RAADS) (Falkmer et al., 2013); or the studies available being of low quality 





Use of diagnostic and screening tools requires highly specialised training (Lord 
et al., 1997) and the ADOS kit (includes test materials and 50 protocol booklets) 
costs more than £2000 including VAT (Hogrefe catalogue 2017). ADOS training 
is available only to clinicians or authorised researchers. This means that 
utilising ‘gold standard’ tools demands both training and financial investment 
making them inaccessible to lay people and, as argued by Milton in a 
commentary on ADOS training, not designed to be operated by autistic people 
(Timimi et al., 2019). The attempt to consolidate clinical judgement via 
diagnostic tools – to create an objective, measurable scale equivalent to a 
biological diagnostic test – seems currently to lack evidence of clinical accuracy 
which is likely to be due to the problem of assessing behavioural symptoms in a 
way that avoids subjectivity and interpretive bias (Falkmer et al., 2013).  
 
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
The ADOS is commonly used as the core assessment tool in autism diagnosis 
and therefore is outlined in more detail here. The ADOS is an activity-based 
semi-structured standardised observation tool whereby the person being 
assessed performs a number of communication and interaction tasks, involving 
interactive stimulus materials, for example, using objects to build a story. The 
person is then scored on a range of behaviours such as emphatic or emotional 
gestures and overall quality of rapport. There are five modules in ADOS-2 which 
are used in assessment for different ages and abilities, from toddlers to adults. 
As an example of the range of tasks, I have outlined the tasks in ADOS Module 




1. Construction task*:  
2. Telling a story from a book:  
3. Description of a picture* 
4. Conversation and reporting 
5. Current work or school* 
6. Social difficulties and annoyance 
7. Emotions 




10. Break (observed) 
11. Daily living* 
12. Friends, relationships and marriage 
13. Loneliness 
14. Plans and hopes 









ADOS facilitates the coding of behaviours related to language and 
communication, reciprocal social interaction, imagination, stereotyped 
behaviours and restricted interests as well as ‘other abnormal behaviours’. 
These are rated between 0 (no evidence of abnormality related to autism) and 3 
(definite evidence) (Vllasaliu et al., 2016). Assessment takes between 40 and 
60 minutes to administer although in practice this can take longer. The coding 




A. Language & 
Communication 
A1 Overall level of non-echoed 
spoken language 
A2 Speech abnormalities 
associated with autism 
A3 Immediate echolalia 
A4 Stereotyped/idiosyncratic 
use of words or phrases 
A5 Offers information 
A6 Asks for information 
A7 Reporting of events 
A8 Conversation  
A9 Descriptive, conventional, 
instrumental or informational 
gestures 
A10 Emphatic or emotional 
gestures 
B. Reciprocal social interaction 
B1 Unusual eye contact 
B2 Facial expression directed to 
examiner 
B3 Language production and 
linked nonverbal communication 
B4 Shared enjoyment in 
interaction 
B5 Communication of own affect 
B6 Comments on others’ 
emotions/empathy 
B7 Insight into typical social 
situations and relationships 
B8 Responsibility  
B9 Quality of social overtures 
B10 Amount of social 
overtures/maintenance of 
attention 
B11 Quality of social response 
B12 Amount of reciprocal social 
communication 
B13 Overall quality of rapport 
 
C. Imagination 
C1 Imagination/creativity  
 
D. Stereotyped behaviours 
and restricted interests 
D1 Unusual sensory interest in 
play material/person 
D2 Hand and finger and other 
complex mannerisms 
D3 Self-injurious behaviour 
D4 Excessive interest in or 
references to unusual or highly 
specific topics or repetitive 
behaviours 
D5 Compulsions or rituals 
 




E3 Tantrums, aggression, 
negative or disruptive 
behaviour 
 
Table 5: Coding groups for ADOS module 4 (adult and adolescent) 
 
Whilst the ADOS is considered to be a gold standard tool in research and 
clinical practice, some scholars have criticised it, arguing that the tool lacks 
transparency, and observing that context, emotion, and differences in 
interpretation and power imbalances play an unidentified role in the assessment 






1.6 Concluding comments 
 
To conclude, autism is defined by behaviours, reinterpreted as symptoms, and 
is therefore particularly interesting for considering as a case study to explore 
diagnosis. As I have outlined above, there are a number of ongoing debates 
around aetiology, heritability and the usefulness of the diagnostic classification.  
 
A symptom is generally regarded as an indicator of a disease or disorder and 
one that is reported by the individual coming for diagnosis. However, in autism, 
behaviour itself constitutes the symptom of the condition. And yet behaviour is 
something we all engage in every day: the boundaries between typical and 
atypical behaviour is subject to a wide range of social factors embedded in 
context, culture, setting, interaction, interpretations and relationships. As I shall 
explore, interpretation of behaviours as symptoms (i.e. as pathological) is core 
to diagnosis of autism. This chapter has demonstrated both our contemporary 
understanding of what autism is – our ontological understanding – as well as 
how we know it through identification and classification – its epistemological 
framework. Ontological and epistemological understandings inform each other 
and are of their time in that we can only ‘know’ and reflect on knowing through 
our contemporary understandings. Looking at psychiatric diagnoses more 
broadly, Whooley (2019) argues that a general inability of the psychiatric 
profession to pin down the essence of mental distress – what psychiatric 
disorders really are – means that ontological assumptions are only temporary. 
Shifts in knowledge and understanding can be seen through changing labels 
and classifications. Ontological and epistemological elements are self-
reinforcing in that how one conceives a disorder shapes how we investigate it; 
and how we investigate a disorder shapes the object itself (Whooley, 2019). I 



















CHAPTER TWO: Social Framing of Diagnosis 
 
 
…diagnoses have become part of how we make sense of ourselves, 
 each other, and the world 
 













2.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework for the thesis which is sited 
within a sociology of diagnosis framework. I introduce a social model of 
diagnosis as outlined by Jutel (2011) incorporating diagnosis as process, 
category and the consequences of diagnosis. I will consider three studies in 
conditions other than autism to explore diagnosis as categorisation. I then 
consider one aspect of diagnosis-as-process: socio-demographic factors in 
diagnosis, which impact on who comes to the clinic for assessment. I will also 
consider the consequences of diagnosis specifically in relation to stigma. The 




2.2 Sociology of diagnosis 
 
In 1978 Blaxter asserted that diagnosis, as a subject for sociological interest, 
was not studied as much as it might be, despite its centrality to the practice of 
medicine (Blaxter, 1978). She discussed the concept of diagnosis as a 
category, a way in which collections of symptoms are collected into diseases 
and used for classification; and also as a process, the act of diagnosing 
undertaken by clinicians and all that entails. She described these two factors as 
inextricably linked: diagnosis-as-process being dependent on the categories 
created within which the process happens; but categorisation being the result of 
the process of diagnosis itself (Blaxter, 1978).  
 
Building on this work, and the work of Brown (1995, 1990), Jutel and Nettleton 
called for a sociology of diagnosis (Jutel, 2009; Jutel and Nettleton, 2011) which 
pushed for acknowledgement and development of this sub-disciplinary field 
within the wider discipline of medical sociology. This call, which was extended in 
further work undertaken by Jutel (see, for example, Jutel, 2011, 2015, 2016, 
2019), revisited diagnosis as a powerful social tool, considering its social 
framing, its place in the institution of medicine and, ultimately, the way in which 




rubric to Blaxter’s process and category: that of ‘consequences of diagnosis’, 
acknowledging that diagnosis has consequences for those to whom it is 
applied, including stigmatisation and blame, vindication and legitimation, 
facilitation of access to resources as well as limitations in opportunity (Jutel and 
Nettleton, 2011). 
 
Jutel describes the ways in which diagnosis shapes, and is shaped by, society. 
She argues that diagnosis creates social order by organising illness, enabling 
access to support and resources, and by bestowing permission on the individual 
to be ill and to assume a sick role (Jutel, 2009). Importantly, diagnosis provides, 
through classification, the framework in society which judges what is normal and 
what is pathological and triggers the process by which that behaviour is treated. 
It confers authority to the medical profession and ‘sets the doctor apart’ (Jutel, 
2009, p. 279) from lay people. It has been argued that the patient-doctor 
relationship has shifted with greater lay knowledge available through 
technology, increased information and greater patient-doctor consultation 
leading to individuals becoming highly knowledgeable lay experts (see Epstein, 
1995; Hardey, 1999). However, the final judgement remains with the doctor 
alone (Jutel, 2011). 
 
In Chapter One I asked the question ‘what is diagnosis?’ which, in medical 
terms, can appear to be a linear process of identifying signs and symptoms. 
This medical model for understanding, diagnosing, managing and treating 
disease and disorder, is dominant in Western society (Latimer, 2013). 
Examining psychiatric diagnosis, Rose (2013) outlines at least ten functions of 
diagnosis which broaden this definition and incorporate a number of social 
factors which are meaningful for different actors. For patients, diagnosis can 
have the function of eligibility for treatment, insurability, legitimising absence 
from work, or allocation of educational support or funding, for example. For 
lawyers, diagnosis can be a condition for involuntary detention and treatment. 
For epidemiologists, diagnostic categories provide the basis of estimates of 
prevalence and predictions for the future. For funders of research, diagnosis 
can serve to highlight a problem that is worthy of research. For commercial 




drugs. Diagnosis can also be the basis for social mobilisation with charities, 
support groups and activists lobbying for services and research based on a 
specific diagnosis (Rose, 2013). In summary, therefore, diagnosis is entrenched 
in the infrastructure and functioning of wider society. Rather than relying on 
diagnostic categories which, he argues, are arbitrary and constructed 
(Rosenberg, 2006), Rose argues that research and treatment should begin with 
the experience and difficulties of the individual and what types of support would 
mitigate them (Rose, 2013). I shall consider this idea further in Chapter Ten. 
 
 
2.3 Jutel’s social model of diagnosis 
 
Jutel’s (2011) social model of diagnosis demonstrates the interaction between 
how disease is categorised (social framing), the social consequences of 
diagnosis and the process of diagnosis represented by the clinician-doctor 
relationship (see Figure 4). Jutel draws from Aronowitz’s (2008) definition of 
‘social framing’ of diagnosis, as the way that societies generally ‘recognise, 





Figure 4: Jutel's social model of diagnosis 
(Jutel, 2011) 
 
Jutel’s model frames diagnosis as an integrated social system whereby each of 
these three concepts - category, consequence and process – serve to frame 




As Jutel describes, there is a circular relationship between the two parts of her 
original model, with ‘diagnostic categories shaped by the consequences they 
entail, and the consequences shaped by the categories imposed’ (Jutel, 2019, 
p. 3621). The social framing of diagnosis – how the category of a disease or 
disorder is created, shaped and revised – is rooted in contemporary versions of 
utilised classification systems and the historical, cultural and social events that 
inform them (Jutel, 2011). Social framing includes the way in which we carve up 
understanding of ‘symptoms’ or behaviours to construct one disease category 
or another (Jutel, 2019). The category (or social framing) of diagnosis also 
encompasses how risk profiles and surveillance systems contribute to blurring 
the boundaries between ‘normal’ and pathological (Armstrong, 1995), as well as 
the development of diagnostic technologies and their contribution to redefining 
conditions (Jutel, 2019).  
 
Social consequences include legitimisation of the patient’s distress, 
stigmatization as the result of a diagnostic label, exploitation by commercial 
interests such as drug companies, or allocation of resources or support. These 
consequences inform how we understand a condition and how it is diagnosed, 
thereby contributing to the iterative and developing understanding of disease 
categories (Jutel, 2011). Diagnosis is particular to the value and technologies of 
its time, and, in the clinic, is subject to practices and processes of debate and 
adjudication between different forms of evidence (Latimer, 2013). It is, however, 
presented as a reflection of the natural, as if it is 'validating a reality' (Jutel, 
2009). 
 
At the centre of Jutel’s model is the relationship between the clinician (MD) and 
the patient (PT) – the process of diagnosis. I use a simplified version of this 
three-part model in Section 2.8 to review autism separately as a category, 
process and as a consequence. The ‘diagnosis as process’ aspect of the model 
is explored further in Chapter Four where I examine clinician interaction in team 






2.4 Lumping and splitting 
 
Jutel’s vision of a sociology of diagnosis builds on Blaxter’s notion of diagnosis 
as a category and a process; both the way that a collection of symptoms 
becomes a disease or disorder but also a method, the judgement by which 
individuals are labelled with the designated category (Jutel, 2009). Considering 
how symptoms are lumped together or split apart (Zerubavel, 1996) and how 
this changes over time, enables an examination of the way in which disease 
and disorder are ‘of our time’: some classifications no longer exist as medical 
entities and others are likely to change again in the future (Jutel, 2009). Jutel 
uses examples of witchcraft, homosexuality and drapetomania  – the tendency 
of slaves to try to escape – to illustrate the former; and surmises that conditions 
such as erectile disfunction and excited delirium may well follow suit in the 
future (Jutel, 2009). She argues that ‘disease entities’ are framed by and then, 
in turn, frame social and cultural values around our understanding of health, 
illness, normal and pathological behaviour and symptoms (Jutel, 2009).  
 
There is a great deal at stake in the construction of disease entities and the 
decisions around which ones are validated as disease entities through the 
medical gaze. As diagnosis can both validate and offer practical support post-
diagnosis, the struggle for legitimisation through diagnostic labelling can be 
fraught and contentious. This is reflected, for example, in the battle to retain the 
diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome (AS), by those who have the label (Giles, 
2014; Singh, 2011) and in the struggle for acknowledgment of stigmatised 
conditions such as HIV/Aids (Parker and Aggleton, 2003). It is also an ongoing 
dispute in the emergence of contested or medically-unexplained illnesses (see, 
for example, Armentor, 2017; Dumit, 2006; Shriver and Waskul, 2006). The 
impact of a label on an individual can be life-changing.  
 
Blaxter argues that diagnostic categories can be viewed as a ‘museum of past 
and present concepts of the nature of disease’ (Blaxter, 1978, p. 10). 
Categorisations emerge from, in different eras, the conflation of the symptom 
and the disease, the site of the disease, and, in the twentieth century, the 




Syndrome as a ‘chromosome abnormality’ (Blaxter, 1978). This does not 
change the ‘nature’ of the condition, but can contribute to a conceptual shift in 
how we understand a condition, or how we configure a number of symptoms 
into a disease entity, and therefore how we approach its diagnosis, treatment 
and prognosis. 
 
To understand this better, it is necessary to look further at some specific 
conditions in relation to diagnosis as a category, process and consequence.  
 
 
2.5 Diagnosis in practice: classification (diagnosis-as-category) 
 
Standard medical texts tend to present the diagnostic process as a way to 
identify underlying pathology from signs and symptoms located in the body (e.g. 
Langlois, 2002), however there are a growing number of studies which 
challenge this assumption (e.g. Gardner et al., 2011; Jutel, 2013; North, 2015; 
Willig, 2011). There is some overlap between a general sociology of health and 
illness which has not specifically excluded the matter of diagnosis, however, 
here I focus on three studies in conditions other than autism, which make 
specific relevant points about diagnosis. I will go on to discuss the concept of 
diagnosis-as-category as it relates to autism in Section 2.8.2. 
 
Halpin’s study of Huntingdon’s Disease (HD) demonstrates how classifications 
are not just theory-based or as Bowker and Star suggest ‘properties of mind’; 
rather they have a ‘material force in the world’, with consequences (Bowker and 
Star, 1999, p. 39). Halpin undertook interviews with people diagnosed with HD, 
recognised as a neurological condition but which has frequently been 
misdiagnosed as a psychiatric illness (Halpin, 2011). Halpin argues that the 
conceptualisation of HD within a diagnostic schema designed around 
psychiatric illness highlights ambiguities between neurology and psychiatry 
which has consequences for those who might be misdiagnosed. Misdiagnosis 
because of these ‘interdisciplinary ambiguities’ based on ‘epistemological 
divides’ has led to incorrect treatment, confusion and grief for those diagnosed, 




2011, pp. 859, 864). Halpin’s study illustrates the construction of diagnostic 
schemas which may differ between disciplines, and provides an important 
analysis, tied to Jutel’s focus on consequence, of the impact of allocating 
individuals to diagnostic categories that do not accurately reflect their condition. 
He notes how each gaze (neurological and psychiatric) looks deeply but 
partially: the former focusing on structural damage, the latter on changes in 
mood or personality. Halpin concludes by suggesting a more comprehensive 
diagnostic tool may alleviate the real distress caused by misdiagnosis (Halpin, 
2011).  
 
Whilst Halpin’s analysis is a powerful illustration of Jutel’s argument around the 
consequences of diagnosis when classifications are considered from different 
disciplines, it does little to challenge the reality of the diagnostic categories 
themselves. Other studies examine conditions within which genetic 
explanations play a role in classification. Focussing on how classification 
systems are represented in medical and scientific texts, Hedgecoe examined 
the way in which the boundaries of the disease Cystic Fibrosis (CF) have 
expanded to include previously neighbouring, but separate, conditions 
(Hedgecoe, 2003). Importantly, he argues that the use of genetic explanations 
does not alleviate uncertainty in diagnosis, indeed it can increase diagnostic 
uncertainty in some cases because of a conflict with the diagnostic practice of 
clinicians (Hedgecoe, 2003). Through this example Hedgecoe claims, in 
contrast to Halpin’s argument, that tests which are intended to provide more 
definitive evidence do not absolve us from social decision-making in diagnosis. 
He argues that the introduction of genetic testing in this field highlighted, rather 
than removed, social decisions from the process of classification (Hedgecoe, 
2003). Hedgecoe’s argument concurs with other views that a reliance on 
genetic markers as objective proof of disease is inappropriate, rather, the 
meaning and relevance of biomedical entities must be addressed (Rabeharisoa 
and Bourret, 2009). Hedgecoe’s study, in contrast to Halpin’s, does not consider 
the development of more accurate tools as the answer to diagnostic uncertainty, 
or misdiagnosis. Rather, it challenges the construction of categories in the first 
place by demonstrating that they are socially constructed and therefore open to 




If disease categories are constructed, what are some of the drivers of change? 
It is argued that particular sets of historical and social circumstances shape the 
creation and development of diagnostic categories (Eyal et al., 2010; Latimer, 
2013; Mol, 2002; Nadesan, 2013) which can involve an interaction between, for 
example, changes in legislation (for example, see Eyal, 2013; UK Parliament, 
2009); the work of advocacy and activist groups (for example, see Epstein, 
1995; Singh, 2011); increased access to specific genetic technologies (Latimer, 
2013; Navon and Eyal, 2016; Rabeharisoa and Bourret, 2009); and changes in 
institutional structures and understandings (Nadesan, 2013). In particular there 
is a strong argument for the influence of commercial and political concerns 
which may produce ‘technological catalysts’ such as the development of 
population screening programmes (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2014), for 
example. Commercial concerns can also drive the promotion of self-diagnostic 
‘tools’ (Ebeling, 2011) and, most strikingly, the creation of ‘new’ disease entities 
for commercial gain (Moynihan et al., 2002). Some researchers argue that as a 
condition becomes a ‘discrete ontological entity’, that is, becomes a ‘thing’, it is 
open to commodification (Mallett and Runswick-Cole, 2016). Mallett and 
Runswick-Cole (2016) argue, for example, that the marketing and sale of 
diagnostic tools contributes further to the reification of the condition by fulfilling   
the need for differentiation, training and treatment programmes, scientific and 
academic conferences and published research.  
 
The condition of ‘female sexual dysfunction’ (FSD), it is argued, is entirely 
constructed to enable drug companies to profit from its treatment (Moynihan, 
2003). Moynihan and others argue that, in order to build a market for a 
medication, a disease entity has to be established. The marketisation of illness 
is extremely lucrative: the prescription of Viagra for the condition of erectile 
dysfunction provided the main drug companies with reported sales of upwards 
of $1bn each (Moynihan, 2003). The drive to construct a ‘new category of 
illness’ of FSD involved meetings of selected attendees primarily funded by 
pharmaceutical companies who therefore had a financial or reputational stake in 
the development of a new disease entity (Moynihan, 2003). This marketisation 
was based on a study which concluded that 43% of women experienced FSD 




conclusions were inadequate. Nevertheless, this figure is widely quoted in 
articles about the newly-termed condition (for example see, Allahdadi et al., 
2009; Berman et al., 1999) thereby iteratively contributing to cementing an 
understanding of what ‘FSD’ ‘is’. 
 
These examples illustrate just three important debates that challenge diagnostic 
classification. The examples illustrate how the creation of conditions can be 
driven, not by biomedical advances but by commercial interests. In addition, 
these examples reveal how different medical disciplines can project a different 
kind of gaze and therefore interpretation of symptoms, which can impact on the 
diagnostic category allocated. The examples above also demonstrate how 
technological developments such as in the development of diagnostic tools or 
genetic testing does not increase the certainty of diagnosis, rather it can raise 
further questions around meaning and relevance. Diagnostic categories, 
therefore, are transformed by social forces and in turn transform society.  
 
 
2.6 Diagnosis in practice: who gets assessed? (diagnosis-as-process) 
 
One element of the process of diagnosis is the question of who is able to 
present to the clinic in the first instance, and be available for assessment. 
Across the world, social factors such as employment conditions, social 
exclusion, gender inequality, poverty and unequal health systems are at the root 
of gross inequalities in health (Marmot, 2005; WHO, 2017). Between countries 
there are huge differences in life expectancy, for example: in Sierra Leone life 
expectancy at birth is 34, in Japan it is 81.9 (WHO, 2004). Within the USA, 
there is a 20 year life expectancy gap between the most and least 
disadvantaged people (Murray et al., 1998). There is a large literature on social 
inequality in health which space does not permit me to discuss in detail. 
However, the concept of the ‘inverse care law’ (Tudor Hart, 1971) is a useful 
one for considering social demographic factors in diagnosis.  
 
The inverse care law proposes that the availability of effective medical care 




concept, therefore, suggests that those people who live in socio-economically 
deprived environments are less likely to be able to access the health provision 
they require. The inverse care law is reflected in lower levels of resources and 
provision in such areas and may even influence how clinicians perceive the 
relationship of the symptoms to the environment. This may lead to a sense that 
the condition (or the behaviours attached to the condition) is insoluble, as found 
in the case of depression in an interview study in north-west England (Chew-
Graham et al., 2002). One study examining data from the US and Puerto Rico 
found that lack of access to mental healthcare resources despite evidence of 
psychopathology, was linked with economic disadvantage (including not being 
covered by health insurance) and parent psychopathology (Flisher et al., 1997). 
The authors conclude that access could be improved by better information for 
parents about accessing mental health services as well enabling access for 
children and young people independent of their families (Flisher et al., 1997). 
 
Research exploring ADHD diagnosis using a ‘pathways to care’ model 
(Goldberg and Huxley, 1980; Huxley, 1996) found that parents were the main 
‘gatekeepers’ to accessing specialist services for their children with ADHD 
(Sayal et al., 2002). Goldberg and Huxley’s model suggests a framework 
through which patients pass from primary care to access specialist mental 
health care providers (Goldberg, 1995), with patients traversing four ‘filters’ in 
order to access treatment (See Figure 5).  
 
The first of those filters is whether the patient presents at a GP surgery in the 
first instance. The second filter concerns GP recognition and referral through 
the pathway, which is reliant both on local resources and clinician expertise. By 
examining data for children who had passed through filter one and two with 
those who had not, researchers found that parental perception of the child’s 
behaviour as problematic determined whether they attended primary care in the 
first instance, providing the most important access barrier (filter 1). Child 
conduct, however, was important in clinician identification, and GP non-
recognition (filter 2) was the main barrier to accessing specialist services (filter 
3). (Sayal et al., 2002). This suggests that an interaction of parent, child and GP 




care for ADHD. There are therefore a number of ‘gatekeepers’ related to access 
which can include parents, health and education professionals as well as 
access to local resources. I will consider socio-economic factors in relation to 
autism in Section 2.8.3. 
 
Filter 1: The decision to consult (illness behaviour) 
Filter 2: GP recognition (ability to detect disorder) 
Filter 3: The decision to refer (referral to mental health services) 
Filter 4: Admission to psychiatric hospital/services 
 




2.7 Diagnosis in practice: stigmatisation (consequence of diagnosis) 
 
The social context of a disorder can shape the way in which individuals labelled 
with a condition live their lives. This section takes one aspect of this –
stigmatisation – and considers it as a consequence of diagnosis. The 
consequences of diagnosis can be both positive and negative and I consider 
this in relation to autism in Section 2.8.4. Being seen as someone who is 
associated with mental ill health is to hold a stigmatised identity, with 
implications for our relationships, experience of work, education, medical 
treatment and other fundamental aspects of daily life. Goffman’s classic work on 
stigma suggests that the presence of a stigmatised identity can provoke others 
(‘normal’ people) to turn away from the stigmatised individual with the impact 
that the person feels devalued and rejected. This reaction from others 
contributes to the ‘spoiling’ of ‘normal’ identity (Goffman, 1963).  
 
Whilst responses to stigma vary, possession of this spoiled identity can impact 
negatively on an individual’s behaviour and health. For example, when an 
individual perceives that their identity is socially devalued or tainted because of 
their attributes related to a particular stigmatised group, their responses to this 




mechanisms) and involuntary (e.g. anxiety, increased vigilance). Individual 
responses can impact on health, academic achievement and self-esteem (Major 
and O ’Brien, 2005). This complex relationship to one’s personal and social 
identity, therefore, can determine how and whether one seeks diagnosis in the 
first place; and how one copes with diagnosis of a stigmatised condition if it is 
given. 
 
Being stigmatised, therefore, contributes to how our identities are shaped and 
understood, and this impacts both on how clinicians see a condition and the 
social implications of diagnosis – clinicians do not sit outside society’s shared 
understanding of the world – as well as how individuals, parents and families 
perceive the value or otherwise or seeking and receiving a diagnosis. What 
seems personal, located in the body and intimate is actually regulated, shaped 
and informed by society’s creation of the science of psychology and the 
meaning it brings (Rose, 1999). This impacts on what diagnosis means in 
different times for different conditions, how we value and devalue these different 
diagnoses and why we might substitute one for another over time.  
 
 
2.8 The social framing of autism diagnosis  
 
2.8.1 Introduction 
This section will consider how the sociology of diagnosis framework can be 
applied to autism diagnosis in particular. As above it will use an organising 
framework comprising the three rubrics of process, category and consequence. 
However, as will be seen, these three concepts cannot be separated as each 
iteratively impact on the others.  
 
Nadesan’s (2005) social study on the identification, interpretation and treatment 
of autism explores how autism as an ‘interactive kind’ (Hacking, 2000) is 
produced in relation to historical conditions and interpretative frameworks. 
Nadesan argues that there was a particular set of historical conditions which 
enabled the identification of autism in the 1940s. These conditions related to a 




social surveillance of children and the emergence of ‘childhood’ as a research 
focus resulting from nineteenth century social, political and cultural 
developments (Nadesan, 2005: 27). Nadesan argues that a particular culturally 
and historically situated set of understandings have developed from the 
institutional frameworks of ‘knowledge, practice and identities’ (Nadesan, 2005, 
p. 210) as well as the appropriation of and resistance to these identities and 
dominant discourses, by those who identify as autistic. These include the 
development of social conditions to enable children to be monitored, identified 
and labelled, such as mass public schooling and the growth of child psychiatry 
and psychology. She argues that changes in the built environment might have 
contributed to what we conceptualise as autism symptoms and that the 
emerging fields of psychoanalysis and medical models of disease have 
produced a framework for understanding behaviours which ‘render intelligible’ 
autistic symptoms (Nadesan, 2005, p. 184). These emerging fields have 
enabled the production of a set of knowledges to understand particular 
behaviours in specific (medicalised) ways.  
 
Drawing from Hacking, she argues that these particular conditions led to the 
development of a ‘niche disorder’ (Nadesan, 2005, p. 184) of autism, that is, 
one that is only possible due to specific historical, economic, cultural and social 
developments of the time. This enabled the construction of autism as a 
condition and as a social construct for defining the normal and the pathological. 
Nadesan argues that this does not negate the possibility that the biomedical 
conditions that gave rise to autism did not exist prior to this, but that the 
‘conditions of possibility’ (Nadesan, 2005, p. 184) for naming and framing the 
condition were socially and historically specific to this time. In summary, 
Nadesan argues that no fixed, conclusive or universal ‘truth’ about autism as a 
biological or psychological entity can be located, rather autism is produced 
through a particular set of historically specific social conditions and practices. 
Nadesan’s work illustrates the interaction of process, category and 
consequence in diagnosis, not as a linear or static relationship, but one in which 
active agents, both social and individual, shape and are shaped by the 





I will discuss how different understandings of the condition of autism are 
understood in Chapter Three. However, it is important to mention here the 
influential and important body of work that is termed ‘critical autism studies’ (see 
Kapp, 2019; O’Dell et al., 2016; Orsini and Davidson, 2013). A critical approach 
to what constitutes autism is driven by a neurodiversity movement which aims 
to develop new analytical frameworks for studying both the nature and culture of 
autism, to challenge power relations that shape the field of autism and support 
enabling narratives of autism that challenge existing deficit-focussed 
constructions (Orsini and Davidson, 2013). These newly emerging activist-
focussed definitions of autism are in turn influencing contemporary 
understandings of the condition.  
  
2.8.2 Autism: Diagnosis-as-category 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the heterogeneous nature of autism 
symptoms. People who qualify for diagnosis range from those who are severely 
affected, may have an intellectual disability, and meet DSM (APA, 2013a) 
specifiers of ‘requiring very substantial support’; to those who require less 
support and are often diagnosed in adulthood. Aetiology is uncertain and 
approximately 70% of people who are diagnosed are considered to meet criteria 
for at least one other psychiatric condition (NICE, 2011). All of these factors 
problematise the practice of fitting people within a diagnostic box. Importantly, 
as I have outlined, diagnostic rates for autism have increased greatly and it has 
been argued that a key contributor to this increase has been a result of the 
reclassification of autism as a spectrum in DSM-5 (APA, 2013a) and the 
broadening of diagnostic criteria (Russell et al., 2015; Rutter, 2005). Russell 
(2014) argues that this reclassification has resulted in the inclusion of less 
severe cases in the category of autism, thereby increasing diagnostic rates.  
 
Some researchers go further and argue that it is precisely the expansion of the 
category of autism, without corresponding evidence, that has created a ‘false 
epidemic’ of autism (Frances, 2010). Others argue that autism as a category is 
neither scientifically accurate nor clinically useful with its heterogeneity, in 
particular, having no prognostic value (Timimi and McCabe, 2016a). The 




classification is about how autism is constructed and conceptualised rather than 
through scientific knowledge (Timimi and McCabe, 2016a). There is also a 
challenge to the presumed standardisation of tools such as the ADOS, given 
the interactional nature of the assessment: the assessor cannot help but 
influence behaviour by the actions they take, or do not take (Timimi and 
McCabe, 2016b).  
 
Diagnostic substitution 
Shattuck argues that the expansion of the category of autism can be identified 
in prevalence estimates (Shattuck, 2006). His study of data on the prevalence 
of disabilities among children in US special schools found that the growing 
apparent prevalence in autism (from 0.6 to 3.1 per 1000 from 1994 to 2003) 
increased with corresponding declines in categories for ‘mental retardation’ 
(MR) and learning disabilities (LD) (declining by 2.8 and 8.3 per 1000 
respectively in the same period) (Shattuck, 2006). Higher autism prevalence 
was therefore significantly associated with corresponding declines in prevalence 
of LD and MR. Shattuck argues that this represents a process of ‘diagnostic 
substitution’, which can skew prevalence figures (Shattuck, 2006). Other studies 
have identified that people who are currently diagnosed with autism would, in 
the past, have been diagnosed with MR, now intellectual disability (ID) (Coo et 
al., 2008; King and Bearman, 2009). For example, a Canadian study examining 
special education codes suggested that diagnostic substitution accounted for 
over a third of the increase in autism diagnosis in British Columbia between 
1996 and 2004 (Coo et al., 2008).  
 
One study identified that more than one quarter of those diagnosed with autism 
in California between 1992 and 2005 would previously have been diagnosed 
with MR (King and Bearman, 2009). Researchers note that the majority of the 
increased diagnoses can be seen at the ‘tail’ ends of the spectrum of autism 
symptoms – what is considered’ low’ and ‘high’ functioning (Liu et al., 2010a). 
According to this research, increasing heterogeneity of symptoms and 
diagnostic expansion to include ‘milder’ symptoms has increased diagnosis, and 




MR/ID. At the less severe end of the spectrum, diagnostic symptoms overlap 
with other learning disorders, leading to diagnostic ambiguity (Liu et al., 2010a). 
  
The change in how we name these conditions does, in itself, tell a story of how 
social processes interact – including those of social activism – to produce a 
category label deemed appropriate to contemporary thinking around value, 
stigma and personhood. It is unacceptable now to talk about ‘retardation’ – 
indeed, it is generally considered offensive. The assertion of the disability rights 
movement and other social activist movements to the right to define their own 
identities has changed both the label and the stigma attached to it and, 
consequently, the social implications of diagnosis. I consider autism in relation 
to stigmatisation further in Section 2.8.4. 
 
2.8.3 Autism: Diagnosis-as-process 
 
Accessing autism assessment 
There are barriers to accessing healthcare support in autism. For example, 
parents or families may not perceive their difficulties as problematic or health 
related (Sayal et al., 2002). It may be that certain groups have poorer access to 
information about the condition or fewer opportunities to seek diagnosis. 
Studies show that children from socially disadvantaged groups are diagnosed 
later than more socially advantaged groups (Baird et al., 2006). In the US, black 
children tend to be identified with autism later than white children (Mandell and 
Palmer, 2005). Alternatively, there may be different perceptions of the stigma 
attached to the label or perceived necessity for diagnosis, leading to a greater 
reluctance to enter into the diagnostic process. Popular archetypes attached to 
the condition of autism (such as it being a male condition, and one linked with 
particular types of male interests) also shape how families and clinicians may 
perceive the behaviours of an individual. Such social and demographic factors, 
therefore, may wield an influence at every stage of diagnosis. 
 
Prior to diagnosis, therefore, social factors can determine who comes forward 
for diagnosis and who is referred for further assessment. In autism, Russell and 




barriers to assessment. The authors outline how identifying differences between 
access barriers (socially determined factors) and risk factors, which may 
predispose individuals to develop a condition, is necessary to understand 
access barriers. Working with a longitudinal UK cohort study, therefore, the 
authors differentiated children with a diagnosis, from those who had clinical 
traits at diagnostic level, but had not been formally diagnosed. Russell and 
colleagues found that, with the severity of autistic traits held constant, younger 
mothers and mothers of first-born children were significantly less likely to have 
children diagnosed with autism (Russell et al., 2011). This may be due to older 
mothers being better at identifying their child’s difficulties. Lack of diagnosis was 
linked with maternal depression, which may mean that a depressed mother is 
unable to seek help for their child, or that a GP attributes her concerns to 
depression (Russell et al., 2011). Young motherhood and depression in 
motherhood may, therefore, be access barriers to seeking support for a child 
with difficulties. In other conditions, similar social factors can be observed, for 
example, a study examining late stage diagnosis of breast and cervical cancer 
found that age, class and cultural background were factors in late stage 
diagnosis (Mandelblatt et al., 1991).  
 
Finally Russell et al’s (2011) study found that boys were more likely to receive a 
diagnosis than girls (Russell et al., 2011). Whilst it is generally understood that 
more boys are considered autistic than girls (Rutter, 2005), with severity of 
autistic traits held constant, Russell and colleagues found that there is an 
additional bias towards male identification. This study suggests that social as 
well as biological factors can influence whether children are brought to the clinic 
(Russell et al., 2011). 
 
Socio-demographic factors and autism 
There is a strong positive association between socioeconomic status (SES) and 
autism diagnosis in the US, with higher SES and parental education linked to 
increased likelihood of diagnosis (King and Bearman, 2011; Liu et al., 2010a). 
However, it has been shown that in the UK and in Denmark, the reverse is 
found, with lower SES associated with increased diagnosis (Russell et al., 




insurance is required to access services, there may be a barrier to access for 
poorer families, but wealthier parents have resources and the education to 
pursue an assessment. In the UK where healthcare is free at the point on entry, 
poorer families can access services when required. A French study also found 
that autism with ID is more likely to be diagnosed in areas of high levels of 
deprivation (Delobel-Ayoub et al., 2015). These contrary findings suggest both 
cultural and economic differences in the social framework for autism diagnosis. 
 
King and Bearman explored why autism prevalence is uneven across different 
communities by looking at socially salient community characteristics (King and 
Bearman, 2011). Working with California birth cohorts from 1992 through to 
2000, they found that communities have different effects on different individuals 
at different times in relation to levels of diagnosis (King and Bearman, 2011). 
Importantly, they found that higher levels of education and SES were 
consistently linked with higher levels of diagnosis, reasoning that this is driven 
by knowledge or information diffusion in wealthier and highly educated 
communities (King and Bearman, 2011). 
 
A further study on California data found that there was a strong link between 
clusters of diagnosed children and the availability of diagnostic resources, 
measured as SES (as a proxy for good local resources and health related 
information), paediatrician density, government spending and advocacy 
organisation density (Mazumdar et al., 2013). This included the finding that 
children moving into a neighbourhood with more diagnostic resources than their 
previous neighbourhood were then more likely to receive a diagnosis than 
children whose neighbourhood does not change (Mazumdar et al., 2013). 
These findings highlight the important role of resources in autism diagnosis, 
demonstrating that diagnostic resources in a neighbourhood have an 
independent effect on autism incidence, although the study does not reject 
outright the potential role of toxicants, for example, in additionally driving 
prevalence (Mazumdar et al., 2013). Furthermore, it might also be argued that 
knowledge obtained via social clustering may enable a parent who desires 
diagnosis for their child to prepare an ‘expert’ case in how their child fits the 




‘perform’ the condition, which has no biomarkers, could be a significant factor in 
the diagnostic decision.     
 
Awareness of autism, access to resources and information diffusion 
Leonard and colleagues (2010) reviewed a number of socio-cultural factors –
related to infrastructure, relationships, local services and socioeconomic 
disparities – which are linked with autism diagnosis. The authors suggest that 
increased awareness of autism has led to shorter pathways and diagnosis at a 
younger age (Prior, 2003; Wing and Potter, 2002). Other studies have shown 
that rates of diagnosis are linked with the number of paediatricians in a 
geographical area in both the US (Mandell and Palmer, 2005) and the UK 
(Howlin and Asgharian, 1999) although this may also be related to socio-
economic factors (local resources). 
 
Diagnosis of autism in children can lead to access to services and funding 
which may not be available to children with other types of disabilities, including 
intellectual disabilities (Caronna, 2003). In some countries or regions, for 
example, some US states, access to support is dependent on diagnosis 
(Barbaresi et al., 2005; Leonard et al., 2010; Ruble et al., 2005). One study from 
Australia showed that, in borderline cases, clinicians may ‘upgrade’ to a 
diagnosis of autism if they believed it would enable access to appropriate 
support (Skellern et al., 2005) (See Section 2.8.4). 
 
Liu and colleagues (2010a) identified that geographical proximity to others with 
a diagnosis can increase diagnosis rates through ‘information diffusion’. The 
authors used a longitudinal data set from California and examined geographical 
information of children between the ages of two and six over five years from 
2000 to 2005. They then matched this with data of every child diagnosed with 
autism over that period to examine whether proximity to a child with autism 
affected the likelihood of being subsequently diagnosed with autism (Liu et al., 
2010a). The researchers ruled out other possible factors such as toxicants in 
the local environment, virus diffusion and the results being a by-product of 
neighbourhood selection i.e. parents choosing to live in a particular area who 




availability of knowledgeable parents – because they had a child with a 
diagnosis – created ‘clusters’ of diagnosed children through information about 
autism flowing through interpersonal networks. Parents require both the 
resources to seek diagnosis, and the knowledge in how to deploy these 
resources, and this becomes available through social proximity. This was found 
to be the case particularly in younger children, where parental resources are 
more important, and in ‘high-functioning’ cases, where a parent might not 
pursue a diagnosis without a knowledge base provided by other parents. 
Notably, it was found that children who were diagnosed with autism had a 
similar mode of referral to their nearest neighbour with autism (Liu et al., 
2010a).  
 
The evidence of ‘clusters’ of diagnosed children, (King and Bearman, 2011; Liu 
et al., 2010a; Mazumdar et al., 2013) therefore, highlights the role of social 
influence and resources in diagnosis. Health professionals use standard 
diagnostic criteria, but the numbers of those diagnosed are dependent on 
whether a parent brings a child to the clinic and whether that parent has the 
resources, desire and knowledge to pursue a diagnosis when meeting barriers 
or disputes, as well as whether there are local diagnostic resources. This might 
also provide a mechanism to support families when the diagnostic process 
becomes difficult or lengthy. Liu and colleagues note that most accounts of the 
diagnostic process suggest that it can be very difficult to obtain a diagnosis, 
which may be an access barrier, although this might be, in part, accounted for 
by selection bias, as those with straightforward accounts of the process might 
be less inclined to tell them (Liu et al., 2010a).  
 
During assessment 
Once an individual has reached the clinic, diagnosis of autism (as well as other 
conditions) is dependent upon interaction between patients, families and 
clinicians, as well as between clinicians themselves, and between clinicians and 
other professionals. What is particular to autism, however, is that assessment is 
based on observation of behaviours and patient and family reporting of 
behaviours outside the clinic. Diagnostic activity in autism assessment, 




patient/parent); on context (the site of behaviour shapes its interpretation); and 
on clinicians working together to consider and make collaborative judgements 
about their interpretations of behaviours and reported behaviours.  
 
The diagnosis of autism, therefore, is open to shaping by social, environmental 
and psychological factors and is the result of the interaction of a number of 
actors involving clinical interpretation and interaction as well as patient 
presentation and interaction, both of which are time and setting sensitive. I 
explore the specific interaction of diagnostic decision-making in teams in 
Chapter Four. However, here I introduce the concept of diagnosis as process by 
exploring an important body of work undertaken by Maynard and Turowetz, 
which examines interaction at several stages of autism assessment. Whilst 
there has been a significant amount of research exploring interaction between 
doctors and patients, including diagnostic delivery (for example, Heritage and 
Maynard, 2006; Peräkylä, 1997), there has been little examination of the way in 
which clinicians accomplish autism diagnosis through talking about their 
patients together. One exception to this gap in research is an influential body of 
empirical work undertaken by Maynard and Turowetz (Maynard and Turowetz, 
2019, 2017; Turowetz, 2015a, 2015b; Turowetz and Maynard, 2019, 2017, 
2016). 
 
Maynard and Turowetz and the diagnostic process 
Maynard and Turowetz have undertaken extensive conversation-analytic 
studies of observations of autism assessments of children over two time spans 
(1984-5 and 2011-15) in the US. These studies include analysis of autism 
assessments during facilitation of the ADOS; during ‘pre-staffing’ meetings 
which take place without the patient/family present and are most akin to 
specialist assessment team meetings in the UK, the subject of this PhD study; 
and during ‘staffing’ meetings, where clinicians present findings to caregivers 
(Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, 2017; Turowetz, 2015a, 2015b; Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2019, 2017, 2016). Their detailed analysis of the diagnostic process 
for autism in children considers how clinicians ‘assemble’ a diagnosis, 
constituting the facts of a case, and ultimately build a narrative which supports a 




methodically produced through interaction between clinicians and between the 
child and clinicians. I outline some of Maynard and Turowetz’ findings here, 
although I attend to other aspects of their work throughout this thesis, 
particularly in Chapter Four in relation to the construction of diagnostic 
narratives. Important to this thesis is the concept that the very process of 
diagnosis itself, and how clinicians interact to make diagnosis happen, impacts 
not only on diagnosis as an outcome, but on the creation of autism as a 
condition. 
 
Turowetz followed the case of one child, Tony, aged ten, through assessment, 
case discussion and delivery of diagnosis, to track how a narrative about Tony’s 
mental functioning developed interactionally through the assessment process to 
materialise as a clinical fact at the point of diagnostic delivery to parents 
(Turowetz, 2015a). Turowetz claimed that clinicians identify and select 
diagnostically salient (story-worthy) symptoms to recount to colleagues who will, 
together, build consensus around their importance to a potential diagnosis. 
Clinicians orient to story-worthy events, therefore, to create diagnostic 
consensus.  
 
Turowetz draws parallels with Gibson’s (2011) analysis of deliberations 
between politicians about how to respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
suggesting that in both cases participants use storytelling to formulate a 
problem, consider and evaluate different interpretations, steer discussions down 
a particular path and finally come to consensus. Through exploring the 
interpretation of Tony’s understanding of a picture of a cup, Turowetz examined 
how interpretations of Tony’s ambiguous actions were revised and developed, 
and served to emphasise certain (abstract) interpretive frames over others 
(concrete). Ultimately Turowetz claimed that story-telling through interaction is a 
mechanism by which local situated events (behaviours in assessment) are 
transferred into a warrantable diagnostic conclusion – as a clinical event or fact 
(Turowetz, 2015b).  
 
Drawing on the same dataset, Turowetz argued that while behaviour in 




way that the assessing clinician is presented as a neutral facilitator and 
diagnostic tools as largely passive recording measures (Turowetz, 2015b). 
Whilst focussing on the actions of the child fits with the institutional objectives of 
the clinic (Drew and Heritage, 1992), muting or minimising the influence of other 
actants present in assessment (clinician and clinical tools) renders the child 
solely responsible for behaviour, individualising his or her symptoms. This is 
particularly relevant in a condition which is assessed primarily by observing 
behaviour, as it serves to interpret the presence of symptoms as embedded 
within the child rather than as an interaction between child and environment 
(Turowetz, 2015b). Furthermore it can be argued that the act of being social is 
dependent upon the ‘interactional ecology’ of the situation – the nature of the 
specific kind of social interaction taking place rather than an essentialist 
embodied quality of the individual (Solomon, 2015). Behaviours are contextual, 
social and interactional.  
 
Turowetz argues that the foregrounding of clinically relevant behaviour is done 
through citing conduct via reported speech and persistence markers which 
allows clinicians to incrementally build a diagnostic case. Clinicians quote the 
speech of the child being assessed which then vividly demonstrates (rather than 
just reports) a particular action, reinforcing an emerging diagnosis of autism. 
Persistence markers (such as ‘always’, ‘still’, ‘a lot’) mark behaviour as 
persistent, pervasive and stable (Turowetz, 2015b). 
 
Turowetz’ work is extended in partnership with Maynard with further studies 
related to interaction in autism assessment (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; 
Turowetz and Maynard, 2017, 2016). They argue that clinicians use a device 
called ‘category attribution’ which provides a narrative about the child 
presenting for assessment alongside a claim about members of a category - 
children with autism or typically developing children (Turowetz and Maynard, 
2016). These category attributions have a moral dimension because they 
assess discrepancies between where the child is and where they ‘ought’ to be. 
They reflect normative expectations of child development and therefore a child 
is considered typical or atypical in respect of social and clinical norms. This 




delivered to parents and translates general understandings of child 
development to specific claims about particular children (Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2016). Ultimately the authors argue that, as symptoms never fit 
perfectly into one diagnostic category, the process of category attribution 
‘bridges the gap’ between the diagnostic category and the individual child 
(Turowetz and Maynard, 2016).  
 
To summarise this body of work, the researchers have identified that clinicians’ 
practices do not simply organise and document symptoms, but play an active 
part in fitting symptoms within diagnostic categories (Turowetz and Maynard, 
2017). Strategies such as foregrounding clinically relevant behaviour, building a 
case from story-worthy events, presenting the clinician as neutral facilitator and 
presenting the child as solely responsible for behaviour, enable clinicians to 
construct a warrantable case for diagnosis. 
 
Empirical studies in interaction in autism diagnosis 
Other than this extensive work by Turowetz and Maynard, I identified several 
further studies examining interaction in autism diagnosis. One study observed 
triage assessments in CAMHS in the UK to examine how parents build a case 
for diagnosis (O’Reilly et al., 2017). O’Reilly and colleagues examined the 
interaction between parents and clinicians in this initial assessment and found 
that parents generally raised the possibility of autism first, before the clinician, in 
a manner that served to build a case for autism (O’Reilly et al., 2017). The 
speculative presentation by the parent of what is termed a ‘candidate 
diagnosis’, suggests that the parent is seeking confirmation of their assessment 
whilst both respecting the expertise of the doctor and raising the diagnosis as a 
possibility (Stivers, 2002). Clinicians are then positioned to either refute or 
agree with the parental assessment. The authors demonstrate how distinctive 
patterns of social interaction shape the diagnostic process and illustrate the role 
of the invested, well-informed and experienced parent in diagnosis (O’Reilly et 
al., 2017). Here the non-linear (though interactionally patterned) nature of 





One further study observed meetings of two multi-disciplinary autism 
assessment teams in the UK where children who had recently been assessed 
for autism were discussed (Parish, 2019). The study found that clinicians 
presented information in an uncertain manner, interjected in a discussion to 
present relevant information, and indicated the noteworthiness of information 
through their response (Parish, 2019). These interactional strategies enabled 
clinicians to discuss different candidate suggestions for diagnosis and elicit 
information as required. Parish argues that the multi-disciplinary context, 
therefore, can help to reduce cognitive bias which might be more likely with a 
clinician working alone (Parish, 2019). However, other research demonstrates 
that the assessment team can foreground diagnostically relevant behaviours 
whilst discounting those that do not fit (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017), thereby 
challenging this finding. Nevertheless, Parish’s work contributes to a body of 
work which examines how clinician interaction can shape diagnostic decision-
making. 
 
Hollin and Pilnick (2018) studied assessment of young adults (late teens to mid-
twenties) who had already been diagnosed with autism. In ADOS assessment 
sessions facilitated by ADOS-trained researchers, Hollin and Pilnick 
demonstrated how judgements are made about which kinds of behaviour are 
consequential for diagnosis. Whilst the authors are cautious about generalising 
their findings due to the particular settings of the assessments (as a research 
project involving people who were already diagnosed) they were able to 
conclude that the interpretation of behaviour in ADOS sessions can be 
challenging. Hollin and Pilnick examined whether resistance on the part of the 
patient would be interpreted as a diagnostic indicator or as an appropriate 
choice from a number of possibilities (Hollin and Pilnick, 2018). The researchers 
found that some forms of resistance, for example, resisting a particular task as 
inappropriate, were deemed acceptable; whereas other forms of resistance, for 
example, resistance to a particular line of conversation, were considered a 
diagnostic indicator of autism. The study demonstrated both how clinicians 
continually make judgements about which kinds of behaviour are consequential 




behaviours required to identify and separate these kinds of behaviours with 
consistency (Hollin and Pilnick, 2018).  
 
Muskett and colleagues also explored the interpretation of one symptom of 
autism, inflexibility, by observing play between an adult and an eight-year-old 
diagnosed child (Muskett et al., 2010). They concluded that this behaviour, 
rather than a direct reflection of an underlying deficit, was the product of a 
child’s attempts to gain control over the situation. Muskett et al (2010) argue 
that the adult (assessor) initiated actions which triggered inflexible behaviour, 
thereby leading to the allocation of certain behaviours as residing within the 
child, when in reality they were interactionally-produced. One further study 
examined interaction in the ADOS and found that the way in which clinicians 
formulated questions for the child being assessed, either created difficulty for 
the child or facilitated the production of a ‘valid response’ (Stickle et al., 2017). 
 
Finally, Rossi, in her ethnographic study of an autism assessment clinic in the 
US, found that all but two children undergoing assessment over the course of 
fourteen months received a diagnosis of autism (Rossi, 2012). Rossi argues 
that we need to have an institutional understanding of diagnosis, with 
examination of how a network of agencies and organisations eventually lead to 
the diagnostic label. The diagnosis of autism is a product of the institutional 
matrix within which it is embedded: the institutional routines of the clinic favour 
one outcome over another and therefore contribute to the ‘epidemic’. Rossi 
argues that diagnosis is achieved through ‘translation’ – a parent/clinician 
interaction that enables the clinician to shift narratives to align with parent 
responses; and the calibration of diagnostic tools can modify the diagnostic 
process and category (Rossi, 2012).  
 
This section has briefly considered some interactional practices in the process 
of diagnosis. I extend this examination of the process of diagnosis in Chapter 






2.8.4 Autism: Consequence of diagnosis 
 
Benefits of diagnosis 
Clinical guidelines suggest that diagnosis of autism can offer a number of 
helpful consequences for the individual and for families. In diagnosis of children 
and young people, it is considered that autism diagnosis can offer families a 
framework for understanding their child and an opportunity to make informed 
decisions about interventions and management strategies (National 
Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). Furthermore, 
diagnosis can be a relief for a young person, and enable access to resources 
and support, emotional benefits, appropriate support from education, healthcare 
and social care services and recognition of existing conditions (National 
Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). Early 
recognition is considered important for accessing targeted treatments and 
appropriate support services, and improving outcomes by ‘maximising 
opportunities for skills development and adaptive learning, and reduce the risk 
of abnormal non-adaptive behaviours becoming entrenched and the 
development of secondary behavioural problems’ (National Collaborating 
Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011, p. 67).  
 
For adults, the benefits may be less clear given the apparently lost opportunity 
for impacting on developmental changes, therefore, treatment interventions are 
unlikely to be recommended. Clinical guidelines, however, suggest that a 
number of interventions (such as access to leisure programmes or supported 
employment) might offer improved quality of life in diagnosed adults (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2012). NICE (2012) also recommends 
that diagnosis should trigger an assessment for social care services. 
Additionally, research suggests that it can be a relief for those diagnosed to be 
able to meet other autistic people in support groups, for example (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2012). However, interviews and surveys 
with autistic adults, parents and professionals have found a dissatisfaction with 
the quality and availability of post-diagnostic support (Crane et al., 2018, 2016; 





I have explored earlier in this chapter how Hacking (2006b) and Nadesan 
(2005) consider that individuals may be transformed by their diagnostic 
categorisation. Those diagnosed become a ‘moving target’ (Hacking, 2007): a 
person for whom the diagnostic label changes through their interaction, with the 
result that they become a different ’type’ of person, a process Hacking calls 
‘making up people’ (Hacking, 2007, 2006b). I discuss this further in Chapter 
Three. Several empirical studies have considered the consequences of an 
autism diagnosis.  
 
Identity and legitimisation as a consequence of diagnosis  
One survey of ‘high-functioning’ autistic adults found that a majority (71.9%) 
experienced relief on receiving a diagnosis, suggesting that the diagnosis may 
provide an understanding of their life experiences to date and offer a way to 
reframe their understanding of their own behaviour (Jones et al., 2014). 
However, a significant proportion also felt angry (12.5%), upset (17.2%), 
anxious (25%) or confused (24.2%) and unsure about the future given the lack 
of formal support, post-diagnosis (Jones et al., 2014). Another study found that 
diagnosis can act as a ‘sense-making narrative’ (Molloy and Vasil, 2004). One 
study, utilising a focus group and interview design, found that diagnosis 
provided a way for individuals to obtain an explanation for their previous 
experiences, including exonerating them from blame. Diagnosis enabled access 
to support and services, and the opportunity to meet others with a diagnosis 
enabled them to find a place to ‘fit’ (Punshon et al., 2009). Punshon and 
colleagues (2009, p. 265) liken this to having a ‘not guilty verdict’. Here 
diagnosis provides both legitimization and potential allocation of resources.  
 
Diagnosis can represent pride in an identity of difference, an explanation for 
difficulties experienced over many years, or a route to support and validation 
(Crane et al., 2018). An acknowledgment of the ‘autistic advantage’ such as 
hyperfocus, attention to detail, good memory, and creativity as experienced by 
autistic adults (Russell et al., 2019a), can be applied to foster a positive self-





It should be emphasised that some of the above studies (e.g. Jones et al., 
2014; Molloy and Vasil, 2004; Punshon et al., 2009) were conducted with 
people diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) or ‘high-functioning’ adults. 
Russell and colleagues found a selection bias against inclusion of participants 
with an intellectual disability (ID) across all fields of autism research (Russell et 
al., 2019b), thereby suggesting that the views of more severely impacted 
autistic people do not adequately inform our understanding of the impact or 
experience of diagnosis of autism.  
 
Molloy and Vasil (2004) acknowledge that their survey participants, who had 
received a DSM-IV diagnosis of AS, may have felt differently, and perhaps more 
negatively, if they had received a DSM-5 diagnosis of ASD. The type of label 
can affect the initial impact of the diagnosis and, potentially, an individual’s 
future relationship with an autistic identity. For example, in advance of changes 
to DSM-IV, Singh conducted an interview survey of adults diagnosed with AS 
(Singh, 2011). In DSM-5, autism was re-conceptualised as a ‘spectrum’ disorder 
with the consequent disappearance of the classification of AS. Singh (2011) 
found that the potential consequences of this disappearing diagnostic category 
threatened the identity of those with the diagnosis or those self-identifying with 
AS. The majority of her participants distinguished themselves from the broader 
category of autism, as people who were ‘verbal, smart and ‘high-functioning’ 
(Singh, 2011, p. 253). Participants expressed concern that there would be 
implications to their sense of identity, particularly in relation to having a label 
(autism) they considered to be more stigmatised than AS. 
 
Resource access as a consequence of diagnosis 
Service provision, in the form of support in school or work, treatment options, 
signposting or support groups, has been found to diminish dramatically as 
individuals grow past adolescence (Howlin, 2008). The likelihood of helpful, 
practical outcomes after autism diagnosis, therefore, is questionable for adults 
receiving a diagnosis. Both Howlin’s (2008) study and Russell et al’s (2012) 
study outlined above, suggest that the perception that individuals and families 
might have hopeful outcomes after diagnosis is one that may encourage the 




suggest. For example, Russell and colleagues’ (2012b) study examined a 
longitudinal birth cohort study based in South West England, and found no 
difference in the development of prosocial (as opposed to antisocial) behaviours 
in children who were diagnosed and those who were not. These findings 
suggest that social behaviours are not impacted adversely or otherwise by 
diagnosis (Russell et al., 2012b). This study examines one aspect of a 
consequence of diagnosis – social behaviours – and suggests that post-
diagnostic treatment is not effective in improving prosocial skills, thereby 
questioning the promise of effective treatment as a result of diagnosis (Russell 
et al., 2012b).  
 
One study found that parents were able to access a range of resources after 
diagnosis, including educational, social, and health resources, and access to 
information and financial support (Russell and Norwich, 2012). In this interview 
study, parents were positive about the resources and opportunities an autism 
diagnosis for their child would offer, while still weighing up the balance of these 
benefits against the stigma that their child might experience with the diagnostic 
label (Russell and Norwich, 2012). Benefits for parents included a way to come 
to terms with their child’s behaviour and understand it, as well as being able to 
draw on a biomedical understanding of autism which served to alleviate blame 
(Russell and Norwich, 2012).  
 
A survey study examining Queensland-based paediatrician and child 
psychiatrist decision-making, found that clinicians may diagnose when uncertain 
– for pragmatic reasons – to secure best outcomes for the child (Skellern et al., 
2005). Of a total of 105 respondents, 58% indicated that they had exaggerated 
(or upgraded) a child’s symptoms in order to enable access to additional 
educational resources; and 36% to allow access to a carer’s allowance when 
the diagnostic process had not met requirements to do so (Skellern et al., 
2005). The authors argue that clinicians therefore use diagnosis as a strategy to 
enable appropriate support for patients and families, in a system which 
demands categorical diagnoses despite the complexities of diagnosing within a 
‘spectrum’. In the UK, an online survey of 116 healthcare professionals involved 




had ‘upgraded’ a diagnosis to autism when faced with unclear presentation or 
patients failing to meet criteria on diagnostic tools (Rogers et al., 2016). This 
was attributed to a combination of factors: enabling access to support, differing 
opinions within the diagnostic team or pressure to meet targets (1%). 32% of 
respondents reported that they would never upgrade. These practices challenge 
both the consistency and efficacy of diagnostic labels. Skellern et al (2005) 
argue that provision of services would be better measured by functional need 
rather than diagnostic label.  
 
These survey studies rely on clinicians’ interpretation and reporting of questions 
which may differ across individuals and services. However, the results present a 
potential challenge to the category of autism in that individuals may be 
diagnosed with the condition due to pragmatic or functional reasons rather than 
strict diagnostic classification. The studies offer a useful perspective on the 
potential consequences of diagnosis, in this case positive, at least in the short-
term, as the diagnosis provides access to services. Rogers et al’s (2016) and 
Skellern et al’s (2005) studies also offer insight into the process of diagnosis, in 
that it demonstrates how diagnosis is embedded in disciplinary practices within 
which there resides a set of beliefs around the function of diagnosis which, in 
turn, affects the category.  
 
Autism and stigma reversal 
At the same time as the diagnosis of autism has expanded, stigma around 
autism in the US has decreased, whilst stigma related to MR has increased (Liu 
et al., 2010a). Liu et al (2010a) attribute this to a reclassification of autism from 
an emotional to a developmental disability, informed by the shift away from the 
idea of autism being caused by inadequate parenting, a highly stigmatising 
position, as first suggested by Kanner and later promoted by Bettelheim (1967). 
De-stigmatisation of autism may also be related to increased resources being 
attached to autism research alongside the expansion of advocacy through 
activist groups. Additionally, because of de-stigmatisation, more people are 
likely to be seeking diagnosis which would contribute to a feedback effect 
(Hacking, 1995) and further drive de-stigmatisation. Parents of autistic children 




thereby further contributing to a social model by which autistic people and 
parents seek to destigmatise the condition (Russell and Norwich, 2012). This 
process of advocacy serves to reframe the condition within a different narrative 
which might better serve their children (Russell and Norwich, 2012). 
 
Some research has shown that, for parents, the attachment of a label of autism 
to their child can reduce the way in which parents experience stigma when their 
child has been diagnosed, as it enables parents to resist stigmatisation by 
applying their medical knowledge to perform their family identity as one which is 
unspoiled and autistic (Farrugia, 2009). This assertion, however, rests on the 
continued categorisation of the child as ‘other’ – not normal – whilst attempting 
to locate the family identity as a different kind of ‘normal’ (Farrugia, 2009). The 
tensions inherent in these conflicting identity positions are likely to impact on the 
whole family and may, indeed, contribute to highlighting or categorising 
behaviours as deviant or ‘autistic’ when they might otherwise have been 
considered normal or ‘lively’, ‘different’, ‘eccentric’ or similar. The diagnosis itself 
is not neutral – in this case, the label provides a coping strategy for families at 
the same time as creating a medicalised category for the child, with lifelong 
implications for understanding that child’s development, and for that child’s own 
understanding of his/her social and personal identity. The social framing of 
diagnosis, therefore, shapes the condition as the condition is shaped by 
diagnostic criteria.  
 
Different diagnostic labels are associated with different levels of stigma and this 
can also differ in different geographical or cultural contexts. In Silicon Valley, for 
example, autism is increasingly less stigmatised as employers recognise the 
particular skills in technological innovation that autistic people bring to the 
workplace (Grinker, 2015). In contrast, children with autism in Kenya are so 
stigmatised that children are hidden or abused (Grinker, 2007). The experience 







2.9 Concluding comments 
 
Increasingly, our ailments and difficulties are understood as medical, including 
all kinds of mental health conditions such as depression, personality disorder 
and schizophrenia, as well as what Blaxter termed ‘social’ diseases such as 
alcoholism, obesity and hypertension (Blaxter, 1978). Whilst this offers an 
avenue for potential treatment and resources, this chapter has shown how 
diagnosis, in particular autism diagnosis, is a thoroughly social process. The 
focus on the medical shifts attention away from the social. In an attempt to 
alleviate symptoms, it is possible to overlook how disease categories come 
about. In a practical sense, a focus on the medical can detract from important 
social issues that impact on health. These include, for example, alleviation of 
poverty, investment in education, improvements in housing and employment 
opportunities as well as generally challenging systems and structures that fail to 
deal with social issues that undermine individual attempts to keep healthy. 
Focussing on the medical may also obscure the social decision-making 
mechanisms concerned with how we categorise disease, who decides and how, 
and what the consequences are for people who are diagnosed.  
 
This chapter has outlined the challenge to a medical model of diagnosis and 
offered some examples of empirical studies which support a social perspective. 
It has also begun to provide a background as to how autism can be viewed as 
an entity that can be socially framed. The next chapter will consider the social 
framing of autism diagnosis further by looking at how the concept of 
medicalisation and social notions of normality shape how we see autism now, 



















CHAPTER THREE: The Construction of Autism 
 
 
Every era imposes its own normative values on the human body, and contemporary 
Western medicine takes biology as the cause, and behaviours as the emerging effect. 
 









3.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
 
This chapter extends the argument in Chapter Two by exploring further the 
construction of autism as a category. I consider how society separates the 
‘normal’ from the pathological in the context of medicalisation, technological 
advances and how this conception changes over time. Although I draw from a 
range of conditions, my focus is particularly framed within concepts of 
acceptable human behaviour in relation to psychological, behavioural or 
neurological conditions. This is partly because this is the framework within 
which autism is located. Additionally, it could be argued that considering 
psychological, behavioural or neurological conditions forces attendance to 
issues different from (some) physical illness, related, for example, to aetiology 
and how society deals with entities that are beyond our understanding.  
 
 
3.2 Defining normal 
 
According to standard diagnostic classification, we either suffer from mental 
illness or we do not: we are either ill or not, sane or insane, normal or abnormal, 
ordered or disordered. However, this has been challenged. Bentall, for example, 
suggests that mental illness is arbitrary rather than scientific and that psychiatric 
illness should be seen as part of human variation in behaviours, rather than as 
a disease or disorder (Bentall, 2003). In forwarding this argument, Bentall 
proposes, contrary to medical classification systems, that the boundaries 
between mental ill health and wellness are indistinct and permeable, and that 
normal and abnormal symptoms reside on a continuum which he describes as a 
‘principle of continuity’ (Bentall, 2003, p. 115). Bentall’s argument proposes that 
the division between symptoms and behaviours related to psychiatric illness 
only differ from what is currently considered ‘normal’ behaviour and 
experiences, by frequency, severity and phenomenology. He argues that 
comparable experiences and behaviours can be identified in non-clinical 





This challenge to the medical model of madness sits within a long history of 
debate around the meaning and existence of mental illness. The controversial 
‘anti-psychiatry’ movement, associated with R.D. Laing (1970) is only one 
movement in the challenge to psychiatric diagnosis. Laing argued that mental 
illness, rather than being medical, was meaningful and caused by oppressive 
family systems (Bentall, 2003). Szasz, whilst denying an anti-psychiatry 
alignment with Laing (Szasz, 1960) proposed that mental illness is a ‘myth’ as 
no underlying pathology can be found. Bentall rejects this stance, however, but 
argues that our current understandings of mental illness are flawed (Bentall, 
2003). Bentall advocates for an understanding of mental illness based on the 
idea that ‘abnormal behaviours and experiences exist on a continuum with 
normal behaviours and experiences’ (Bentall, 2003, p. 155). Bentall also 
suggests that whether someone is ‘mad’ or ‘sane’ depends on the perspective 
taken. Bentall illustrates his ‘principle of continuum’ and idea of perspective by 
examining the differences in understandings of mental illness across cultures 
and geographies. For example, black British people of African Caribbean origin 
are more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia, or be admitted to 
psychiatric hospital, than the British white population. But studies in the 
Caribbean show lower incidence rates than in the UK. There is no evidence that 
demonstrates any underlying sensitivity to madness in this group (Bentall, 
2003). It is likely, therefore, that there are environmental determinants of 
madness (or different cultural understandings of madness) which challenge the 
concept of the existence of underlying biological or medical determinants alone. 
Bentall’s research underpins the argument that, at the very least, psychiatric 
symptoms should be viewed from multiple perspectives, as no one framework 
provides a sufficient explanation (Bentall, 2003).  
 
Other theorists and practitioners propose a pragmatic approach to supporting 
individuals through mental distress. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Rose 
(2013) argues that research and treatment should be rooted in the needs of 
each individual and the support they require as opposed to arbitrary diagnostic 
categories. Bentall’s pragmatic conclusion to the challenge of the medical 
model is that distress should be the defining criteria in seeking and bestowing 




clinicians have developed conceptual alternatives to psychiatric classification. 
Johnstone and colleagues (2018) propose an alternative perspective 
conceptualised as the ‘Power, Threat, Meaning (PTM) Framework’. This 
framework focusses on people’s lived experiences and social, material and 
cultural contexts which the authors believe have been marginalised in current 
theoretical frameworks which inform psychiatric classification and diagnosis. 
The framework proposes a radical non-diagnostic system which aims to ‘re-
integrate many behaviours and reactions currently diagnosed as symptoms of 
mental disorder back into the range of universal human experience’ (Johnstone 
et al., 2018). Rose (2013), Johnstone et al (2018) and Bentall’s (2003) 
conclusions, therefore, appear, to varying degrees, to be attempts to erase 
artificial boundaries between conditions, whilst acknowledging that people in 
mental distress require specific support and treatment. Considering mental 
distress as part of normal human functioning, therefore, may be a way to 
reconsider diagnosis in practice. But does this relate to autism too? 
 
3.2.1 Autism and normality 
Autism Spectrum Disorder is classified in DSM-5 (APA, 2013a) as a 
neurodevelopmental disorder, located within a categorisation system for ‘mental 
disorders’. Although there is an argument about whether a neurodevelopmental 
disorder should be classified as a mental disorder at all, it can be argued that, 
as with other ‘mental disorders’, its existence as non-arbitrary and self-
contained can be challenged. This is illustrated by the shifting definitions of 
behavioural criteria and resulting classifications that determine its existence that 
I outlined in Chapter One.  
 
Bentall argues that the line between normal and abnormal is socially 
constructed. This may apply to autism, where symptoms are behavioural, broad 
and wide ranging and extend into what is considered a sub-clinical or ‘normal’ 
range of behaviours distributed as a continuum extending into the general 
population (Constantino, 2011; Constantino and Charman, 2016; Russell et al., 
2012a, 2010a). Diagnosis demands a threshold and therefore a ‘cut-off’ 
between those who are autistic and those who are not. Russell argues that 




historically and culturally determined and is a reflection of values prominent in 
society at the time (Russell, 2014). This phenomenon can be witnessed in the 
historical changes in classifications from childhood schizophrenia to pervasive 
developmental disorder, for example (See Chapter One).  
 
One study examining online discussion forums examined the apparent ‘natural’ 
trajectory of child development and how children with particular behaviours are 
produced as deficient and ‘abnormal’ (O’Dell and Brownlow, 2015). O’Dell and 
Brownlow (2015) argue that dominant discourses of normal child development 
limit the ability of autistic people to create positive self-identities. Focus groups 
with professionals, parents and autistic people demonstrated how the 
boundaries between ‘normal’ and ‘autistic’ are fluid and negotiated (Lester et al., 
2014). The negotiation incorporates whether autism is considered a disability (in 
which case constructed as abnormal) or an ‘ability’. This rhetoric was further 
‘couched within a repertoire of severity, by which participants negotiated 
different meanings of normality/abnormality against the benchmark of the 
severity of the condition’ (Lester et al., 2014, p. 149). The authors suggest that 
different positions and differences within the condition, therefore, may be central 
to the perceptions of normality or abnormality in autism (Lester et al., 2014). 
The authors argue that without a singular understanding of what autism is, 
negotiating these boundaries is problematic. Both studies challenge the clinical 
discourse within constructions of autism and normality.  
 
Culturally determined understandings of how to behave shape all our 
interactions. Societies have social expectations – to smile in the right place and 
at the right time, to greet people in particular ways and to interact in a way that 
seems appropriate to the setting. When individuals do not conform to these 
norms of behaviour, it may not in itself cause distress, but society’s 
expectations of normal behaviour might impact on the individual in ways that 
are practical (e.g. failing a job interview) as well as emotional (e.g. feeling 
pressure to conform). It may cause no distress to the individual to be non-
verbal; but in a society that values verbal communication above all others, it is 
likely that before long, an individual who does not speak is made to feel of less 




2007). Mental distress in social contexts, therefore, may be to do with an 
individual’s ability to relate and function in a world that does not accept social 
difference. Whether underlying biological differences exist or not, one solution 
to mental distress, therefore, is for society to better accept different kinds of 
social behaviour thereby lessening the difficulties individuals may have in 
functioning in a social world.  
 
Normality, autism and DSM revisions 
Sweet and Decoteau analysed debates around revisions to DSM-IV and argue 
that a definition of normal depends on the condition being discussed, and 
therefore our rules for normality can shift and contradict each other (Sweet and 
Decoteau, 2018). They argue that there exists ‘lumpiness and inconsistencies in 
biomedicalisation and in the neo-liberal mandate to self-optimise’ (Sweet and 
Decoteau, 2018, p. 115). In other words, in a society which values the free 
market state and focuses on individualisation, we shape normality around what 
benefits society best. The researchers take the conditions of autism and of 
depression to illustrate this. They argue that the category of autism was 
defended in debates around DSM revisions, as normality is about having and 
keeping the label in order to access services that improve functioning. This 
biomedical construction of normal rests on a concept that behavioural 
intervention and support (made available through keeping the diagnostic label) 
is necessary for future achievement (normality), which they call ‘normalisation 
via optimisation’ (Sweet and Decoteau, 2018, p. 115). In contrast, the category 
for depression was attacked, mainly by therapists and healthcare professionals, 
as being too expansive. This, they argue, was because achieving normality in 
this condition is about losing the label and instead, working towards a kind of 
natural innate ‘human-ness’ by rejecting psychiatric intervention and drawing on 
our own inner resilience. Depression as a condition, therefore, is represented as 
a loss of normality; normality in autism is instead an ‘end goal of a set of 
interventions’ (Sweet and Decoteau, 2018, p. 117). Therefore ideas of ‘normal’ 
in these two conditions are shaped by contemporary debates, different ideas of 





The protection of the autism boundary became fraught during the revisions of 
DSM-IV, particularly in relation to the loss of the AS sub-category. I would argue 
that the picture painted by Sweet and Decoteau is also ‘of its time’. Revisions to 
the next version of DSM may begin to critique autism boundaries, given the 
ongoing debates around the difficulties of the practical aspects of diagnosis 
when symptoms are considered widely heterogeneous. However, this is likely to 
be set against continuing ‘diagnostic domain defence’ debates (Barker and 
Galardi, 2015) around identity and Asperger’s Syndrome (Giles, 2014; Singh, 
2011).  
 
3.2.2 Technological advances 
Advances in genetics, neuroimaging and medical technologies appear to have 
done little to help define the boundaries between normal and abnormal. I 
outlined genetic biomarker developments in autism and a critique of these in 
Chapter One. Rose suggests that, given advances in technology and brain 
imaging, we might by now have expected to know what a ‘normal’ brain looks 
like (Rose, 2010).  However, even with Alzheimer’s Disease, which is 
considered to have a distinct neurological basis, there is no simple relationship 
between the visual representation of the brain and the way in which someone 
behaves or other kinds of symptoms (Rose, 2010). For example, Rose explains 
that although plaques and tangles in the brain are likely to be linked to 
Alzheimer’s, it is still the case that visualisation of the brain cannot predict the 
development of the disease. Advances in medical genomics take us no further 
into this, as there is no ‘normal’ – single standard or reference – genome (Rose, 
2010).  
 
Latimer and Thomas (2015) undertook an observational study of a 
dysmorphology genetics service and a Down’s Syndrome prenatal screening 
clinic. They demonstrated that, although diagnosis is associated with 
chromosomal abnormalities and genetic mutations, the pathway from genetic 
mutation to specific conditions is still unclear. Latimer’s extended ethnography 
of dysmorphology explores how certain forms of life become constituted as 
malformations or abnormalities and, consequently, contribute to the ‘shrinking 




pathological and problematic (Latimer, 2013). Latimer argues that society’s 
preoccupation with the genetic story illustrates how much ‘difference’ bothers us 
as a society and outlines how genetics is concerned with mapping minute 
deviations in growth and form to describe congenital abnormality. She argues 
that this search for congenital abnormality connects to how genetics plays its 
part in defining normal human development, and through this work of division, 
medical authority is exercised (Latimer, 2013).  
 
3.2.3 Defining normal in ‘physical’ conditions 
There are many studies which explore the idea of ‘normality’ outside the 
discipline of psychiatry and psychology, for example, in short stature (Morrison, 
2019), female sexual dysfunction (Moynihan, 2003) and osteoporosis screening 
(Salter et al., 2011).  
 
Drawing from Rose’s work, Timmermans and Buchbinder’s influential study of 
the genetic screening of babies explores the way in which the clinic uses 
measures of ‘normal’ child development to develop categories of normal or 
abnormal children in their discussion with parents (Timmermans and 
Buchbinder, 2012). The authors argue that clinicians use normalisation 
techniques – regulating babies according to statistical norms (e.g. see Bellman, 
Byrne, and Sege 2013) – to foster a sense of ‘objective normality’ (Timmermans 
and Buchbinder, 2012, p. 123). The process of normalisation incorporates a 
moral assessment about the kind of life a child might be expected to lead. As 
with other studies (see Barker and Galardi 2015; Latimer and Thomas 2015), 
judgements of ‘normality’ are linked with future expectations related to that 
specific condition. Timmermans and Buchbinder argue that it was the growth of 
child surveillance that enabled the privileging of child health and the 
establishment of a set of standards for child development (Timmermans and 
Buchbinder, 2012).  
 
To conclude this section with Rose, ideas of norms are socially and historically 
variable and indeed there has never been a ‘normal’ or natural human (Rose, 
2010). Rose argues that it appears that a lifetime without mental illness now 




2010). And yet, these divisions between the normal and the pathological shape 
our understandings of society and help us make moral judgements about 
groups and individuals. Key to understanding the context within which 
definitions of normal are constructed is the idea of medicalisation, which will be 





Medicalisation is a sociological concept which describes a process by which 
non-medical problems become viewed and treated as medical (Conrad, 1992). 
Some commentators consider medicalisation as illuminating how medicine 
functions as a method of social control (e.g. Zola 1972). However, Conrad, in 
tracing its conceptual roots since the 1970s, asserts that it is simply a neutral 
way to describe something that has become medical (Conrad, 1992). Freidson 
argues that medicine has obtained exclusive jurisdiction over deciding what 
illness is and therefore how people must behave in order to be treated as ill 
(Freidson, 1970). Freidson argues that this jurisdication can lead to a society 
which prioritises its version of health and wellbeing over civil liberties and moral 
integrity (Freidson, 1970). According to Conrad, however, medicalisation must 
include all problems defined in medical terms, not just non-medical problems 
considered to be inappropriately medicalised (Conrad, 1992). Notwithstanding, 
he acknowledges that a key concern is medicalisation of so-called deviant 
behaviours (madness, alcoholism) and ‘natural’ life events (childbirth, 
menopause) (Conrad, 1992). 
 
3.3.1 Shifting concepts of medicalisation 
Zola considers the process of medicalisation as an insidious process which is 
the result of an ‘increasingly complex technological and bureaucratic system’ 
(Zola, 1972, p. 487) which has led us to rely on the ‘expert’. Zola argues that 
these experts are presented as morally neutral and yet are part of a system 
which, for example, prioritises the diseases of the rich (cancer, stroke) over the 




in moral social practices. Zola argues, therefore, that clinicians are guided not 
by technical knowledge but by values (Zola, 1972).  
 
Zola argues that medicine is involved in the management of the state and works 
hand-in-hand with institutions with legal powers to change social aspects of life. 
These social aspects can include, for example, imposing quarantines or 
vaccinations to achieve social ends (Zola, 1972) or introducing fluoridisation into 
water systems (Freidson, 1970). Psychiatry, in particular, has served the state 
in actively dealing with deviance and determining, for example, when individuals 
should be involuntarily deprived of their liberty (Zola, 1972). Zola argues that the 
role of medicine has expanded to include broader issues than those related to 
individual health and illness, for example, the absolute right to control over 
technical and ‘specialist’ procedures such as surgery and prescribing 
medication. It is this ‘omnipresence of disorder’ (Zola, 1972, p. 498) that 
enables, for example, a Californian judge to order the sterilisation of an unwed 
mother as a condition of probation (Zola, 1972). 
 
3.3.2 Medicalisation as interactional 
Arguing against narrower concepts of medicalisation such as those that equate 
with ‘medical imperialism’ (Strong 1979), Conrad and Schneider explicate their 
definition of medicalisation by describing it as having three levels: conceptual 
(for example, defining illness through research journals or diagnostic manuals); 
institutional (the adoption of a medical approach to treat a problem); and 
interactional (doctor-patient interaction, for example, in diagnosis and treatment) 
(Conrad and Schneider, 1980). This can be mapped on to macro, meso and 
micro levels (Gabe, 2013) and relocates the site of medicalisation from being 
the responsibility of the medical practitioner alone, to a broad and inter-related 
set of practices and values that, at a micro level, can include non-clinical actors 







Figure 6: Macro, meso and micro medicalisation in autism  
based on Halfmann (2012) and Conrad and Schneider (1980) 
 
 
In his study of two periods of US abortion history, Halfmann (2012) illustrates 
the operation of medicalisation at these three levels and acknowledges multiple 
dimensions of medicalisation which include discourses, practices and identities. 
Halfmann argues that the conceptualisation of medicalisation as this fluid and 
interactive state enables attention to be paid to detailed changes in 
medicalisation as well as instances when medicalisation and de-medicalisation 
occur simultaneously (Halfmann, 2012). Medicalisation, then, is neither static 
nor absolute and can be driven by a number of intersecting factors.  
 
3.3.3 Drivers of medicalisation 
There are a number of arguments to explain the way in which medicalisation 
occurs. For example, one argument suggests that the medical profession 
expands concepts of health and illness in order to extend its professional 
dominance (Gabe, 2013). Studies of paediatrics consider how medicine has 
extended its role to one which encompasses the psycho-social and behavioural 
difficulties of children, for example. Pawluch (2012) argues that paediatricians 
expanded their role when there were fewer sick children to treat due to 




their declining status by extending their territory to include behavioural 
difficulties, thereby medicalising the behaviour of children (Pawluch, 2012). 
Alternatively, Halpern argues that this focus on psychosocial disorders came 
about because of ‘routinisation’ – the paediatric profession extending their remit 
into an area more stimulating than routine outpatient care (Halpern, 1990).   
 
Others argue that medicalisation is the result of broader social processes to 
which clinicians and other medics respond (Gabe, 2013), including increasing 
bureaucratisation and professionalism as a result of industrialisation (Illich, 
1976). Some argue that lay interests can drive medicalisation (e.g. Ballard and 
Elston, 2005; Gabe and Calnan, 1989; Riessman, 1983). Some examples of lay 
influence of diagnosis include the case of Vietnam veterans helping to define 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Scott, 1990); people with chronic 
fatigue fighting for recognition and advocating for the benefits of diagnosis 
(Woodward et al., 1995); or charity activists and families campaigning to 
support a private members bill to provide autism diagnostic services for adults 
(National Autistic Society, 2019).  
 
Medicalisation can also be driven by the lowering of treatment thresholds, such 
as in hypertension (Pereira Gray et al., 2016) resulting in an expansion of the 
category and medical jurisdiction of it. In contrast there are few examples of 
domain contraction, leading to de-medicalisation, except where the diagnostic 
criteria have been removed altogether, for example, with homosexuality (Barker 
and Galardi, 2015; Conrad and Schneider, 1980). Domain expansion, leading to 
increased medicalisation, has been argued to be the case in autism 
classification, with the introduction of the ‘spectrum’ in DSM-5. However, it is 
also argued that lay people perceived domain contraction to take place as 
DSM-5 changes were seen to exclude some individuals who were already 
diagnosed (Barker and Galardi, 2015). This perception led to ‘diagnostic domain 
defense’ (Barker and Galardi, 2015, p. 121) whereby people who had 
‘experience-based’ expertise argued against de-medicalisation, instead 





Some research has focussed on the way in which pharmaceutical and 
technology companies are driving medicalisation in order to promote products 
(Conrad, 2007; Moynihan, 2003; Moynihan et al., 2002). This aggressive 
promotion of pharmaceuticals, Conrad (2007) argues, leads to a society where 
drugs seem to be the answer for a range of conditions previously un-noted (the 
potentially ill) and the lay public are transformed into consumers rather than 
patients (Gabe, 2013). Critics however, suggest that these scenarios paint a 
picture of the lay public as passive rather than, at times, active in the process of 
medicalisation (Riessman, 1983).  
 
Some argue that a ‘top-down’ view of medicalisation as a ‘sinister agent of 
social control’ (Pereira Gray et al., 2016, p. 8), as represented by the work of 
Zola and Illich, is now outdated. Rather, medicalisation consists of an 
interaction between a range of active agents, individual, institutional and 
conceptual. In addition, others argue that the focus now should be on 
biomedicalisation, incorporating major transformations in techno-scientific 
biomedicine such as scientific innovation in geneticisation (Clarke et al., 2003). 
Featherstone and Atkinson argue that it would be a mistake to supplant one 
kind of medicalisation with another, as the newer developments in medical 
knowledge do not entirely supplant those of a previous age (Featherstone and 
Atkinson, 2012). Rather, medical knowledge becomes a ‘palimpsest of 
knowledge forms, techniques and practices’ (Featherstone and Atkinson, 2012, 
p. 188) in that visible traces of the earlier form can be seen through the new. 
Others argue that, despite its critics, medicalisation as a concept is still current 
and relevant (Busfield, 2017). 
 
For the purposes of this PhD study, I would align with the argument against 
‘medical imperialism’ as a concept which suggests that individuals within the 
medical professions have an agenda of intent to control and dominate (Conrad 
and Schneider, 1980). This is in line with Blaxter’s comment that a 
contemporary view of medicalisation encompasses influences not just from the 
medical profession, but from commercial interests, social movements and the 
lay public (Blaxter, 2010). However, medical authority remains a factor in the 




metaphor (Featherstone and Atkinson, 2012), some argue that the authority of 
the clinician has been diminished with advances in technology, access to 
information and critiques of the ‘expert’. However, medical authority remains a 
part of the palimpsest of medical knowledge and its traces might still be seen in 
macro, meso and micro contexts. In any case, others argue that medicine 
continues to find ways to reassert its dominance, in part through the clinic 
(Latimer, 2013). My position is that the concept of medical authority being 
wielded through the actions of individual clinicians is mostly outdated and 
reductionist. Medical authority resides at structural and societal levels and 
operates in a complex interaction between different institutions (including 
education, research bodies, the criminal justice system, commercial interests as 
well as the medical establishment). Neither should the concept of medicalisation 
be used as a general attack on the medical profession (Busfield, 2017) but 
rather as a mechanism to explore structures, knowledge and authority. 
 
This PhD study engages primarily with the way in which healthcare 
professionals talk together (micro), and this is viewed in the context of the 
institutional demands of the clinic (meso) which is in turn dictated by macro 
structures such as diagnostic criteria and research agendas (See Figure 6). It 
may be possible to observe how medicalisation is operated in the specialist 
autism team, but this does not happen in a vacuum, rather it is part of a belief 
system and value base that is pervasive throughout society and supported by 
our institutional structures. As outlined by Mann (2016) in her study of the 
medicalisation of ADHD, expertise is no longer the ‘possession of the powerful’ 
(Mann, 2016, p. 4) but is distributed across a range of actors including medical 
professionals, patients and families, pharmaceutical companies, educational 
institutions and researchers. Although power may be distributed unevenly 
between them, medicalisation becomes an interaction between these, and 
other, different parties. 
 
3.3.4 Consequences of medicalisation  
The consequences of over-medicalisation are potentially grave. Frances argues 
that, with the expansion of diagnostic boundaries as seen in DSM-5, a new 




drug treatment, over-medicating, stigma, problems with insurance, and a 
reduced sense of personal responsibility (Frances, 2010). Frances (2013, p. 77) 
expresses concern about what he calls ‘diagnostic inflation’ i.e. the unnecessary 
diagnosis of the worried well, which turns the healthy into the sick (Verhoeff, 
2012). According to Frances, diagnostic inflation can cause the creation of false 
epidemics such as those of childhood bipolar disorder, ADHD and autism 
(Frances, 2010). With this ‘shrinking normal’ Frances argues that there is more 
pressure on resources in health, education and in broader services, leading to a 
displacement of services from those who really need them (Frances, 2010).  
 
The consequences of medicalisation have been particularly examined in 
relation to ‘natural’ life processes in women’s lives. Normal events such as 
menopause, childbirth, menstruation and pregnancy are reinterpreted as 
pathological and therefore automatically require medical attention (Purdy, 
2001). The result of subjection to the medical gaze is the removal of 
responsibility and control from individuals and communities (Jutel, 2009; 
Sawicki, 1991; Stanworth, 1987). Riessman (1983) argues that the challenge in 
women’s health is to separate out where medical intervention is necessary from 
those normal and healthy processes in a woman’s life cycle.  
 
There can be positive benefits to medicalisation. For example, before 1980, 
when the classification for ADHD first appeared in DSM, children now 
diagnosed with ADHD may have been considered bad or naughty, with the 
resultant parent-blaming and challenges to their educational progress (Grinker, 
2015). Now children with ADHD are more likely to be supported and treated 
rather than stigmatised as naughty. 
 
As well as clinical benefits related to treatment, support and prognosis, there 
can be symbolic benefits for the individual and family (Gabe, 2013) as I outlined 
in Chapter Two in relation to autism. For example, research shows that 
diagnosis can offer a sense of relief in that it can give meaning to difficulties 
individuals may have experienced throughout their lives, as well as legitimising 
their condition and potentially reducing stigma (e.g. Woodward et al. 1995). 




problem’ in that it can counteract accusations of moral weakness and 
counteract blame (Gabe, 2013).  
 
Perhaps, therefore, as first suggested by Conrad, medicalisation is neither a 
good nor a bad thing: the reframing of behaviour as medical provides both 
benefits (treatment, support, de-stigmatisation) as well as difficulties 
(stigmatisation, over-medication, commercialisation).  
 
 
3.4 Shifting concepts of autism 
 
Drawing from broader studies of medicalisation, and from our understanding of 
how autism has developed as a condition, it can be seen how autism has 
emerged as a product of shifting diagnostic boundaries, parental and patient 
activism, the rise of lobby and political groups such as the neurodiversity 
movement and increased visibility through cultural and media representations of 
autism. Eyal and colleagues argue that visibility of autism is higher than ever. 
However, rather than autism being an epidemic that has ‘made autism visible’, 
the visibility of autism has ‘made the epidemic’ (Eyal et al., 2010). This 
construction of autism does not render as ‘unreal’ the very present experiences 
of those diagnosed with the condition. Indeed Eyal et al argue that this 
polarisation between whether autism is a ‘true’ condition, or a social 
construction misses the main point of the complexity of the development of 
autism as we know today (Eyal et al., 2010). Autism (or any other condition) can 
be both ‘real’ and constructed.  
 
Some social theorists have explored the conceptualisation of autism in relation 
to changes in classification (e.g. Evans, 2013; Eyal et al., 2010; Nadesan, 
2005). Evans (2013) argues that the work of Wing and Rutter in particular was 
highly influential in expanding the category of autism and linking it to other 
childhood disorders (Evans, 2013). With this expansion, increasing numbers of 
children could now be classified by this behavioural criteria (Evans, 2013) and 
the inclusion of those with even the ‘mildest’ symptoms served to pathologise 




DSM, Eyal et al claim that psychiatry has retrospectively modified diagnostic 
criteria to suit current notions of the condition, thereby leading to an increase in 
diagnostic rates (Eyal et al., 2010).  
 
According to critical autism theorists Timimi and McCabe (2016a), the 
psychiatric and psychology professions developed new theories of autism to 
help forward research into the biological basis of autism. This included 
developing ideas of Theory of Mind as a central deficit (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and the extreme male brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 
2003). Other psychological theories developed around autism included a lack of 
executive function (Hughes and Russell, 1993) and deficits in central coherence 
(Frith, 1989; Frith and Happé, 1994). Timimi and McCabe argue that the 
expansion of the category of autism has no scientific basis and that instead of 
focussing on individual deficit we should challenge medical models that define 
disorder and consider the political and social reform that will eradicate inequality 
and discrimination (Timimi and McCabe, 2016a).   
 
In Chapter Two I discussed Nadesan’s argument that autism has emerged out 
of a particular set of niche conditions, including shifts in standards of parenting, 
a focus on the psychological, and measurements of child development 
(Nadesan, 2005). Her thesis argues that the medicalisation of childhood 
behaviour was in part because concerned parents were encouraged both to 
monitor their children against developmental norms and to seek expert advice 
from those increasingly available to offer it (Nadesan, 2005; also see Hacking 
2006b).  
 
Rather than contributing to a discussion about whether autism is ‘really’ on the 
increase, or whether the condition is socially constructed, Eyal et al instead 
argue that the rise in autism diagnosis is the result of the deinstitutionalisation of 
mental disorders from the 1960s, which led to a redistribution of expertise and 
the rise of parental activism (Eyal et al., 2010). This shift included both physical 
and structural change (the closure of large institutions for example) and 
symbolical change with ‘categories’ of people emerging which reflected the 




included community services, special education and early intervention rather 
than incarceration and containment. This change gave rise to a redistribution of 
expertise, so that a range of people from parents to special educators now 
claimed a right to specialist knowledge and began to reshape the landscape of 
our understandings of conditions (Eyal et al., 2010).  
 
The campaigning and lobbying sector can also influence how a condition is 
considered legally and conceptually.This can be seen in the work of the 
patient/parent lobby who argued for the establishment of the Autism Act 2019 in 
England (National Autistic Society, 2019) as well as in the challenges to 
category changes in DSM-5 (Barker and Galardi, 2015). Similarly, intensive 
lobbying by parent activists in Brazil led to the formation of a federal law which 
recognised autism as a disability, in a political manoeuvre to take control of 
treatment of autistic people away from the mental health profession (Rios and 
Costa Andrada, 2015). Silverman has tracked the development of autism in the 
United States, including how parents have contributed to the development of 
the condition through funding specific kinds of research and advocating new 
therapies (C. Silverman, 2013). 
 
3.4.1 The autism epidemic and call for action 
Verhoeff argues that society’s development of ‘autism’ has much to do with how 
modern society deals with distress and suffering, and is based on prevailing 
values and implicit norms which impact on our (children’s) lives (Verhoeff, 
2012). Verhoeff argues that autism cannot be a ‘natural’ phenomenon because 
such a thing demands shared underlying structure, but autism has a large 
diversity of classified traits. Furthermore, the history of autism classification 
demonstrates the constructed nature of the diagnostic boundary. And yet, it is 
argued, these factors are considered relatively unimportant in the call for action 
that is the search for ‘autism’s natural boundaries at neurobiological levels’ 
(Verhoeff, 2012, p. 429). Verhoeff considers this search to be driven by 
society’s desire to locate suffering as a natural phenomenon rather than as 
embedded in the social world. Rather than the boundaries of autism being 
natural they are constructed as a way to explain uncertainty, to shape a body of 




428) about people who relate to their environment in a way that is troublesome 
(Verhoeff, 2012).  
 
Ebben, in a study analysing texts about autism, found that metaphors of danger 
and contagion are widely present (Ebben, 2018). Ebben argues that the notion 
of autism as an epidemic represents an urgent call to action to regain control 
over normalcy (Ebben, 2018). Reality is produced through cultural encounters 
and these encounters are shaping how we see autism as an epidemic. More 
than simply being a linguistic framing, it structures our thinking and action about 
what autism is and how we need to deal with it. This in turn ‘creates the social 
reality we live in’ (Ebben, 2018, p. 143). This cultural framing of autism as an 
epidemic, I would argue, positions autism as a medical entity that we should 
urgently work hard to do something about abating. This message is not just for 
autism researchers and scientists: it impacts how parents might interpret their 
own child’s behaviours, how charities shape their own understanding of autism 
and how society looks upon autistic behaviours as undesirable and deviant. 
This ‘epidemic’ message is one that is challenged by the neurodiversity counter-
narrative (Kapp, 2019). 
 
3.4.2 The Neurodiversity movement 
Drawing from a social model of disability, the neurodiversity movement argues 
that forms of ‘neurodivergence’, rather than being abnormal or deviant, are 
inherent and valuable variations of human development (Exploring Diagnosis, 
2018). Activists within this movement seek to provide mutual support and self-
advocacy and to develop a sense of positive self-identity (Kapp et al., 2013). 
This movement, led by autistic people, seeks to re-position autism as an 
inseparable aspect of a person’s identity rather than as a condition which 
requires a cure (Ortega, 2009). However, although neurodiversity proponents 
would generally support a social model of disability, many argue that autism is 
essentially biological and part of normal neurological difference, rather than 
seeking to reframe autism as socially constructed (Kapp et al., 2013). Some 
argue that there has been a shift in the way we see Asperger’s Syndrome or so-
called ‘high-functioning’ autism to the extent that ‘genius’ has been medicalised 




retrospective diagnoses of renowned figures such as Newton and Einstein 
(Shepard, 2010). These new models of autism, whilst apparently positive, are 
associated with particular norms around gender, race and class (male, white 
and middle/upper class) which can then lead to stigmatisation towards those 
that may be more impaired by their condition (Shepard, 2010).  
 
The neurodiversity movement tends to be opposed to parent groups who 
demand a ‘cure’ and professional groups working towards this end (Ortega, 
2009). These two views are characterised by Hart as ‘autism-as-difference’ 
(self-advocates) – where the autistic person is ‘differently connected’ to the 
world (Hart, 2014, p. 289); and ‘autism-as-disorder’ (parents) – where the 
autistic person is cut off from the world (Hart, 2014). These opposing tensions 
are likely to continue to shape our shifting understanding of autism in 
contemporary debates and into the future.  
 
Overall, however, the neurodiversity movement is contributing to a realigning of 
autism as a positive identity, albeit one in which difficulties have, at times, to be 
overcome (Kapp, 2019). Along with others in the disability rights movement, 
autistic advocates argue that society, rather than disabled individuals, needs to 
change to enable the successful functioning of disabled people in society. The 
work of the neurodiversity movement, therefore, reframes autism as a positive 
self-identity and in turn this contributes to how we might consider (some aspects 
of) autism in the future.  
 
 
3.5 Hacking’s Looping and ‘Making up people’ 
 
I discussed in Chapter Two, Jutel’s observation that the process and category 
of diagnosis frame and are framed by social and cultural values (Jutel, 2011). 
Here I explore the construction of autism in relation to Hacking’s concept of 
‘looping’, defined as how we choose to classify people to enable systematic and 
generalizable knowledge of a particular ‘kind’ of human which then, in turn, 
shapes and makes happen that particular ‘kind’ of human (Hacking, 1995). 




Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), arguing that whilst people diagnosed with 
DID were once rare, there has been an ‘epidemic’ in north America. The 
epidemic, Hacking argues, is not based on a ‘real’ increase in incidence, rather 
is caused primarily by a particular set of discourses that grew around multiple 
personalities. This discourse was fed by the psychiatric profession, the media, 
political movements such as feminism, growing concern about child sexual 
abuse, and a growing number of professional conferences and journals around 
the condition (Hacking, 1995).  
 
The condition of DID has become, in Hacking’s words, a ‘human kind’: a ‘kind’ 
of people that are studied and categorised, for whom we would like to have 
systematic and accurate knowledge. These ‘kind’ of people constitute a group 
that we come to understand in relation to a particular accepted set of 
knowledges, specialist and general, including the cause of their condition, the 
potential prognosis and range of behaviours (Hacking, 1995). Whilst the 
beginnings of the condition start within the remit of the medical profession, it 
becomes general and owned by those with the condition and the broader public. 
This set of knowledges then feeds into our understanding of the ‘kind’ of human 
this person is: according to Hacking, ‘the kind and the knowledge grow together’ 
(Hacking, 1995, p. 361). This ‘feedback effect’ changes those within this ‘kind’, 
changes how they think of themselves and changes how wider society thinks 
about them. This in turn forces the classification-makers to reconsider how they 
are classified (Hacking, 1995).  
 
It is worth expanding on this by briefly exploring Hacking’s five-part framework 
in relation to DID. Hacking’s framework describes the interaction of a number of 
entities: the classification; the people assigned a diagnosis who, prior to 
classification, are ‘unhappy people’; institutions (medical and lay); knowledge 
(expert and popular); and experts who generate knowledge, judge its validity, 
and use it in their practice (Hacking, 2006b). Knowledge includes conjecture, 
presumptions and ‘so-called’ facts about the now named disorder. For example, 
psychiatrists declared that multiple personality disorder was caused by early 
sexual abuse and repressed memories. Hacking argues that this knowledge 




understanding of multiple personalities. Early sexual abuse then became part of 
both lay and medical knowledge of multiple personality (Hacking, 2006b). 
Hacking argues that when a classification is created and assigned to a person, 
they then become a ‘moving target’ – a way that this particular condition 
‘changes its contours and its lived experience’ through the way of life of 
diagnosed people (Hacking, 2006b, para. 33). Remarkably too, more and more 
‘unhappy people’ then begin to manifest symptoms of multiple personality 
(Hacking, 2006b). Experts work within institutions that provide legitimacy and 
assures their status as experts. People assigned a diagnosis are now classified 
as a ‘given kind’ (Hacking, 2006b). In 1985, therefore, multiple personality was 
a way to be a person; it had not been in 1955.  
 
For autism, Hacking argues a different case: autism clearly did exist in the 
1950s, say, but it was still not experienced, for ‘high-functioning’ autistic people, 
as a way to be a person (Hacking, 2006b). Once the term of autism has been 
assigned, it is through people experiencing themselves in that way (of being 
autistic) that a looping effect occurs. The category of ‘high-functioning autistic’ 
therefore is expanded as it became understood that it was possible to be 
autistic and have strengths and acquire skills to overcome difficulties. Therefore 
a new group of people were encompassed within the category – those who may 
not have had such difficulties in childhood and who have managed their 
difficulties into adulthood (Hacking, 2006b). More and more people, then identify 
as autistic. 
 
As we assess behaviour and label the individual with a condition, then, the 
category shifts along with the shift in behaviour. Diseases are not stable but 
shift and change based on the practices of which they become a part (Mol, 
2002). ‘Making up people’, Hacking argues, is rooted in the way in which 
‘names interact with the named’ (Hacking, 2006b, para. 4). The process of 
diagnosis relates to a particular set of criteria relevant to a particular time but we 
know this can change (e.g. from multiple personality disorder to dissociative 
identity disorder), grow (e.g. ADHD and autism) or become obsolete as a 
(medical) classification (e.g. homosexuality). These shifts in conceptualisation 




cure or consider prognosis (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). How we 
understand a condition, what we call it, who gets diagnosed with it and how this 
impacts on our future understanding of the condition is inextricably linked. 
 
 
3.6 Concluding comments 
 
Combining a broadening of diagnostic criteria, the re-presentation of autism in 
all aspects of the media and, in the UK, the establishment of a route to 
diagnosis for adults, we can see how the idea of autism has changed and 
shifted and therefore can be argued as socially constructed. At the same time, it 
is acknowledged that there can be real distress for those who may have 
behaviours considered to be autistic, and further distress caused by society’s 
view towards those behaviours. The development of the category of autism has 
been shaped by developments in how we understand behaviour (as 
psychological, as cognitive, as behavioural), how we want to manage that as a 
society and how we decide what the future of a person with particular 
behaviours should look like. Autism is the medicalisation of certain types of 
behaviours, the definitions of which have also changed over time.  
 
We have a new idea of autism that is far removed from Kanner and Asperger’s 
initial definitions. This now includes the possibility of adults (as well as children) 
being diagnosed, challenging the idea of autism being a condition identified in 
childhood. These new definitions require the medical profession to assess a 
much broader range of people than they did in the past with the challenges that 
brings. The next chapter will go on to consider how clinicians make diagnostic 
decisions together before introducing the studies that form the empirical 
















CHAPTER FOUR: Making diagnostic decisions 
 
 
The clinic is not simply a place in which people are fitted into existing diagnostic 
categories. Rather, the categories themselves are fashioned and refashioned. The 
clinical encounter involves not merely the assembly of an individual diagnosis. The 
diagnostic category… itself is being actively shaped and negotiated amongst experts.  
 












4.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
 
The clinical setting is a site of knowledge production (see, for example, 
Featherstone and Atkinson, 2012; Latimer, 2013) in that decisions made in this 
context inform and shape our understandings of disease and disorder, their 
aetiology, symptomatology and capacity for treatment. Diagnostic decision-
making is informed by its institutional setting and interactional context. This 
includes the potential for competing opinions, different disciplinary frameworks 
and varying levels of experience. Given the potential for uncertainty in autism 
(and perhaps other) diagnoses, how do clinicians both draw on and produce 
knowledge in this context? This section explores diagnostic uncertainty, 
narrative case-building, and how clinicians utilise different types of knowledge to 
come to assessment decisions. In particular it explores the role of experience 
within diagnostic decision-making in medicine and draws on ideas of objectivity 
and disciplinary knowledge.  
 
 
4.2 Knowledge and uncertainty 
 
4.2.1 The scientific method 
The medical profession seeks certainty: we rarely hear about society’s desire 
for diagnosis to become broader or less specific. Instead, it seems that there is 
a perpetual pursuit of precision, a striving for increased accuracy in diagnostic 
tests and the biomarkers that will remove uncertainty, alongside revisions of 
tools to enable clinicians to make ‘objective’ and robust decisions.  
 
It has been argued that the most effective form of decision-making in diagnosis 
should take the form of scientific hypothetico-deductive reasoning (see Elstein 
et al., 1978). This type of reasoning comprises a rigorous search for 
disconfirming evidence and enables decisions to be made between alternative 
hypotheses (White and Stancombe, 2003, p. 5). The development of evidence-
based medicine (EBM) stresses that medical decisions should be made with 
only the most current, highest quality, methodologically rigorous, scientific 




expert opinion and clinical reasoning (Engebretsen et al., 2015). Some argue 
that it must be possible to extract medical ‘truth’ from the clinical encounter 
without recourse to the individual views or knowledge of the clinician (critiqued, 
for example, by Greenhalgh, 2011; Timmermans and Berg, 2003).  
 
EBM translates to the clinic via clinical practice guidelines, based on current 
scientific evidence (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). As I will demonstrate later in 
Chapter Six, clinical guidelines for autism (and other conditions) include 
recommendations for the use of clinical judgement in decision-making. In 
practice, therefore, decision-making may deviate from this positivist model, 
because real-world decision-making is located, contextual and a human 
process, with all the difficulties and benefits this involves. Clinicians themselves 
value experience, specialist knowledge and an ability to incorporate patient 
preferences into their assessment, thereby immersing interpretation, 
experience, opinion and interaction at the core of the decision-making process.  
 
4.2.2 Critiques of the scientific method 
Despite the introduction of guidelines, gold standard diagnostic tests and other 
‘scientific’ procedures, Featherstone and others argue that attempts at 
standardisation do not succeed in determining clinical practice (Featherstone 
and Atkinson, 2012). The hypothetico-deductive method has been critiqued 
within the domain of the bio-psycho-social model where it is understood and 
acknowledged that, for example, patient experience should be valued and 
considered. Researchers also argue that the method of hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning, or information processing model, may have some merit in some 
situations, but this method of reasoning does not cope well with ambiguity, 
uncertainty or complexity (White and Stancombe, 2003). Encounters between 
patients and clinicians, and between clinicians, are conducted through language 
and therefore have potential for misunderstandings, inaccuracies and ‘false 
trails’ (White and Stancombe, 2003). Models such as pattern recognition (‘I 
know this is autism because I’ve seen it before’), intuitive reasoning and multi-
disciplinary consultations may be more appropriate and productive (Higgs and 





Similarly, others argue that EBM must integrate scientific evidence with clinical 
experience, patient values and preferences (Sackett et al., 1996). Recent 
critiques of EBM argue that interpretation should be central to the EBM process 
(Engebretsen et al., 2015; Greenhalgh, 2011). Greenhalgh argues that rather 
than attempting to rely on evidence alone, clinicians must, therefore, 
incorporate a ‘narrative-interpretive paradigm’ (Greenhalgh, 2011, p. 323) in 
their consultations. This narrative-interpretive approach should take into 
account experience, the patient’s culture and perspectives, and the results of 
scientific research (Greenhalgh, 2011). However, Engebretsen and colleagues 
argue that there is little guidance about how to apply these different knowledge 
components to decision-making (Engebretsen et al., 2015).  
 
4.2.3 Uncertainty in medical practice  
It is argued that uncertainty is central to medical practice (e.g. Beresford, 2006; 
Bursztajn et al., 1986) because diagnosis is an act of interpretation and involves 
transposing clinical research to the idiosyncrasies of the individual patient 
(Tanenbaum, 1993). Beresford suggests that uncertainty in diagnosis can be 
caused by inadequate scientific data, not knowing patients’ wishes or the 
problem of applying abstract criteria to concrete situations (Beresford, 2006).  
 
Medical sociologists have sought to challenge ideas of certainty in diagnosis 
more fundamentally, by raising questions about the nature of objectivity, 
challenging the concept of standardisation, and problematising the creation and 
recreation of medical knowledge as a certain entity. Studies have explored, for 
example, pharmaceuticals and neuroscience (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2014; McGoey, 
2009; Pickersgill, 2011); medical training (e.g. Atkinson, 1984; Fox, 1957; 
Timmermans and Angell, 2001); classification, patient/doctor interaction and 
diagnostic decision-making (e.g. Bowker and Star, 1999; Bursztajn et al., 1986; 
Hedgecoe, 2003; Star, 1989; Zayts et al., 2016); uncertainty as a resource for 
clinicians (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014; Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012); and 
uncertainty in medically unexplained or contested diagnoses (e.g. Armentor, 





I do not offer a full review of this body of scholarship here but instead include a 
small number of studies which provide a context for my PhD project. For 
example, early work by Fox (1957) examines the theme of uncertainty in her 
exploration of how medical students acquire knowledge. Fox proposes that 
there are different meanings of uncertainty in the way in which students develop 
their knowledge base. Firstly, there are the inherent limitations of medical 
knowledge generally. Secondly, the understanding of medical students is 
imperfect in that they cannot master all available knowledge. Thirdly, there are 
challenges for clinicians in distinguishing between the two (Fox, 1957). 
Uncertainty, therefore, may have different sources and implications for practice. 
 
Bursztajn and colleagues argue that medical culture denies uncertainty in the 
pursuit of the ‘objectively correct decision’ (Bursztajn et al., 1986, p. xi), which 
they term a ‘mechanistic paradigm’ (Bursztajn et al., 1986, p. xxvi). This 
mechanistic paradigm seeks certainty and can lead to over-diagnosis as 
clinicians make every effort to cover all bases and alleviate risk. Bursztajn and 
colleagues argue, instead, for a ‘probabilistic paradigm’ which accepts 
uncertainty as an inherent part of reality and questions whether subjective and 
objective knowledge can be separated. This approach, they argue, would bring 
medicine up-to-date with developments in physics, would recognise values and 
feelings as a core aspect of science and become a science of action and 
practice rather than of the laboratory (Bursztajn et al., 1986). Further, they 
argue that an acceptance of uncertainty enables shared risk-taking, mutual 
support and the possibility of trust-building between clinicians, patients and 
families. The probabilistic paradigm incorporates a capacity to doubt (Bursztajn 
et al., 1986). This approach would return to a ‘many-sidedness of reality’ that 
was lost in the over-simplification of medical science in the 19th century 
(Bursztajn et al., 1986, p. 63). 
 
4.2.4 Practical reasoning and experience 
Both Burszstajn and Fox’s studies have been critiqued as being too 
reductionist, with Atkinson, for example, suggesting that a general sociological 
focus on uncertainty as conventional wisdom lacks rigour (Atkinson, 1995). 




concept within medical sociology, certainty and uncertainty reflect different 
attitudes which may co-exist together (Atkinson, 1984). The ‘moral certainty’ 
(Atkinson, 1995, p. 116) of practical reasoning resides alongside the uncertainty 
of theoretical discourse. These are different sorts of knowledge, reflecting (at 
least) two different orientations towards knowledge and practice, and, according 
to Atkinson, are adopted in different settings. The moral certainty of practical 
reasoning, experience or routine, is adopted in day-to-day clinical practice; and 
the uncertainty of theoretical discourse is the knowledge of the laboratory 
(Atkinson, 1995). Paradoxically, Atkinson argues that it is personal knowledge – 
what might be termed clinical judgement or intuition – that is given the privileged 
place of certainty within medical decision-making. However, clinical judgements 
themselves are the products of social processes influenced and shaped by 
context, discourses, human interaction and the particular classification 
framework pertinent at the time of working (White and Stancombe, 2003).  
 
The framing of medical decision-making as practical reasoning, or as pragmatic, 
positions the clinician as one who, rather than engaging in information-
processing, can respond to the complexities of diagnosis by justifiably drawing 
on personal experience and judgement. Experience and personal opinion 
cannot necessarily be validated by scientific knowledge, but Atkinson argues 
that this is ‘not normally treated by practitioners as reflections of uncertainty but 
as warrants for certainty’ (Atkinson, 1995, pp. 114–115). In other words, clinical 
judgement is not considered by clinicians as a source of uncertainty but as a 
way to be sure, especially in the light of ambiguity or consideration of co-
conditions.  
 
Atkinson argues that Bursztajn and colleagues’ vivid examples of practice serve 
to illustrate that, contrary to their argument, the process of diagnosis is, in 
practice, far more complex than their argument of a mechanistic paradigm 
suggests. Atkinson suggests that there are changing local definitions of 
knowledge and action therefore uncertainty encompasses a complex set of 
attitudes towards knowledge and practical activity (Atkinson, 1995). Different 
orientations to uncertainty are reflected in different circumstances, for example, 




of different disciplines. How certainty or uncertainty is conveyed in these 
different settings, therefore, is key to what knowledge is drawn on and what kind 
of warrant that knowledge has (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Freidson’s classic text on the profession of medicine also considers the role of 
experience and reasoning in diagnosis, suggesting that clinicians have a 
particular perspective of their professional role which values pragmatic action 
and practical reasoning over theoretical approaches or acquisition of knowledge 
for its own sake (Freidson, 1970). He argues that clinicians must believe in the 
efficacy of her or his actions rather than attend to research that identifies the 
unreliability of diagnosis, or is rooted in uncertain findings, for example. These 
factors lead the clinician to be a pragmatist focussed on results and with an 
emphasis on emotional experience, rather than general concepts or 
probabilities. In this way the clinician comes to rely on the ‘authority of his (sic) 
own senses’ (Freidson, 1970, p. 170). The clinician therefore depends on a 
clinical mentality which is primarily individualistic and reliant on a personal bank 
of experience and knowledge (Freidson, 1970).  
 
It could be argued, therefore, that the science of medicine is filtered through the 
hands of the experienced clinician, which can outweigh any research-based 
evidence (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Experience places the clinician as 
‘one who knows’, and allows a space for interpretation and judgement. Reliance 
on experience might meet the challenge put forward by White and Stancombe 
(2003) in relation to the limitations of the hypothetico-deductive method: 
experience and specialist personal knowledge can navigate some of the 
uncertainties and interactional difficulties in making the diagnostic decision. A 
focus on experience may enable the clinician to find moral or pragmatic 
certainty within a context of conflicting evidence and inconclusive tests. For 
example, in psychiatric diagnosis, an interview study identified that psychiatrists 
deal with the institutionally-induced competing demands of diagnosis by 
engaging in ‘psychiatric workarounds’ such as negotiating diagnoses with 
patients or fudging codes on paperwork (Whooley, 2010). A workaround 




depends on the clinician making ‘moral sense’ (Leydon, 2018) of the diagnostic 
decision by taking into account the consequences for the patient.  
 
Timmermans and Buchbinder’s study of the genetic screening of babies 
considers how experience and judgement can be considered as a different type 
of ‘objectivity’ which is utilised to foster a sense of objective normality 
(Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). The authors describe three types of 
objectivity: narrative objectivity (e.g. parental report); mechanical objectivity (e.g 
growth chart); and disciplinary objectivity in the form of the physical examination 
(Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). However, the authors argue that medical 
authority – disciplinary objectivity – is privileged and therefore plays a ‘pre-
eminent role’ in assessment (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). The ability 
to foreground disciplinary objectivity, or trained judgement (Daston and Galison, 
2007) is particularly important, not simply to interpret test results when the 
results of diagnostic tests may be ambiguous, but as a strategy to make sense 
of uncertainty (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). The warrant to make this 
judgement is rooted in a cultural framework that privileges the health 
professional with ’the disciplinary eye’ (Daston and Galison 2007). This expert 
medical gaze (Featherstone and Atkinson, 2012) positions the clinician as one 
who ‘knows’, and who can therefore categorise and collate in a way that lay 
people cannot. As I will explore further in Chapter Eight, clinical expert 
judgement can take epistemic precedence over standardised tests, making the 
clinic a place where clinicians shape diagnostic categories through their 
practice.   
 
I would argue that diagnostic uncertainty is not necessarily problematic or a 
failure of medicine or individual medics, rather it is inherent to the interaction 
and social process of diagnosis (Malterud et al., 2017). It serves to illustrate the 
nature of scientific knowledge as partial, situated (Haraway, 1988) and socially 
created. An acceptance of the partial and constructed nature of our disease 
classification system may help us consider what diagnosis ‘does’ for people, not 
just individually, but for society and how we come to understand behaviour as 





4.2.5 Autism as an uncertain entity 
Atkinson argues for a detailed analysis of how clinicians locate the sources and 
nature of doubt, and how they express them discursively, within case 
discussions (Atkinson, 1995). Social science scholars have explored the 
‘practical uncertainty work’ undertaken by clinicians in practice (see Hollin, 
2017a; Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 2014, 2011). This work involves the 
implementation of strategies to overcome diagnostic uncertainty enabling 
diagnosis to take place. Above, I have explored uncertainty in diagnosis 
generally; this section considers uncertainty in the case of autism.  
 
Some scholars have explored the concept of uncertainty specifically in relation 
to autism as a condition (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2014; Hollin, 2017a, 2017b; Turowetz 
and Maynard, 2019). Hollin (2017b) has explored how the cognitive work of key 
autism researchers in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Frith, Happe and Baron-
Cohen, shifted autism into the cognitive domain as an explanatory framework. 
In doing so, the work of these researchers embedded the concept of 
heterogeneity as core to the definition of autism (Hollin, 2017a). Hollin considers 
how the belief that autism is a heterogeneous condition can be conceived as an 
‘agential cut’ – a point at which autism became one thing to the exclusion of 
others – which was a result of this early work of these autism researchers 
(Hollin, 2017a). Hollin argues that this incorporation of difference into one 
category has ethical considerations as it locates differences in behaviour within 
the condition of autism, rather than perceiving it as ‘dynamic, contextually 
dependent and co-produced’ (Hollin, 2017a, p. 628).  
 
Specifically, Hollin introduces the term ‘ontological indeterminacy’ into his 
concept of autism as a condition (Hollin, 2017a, 2017b). Rather than seeking to 
erase uncertainty, Hollin argues, researchers have effectively centralised it 
within the meaning of the condition itself. The result of this is that autism, in its 
heterogeneity, has become ‘determined by its indeterminacy’ (Hollin, 2017a, p. 
611). By definition, therefore, ‘no two individuals with autism are the same and 
an individual’s symptoms cannot be explained with reference to a single 




concept of autism as an ‘uncertain entity’ (Hollin, 2017b, p. 209), with the 
resulting implications for clinical and research practice.  
 
The concepts of practical uncertainty work and, in particular, Hollin’s ideas 
around ontological indeterminacy, are explored more fully later in relation to 
data collected as part of the PhD study (Chapters Seven and Eight). This 
section has explored how diagnosis is imbued with uncertainty (of different 
kinds and shifting across disciplines, settings and times), and how clinicians 
draw on what Freidson (1970, p. 172) calls ‘self-validating and self-confirming’ 
individualistic experience-laden understandings of different conditions ot make 
decisions. Those experience-based understandings contribute to constructing a 
condition in the image of that experience, with the circular and re-affirming 
consequences that brings. As Atkinson argues, we must look at how this 
happens in practice, and the following sections will look at the use of narrative 
in diagnostic decision-making and how clinicians diagnose in collaborative 
teams. 
      
 
4.3 Narrative case-building 
 
One way of reducing uncertainty, it is argued, is for clinicians to work together to 
create a coherent diagnostic narrative before relaying information back to the 
patient (Messer et al., 2018). If there are divergent conclusions, clinicians 
should give priority to those aspects they deem most important and be sure to 
come to a ‘firm conviction’ (Messer et al., 2018, p. 268). A lay person or patient 
might be intrigued by this ability to fit evidence into a classification despite 
divergent information. The development of ‘convinction’ from ‘uncertainty’ then 
is something that may happen in narrative case-building, which is explored in 
this section.  
 
4.3.1 Narrative and medicine 
There is a body of work which examines narrative in medical settings. For 
example, Hunter examined doctors’ case presentations and suggests the 




encapsulated within the doctor’s narrative (Hunter, 1991, p. 51). Other work 
includes Silverman’s examination of medical decision-making (Silverman, 
1987); clinical reasoning in occupational therapy (Mattingly, 1998, 1991); how 
clinical experience is invoked to ground diagnostic claims (Mischler, 1984); 
genetic counselling in paediatrics (Bosk, 1992); and how clinicians talk to 
patients (Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998; Byrne and Long, 1976) including extensive 
conversation-analytic studies into patient-doctor communication  (see, for 
example, Heritage and Maynard, 2011, 2006; Maynard and Heritage, 2005; 
Pilnick et al., 2009). 
 
There is also a large body of work, not dealt with here, related to the narratives 
of patients and individuals experiencing different conditions and diseases (for 
example see Charmaz, 1999; Frank, 2013; Kleinman, 1988; Riessman, 1990). 
Narratives can help to produce shared experiential meanings around particular 
conditions and have also increasingly been used as part of what is termed 
‘narrative based medicine’ whereby the meaning of patient experiences are 
used, particularly in general practice, to help decision-making (Greenhalgh, 
2011). Some argue that there is a shift from the dominant medical narrative 
being that of the clinician, to that of the patient and, indeed, that clinicians are 
increasingly incorporating patient narratives into their own case narratives 
(Kalitzkus and Matthiessen, 2009; Morris, 2006). 
 
4.3.2 What is a narrative? 
At its simplest, narrative is defined by a sequence of utterances which are 
organised in such a way as to be consequential for later action and to convey 
the meaning a speaker wants to communicate to their audience (Riessman, 
2008). Although there are various detailed accounts of what constitutes a 
narrative, Riessman argues that narrative must include a ‘sequenced storyline, 
specific characters and the particulars of a setting’, therefore, not every form of 
talk is framed by narrative structure (Riessman, 2008, p. 5). There are patterns 
in communication between people and, as I will discuss in Chapter Five, talk is 
designed to meet particular aims: to persuade, to account for, to position 




narrative matters, then, because only in certain forms does it become 
rhetorically persuasive (Riessman, 2008). 
 
Classic studies of narrative by Labov and Waletzky (Labov, 1972; Labov and 
Waletzky, 1967) are influential and important despite later developments which 
challenge or develop their strict structural approach (Riessman, 2008). At its 
most basic, they argue, a narrative takes the form of ‘a sequence of two clauses 
which are temporally ordered: that is, a change in their order will result in a 
change in the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation’ (Labov, 
1972, p. 360). In Labov’s study of the language of young black people in inner-
city US, he found that narrative story-telling formed a basic six-part structure: 
abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda 
(Labov, 1972) (see Figure 7). Each of these elements describes the function of 
a clause in the overall narrative and can be repeated to generate complex 
structures. Not all features need to be present. Labov and Waletzky argued that 
an important element to driving narrative forward was the temporal aspect of the 
story: certain elements have to be told in a particular order otherwise they will 
not make sense, although not all researchers agree with the importance of this 




Underlying question Purpose 
Abstract What was this about? Summarises the whole story 
 




Then what happened? Introduces event sequence or plot, usually a 
turning point 
 
Evaluation So what? Identifies the point of the narrative – 
comment on meaning for speaker and 
communicates emotions 
 
Resolution  What finally happened? States outcome of the plot 
 
Coda  Questions are no longer 
relevant 
Signals the narrative is finished 
 
 





4.3.3 Atkinson and case presentation 
Atkinson’s study of a haematology clinic observed how case presentation takes 
a narrative form which includes a common pattern of presentation of highly 
selected and compressed information; introductory statement, recent history, 
outline of physical examination, results of lab and other tests, and initiation of 
treatment (Atkinson, 1995). Atkinson argues that the rhetorical ability to tell 
appropriate stories is a tacit competency requirement of clinicians (Atkinson, 
1995). Medical practitioners, he argues, must effectively turn the results of tests 
and investigations into a plausible and persuasive story which serves to ‘justify 
past actions, current understandings and future plans’ (Atkinson, 1995, p. 90). 
These oral narratives are shaped in both formal (e.g. the ward round) and 
informal (e.g. passing conversations between colleagues) occasions and can be 
places where social control and status are enacted (Atkinson, 1995). Atkinson 
argues that this talk does not just reflect the work of the medical setting, but is in 
itself medical work, in that the case is produced by the talk about it (Atkinson, 
1995). Turowetz and Maynard also argue that being a competent clinician 
includes the ability to foreground diagnostically relevant ‘storyable’ episodes in 
order later to recount to colleagues, patients and families (Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2017).  
 
Atkinson argues that recounting the case in a medical context does more than 
communicating the facts of the case. As with other kinds of talk, individuals do 
things with words and, in case construction, clinicians may be giving good 
accounts of themselves (for example, in seeking particular actions in a timely 
fashion) or questioning the credibility or moral status of the patient or family 
(Atkinson, 1995). For example, White’s (2003) analysis of professional 
narratives in paediatrics and child health found that clinical talk is often 
underpinned with moral judgements about the family, including culpability. 
White argues that these characterisations provide a warrant for diagnosis and 
suggests that judgements about the adequacy of parental love are key to the 
clinical discussion (White and Stancombe, 2003). 
 
Goffman argues that some types of interaction develop an institutionalised form 




the purpose of the setting (Goffman, 1961). These interactions are constrained 
by particular ‘ground rules’ whereby each speaker conforms to their mutual 
obligation to those rules (Goffman, 1983). Strong developed this concept 
through an analysis of interaction between clinicians, patients and parents in 
two paediatric clinics in Scotland and the US to demonstrate what he terms the 
‘ceremonial order’ of the clinic (P.M. Strong, 1979, p. 12). Strong suggested that 
these roles, whilst structured, are not singular and specific to individuals, but 
can be seen repeatedly across encounters and settings (P.M. Strong, 1979). 
 
Atkinson’s analysis extends Strong’s notion of the ceremonial order of the clinic 
to explicate a highly formalised set of procedures through talk, which he terms a 
‘liturgy’ or sacred quality of case-talk (Atkinson, 1995, p. 94). Atkinson argues 
that clinicians assemble stories which produce and reproduce medical 
knowledge about particular medical conditions. It is through this recounting of 
stories that clinicians ‘reproduce the orthodoxies of medical thought, knowledge 
and talk’ (Atkinson, 1995, p. 5). Through recounting narratives, knowledge is 
produced by clinicians via the clinical setting, shaping how conditions are 
understood and communicated back to patients.  
 
Anspach examined the case presentation of clinicians in training and suggested 
that there are four key elements that are core to their presentational rhetoric 
(Anspach, 1988). Firstly, clinicians separate biological processes from the 
person, which she terms de-personalisation; secondly, clinicians use the 
passive voice which separates the speaker from the action, emphasising what 
was done rather than who did it; thirdly, clinicians treat technology, e.g. CT 
Scans or EEG’s, as an active agent; and finally they treat patients’ accounts as 
subjective (Anspach, 1988). Anspach highlights linguistic features, which 
demonstrate how clinicians achieve these actions, arguing that they serve to 
enact functions such as enhancing credibility, mitigating responsibility and 
downplaying patient accounts (Anspach, 1988). Atkinson argues that, although 
there are important features to note and analyse, Anspach fails to demonstrate 
how clinicians pull these features together to produce a case account which is 
plausible and persuasive (Atkinson, 1995). For example, in Atkinson’s own 




as more credible than others and includes threads of responsibility, judgement 
and culpability (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Atkinson proposes that the temporal order of the narrative is key to managing 
uncertainty and the establishment of credibility (Atkinson, 1995). For example, 
the chronological narrative of temporally-located facts and events serves to 
‘scaffold’ uncertainty within a framework of uncontested assertions (Atkinson, 
1995). The difference in how these events contribute to the diagnostic narrative 
can be found in how they are uttered as unproblematic and unmarked by 
hesitancy. In contrast, there are more complex statements about the patient, 
which are marked as tentative or uncertain, using, for example, hedging 
statements and approximations. Atkinson suggests that these case 
presentations, along with many others, follow the Labovian pattern as outlined 
above with the evaluative aspect of narrative used to communicate the moral of 
a story to peers (Atkinson, 1995). Overall, the narrative frame constricts the 
case as subject for medical talk and establishes the boundaries of what is 
important.  
 
Atkinson, therefore, demonstrates through data analysis how clinicians orient to 
the knowledge presented in different ways and argues that this orientation can 
mark each piece of information as more or less credible. These orientations to 
knowledge cannot be defined as simply being either certain or uncertain, rather 
degrees of certainty may be expressed and are embedded in talk. Contrastive 
rhetoric can apply blame or judgement and inscribe aspects of power between 
different medical disciplines and roles (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
4.3.4 Narrative in autism diagnosis 
An important body of work in the use of narrative in the diagnosis of autism has 
been undertaken by Turowetz and Maynard. I provided a brief overview of their 
research in Chapter Two: here I discuss specifically their examination of 
narrative structure in autism diagnosis across two time spans (1985 and 2014). 
The authors undertook a conversation analysis of meetings where clinicians 
discuss a case of a child’s diagnosis both with and without parents present 




A conversation-analytic approach to storytelling tends to examine the way in 
which turns of talk are structured interactively (see Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks, 
1992) and considers how interaction functions to make things happen and what 
clinicians produce through this interaction (Turowetz, 2015a). Turowetz and 
Maynard show how narrative works as a ‘mechanism for translating local, 
situated events into warrantable findings’ (Turowetz, 2015a, p. 73). With the 
conversation-analytic approach, narratives are shaped by a process of 
interpretation and interaction: how people respond to storied assessments 
contributes to the success, or otherwise, of diagnosis (Maynard and Turowetz, 
2019).  
 
The authors argue that diagnostic practices are narratively constructed whereby 
clinicians engage in storytelling to rule in, or out, a diagnosis of autism 
(Maynard and Turowetz, 2017). The authors argue that these systematic 
narrative practices of diagnosis are generic and cut across differences in time 
and social environments (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017). Narrative practices are 
shaped by an interactive process between tellers and recipients in real-time 
which involves assembling story components and types towards collaborative 
production of a narrative. The authors draw on Goffman’s (1983) concept of the 
‘interaction order’, briefly mentioned above, in the way that ‘ground rules’ are 
established for social interactional norms. Maynard and Turowetz describe how 
the microanalysis of face-to-face social interaction can contribute to 
understanding how clinicians ‘do diagnosis’ – as an active, inter-active, 
interpretive process rather than as a static classificatory exercise (Maynard and 
Turowetz, 2017). In particular, they argue that by examining this social 
interaction during diagnosis we can better understand the social organisation 
involved in all diagnosis, not only in the diagnosis of autism (Maynard and 
Turowetz, 2017).  
 
Maynard and Turowetz’s studies demonstrate how the diagnostic process takes 
a narrative form in four parts: preface (an introductory narrative); possible 
stories (either tendency or instantiation); typifications (categorical assertions 
which include diagnostic upshots); and story recipiency (how the story is 




Turowetz, 2017) (see Figure 8). This narrative structure is used to gradually 
build an evidential case for diagnosis. Tendency stories, or ‘habitual stories’ 
(Riessman, 1990), differ from instantiation stories (anecdotal instances of 
particular behaviour) in that they extend behaviour beyond the individual 
behavioural act (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017). Tendency stories serve to 
present the behaviour as habitual or recurrently atypical and therefore are 
implied to be more inherent or core to the child’s being rather than a one-off and 
perhaps situational occurrence. The authors assert, therefore, that narrative is 
part of ‘the practical epistemology of clinical work’ through which clinicians 
assign and adapt classification to specific individuals (Turowetz and Maynard, 
2017, p. 4). 
 
Preface Setting up the stories to follow 
 
Stories Either instantiation (single episode, reference to a single instance): or 
tendency (propensity to behave in a certain way) 
 
Typifications Relatively static, categorical assertions and assessments including diagnostic 
upshots 
 
Story recipiency Responses by others affecting how narrative is assembled 
 
Figure 8: Narrative structure for diagnosis in interaction (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017) 
 
Clinicians use what Maynard and Turowetz call ‘contrastive elements’ of both 
positive (away from diagnostic symptoms) and negative (associated with 
diagnostic symptoms) to enable ‘interactional progressivity’ towards diagnosis 
(Maynard and Turowetz, 2017, p. 265). This culminates in the creation of a 
coherent diagnostic narrative in preparation for communication of the 
assessment to parents and families. Particularly relevant to this thesis is the 
claim that this recurring narrative of instantiation, tendency and typification can 
be seen as a method for resolving uncertainty even with tentative diagnoses. 
 
More recent work from Maynard and Turowetz consolidates previous studies by 
exploring how narratives shift over time to accommodate different historical 
periods and incorporate contemporary classifications and understandings of the 
condition (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019). The delivery of diagnosis can include 




cultural phenomena not previously available (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019). 
Maynard and Turowetz argue that diagnosis is not just interpretive and 
interactive but interactional in that the success of the diagnostic narrative is 
dependent on how it is received and responded to by other clinicians and 
families (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019). The authors argue that ‘narrative 
discourse is dynamic – assembled in real time through ongoing talk and 
embodied conduct’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, p. 91). Drawing from 
Hacking, the researchers show how parents are complicit in ‘making up people’ 
in their response to the diagnostic narrative (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019).  
For example, in one case, parents resisted and refused the categorisation of 
both autism and MR for their son, despite ‘artful deployment of narrative 
practices’ by the clinician, thereby shifting the diagnostic narrative (Maynard 
and Turowetz, 2019, p. 98). Maynard and Turowetz describe this as an 
‘interactional accomplishment’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, p. 98) which has 
long-term consequences both for the child and for the diagnosis.  
 
Finally, these researchers found that clinicians use narrative as a method for 
differentiating autism from a possible co-condition. They demonstrate that 
narrative is a pervasive and endogenous practice for producing diagnostic 
decisions (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017) which involves foregrounding 
symptomatic behaviours and incrementally building a case to rule in or rule out, 
a diagnosis. They also argue that lay-actors, such as parents and caregivers, 
can ‘harness narrative structure’ by using stories that align with or challenge the 
findings of clinicians (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017, p. 21).  
 
In this section I have shown how the use of narrative can be a means to 
alleviate uncertainty and to shape contradiction into coherence. Narrative is 
created through interaction and this interaction shapes the narrative told. 
Narratives of diagnosis change and shift over time and, as we can see in the 
work of Maynard and Turowetz, are constructed in interaction and are shaped 
by contemporary understandings of a condition. The next section will look at 






4.4 Decision-making in teams 
 
Messer and colleagues (2018) argue that, in the field of rheumatology, where 
clinicians can often find themselves working alone, one strategy to help resolve 
uncertainty is to ensure consultation with colleagues. Consultation can include 
asking for advice, or working within multi-disciplinary teams (MDTs) (Messer et 
al., 2018). The authors argue that this is crucial to ‘shape opinion into a 
consensus’ (Messer et al., 2018, p. 268) prior to communicating with the 
patient. However, as I will argue, working with others may serve to alleviate 
uncertainty but also involves a further and complex layer of social interaction 
which impacts on decision-making. Furthermore, consulting between disciplines 
and with those with differing experience may introduce an element of competing 
medical authority. I will argue that it is the process itself that resolves 
uncertainty (through the dynamics of interaction), as consensus offers a way for 
clinicians to feel more confident in their diagnostic decisions. This section 
explores research which has examined discourse and interaction in team 
meetings. 
 
Most healthcare practitioners work in collaboration with others and it is 
considered especially important due to the growing complexity of healthcare 
and when dealing with complex or chronic health conditions (Croker et al., 
2000). In autism assessment, involvement of the MDT is generally 
recommended for both children and adults (NICE, 2012, 2011; RASDN, 2013, 
2011; SIGN, 2016). However, the team working context can vary between 
settings and practices. Teams may make decisions collaboratively, or 
separately and then report back to the team, work with patients as part of the 
team or use meetings to refer on or receive advice (Higgs and Jones, 2000). In 
MDTs, skills in communication, experience, understanding of roles and team 
dynamics can all play a part in team effectiveness (Croker et al., 2000).  
 
There have been many studies which broadly examine the effectiveness of 
collaborative decision-making in multi-disciplinary healthcare settings and which 
assess performance and outcomes of such meetings (e.g. Blazeby et al., 2006; 




However, for the purposes of this PhD I am particularly interested in studies 
which examine the collaborative and discursive elements of diagnostic decision-
making.  
 
4.4.1 Interaction in teams 
It is argued that the social complexities of medical work problematise attempts 
at standardisation, including the use of statistical and computerised models 
(Måseide, 2006). Evidence itself has no meaning without interaction and 
discourse to make it practically useful (Måseide, 2006). In his study exploring 
collaborative decision-making in a thoracic ward, Måseide found that evidence 
is a discursively generated, interactional product, suggesting that although 
‘aspects of nature’ (Måseide, 2006, p. 53) may not change, the meaning of facts 
and evidence change with their use in discourse. These discourses are made 
up of voices present and not-present: voices include those of the institution, 
voices of representation (i.e. of the diagnostic tool) as well as the mediated 
voices of patients and other professionals. Måseide argues that evidence is 
grounded in local interaction and ‘moral and situational considerations’ 
(Måseide, 2006, p. 53) which are made useful locally, rather than systematic 
scripts rooted in evidence-based medicine.  
 
Research within a gynaecological cancer MDT identified that clinicians 
prioritised disease-centred information over patient-centred factors, such as 
patient choice. The process of diagnosis was affected by the complexity of the 
case, the make-up of the team, and the extent of participants’ agreement 
(Kidger et al. 2009). Further work in a head and neck cancer clinic identified that 
the absence of the patient in MDT meetings led to the creation of an ‘evidential 
patient’ in discussions which focussed on clinical information, rather than 
patient-centred information, selectively-reported to steer the discussion one way 
or another (Hamilton et al. 2016).  
 
Where patients are not present in the meeting, they can be considered as  
‘implicated actors’ (Clarke and Star, 2008): actors who are silent or not present 
in an action which nonetheless has an impact on their lives. At this stage the 




represented, re-constructed and ‘talked into being’ (Nikander, 2003) by the 
team. In the course of this reconstruction of the patient, diagnosticians may 
assess the information given on the perceived credibility of the source (Cicourel, 
1990) thereby asserting a moral judgement. Hughes and Griffiths (1997) 
examined how moral and social discourses in a cardiology clinic contributed to 
ruling in (as deserving) or ruling out (as unsuitable) potential access to 
resources in the form of surgery or admission to a specialist neurological 
rehabilitation centre. Subsequent work by Griffiths found that resource 
pressures also came into play in referrals to Community Mental Health Teams 
(CMHTs) (Griffiths, 2001). Through a process of implicit as well as explicit 
categorisation, patients fall in or outside availability for services, which 
effectively defines the category of mental illness and enacts rationing of 
services through interaction (Griffiths, 2001). 
 
4.4.2 Power and epistemic authority 
Some researchers have explored power and epistemic authority (rights to 
particular knowledges) in MDTs. Smart and colleagues (2018b) consider power 
both in terms of the privileged power of the psychiatrist in the mental health 
setting as well as what they term the ‘expert power’ of the disciplinary specialist. 
Smart et al (2018b) argue that clinicians have ways of exerting ‘power over’ 
those without, either because of traditional hierarchies which place the medical 
doctor at the ’top’, or because of the ability to draw on their own specialist 
disciplinary knowledge. Epistemic order (focus on specialist disciplinary 
knowledge) rather than a traditional hierarchy (doctor at the top) provides 
opportunities for those with the most appropriate knowledge to be heard, and 
greater equality in discussions (Smart et al., 2018b). In addition, the disciplinary 
specialist may be able to assert ‘encountered authority’ (Dew et al., 2015) 
through having had more personal knowledge of the patient. Considering power 
in this way shapes it as interactional and fluid; traditional hierarchies can be 
trumped by domain specific expert power, and, the authors argue, need not be 
inherently problematic (Smart et al., 2018b). 
 
One study explored hierarchies and potential conflict in a ward round in a 




as low on an institutional hierarchy, but high on a social/experience hierarchy, 
such as registered nurses and social workers, engaged in ‘mitigating strategies’ 
to deal with potential disagreement. These strategies included deferential 
strategies (politeness) as well as empowering strategies (claiming authority 
through social hierarchy as care-giver) in order to disagree with clinicians with 
perceived higher status in the institutional hierarchy, for example, attending 
physicians (Graham, 2009). A study on teams in palliative care also found that 
questioning was used as an interactional device to save face and manage 
potential tensions (Arber, 2008).  
 
Housley’s work on role as an interactional device and resource in team 
meetings suggests that role is a mechanism by which different types of 
knowledge are inserted into the decision-making process (Housley, 1999). 
Examining interaction in social work meetings, Housley argued that 
membership categories are deployed as decision-making strategies. Team 
members negotiate and contest role, and, rather than being imposed from 
above, role is an ‘emergent property’ of participants’ work within meetings 
(Housley, 1999, p. 10.1). Roles, therefore, are interactively achieved and are 
contested and dynamic. Housley’s later work examines how knowledge is 
produced through interaction and conversation (Housley, 2000). Rather than 
occupying clearly defined and static positions, team members work together 
locally through structured and methodical interaction and discourse to achieve 
the interactional accomplishment of knowledge (Housley, 2000).  
 
4.4.3 Clinician interaction in autism assessment 
There is a smaller body of work examining how clinicians assess autism in 
MDTs by examining interaction. One recent study (Parish, 2019), briefly 
mentioned in Chapter Two, observed two autism assessment teams in the UK. 
Parish found that clinicians presented information in an uncertain manner and 
used strategies to encourage participants to elaborate on information. This 
study asserts that team decision-making can reduce cognitive bias, as 
‘conversational cues’ that encourage elaboration may make clinicians more 





The extended body of work by Maynard and Turowetz, which includes 
discussions without the patient present (termed ‘backstage’), has been 
discussed in Chapter Two and in this chapter in Section 4.3.4. One particular 
aspect of these backstage discussions noted by the authors, is that the lack of 
presence of the patient or family enables preparation for later diagnostic 
delivery to the family. The clinicians are then able to present themselves with a 
unified and ‘jointly determined’ response in terms of both the content and style 
of delivery (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017). 
 
Studies examining discourse, therefore, have the potential to examine how 
decision-making is socially and interactionally bounded (Halvorsen, 2015) and 
how decisions are woven with temporal, spatial, sequential and interactional 
aspects. Examining interaction in decision-making can render problematic the 
notion of straightforward, context-free decision-making processes (Boden, 
1994). Rather, interaction within MDTs are ‘occasioned, locally ordered, 
situated, interactionally achieved resources for getting the day’s work done’ 
(Housley, 1999, p. 1.4). 
 
 
4.5 Concluding comments 
 
To conclude, studies have shown that, despite best efforts at standardisation, 
decisions in teams are made through interaction and discourse and therefore 
are not just complicated by social and contextual factors but are, in themselves, 
social products.  
 
The next section outlines the methodological framework for this PhD study and 
describes in detail the study design of each of the three empirical studies which 
















CHAPTER FIVE: Methods and Approach 
 
       
Academic study, but in fact all aspects of experience, are based on acts of 
classification, and the building of knowledge and interpretations is very largely 
a process of defining boundaries between conceptual classes, and of labelling 
those classes and the relationships between them…Seen this way, language 
ceases to be a neutral medium for the transmission and reception of pre-
existing knowledge. It is the key ingredient in the very constitution of 
knowledge. 
 










5.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
 
This chapter describes the methodological and theoretical approach to the PhD 
as a whole, and then outlines the research question, method and analytic 
approach for each study.  
 
5.1.1 Rationale for PhD 
Diagnosis is traditionally thought of as a way to identify underlying biological 
problems that cause disease. Scholars working in the field of sociology have 
problematised that, claiming diagnosis is a social process that involves multiple 
actors and is context specific (see Blaxter 1978; Brown 1995; Jutel 2009, 2013; 
Jutel and Nettleton 2011).  
 
The condition of autism is a powerful case study for exploring diagnosis and its 
meaning: autism has uncertain aetiology, there are no biomarkers in regular 
clinical use, diagnostic classifications have shifted and expanded and 
symptoms are considered to be widely heterogeneous. In addition, 
approximately 70% of people who are diagnosed are considered to meet criteria 
for at least one other psychiatric condition (NICE, 2011). Furthermore, autism 
assessment is based primarily on the observation of behaviours which can be 
ambiguous and dependent on context, and are therefore open to interpretation. 
I was interested in how diagnosticians manage to be clear and unambiguous 
about the borderlines between classifications. 
 
Autism is considered to be a lifelong condition, and therefore it is important to 
understand how we assign the label to a person. This has implications not only 
for the individual and their family, but also for a wider society and how we 
understand ‘normal’ or typical behaviour, what we do about it, and how that 
contributes to the values we have and the judgements we make about people in 
daily life.  
 
Empirical work in autism diagnostic team interaction 
Previous studies, as outlined in Chapters Two to Four, have explored 




medical classification and examined the construction of conditions in 
ethnographic work and in patient-doctor interaction. There remains, however, 
very little empirical work undertaken on how clinicians make a diagnosis of 
autism together by observing clinical practice in situ. In particular there is little 
research on how clinicians work together in team meetings to resolve 
uncertainties inherent to diagnosis of the condition. I have found three 
exceptions to this. Firstly the extensive work of Maynard and Turowetz explores 
the process of autism assessment of children across two time spans, including 
multi-disciplinary ‘pre-staffing’ meetings – case conferences where the patient 
and diagnosis is discussed. This body of work examines the way in which a 
clinical category of autism is constructed by, and for, diagnosticians in the clinic, 
through talk. However, this work is entirely within a US context and with 
diagnosis of children. Further work by Rossi (2012) represents an important 
contribution to the field and again examines diagnosis of children in a US 
context. Finally, Parish (2019) observed MDT meetings in children’s services in 
the UK where diagnosis of autism was discussed. However, this work, whilst an 
important insight into working practices, does not consider the findings in 
relation to wider debates around medical uncertainty or the construction of 
disease categories.  
 
I was keen to include adult assessment in this PhD study as this is a particular 
gap in the literature. The increased trend towards diagnosis of adults in the UK 
suggests that, as an institution, medicine has a warrant to retrospectively 
explain a person’s behaviour within a contemporary understanding of autism. 
By this I mean that someone who might not have been considered autistic in the 
past, or have had access to an autism assessment, can now have their 
historical behaviour assessed in the light of contemporary understandings of the 
condition, rather than the understanding that might have been commonplace in 
their childhood. This has implications for the assessment process. There is less 
likelihood of accessing a well-documented developmental history for an adult, 
for example, therefore there is an increased reliance on a patient or family’s 






Social factors in diagnosis 
I was interested in the social factors, or social framing, embedded in the 
diagnostic process of autism. My understanding of social factors was initially 
influenced by a study of the barriers to accurate diagnosis of heart failure in 
primary care settings (Fuat et al., 2003). This study informed an understanding 
of ‘social factors’ which included time constraints on clinicians, lack of 
availability of tests, patient preference and training limitations. However, as the 
project progressed, the concept of social factors broadened to include, for 
example, the interaction between clinicians and other agents such as the 
diagnostic tool, or non-present patient (for discussion of this conceptual shift, 
see Section 5.8).  
 
From the literature review, I became interested in how clinicians negotiate 
ambiguity and uncertainty in assessment, and felt that this would give some 
insight into the contemporary meaning of autism and its social framing. 
 
I chose to observe team meetings where diagnostic decisions were made. 
Although partly pragmatic, in that observing the whole assessment process 
would not have been possible within the scope of the PhD, the team 
assessment meeting is one that typically takes place ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 
1959; Maynard and Turowetz, 2017) without patients present. Therefore, this 
meeting is a place where clinicians can talk about the patient and the condition 
without recourse to shaping the discourse in a way that is acceptable or 
understandable to the patient. Consequently it is a place where I considered it 
would be possible to gain some insight into how clinicians draw on, and shape, 
meaning in the diagnostic process and autism, collectively. Here is where we 
see diagnosis ‘in the making’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017). 
 
The core of the PhD, therefore, was designed as an observational study, with 
supporting studies to include a review of clinical guidelines and a set of 
interviews. The research questions were kept deliberately broad to enable an 






5.1.2 Study Design 
 
PhD Aims and Objectives 
The aims of the PhD were to explore social factors in autism diagnosis in 
secondary care; and to understand how clinicians collaboratively make 
diagnostic decisions in autism assessment. The thesis had the following 
objectives:  
 
a) To undertake a review of clinical guidelines in use in the UK and consider 
where, within those guidelines, social factors and influences are taken 
into account (study one) 
b) To document and analyse discussions made in MDT meetings (or local 
equivalent) to identify social and interactional processes (studies two and 
three) 
c) To gather views and experiences of clinicians involved in the diagnostic 
process via interviews (study four) 
d) To contribute to a social understanding of diagnosis 
 
Research Questions 
The PhD asked the questions:  
 
1. What diagnostic guidelines are available for clinicians assessing 
children and adults for autism in the UK; and how does guidance reflect 
social factors and influences? 
2. How do healthcare professionals make diagnostic decisions in 
specialist autism assessment team meetings? 
3. How do clinicians understand autism and diagnosis in secondary 
care?  
 
The PhD project comprised four inter-related studies: 
 
a) Review of clinical guidelines, existing diagnostic classifications and 
assessment processes to map the social process of diagnosis and 




b) Observation of specialist autism assessment team meetings where 
diagnostic decisions are made to identify themes (study two) and 
interactional processes (study three) 
c) Interviews with clinicians involved in the diagnostic process to explore 
understandings around autism and diagnosis (study four) 
 
The four inter-related studies were designed to inform each other. The clinical 
guidelines review provided a context for the other studies, in that it produced a 
potential reference point and also enabled an informed approach when 
interviewing clinicians and observing meetings. The interviews and team 
meetings observation happened concurrently, with data collection taking place 
between October 2017 and October 2018. A visual representation of the PhD 
can be found at Figure 9, although it should be noted that there was some time 
overlap between data collection and analysis. 
 
  
Figure 9: Overview of PhD study 
 
5.2 Recruitment and selection of assessment services 
 
5.2.1 Recruitment  
Autism diagnosis is generally undertaken by multi-disciplinary teams (MDTs) in 
secondary care, comprising a range of health professionals including, for 




nurse practitioners. I therefore recruited to include specialist autism assessment 
teams in secondary care. I purposively sampled to ensure both adult and child 
settings to include a range of sites in the study.  
 
Ten sites in total were considered for inclusion after promoting the study 
through a list of contacts drawn together by the wider Exploring Diagnosis 
project and through the NIHR Clinical Research Network. Two sites were 
excluded due to the absence of regular diagnostic decision-making meetings 
and one site decided they were unable to be part of the study due to other 
commitments. Three further sites expressed interest in the study but were 
excluded for reasons of geography. 
 
Four sites (teams) took part in the study, two of which were adult autism 
assessment services, two of which were children and young people’s (C&YP) 
assessment services. One of the C&YP sites specialised in adolescent 
assessment (14+). All sites were in the south of England and were NHS 
providers within NHS Health Trusts. Although I had initially assumed all teams 
would be multi-disciplinary, one team was single-disciplinary. However, I 
decided to include this team in the study as the setting met the inclusion criteria 
outlined in Section 5.2.2. I consider some of the implications of the ‘single-
disciplinary’ approach in Chapter Ten. 
 
A limitation of the study was that sites were primarily self-selecting, and further 
selected by myself on the basis of locality for practical reasons of access. 
Details about sites and settings are given in Section 5.2.4.  
 
5.2.2 Inclusion criteria 
To take part, teams had to be engaged in autism assessment and be made up 
of healthcare professionals actively engaged in autism assessment in 






5.2.3 Sampling, saturation and information power 
The qualitative concept of ‘saturation’ is generally used to decide when data 
collection should cease. Data saturation is based on the point at which 
additional data fails to generate new information (Morse, 1995). However, this 
term makes the positivist assumption that it is possible to reach definitive and 
truthful conclusions from more data (and a specific amount of it) rather than less 
data (Braun and Clarke, 2013) making it more problematic to apply to a study 
with constructionist roots (Malterud et al., 2016). (See section 5.4 for discussion 
of my theoretical perspective). Furthermore, the concept of saturation is drawn 
from a particular methodology (grounded theory) and is therefore not always 
applicable to other qualitative methods or consistently applied (Malterud et al., 
2016). 
 
Instead I used Malterud et al’s concept of ‘information power’, which is a way in 
which researchers can more clearly specify the sampling strategy to 
demonstrate how it might meet the aims of the study (Malterud et al., 2016). 
This concept suggests that with data that are very rich (with greater information 
power), fewer participants are required. How much data are required depends 
on the aim of the study, sample specificity, use of established theory, quality of 
dialogue and analysis strategy. Malterud et al (2016) propose, therefore, that 
the focus for sampling should be on the potential for acquisition of new 
knowledge rather than number of participants. 
 
In this study, although my research aim was broad (how clinicians make 
collaborative diagnostic decisions), my sample specificity was narrow and 
specialist (clinicians involved in diagnosis) and I was able to involve a range of 
clinical disciplines within a smaller number of meetings/participants. My aim was 
exploratory, but the theoretical framework within the sociology of diagnosis field 
meant that the focus was highly specific. My data were to be analysed in detail 
on a case by case basis, with a discursive analytic strategy, meaning that fewer 
participants would be required.  
 
Nevertheless, an anticipated number of participants and meetings was required 




teams on the basis that this would give me the data required to undertake a 
productive analysis and be manageable within the scope of a PhD study. 
However, after eighteen meetings I felt the data was adequate to meet the aims 
of the study on the basis that this is an exploratory study with the aim of offering 
new insights within the sociology of diagnosis framework. The number of 
interviews (sixteen) was restricted to participants in the observation study.  
 
5.2.4 Site details 
A summary of each of the four teams can be found in Table 6.  
 
Adult Site 1 
Adult Site 1 is a specialist Adult Autism and ADHD (Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder) Assessment team. The team is commissioned to 
provide adult assessment services across two NHS Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) with a total population of approximately 1.17 million served by 
146 GP practices. The team provides screening, assessment and diagnostic 
services, training and support for other trust staff, signposting to other services 
and a support group for those diagnosed. 
 
Unusually for this study, the team is a (primarily) single-disciplinary team made 
up of Clinical Psychologists. There is an occasional attendance from other 
professionals (Peer Support Worker, Police Officer) primarily for observation 
purposes. Cases are brought to a weekly Case Review Meeting (CRM) for 
discussion with team members. Five CRM meetings were observed.  
 
Adult Site 2 
Adult Site 2 is a specialist Adult Autism Assessment team established in 2015. 
The service offers diagnosis to adults who have no previous diagnosis of 
learning disability, as well as brief interventions and advice. The team is 
commissioned by the local CCG to provide adult autism assessment services 
across an area made up of 42 GP practices with 322,616 registered patients. 
The population is diverse and highly transient with approximately 37% of 







Site Team make-up  
(not all team members at every 









discussed at each 
meeting 





Clinical Team Manager; Clinical 
Psychologists (CPo) (x4), Assistant 
Clinical Psychologists (ACP) (x3); Peer 
Support Worker. (Occasional input 
sought from other professionals 
outside the team).  
Rural Weekly To discuss selected 
cases for 
assessment 
(referrals dealt with 
separately) 
2.2 (assessments) Over 18; registered 
with GP in area; 
Include LD if able to 
manage assessment 
process; must not 
have been previously 
assessed. 
 




Team Manager (TM); Consultant 
Psychiatrists (CPi) (x2); Occupational 
Therapist (OT); Medical Secretary; 
Social Worker; Speciality Doctor; STS 
Psychiatrist.  
 
Urban Weekly To discuss all cases 
for assessment and 
decide on referrals 
4 (assessments); 
6 (referrals and 
administrative 
discussions)  
Over 18; registered 
with GP in area.  
ADOS (OT or TM); 
ADi-R or 3Di (CPi) 
C&YP 
Team 1 
Clinical Team Manager (CTM); 
Consultant Psychiatrists (CPi) (x2); 
Clinical Psychologist; (CPo) Senior 
Manager (SM); Speech & Language 
Therapist (SLT); Educational 
Psychologist (EP); Autism 
Practitioner (AP) (x2); Senior 
Administrator. 
 








2.6 (referrals and 
administrative 
discussions)  
Children and young 
people up to 18 
ADOS (CTM or SLT or 
AP);  
3di or other 




Consultant Psychiatrist (CPi); Clinical 
Psychologist (CPo) (x2); Clinical 
Psychologist; Senior Nurse; 
Foundation Doctor. 
Urban Weekly To discuss current 
case for assessment 
(referrals dealt with 
separately) 
1 (assessment) Young People aged 
14 and over; must be 
registered with GP in 
area 
ADOS (CPo);  
3Di (CPi) 
 




(Adult site 2 continued) The team is multi-disciplinary and made up of part-time 
staff who also work in other services such as the Learning Disability team. Four 
meetings were observed. 
 
C&YP Site 1 
C&YP Site 1 is a specialist children and young people’s Autism Spectrum 
Assessment Service. The multi-disciplinary assessment service was 
established in 2012, with diagnosticians drawn together from different services. 
The dedicated specialist autism assessment team as currently constituted, 
however, was formed more recently and since 2017 has been part of CAMHS. 
A lead clinician undertakes preparatory work which determines the type of 
assessment required (complex or straightforward, for example). The 
assessment outcome can happen through discussion on the day of 
assessment, or, for more complex cases, at an MDT meeting. 
 
The team is part of a wider assessment service which comprises 128 GP 
services across a population of 1.2 million. Since inclusion in this study, the 
service has undergone changes due to a new alliance of NHS Trusts which may 
have impacted on working practices. Five meetings were observed.  
 
C&YP Site 2 (14+) 
C&YP Site 2 is an adolescent autism assessment clinic which sits within 
specialist CAMHS in a large city and was established in 2014. The specialist 
team is separate from the under-14 multi-agency children’s service to ensure 
that adolescents who are likely to have additional mental health difficulties or 
other co-conditions benefit from this specialist team. The service covers a 
geographical area which comprises 42 GP practices with 322,616 registered 
patients. The team provides assessment and a psychoeducation group for 
parents. Four meetings were observed.  
 
Assessment pathway in participating sites  
There were some differences in the diagnostic pathway within different teams, 
for example, in childrens’ services, referrals could come from a paediatrician. 




within teams depending on the complexity of the case (See Figure 10). For 
example, further tests or information were sought if there was a lack of clarity, 
complicating co-conditions or difficulty conducting the assessment. All teams 
had a core assessment which utilised a form of clinical interview and an ADOS 
assessment and, wherever possible utilised further developmental information 
or reports. One team (Adult Team 1) regularly used other tests such as 
‘Reading the mind in the eyes’ test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) for more 
complex or uncertain cases.  
 
  
Figure 10: Autism assessment pathway in participating sites 
 
 
5.3 Ethics and consent 
 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Exeter Medical School 
(UEMC) ethics committee in March 2017 (Ref: Mar17/B/114) and by the Health 
Research Authority (HRA) (Ref: 220180) in July 2017 for the observation and 
interview studies (see Appendix 2: Ethical Approval). The review of clinical 
guidelines was not subject to ethical approval. 
 
An application to be included in the NIHR (National Institute of Health 
Research) portfolio was granted in August 2017. Approval for further sites was 




mechanisms were established on an individual basis with all Trusts involved in 
the project.  
 
5.3.1 Participant Consent 
For both the observation and interview study, sites were sent an information 
pack prior to participation which included participant information sheets 
(Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheets) and consent forms (Appendix 4: 
Participant Consent Forms). I made visits to teams, or had detailed phone 
conversations prior to recording to ensure that everyone understood the 
consent and confidentiality procedures. Agreement was made about dates and 
the number of times I would attend to record meetings and conduct interviews. 
All participants were able to contact me directly with any queries or concerns.   
 
For the observation study, consent form and information sheets were available 
at every meeting in the event of new participants attending. Full consent was 
obtained prior to recording. In addition, a meeting attendance sheet was 
distributed and completed (Appendix 5: Meeting Attendance Sheet).  
 
5.3.2 Patient Consent 
The study was focussed on how staff work together and I had no direct contact 
with patients. It was therefore agreed by both UEMC and HRA Ethics 
Committees that we should observe strict patient confidentiality and anonymity 
procedures, but that individual patient consent was not necessary for this study. 
In another study examining healthcare meetings where the patient is absent, it 
was considered to be unethical to seek patient consent as it may increase 
pressure on the patient (Smart et al., 2018a). Each site managed its own 
consent procedure for patients discussed in meetings.  
 
5.3.3 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Steps were taken to ensure patient anonymity. No identifying information about 
patients (name, NHS number, date of birth, address, postcode or GP 
registration) were recorded as part of this study and access to patient records 
was not required. Data were anonymised with patient ID numbers replacing 




Patient Data Form). Names and identifying information of patients were 
‘bleeped out’ from the audio recording. Any non-anonymised audio (e.g. on 
video recordings) was stored on an encrypted secure drive accessible only at 
the University site. Data (audio and transcriptions) were stored on a secure 
drive accessible only to myself for the course of the PhD study. The video and 
audio data files and accompanying transcriptions were identified by a meeting 
ID number. Pseudonyms for participants and patients were used in all 
transcriptions, data analysis, and reporting.  
 
It is a condition of funding that the data be made available for open access. To 
protect patient and clinician confidentiality the data was further anonymised 
before archiving with the UK Data Service 
(http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/). An additional security measure was put in 
place which necessitates a request for data access prior to use.  
 
 
5.4 Theoretical perspective 
 
5.4.1 Social constructionism 
The study took a social constructionist approach within a sociology of diagnosis 
framework. The sociology of diagnosis framework assumes that diagnosis 
cannot be separated from wider influences of human agency and deliberation 
(Jutel, 2011). This approach challenges the taken-for-granted fit of diagnostic 
categories to their conditions and instead considers them as socially framed 
and shaped by wider social forces and interaction (Brown, 1995). This approach 
is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
 
Epistemologically, I worked from a position which assumes that meaning is 
socially produced and reproduced rather than being primarily located within the 
individual (Burr 1995). This social constructionist approach makes the 
epistemological assumption that we create meaning collectively through our 
interactions and experiences of the world, whilst at the same time 
acknowledging that we experience the world as ‘real’. In this sense, the project 




as healthcare practitioners. However, it also interrogates the meaning we create 
around the experience of ‘being autistic’, the societal judgements and 
assumptions we make about those with the condition as well as the process of 
diagnosis. As articulated by Hacking, one definition of social construction is that 
an entity (such as mental health and how we understand it) could be 
constructed differently (Hacking, 2000). It is possible, therefore (as can be seen 
through the history of our understanding of autism), to take different positions 
on what autism means and how behaviours are interpreted. My constructionist 
approach, therefore, means that I approached the PhD project by exploring how 
autism is constructed through the work of clinicians, rather than examining how 
clinicians identify autism as a condition. 
 
5.4.2 Social constructionism and relativism 
One difficulty with social constructionism is that it considers that there is no one 
‘truth’, rather there are different constructions of reality which depend on 
specific cultural and historic factors (Burr, 1995). This relativist approach is 
problematic for critical approaches to examining data: it renders all viewpoints 
as equally valid or invalid. But as researchers, by asserting our own analysis as 
valid, we render others less valid. However, social constructionism is concerned 
with how knowledge is produced by and through culture, language and 
discourse, therefore is an important core ‘value’ for examining how language 
both constructs and is shaped by institutions and social conditions.  
 
Therefore, unlike more radical approaches to social construction, I also borrow 
from the work of Elder-Vass (Elder-Vass, 2012a, 2012b) who advocates for a 
socially constructionist realism (or realist social construction). Although this 
approach comes from a critical realist position, it embraces the notion of social 
construction and asserts that it is possible for (some versions of) critical realism 
and social constructionism to be compatible. The critical realist approach 
argues that all events are caused by ‘multiple interacting causal powers’ which 
includes individuals and institutions (Elder-Vass, 2012a). The combination of 
‘powers’ is always contingent and therefore critical realism is anti-positivist in 
that happenings or entities cannot be regular or entirely predictable (Elder-Vass, 




consider that entities cannot easily exist independently of how we think or speak 
about them. This is not to say that, for example, pain isn’t ‘real’ for the person 
experiencing it; rather pain and our understanding of pain differs according to 
culture, environment and historical period. My interest is not in whether autism 
exists or not as an independent biological entity, but in how we understand 
autism as a condition and its diagnosis, and what that means for those 
experiencing both autism and diagnosis, as well as for wider society.   
 
The way in which we come to ‘know’ some entities over others is rooted in 
power relationships and histories, therefore, we can challenge the orthodoxy of 
what is known and how it is known by taking a critical and constructionist 
approach to research. This approach does not privilege one view over another; 
however, it does seek to consider those views that might not otherwise be 
privileged or foregrounded. 
 
 
5.5 Discursive Psychology Analysis and Social Construction 
 
5.5.1 Discursive psychology 
A social constructionist approach to the study aligns with the method of analysis 
of study three, discursive psychology, and, to a lesser extent, study two. 
Discursive psychology is concerned with how particular versions of reality are 
constructed, negotiated and deployed in conversation (Willig, 2008). This 
approach moves away from an interest in cognition or underlying mental states 
and instead seeks to understand how knowledge is ‘talked into being’ through 
discursive devices (Willig, 2008).  
 
Discursive psychology takes a relativist position, in that there is no one ‘truth’ 
about the world, rather there are different discursive constructions of the world 
that are enacted through language specific to particular settings and 
conversational contexts (Willig, 2008). Our objects of study cannot be separated 
from our representations of them (Wiggins, 2017). Importantly, the researcher 
plays an active role in the construction of knowledge and acknowledges that 




version of discursive analysis utilised in this PhD is one in which discourse is 
examined to understand how participants use language to achieve particular 
social actions and objectives, such as blame or accountability. 
 
At its simplest, discourse can be considered to be any form of spoken or written 
language (Wiggins, 2017). Burr extends this to define discourse as ‘a set of 
meanings, metaphors, representation, images, stories, statements…that in 
some way together produce a particular version of events’ (Burr, 1995, p. 48). 
Discourse analysts emphasise that exploring language in use helps us to 
understand how the language we use is embedded within social, political and 
cultural frames, and how it both reflects and shapes social order (Jaworksi and 
Coupland, 1999). Exploring discourse in the specific context of diagnostic 
assessment meetings therefore, enables us to examine how language is used 
to shape the diagnostic process, to make day-to-day decisions and, as Jaworski 
and Coupland would argue, to constitute knowledge of the medical category of 
autism (Jaworksi and Coupland, 1999).  
 
Discourse is both constructed and constructive of reality, is situated in a 
particular context (Wiggins, 2017) and expressed through cultural resources 
such as words, gestures and ‘culturally available phrases and expressions’ 
(Wiggins, 2017, p. 10). This relativist approach means that we question how we 
know what we know about the world and how that understanding is shaped by 
social practices (Wiggins, 2017).  
 
5.5.2 Discourse in medical settings 
In relation to health and wellbeing, as a society we have constructed (and 
continue to shape and construct) a sense of what it means to be healthy and, in 
contrast, what it means to be unwell. This construct is only in part related to 
people’s symptoms of disease; whilst diagnostic classification systems could be 
considered to be objective measures of physical and mental illness, they have 
themselves already been shaped, or constructed, by society and are dependent 
on human interpretation in each moment of diagnosis or assessment. In this 
way, discourse (how we name and talk about entities) shapes reality, and our 




meaning depending on the contemporary political, economic, health and social 
context.  
 
In diagnosis, the clinician comes to the diagnostic moment with a history of 
specialist training and experience, and their ability to diagnose is specifically 
framed by this experience. Their process of diagnosis – from the moment of 
reading medical notes, meeting the patient, assessing the patient, discussing 
assessment with co-clinicians, through to diagnostic delivery, use of particular 
diagnostic tools, and recommendations for treatment – is only possible by 
drawing on meanings and understandings that are currently culturally available 
to allow this process. 
 
The medical condition, therefore, is constructed through the sense-making 
practices of particular groups of people, at particular times, in particular 
contexts. In autism, one aspect of how clinicians jointly create the category of 
autism is through how they discuss the condition together in assessment 
meetings. Lay people can only speculate about diagnosis (and frequently do) 
but, no matter how knowledgeable, they lack the recognised framework of 
expertise to definitively diagnose (because that is exclusively linked to training 
and role) as well as society’s permission to hold the privileged position of being 
able to bestow diagnostic labels on individuals. Ultimately only clinicians have 
the warrant to diagnose because society has framed diagnostic power within a 
context of health provision, attached to specific specialist health practitioners 
and tied to a specific classification framework. 
 
5.5.3 Key concepts in discursive psychology 
Wiggins argues that discourse is situated within specific interactional contexts, a 
rhetorical framework, and the turn-taking sequence of interaction (Wiggins, 




The context of talk frames the talk itself. Each setting for talk has its own rules, 




conversation between friends has its own, perhaps informal, rules and, in 
addition, each participant may have a specific role. In institutional contexts, 
such as in the clinic, rules and roles are more explicitly framed and delineated. 
There are expectations of the clinician in this role which are different from those 
of the patient which, in turn, differ from those of the administrator, and these in 
themselves differ inside and outside the clinic. Within each of those categories 
too, individuals performing different roles will have within that role different 
expectations at different times. What each individual says in that context is not 
only produced by the context but shapes it (Wiggins, 2017). This creates a set 
of social practices which become the ‘norm’ for interaction in that context and 
create meaning which is jointly understood.  
 
For example, in the assessment meeting, the way in which a clinician describes 
the behaviour of a patient is both shaped by the setting and shapes how the 
rest of the team, in context, consider the assessment of that person. Even 
allowing for individual differences of presentation, experience, enthusiasm or 
knowledge, a pattern of discursive interaction is present which is framed by, and 
frames, the social action of the meeting: the assessment decision. 
 
Rhetorical framework  
Discourse constructs one version of events over and above others and, 
although it can appear that there can be only one version and therefore one 
outcome, by constructing that one path, other, alternative versions are 
undermined (Wiggins, 2017). If discourse in context, therefore, shapes our 
understanding of reality, then it can be assumed there are potential different 
understandings of that reality that could have been utilised (Wiggins, 2017). The 
assessment process for diagnosis of autism constructs the choice available to 
clinicians as ‘this person has autism’ or ‘this person does not have autism’. 
Rhetorically, the choice for clinicians in this context is a binary one. The 
diagnostic moment does not allow for a diagnostic outcome to be ‘a little bit 
autistic’, or ‘almost autistic but not quite’, or ‘not autistic now but perhaps in the 
future’: these outcomes, although possible, fall under ‘not diagnosed’. 
Simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, however, the complexity of 




for all these options. So whilst there may be discussion of autistic ‘traits’, or of 
‘nearly meeting the threshold’ in assessment meetings, an individual emerges 
from this process with a diagnosis of autism or not: traits, uncertainty or ‘watch 
and wait’ are not, diagnostically, autism, even although they may be available 
as outcomes.  
 
The rhetorical ‘allowance’ in the clinic, therefore, is for one thing or another 
(having autism or not). This production context of rhetorical allowances is key to 
diagnostic decision-making based, as it is, in one version of reality which 
defines the process: this person can only be one thing or another and here are 
the criteria by which we need to assess this. Clinicians construct one version of 
reality, one coherent narrative, which then becomes reality. However, in the 
assessment meeting, it is also part of this rhetorical framework (if not the 
rhetorical allowance for diagnosis of autism) to allow for uncertainty, dispute, 
disagreement, co-conditions (i.e. more than one thing) and a range of other 
complexities. In assessment meetings, the social practice of diagnosis allows 
clinicians to deal with the paradox (and impossibility) of the binary choice by 
using the discursive device of narrative construction.  
 
Turn-taking  
Examination of the way in which people take turns in talk and what they say – 
the ‘indexicality of utterances’ (Wiggins, 2017) – is situated in relation to what is 
said before and after each utterance. What we say and how we say it is created 
in response to what goes before and in anticipation of what might come next. 
Through this we can support (affirm) another’s preference or assertion or 
disagree with it. This process is key to reaching consensus in groups and is a 
social psychological process by which we negotiate and assert our preferences, 
our relationships, our roles and needs or requirements. Consensus and how 
this comes about is made through turn-taking in discourse.  
 
To conclude, this PhD study takes the position that how we name and talk 
about entities (in this case, a patient or a condition for example) is not a passive 
process through which we objectively report a self-contained piece of 




actions such as consensus, decision-making and disagreement are 
accomplished via talk and which, in turn, confirms the meaning of the entity 
itself (Wiggins, 2017). By taking a discursive approach I was able to examine 
how the particular rhetorical context of the diagnostic assessment meeting 
frames the diagnostic process and gives it meaning. Furthermore, this approach 
helped me to understand the particular and time-specific understanding of the 
condition of autism and what it has come to mean.  
 
 
5.6 Introduction to PhD Studies 
 
I adopted a qualitative methodology throughout this PhD as I was interested in 
both the meaning of diagnosis and autism, as well as the everyday practice of 
autism diagnosis. Examining qualitative data allows for ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) of rich data and utilising naturally occurring data alongside 
interviews allows the opportunity both to explore the meaning of diagnosis and 
of autism; and to examine issues of language and the construction of meaning 
through discourse (Silverman, 2004).  
 
Study one comprised a narrative review of clinical guidelines and was the first 
study undertaken whilst applying for ethical approval, recruiting teams and 
building relationships with NHS Health Trusts. Studies two and three are drawn 
from observational data in autism assessment teams and comprise two different 
analyses (one thematic, one discursive), with discrete write-ups (Chapters 
Seven and Eight). However, as analysis took place concurrently and iteratively, 
and the thematic analysis was informed by a discursive approach, the 
methodological detail of these studies are described together below (Section 









5.7 Study One: Review of Clinical Guidelines for Autism Diagnosis 
 
5.7.1 Purpose of study and methodological approach  
Prior to undertaking my main study, the observation of assessment teams, I 
undertook a review of diagnostic guidelines. The review aimed to enable 
understanding of what is considered to be good practice in autism diagnosis, 
what the process of diagnosis involves, and how guidelines deal with what I 
define as ‘social factors’. This helped me to understand the diagnostic context 
for autism assessment in the UK and (later) to consider actual practice in 
relation to these guidelines.  
 
A scoping search and qualitative narrative analysis with a systematic search 
strategy was chosen for this study as I wanted to tell the ‘story’ of diagnostic 
guidelines as a set of texts which shape diagnosis. A full methods outline is in 
the published article in Chapter Six. 
 
5.7.2 Research Question 
What diagnostic guidelines are available for clinicians assessing children and 
adults for autism in the UK; and how does guidance reflect social factors and 
influences? 
 
5.7.3 Data Collection 
Data collection details, search strategy and inclusion/exclusion criteria are 
outlined in the published article, Chapter Six.   
 
5.7.4 Analysis and definition of social factors 
A detailed outline of my data extraction framework and analysis is outlined in the 
published article as above. A process of inductive analysis was undertaken based 
on social factors and influences and a narrative review was written. Social factors 
were defined, for the purpose of this review, as socially related phenomena that 
influenced diagnosis, and drew from three areas as outlined by Jutel and Nettleton 
(2011): diagnosis as a process, as a category and the consequences of diagnosis. I 
included factors that were relevant to multi-disciplinary working or parental/family 




patient and how clinicians may take this into account (the consequences of 
diagnosis); and how issues around classification shape the diagnostic process such 
as how borderline cases are dealt with (diagnosis as a category).  
 
The write-up of Study One can be found in the published article at Chapter Six. 
 
 
5.8 Social factors in diagnosis: a conceptual shift 
 
As outlined in Section 5.1.1, the PhD study began with a concept of ‘social 
factors’ that was primarily influenced by a study of the barriers to accurate 
diagnosis of heart failure in primary care settings (Fuat et al., 2003). This study 
found that there were three categories of difficulties experienced by clinicians: 
uncertainty about clinical practice; lack of awareness of relevant research 
evidence; and influence of individual preference and local organisational factors 
(Fuat et al., 2003). This study informed my understanding of ‘social factors’ 
which included time constraints for clinicians, lack of availability of tests, patient 
preference and training limitations.  
 
My operational definition of social factors, therefore, was defined as socially 
related phenomena that influence or contribute to the diagnostic decision-
making process. I used the term ‘social factors’ to consider those aspects of 
interaction in meetings which seemed to sit beyond discussion of clinical 
symptoms, or to blur the boundaries of diagnostic categories.  
   
The first study, the guidelines review, suggested that there were a number of 
areas of uncertainty in autism diagnosis where social factors might come into 
play. I found that diagnosis, despite how it is overtly presented in guidelines as 
a largely mechanistic process involving a series of tests and assessments, is a 
social  process that is underpinned with uncertainty resolved by clinical 
judgement (Hayes et al., 2018).  
 
During the analysis of study two, a conceptual and methodological shift 




medicalisation and interaction, as well as helpful feedback from reviewers of an 
early version of article two. This brought the project more in line with a social 
constructionist perspective.  
 
First, to consider social factors as ‘beyond’ clinical symptoms became 
conceptually flawed within the context of relevant literature to the study. As an 
anonymous peer reviewer noted:  
 
Healthcare professionals don’t just report or narrate symptoms, but 
actively constitute them through their deliberative work. It is not that 
symptoms aren’t ‘real’ but rather that they’re inseparable from the methods 
used to discover them, including storytelling. (Peer reviewer, article two 
submission, April 2019)  
 
 
To consider social and clinical factors as separate entities then became 
problematic because this conceptual shift determined that what I was previously 
considering as clinical ‘symptoms’ are entirely dependent on how society 
chooses to collect them together to create a condition. For example, ‘repetitive 
interests’, both a behaviour and a clinical symptom, is dependent on how we tell 
the story about someone’s interests. An ‘intense’ interest in model railways or 
insects in the context of a clinical discussion may be considered as disordered 
autistic behaviour; but an athlete with an intense focus on training to win a race 
might be interpreted, in a different context, as competitive and determined, 
although their behaviour, in reality, may also be repetitive.  
 
Second, I took an inductive approach to analysis. I wanted to see what was 
happening in the data without squeezing out factors that did not fit with my 
operationalisation. If I limited myself to looking at factors that I considered to be 
‘above and beyond’ clinical symptoms as outlined in criteria and guidelines, I 
would be both ignoring how those symptoms are in themselves socially created 
and narrowing my gaze on the data. 
 
Finally, it became apparent that taken-for-granted clinical concepts and 
processes such as ‘clinical judgement’ or ‘clinical intuition’, are clearly and 





As social factors are inseparable from the wider context of diagnosis (in that 
diagnosis is a social process, informed and shaped by culture, society, history 
and the institution of medicine; and contributing to it), an ‘operationalisation’ of 
social factors became problematic. My working concept of social factors 
became more fluid and rooted particularly in concepts of interaction and how 
meaning is made through that interaction. I adopted an alertness to a social 
process of interaction in which the condition of autism and the process of 
diagnosis are inseparable from the way in which it is talked about. Later articles 
(Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine) reflect this change in thinking.  
 
 
5.9 Studies Two and Three: Team Meeting Observation 
 
5.9.1 Purpose of study and methodological approach 
I wanted to examine how diagnostic decision-making happened in practice and 
to explore the interactional processes within the decision-making process. I 
chose to utilise naturally occurring data as this enables exploration of real-world 
practices underpinning healthcare (Kiyimba et al. 2019). It provides data which 
is ‘context-rich’ and minimises the active role of the researcher in shaping the 
data (Kiyimba et al. 2019; Potter 2002). Using naturally occurring data to 
examine interaction enables analysis of both the ‘how’ (interactional sequences) 
and the ‘what’ of talk, enabling then an exploration of ‘why’ (Silverman, 2013). 
 
I chose to examine clinician interaction (without the patient present) as this 
involved an aspect of diagnostic decision-making that is rarely observed and 
allowed exploration of how clinicians work together to come to a consensus. 
Given the literature review and findings in study one, I also became interested 
in how clinicians resolve potential uncertainty and ambiguity in autism 
assessment.  
 
A hybrid qualitative discursive/thematic methodology was chosen for this study. 
I was interested in both the content of discussion and the way in which 





Details of data collection and method of analysis are outlined in two articles 
which are at Chapters Seven and Eight. Here I give a more detailed account.   
 
5.9.2 Research Question 
How do healthcare professionals make diagnostic decisions in specialist autism 
assessment team meetings? 
 
I should note here that, prior to the conceptual shift outlined in Section 5.8, I had 
been working with a broad research question which included the term ‘social 
factors’ (How do social factors play a role in diagnosis in specialist assessment 
team meetings?). I decided that the term ‘social factors’ suggested the 
possibility of a separation of clinical and social factors, which had become 
problematic, so removed the term at this stage.  
 
5.9.3 Data Collection 
Data collection took place over a period of ten months across four sites during 
2017-18. Assessment team meetings were observed, audio-recorded and field 
notes made. Where possible meetings were also video-recorded although this 
was primarily used to aid accuracy in identifying individual voices in group 
discussions, especially in situations where multiple voices interrupted each 
other, rather than for analysis. An observation strategy was developed (See 
Appendix 7: Observation Strategy for Meetings). 
  
The number of participants at each meeting ranged from 2 to 6. The number of 
cases discussed at each meeting ranged from 1 to 9, and in total the 
observations provided data related to 88 cases, documenting over 19 hours of 
meeting time. 13 cases discussed were at the referral stage and 24 were 
classified as administrative discussions, primarily relating to booking dates for 
assessments or action other than assessment. These two groups were 
excluded from analysis as they did not involve direct decision-making about 
diagnosis. The final analysis included a total of 51 cases - 24 children and 






5.9.4 Analytic Overview 
The study took an inductive approach to observational data, with analysis beginning 
during data collection. This enabled a ‘dialectical interaction’ between data 
collection and ideas (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). For example, early in the 
observation it was noted that the way in which clinicians discussed the wishes of 
the patient or family appeared to contribute to the trajectory of the discussion. This 
observation enabled a memo to be written about this potential area of interest, and 
to consider whether or where this discussion appeared in future meetings. This 
allowed for expansion of the memo as the data was analysed, including reflections 
on where this did not arise and what difference this might make. Ultimately some 
early ideas were dismissed because they seemed less important as data were 
collected, or they were developed further as a major analytic concept. Initial ideas 
and hypotheses from early data collection and analysis were continually refined and 
reformulated as the study progressed, iteratively informing later data collection and 
analysis.  
 
In addition, early analysis allowed for the development of the interview framework 
from themes drawn from the observational data. For example, a concept such as 
‘patient and family as active agent’ developed and this theme was used, alongside 
data extracts, to present to clinicians for further discussion when they were 
interviewed. 
 
As outlined above, study three took a discursive psychology approach (Wiggins, 
2017; Wiggins and Potter, 2013) and study two drew from aspects of constructionist 
thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013, 2006a). Discursive psychology is 
considered to be sited within a critical epistemology, with constructivist roots, which 
views language as productive rather than reflective (Braun and Clarke, 2013). It is 
particularly suited to the analysis of naturally occurring data, and can provide 
detailed insight into how discourse is situated in interaction and bound up with 
social action (Wiggins and Potter, 2013).  
 
This approach, therefore, enabled an investigation into how clinicians create a 
case for, or against, diagnosis by shaping a particular version of events 




My interest was in how participants in the MDT meeting (or Case Review 
Meeting1) accomplish the social action of diagnosis interactionally by aligning or 
orienting to particular kinds of reports that support a specific version of events 
and, conversely, dismissing or distancing themselves from others. The analysis 
began, however, with a constructionist thematic overview (study three) which 
enabled an overarching engagement with the data prior to discursive analysis.     
 
An iterative series of analytic steps was developed which drew from these two 
traditions (thematic and discursive) and enabled the analysis of both the content 
and process of the meetings (see Figure 11) (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Wiggins, 2017; Wiggins and Potter, 2013).  
 
This method enabled the potential for exploration of:  
 
o How clinicians both draw on, and create, categories of the condition of 
‘autism’ through their talk 
o The everyday and medical discourses drawn on by clinicians in team 
meetings 
o How social relations (agreement, disagreement, persuasion etc.) 
between clinicians contribute to diagnostic decision-making 
 
5.9.5 Analytic Steps 
 
Step one: transcription 
An orthographic (words only) transcription of all audio data was created in the 
first instance. In Discursive Psychology (DP) it is important to understand the 
way in which utterances are produced and how talk is delivered and received, 
as well as the content. A Jefferson transcription of selected extracts was used, 
therefore (Jefferson, 2004), alongside repeated listening to the audio 
recordings. Jefferson transcriptions enable the representation of talk to include 
some of the messiness that is obscured in orthographic transcription. For 
example, people rarely say things in a straightforward way. They hedge their 
                                            
1 As noted in the site details, three of the teams studied were multi-disciplinary; one team held Case 




statements (e.g. using ‘em’, ‘huh’ or ‘sort of’, for example); they include gaps 
and pauses, overlaps of talk; voices are raised; words are emphasised or talk is 
speeded up or slowed down. These details can help to understand what is 
going on in interaction. Is there disagreement or tension? Is someone struggling 
to speak? Are they finishing sentences and, if not, what is stopping them? 
Jefferson transcription, therefore, helps us to understand the social interaction 




Figure 11: Analysis plan 
 
Step two: reading and familiarisation 
I listened to audio recordings and read transcriptions several times for 
familiarisation purposes. I made margin notes to begin to consider relevant 
themes, the use of language and the interaction between clinicians and as a 
way to describe the data focussing on the what, how and when of different parts 
of the interaction (Wiggins, 2017). I decided at this point to consider the clinical 
‘case’ discussion as my unit of analysis as this enabled me to explore the 
trajectory of the discussion which led to a diagnostic decision. Familiarisation 
notes included a description of the case, reflections from field notes, general 





Step three: generating codes and identifying social actions across the 
dataset 
I entered transcripts into Nvivo for data management and coding. The coding 
process took a dual approach and drew from both thematic analysis (study two) 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013) and discursive psychology (study three) (Wiggins, 
2017). This included coding chunks of data (thematic) as well as searching for 
particular discursive features to be analysed.  
 
Thematic coding: I developed codes inductively from the data, noting content 
(e.g. where there was a discussion about practical elements such as ‘school’ or 
‘work’ or where particular types of tools/evidence were used (e.g. ADOS2 or 
SLT report). As I coded additional data, new codes were added, existing codes 
were refined and some codes were grouped together or split apart depending 
on the data. Initial coding descriptions were devised by producing a framework 
of early groupings of data. Codes and groupings were refined iteratively as 
coding progressed.   
 
Discursive coding: As the research question relates to diagnostic decision-
making, I focussed discursively on social actions related to the diagnostic 
narrative structure; dilemmas or disagreement; and consensus. Sequences of 
text were maintained to ensure the preservation of narrative construction 
(Atkinson, 1995). I allocated codes when something interesting was happening 
interactively or related to a sequence of talk. For example, a broad category of 
‘diagnostic dilemma’ was developed when there was a sequence when 
clinicians were faced with conflicting evidence to discuss, such as a below-
threshold score on ADOS, alongside a developmental interview that suggested 
a positive diagnosis.  
 
Step four: generating themes and focussing on discursive issues 
Analysis focussed on two key areas. For study two, I explored the ‘whats’ – 
such as discussions about the consequences of diagnosis and support 
available, and the way in which clinicians come to consensus particularly when 
the decision seems uncertain. For study three, I explored the ‘hows’ – focussing 




(and reflect both the thematic and discursive approach) in reality they were 
undertaken at the same time. This was achieved by undertaking a general 
approach of ‘analytic bracketing’, whereby I ‘shifted back and forth’ between the 
‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of the text (Gubrium and Holstein, 2009). This strategy for 
moving between analytic perspectives was applied throughout the research 
process in order to explore the interplay between narrative work and its 
environments (Gubrium and Holstein, 2009). This meant that I was able to 
explore the interaction between the kinds of matters that were discussed and 
the way that they were discussed, and how this, interactively, led to the 
production of a diagnostic narrative that, in turn, enabled a decision, diagnostic 
or otherwise. For example, an analytic category of ‘diagnostic resources’ was 
created (‘what’), and a note was made of how clinicians discussed, for example, 
those diagnostic resources in relation to the diagnostic decision (‘how’). These 
entities are inter-related with ‘what’ being a potential theme, and ‘how’ being a 
potential social action of interest (for example, how do clinicians ask questions 
of each other, complain, make decisions or support another’s view) (Wiggins, 
2017). These features of discourse were identified by using ‘discursive devises’ 
such as hedging, corroboration and category entitlements as outlined by 
Wiggins (2017), which enables a discursive ‘lens’ to be shone on the data.  
 
I wrote memos to establish clarity about analytic categories and explore 
decisions around overlapping codes and code boundaries. I grouped and re-
grouped codes using mind-maps and frameworks as visual aids. This helped to 
establish connections between cases, negative cases, absent phenomena, 
common themes and processes and enabled a gradual development of 
insights, examining how discourses were constructed and situated in interaction 
(Wiggins and Potter, 2013). 
 
Step five: reviewing themes and actions 
I devised an initial conceptual framework based on early collection of data. I 
revised and developed this framework throughout analysis and drew from data 
maps developed in step four. The development and revision of themes (study 




graphic representation of the key factors and concepts being studied, as well as 
the relationships between them (Miles et al., 1994).  
 
At this stage it was necessary to focus on a specific analytical issue related to 
the research question concerning social action (of decision-making) (study 
three). For the purposes of exploring the interaction element of the analysis, I 
excluded instances if they were no longer relevant to the key question. I then 
collected further instances of the analytic issue of interest. At this stage specific 
data was revisited selectively and more detailed transcription and coding made 
where necessary. The overall analysis, therefore, combines both complete 
(thematic) and selective (discursive) coding (Braun and Clarke, 2013, p. 218).   
 
Step six: defining and naming themes and refining analysis 
Finally, I returned to the complete data set and checked for instances across 
the data, further refining the analysis. For study two (thematic) I grouped codes 
together towards defining and naming themes. For study three (discursive) I 
undertook a systematic sweep of the data to check that the provisional 
discursive model identified held across the data.  
 
Reflexivity   
I held discussions with other researchers on a regular basis to consider 
additional viewpoints and interpretations (Josselson and Lieblich, 2003). This 
was facilitated through a data analysis sharing group and data swaps between 
researchers. Data were discussed in at least six data-sharing meetings with a 
range of researchers present. These meetings were made up primarily of PhD 
students and post-doctoral researchers with occasional attendance from senior 
researchers. In addition, four further data-sharing sessions took place with two 
of the co-authors and regular discussions about the data with one other co-
author. Data were discussed on one occasion with a wider mental health 
research group which included researchers with both qualitative and 
quantitative expertise as well as clinical experience. Anonymised data were also 
analysed with specialists in discursive psychology and conversion analysis 
outside the research team on at least three occasions. All of these sessions 




discussing preliminary themes and ideas and, on occasion, supporting with 
coding. Numerous presentations of work in progress at meetings and 
conferences contributed towards the analysis.  
 
The write-up of Studies Two and Three can be found in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
 
5.10 Study Four: Interview Study 
 
5.10.1 Purpose of study and methodological approach 
The interview study was designed to provide insight into how clinicians 
understand autism and diagnosis. I was interested both in how clinicians 
perceived the process of diagnosis, and also their views on the social context of 
diagnosis. A qualitative thematic approach was undertaken for this study as I 
was interested in themes across the data that might reflect those 
understandings.  
 
5.10.2 Research Question 
How do clinicians understand autism and diagnosis in secondary care?  
 
5.10.3 Data Collection 
I devised a semi-structured interview framework and topic guide which allowed 
for variation in interview depending on the individual interviewee’s experiences. 
The topic guide had two parts: some general questions around the diagnostic 
process; and a section where specific cases were discussed and, where 
possible, sound extracts from meetings were played for clinician reflection 
(Tape-Assisted Recall). (See Appendix 9: Interview Topic Guide). In Tape-
Assisted Recall (TAR), recordings are used to prompt relevant discussion about 
the topic in question (Elliott, 1986). Although commonly used in studying 
therapeutic relationships and patient/clinician consultations (Baker et al., 2019; 
Cape et al., 2010; Elliott, 1986; Elliott and Shapiro, 1988) it was anticipated that 
this method, utilising recordings from the assessment meetings, would provide 





Embedding the interviews into the observation study meant that I was able to 
utilise different methods of data collection within the same settings. This 
approach also had the pragmatic effect of determining sample size and 
participant selection as only clinicians involved in observation could be included.  
 
A total of sixteen interviews were conducted across four specialist autism 
assessment teams over a period of eleven months during 2017-18.  
 
Using Tape-Assisted Recall 
Audio files of team meetings were imported into Audacity sound editing 
software, listened to, and labels applied to sections which could then easily be 
located in interview for playback. In addition, transcripts of the relevant cases 
were produced and copies available for both the interviewee and interviewer, 
highlighted in the areas that were available to be played.  
 
The specific extract of sound material to be played was informed by an early 
conceptualisation of emerging ‘social factors’ taken from the assessment 
meeting data. This included factors such as the desires of the parent or patient 
driving the process; a focus on the needs of the patient or a functionalist 
approach to diagnosis; discussion of masking of symptoms or performing 
autism. An audio extract was played and I would ask for a response. This was 
generally effective in eliciting rich discussion.  
 
In some cases it was not possible to play sound files; in one case the Audacity 
file was corrupted and therefore not accessible. In three cases, the interview 
took place before there had been time to upload and select extracts from the 
recording. In these cases my detailed notes or a transcription were used as the 
basis for discussion. 
 
I am aware that the selection of sound material for discussion shapes the nature 
of the discussion that ensued. However, I would argue that it is a valid method 
for stimulating discussion, with more flexibility and scope than a straightforward 
question which serves to define its answer in the question itself. Nevertheless, I 




research and this is something that is taken into account in the write up and 
analysis of this study. 
 
5.10.4 Analysis 
Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. A thematic analysis approach was 
used to identify patterns and themes within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006a). 
I took an inductive approach to the analysis to enable the identification of 
themes that are of particular concern to participants. I also analysed the data 
deductively to explore specific themes that arose in the observation data. In line 
with my overall theoretical approach, I took a constructionist approach to 
analysis which enabled me to think about the interview as discursively produced 
(between interviewee and interviewer) rather than constructing the views of 
clinicians as context-less and neutrally produced.  
 
Inductive analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006a) framework for thematic 
analysis: transcription and familiarisation; generating initial codes; collating 
codes into potential themes; reviewing themes; defining and naming themes; 
refining analysis through writing up. Codes and themes were identified on paper 
using colour-coded highlighters; exploration of groupings of codes was 
undertaken with mapping and index cards. The analysis is currently being 
refined and a preliminary explorative write-up is at Chapter Nine. 
 
Initial deductive analysis involved identifying key areas of interest from the 
observation data (feeling autism, pragmatism, the role of the family/patient) and 
colour-coding these themes in each interview. The purpose of this deductive 
process was to examine clinicians’ understandings of these themes. Extracts 
were then collated in an excel document for further exploration. 
 
As with the observation data, ongoing analysis was informed by sharing data at 







5.11 Personal Reflection and Position 
 
As a non-clinician, I had to learn and understand a culture and institutional 
structure I was unfamiliar with. This meant having to learn about ‘taken-for-
granted’ concepts in frequent use during meetings and interviews, as well as 
questioning my own assumptions about hierarchies of knowledge and the 
privileged role of the clinician.  
 
I was conscious of being over critical of hard-working NHS staff trying to do a 
difficult job under pressure, and who, furthermore, had given their time to 
support my research project. I considered the difficulties of diagnosis as an 
institutional and socially-created problem, not as difficulties created by individual 
clinicians. The responsibility for our diagnostic system and any ‘workarounds’ 
clinicians employ to make the assessment process work in day-to-day practice, 
sits with society as a whole. We demand diagnostic decisions from our 
healthcare practitioners, no matter how ambiguous or uncertain the boundaries 
between conditions may be. It remains the case that the subject of this PhD is 
the detailed analysis of how individual healthcare practitioners talk to each 
other. However, they do so to meet the needs of the service organisation within 











Introduction to Analytic Chapters 
         
Overview and introduction 
 
This section (Chapters Six to Nine) represents the empirical work of the thesis. 
Studies one to three are written up as articles for publication. Study four is 
written up as a preliminary analysis. Linking statements introduce each article, 
outlining the way in which the article extends the previous empirical study and 
noting its status in the publication process (published, in press or under review).  
 
Understanding the data 
 
Diagnostic tools 
Key tools referred to in meetings are the ADOS (Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule) and a clinical interview, usually an ADI (Adult Diagnostic Interview) or 
a 3Di (Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview) or a more in-
depth clinical interview. The two assessments are undertaken by different 
assessors and then are brought together to discuss amongst the wider team.  
 
Diagnostic criteria 
Autism is diagnosed when there are persistent patterns of difficulty in social 
communication and social interaction, combined with restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviour, interests or activities (APA, 2013a). There were two 
diagnostic systems in use at the time of the study: DSM-5 and ICD-10. Although 
these systems are conceptually different (see Chapter One) clinicians in 
meetings generally referred to a broad understanding of criteria related to the 
definition outlined here. There was very little reference to diagnostic guidelines 
in meetings, however, in interview, clinicians generally expressed their practical 
use of guidelines to be linked to either DSM or ICD, or an understanding of 







Statement of candidate’s contribution to co-authored papers 
 
All empirical studies were undertaken by the PhD candidate including 
conception, research design, ethics applications, recruitment, data collection 
(including systematic search in article 1), analysis, reporting, draft writing and 









This chapter consists of a narrative review of clinical practice guidelines for 
autism in the UK. The narrative review aimed to consider how the content of 
clinical guidelines shapes practice. The review findings helped to inform the 
focus for later studies, including the potential range of factors that might be 
relevant in an exploration of social framing of diagnosis.  
 
All aspects of the study were undertaken by the PhD candidate. Co-authors 
contributions were as follows:  
 
GR: pilot extraction framework; review data selection; revision for intellectual 
content 
TF: research design; review data selection; revision suggestions 
HR: support with data extraction and initial coding 
 
The rest of this chapter presents the published manuscript of the narrative 
review of clinical guidelines. It was published in BMC Psychiatry in July 2018 



















CHAPTER SIX: Clinical practice guidelines for diagnosis of 












Background: Research suggests that diagnostic procedures for Autism Spectrum 
Disorder are not consistent across practice and that diagnostic rates can be 
affected by contextual and social drivers. The purpose of this review was to 
consider how the content of clinical practice guidelines shapes diagnoses of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder in the UK; and investigate where, within those guidelines, social 
factors and influences are considered.  
 
Methods: We electronically searched multiple databases (NICE Evidence Base; 
TRIP; Social Policy and Practice; US National Guidelines Clearinghouse; HMIC; 
The Cochrane Library; Embase; Global health; Ovid; PsychARTICLES; 
PsychINFO) and relevant web sources (government, professional and regional 
NHS websites) for clinical practice guidelines. We extracted details of key 
diagnostic elements such as assessment process and diagnostic tools. A 
qualitative narrative analysis was conducted to identify social factors and 
influences.  
 
Results: Twenty-one documents were found and analysed. Guidelines varied in 
recommendations for use of diagnostic tools and assessment procedures. Although 
multi-disciplinary assessment was identified as the ‘ideal’ assessment, some 
guidelines suggested in practice one experienced healthcare professional was 
sufficient. Social factors in operational, interactional and contextual areas added 
complexity to guidelines but there were few concrete recommendations as to how 
these factors should be operationalised for best diagnostic outcomes. 
 
Conclusion: Although individual guidelines appeared to present a coherent and 
systematic assessment process, they varied enough in their recommendations 
to make the choices available to healthcare professionals particularly complex 
and confusing. We recommend a more explicit acknowledgement of social 
factors in clinical practice guidelines with advice about how they should be 
managed and operationalised to enable more consistency of practice and 











The diagnosis of autism poses particular challenges for healthcare 
professionals (HCPs) as, in common with other neurodevelopmental disorders 
and most psychiatric disorders, there are no biomarkers utilised in clinical 
practice (Klin et al., 2000; Kobeissy et al., 2013; Vllasaliu et al., 2016). In 
addition, the condition is heterogeneous, with wide ranging levels of severity 
and symptom expression and characteristics common to autism may occur in 
people with other conditions (Huerta and Lord, 2012). Those coming for 
diagnosis may also have symptoms of other conditions such as epilepsy, 
learning disability or sleep disorders, for example, complicating diagnosis 
further, with some arguing for a de-compartmentalisation of these conditions in 
younger children (Gillberg, 2010). The ‘gold standard’ of diagnosis is considered 
to be consensus agreement within a multi-agency team (Falkmer et al., 2013; 
Woolfenden et al., 2011). However, negotiating consensus between HCPs with 
different training, professional roles, experience and knowledge can be 
challenging and time consuming. Finally, a review of the accuracy, reliability, 
validity and utility of reported diagnostic tools and assessments found that many 
diagnostic instruments for autism lack a high-quality independent evidence base 
(Falkmer et al., 2013). For example, only three instruments - the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS), Autism Diagnostic Interview Revised 
(ADI-R) and the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) - had a strong 
supporting evidence base (Falkmer et al., 2013). 
 
Given the potential challenges, clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) perform an 
important role in informing HCPs of best practice. CPGs are ‘systematically 
developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate 
health care for specific clinical circumstances’ (Field and Lohr, 1992, p. 2). National 
CPGs in the UK help to provide evidence-based recommendations to support 
Autism Strategies and Action Plans (NICE, 2012) and form the guidance framework 
for HCPs undertaking assessment and diagnosis of autism in the UK. In addition to 
CPGs produced by specialist, government supported healthcare associations, for 
example, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) (SIGN, 2016), 




position papers, for example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCPsych) (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2014). 
 
 
6.2 Social factors 
 
Although CPGs aim to inform diagnostic practice, research suggests that diagnostic 
and assessment procedures vary in practice (NICE, 2012). Diagnosis is dependent 
on observing socially-based behaviours that are arguably not necessarily 
characteristic of the person under assessment but arise from two-way social 
relationships and social context. Assessment mechanisms include drawing 
information from a range of sources, including clinician observation, reporting from 
family members and wider contexts such as school or workplace. This means that 
assessments are contextual and inter-relational and symptoms may change 
according to context or interpersonal relationship, making different assessment 
sources potentially contradictory.  
 
Some studies show that social factors such as individual patient preference, 
availability of resources or local organisational factors can shape diagnostic 
practice, in, for example, heart disease (Fuat et al., 2003). Studies in autism have 
also shown how diagnostic rates can be affected by contextual and social drivers, 
such as diagnostic resources (Mazumdar et al., 2013) or diffusion of information 
about autism through social networks (Liu et al., 2010a). Where there is diagnostic 
uncertainty clinicians may ‘upgrade’ to a diagnosis of autism if they believe it would 
be in the best interests of the patient; if the diagnosis would trigger appropriate 
services and funding; or counteract the limitations of diagnostic tools, particularly in 
atypical presentations (Rogers et al., 2016; Skellern et al., 2005). It seems, in 
practice, clinicians may adopt a pragmatic, practical or functional approach.  
 
 
6.3 Socio-economic and cultural factors 
 
Research has shown that lower socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with 




US where higher SES and parental education is linked to increased likelihood of 
diagnosis (King and Bearman, 2011; Liu et al., 2010a). Research also suggests 
that people with autism from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
communities are less likely to be diagnosed with autism or access appropriate 
services (National Autistic Society, 2014) despite research which shows that 
behaviours associated with autism are likely to be consistent across cultures 
and countries (Norbury and Sparks, 2013).  
 
Prior to diagnosis, social factors can also determine who comes forward for 
diagnosis and who is referred for further assessment. Research examining a 
longitudinal UK cohort study identified that with the severity of autistic traits held 
constant, younger mothers and mothers of first-born children were significantly 
less likely to have children diagnosed with autism (Russell et al., 2011). In 
addition, boys were more likely to receive a diagnosis than girls, and maternal 
depression was linked with a lack of diagnosis (Russell et al., 2011). These 




6.4 Biomarkers in autism diagnosis 
 
There is a great deal of research that explores the underlying neurobiological, 
genetic, chemical and cognitive factors that may, in future, provide biomarkers 
which could be utilised in autism diagnosis (see Goldani et al., 2014 for a review 
of genetic, metabolic and brain focused biomarkers). For example, a recent 
research study has identified a link between damage to proteins in blood 
plasma and autism symptoms (Anwar et al., 2018); while another found shared 
brain activity between boys diagnosed with autism and those with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) which in turn differed from a non-diagnosed control 
group (Carlisi et al., 2017). However, it has been argued that the heterogeneous 
and interactive nature of autism symptoms makes the identification of clinically 
useful biomarker tests problematic (Anderson, 2015). Furthermore, findings 
from biomarker research have yet to be integrated with clinical practice and 




al., 2014). For the foreseeable future, therefore, these developments are 
unlikely to change diagnostic practice (NHS Choices, 2018). 
 
 
6.5 Purpose of the review 
 
Although a few studies have begun to explore health professionals’ views of autism 
diagnosis (Imran et al., 2011; Rogers et al., 2016; Taylor et al., 2016) to our 
knowledge there are few studies that examine how clinical guidelines may inform 
assessment. One exception is a recent systematic review of English speaking 
guidelines undertaken by Penner et al (2017) which reported that guidelines varied 
considerably in quality, content and recommendations but included guidelines 
working across incomparable health systems in different countries. We therefore 
carried out a focussed narrative review of guidelines that impact on UK-based 
practice. Penner et al suggest that in the face of disparate clinical guidance 
clinicians should ‘be mindful of local resources and wait times, eligibility 
requirements for ASD services…and the wishes of families when deciding on how 
best to assess for ASD’ (Penner et al., 2017, p. 10). Our narrative review responds 
to this call for a pragmatic approach by investigating where, within guidelines, social 





6.6.1 Scoping search 
A scoping search was undertaken to check there was no similar review published. 
A search was made in the following databases; PsychARTICLES; Embase; Global 
health; HMIC; Ovid (books; medline; journals); PsychINFO; Social policy and 
practice. One relevant article was retrieved (Penner et al., 2017), as discussed 
above. 
 
6.6.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Full inclusion and exclusion criteria are in Table 7. Whilst we took a broad approach 




the diagnostic process, as well as national CPGs, the researchers acknowledge 
that each of these type of guidelines have different purposes (see Table 8). 
However, we argue that each may have an impact on HCP’s process of diagnosis 
to a greater or lesser extent and for the purposes of this study all were included 
under the term clinical practice guidelines.  
 
 











Documents with guidance-based status for HCPs working in secondary care in the UK; or were published papers, 
aimed at HCPs, with the aim of reviewing CPGs 
Documents related to autism diagnosis and assessment for either children, adults or both 
Documents produced either by or through government or professional clinical bodies or published in a journal 
aimed at HCPs 
Documents related to diagnosis and assessment in UK (England, Scotland, Wales and N Ireland) 
Documents dated from 2009 (reflecting publication of the first UK specific Autism Act) or were the most recent 
CPG published by a key professional body 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
Documents related solely to referral, treatment, prognosis or support services 
Reviews of diagnostic criteria and other academic papers  
Guidelines related to primary care as we were interested in diagnosis rather than referral 
Narrative reviews, editorials and opinions 
Documents related to parliament or legislature; national or regional strategies as they are not the primary source 
for clinicians 
Local guidance 
Guidance provided by private providers of diagnostic services 




Type of guideline 
 
General purpose of type of guideline 
Diagnostic Criteria 
 
To assist clinicians in the diagnosis of mental conditions by providing descriptions of 
the main clinical features in each category  
National Clinical 
Guidelines 




To offer profession specific advice to clinicians and healthcare professionals in their 
specialist area 
Journal Articles To summarise clinical guidelines in clinician-facing publications to keep clinicians up 
to date and/or alert them to changes in good practice 
 
Table 8: Purpose of diagnostic guidelines 
 
6.6.3 Identification of CPGs  
We did not set out to undertake a comprehensive systematic review, as it was 
not a requirement of our study that we consider risk of bias either within or 
across studies (Moher et al., 2009). However, we took a PRISMA approach to 
our search strategy, borrowing from systematic review methodology in terms of 
screening titles and abstracts and data extraction techniques (Liberati et al., 
2009). A systematic search was conducted in June 2017 using the following 
databases: NICE Evidence Base; TRIP; Social Policy and Practice; US National 
Guidelines Clearinghouse; HMIC; The Cochrane Library. In addition, searches 
were made of government related websites and relevant professional bodies as 
well as NICE and SIGN. We used the following search terms to search all 
databases and websites: ‘autism’, ‘diagnosis’, ‘guidance’, ‘statutory’, ‘clinical’, 
‘practice’, ‘guideline’, ‘protocol’, ‘strategy’, ‘policy’, ‘bill’, ‘act’, and ‘parameter’. A 





Figure 12: Search strategy (guidelines review) 
 
 
6.6.4 Study selection 
The first reviewer (JH) removed duplicates and screened titles for relevance. Full 
text copies of the potentially relevant documents were downloaded for screening. 
The first reviewer screened full text documents and excluded those not relevant. 
The remaining titles were independently checked by the clinical specialist (TF) 
using pre-specified inclusion/exclusion criteria (outlined in Table 7). Discrepancies 
were resolved by discussion, with involvement of a third reviewer (GR). Twenty-
eight documents were considered for analysis, with seven being withdrawn at full 
analysis stage. See Figure 13 for full details.  
 
Guidelines from the International Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders (Tenth edition) (ICD-10) (WHO, 1993) and the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (Fifth edition) (DSM-5) (APA, 2013a) were considered 
alongside UK relevant guidelines as they are considered authoritative sources for 










6.6.5 Data extraction  
A data extraction framework was created to draw key characteristics from the 
guidelines (year, author, geographical remit, target audience, age range, range of 
diagnoses covered, age at which symptoms are recognised, diagnostic criteria 
referred to); as well as key elements in the diagnostic process (recommended tools, 
role and composition of the multi-disciplinary team (MDT), who can diagnose, 
assessment targets and key features of assessment). This framework was piloted 
with four reviewers (JH, GR, RW and DE) in a comparison of analysis of three 
guidelines. The framework was amended accordingly and is included in Appendix 
10: Guidelines Review Data Extraction Framework. Data were independently 
extracted by two reviewers (JH and HR) from 21 CPGs and disagreements were 
resolved by discussion and further checks. Data were tabulated and analysed. 
 
6.6.6 Analysis of social factors 
A modified form of narrative review, as described by Popay et al. (2006) and Ferrari 
(2015), was adopted whereby data extraction enabled synthesis of key data, whilst 
also allowing rich narrative description (Ferrari, 2015). Narrative review was 
selected as it enabled the telling of the ‘story’ of CPGs, and consideration of how 
guidelines, as a set of texts, shape diagnosis (Popay et al., 2006). 
 
A process of inductive analysis was undertaken based on social factors and 
influences. These were defined, for the purpose of this review, as contextual factors 
that influence diagnosis but are not based on symptoms of autism. We drew from 
the concept of a social model of diagnosis as developed by Jutel and Nettleton 
(2011). This model considers how diagnostic classifications and medical diagnoses 
are socially created and how social forces – including technological, professional, 
cultural and economic forces – contribute to shaping aspects of the diagnostic 
process including those related to classification, the consequences of diagnosis 
and the process of diagnosis itself (Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). Overall, a social 
model challenges the idea of diagnosis as ‘a moment of clinical purity’ (Latimer, 
2013, p. 196) or as a way simply to identify underlying biological problems. We 
included factors that were relevant to multi-disciplinary working or parental/family 
influence (the process of diagnosis); the potential outcomes of diagnosis for the 




and how issues around classification shape the diagnostic process such as how 
borderline cases are dealt with (diagnosis as a category). This was a dynamic 
process whereby data extracts were considered in relation to each other via 
conceptual mapping and clustering (Popay et al., 2006). 
 
6.6.7 Terminology 
For the purposes of this review and in line with the Autism Strategy (Department of 





6.7.1 Characteristics of guidelines 
A total of 236 documents were retrieved, and 21 were included in the final 
narrative review (see Appendix 11: Clinical Guideline Characteristics for full list 
of included documents). The documents studied are grouped into four types: a) 
International Diagnostic Criteria (n=2); b) National Clinical Guidelines (n=5); c) 
Journal articles that summarise National Clinical Guidelines and the diagnostic 
process, published in key clinical journals (n = 10); d) Guidelines from 
professional bodies (n=4). It should be noted that journal articles, in some 
cases, are designed to give an update rather than a full guideline therefore the 
lack of detail in some areas should not necessarily be seen as a weakness. 
 
Of the 21 guidelines considered, six dealt with diagnosis of adults, seven with 
children and eight with all ages. Of those, two guidelines were international but 
key to diagnostic practice in the UK (ICD-10 and DSM-5), five related to the UK 
as a whole, five to England and Wales, one to Scotland, two to Northern Ireland 
and one to outside the US and Canada (and therefore included the UK). Five 
guidelines did not specify a geographical remit but were published in the UK in 
clinician-facing journals. All guidelines were aimed at HCPs, with six aimed at 
particular specialist roles that included psychiatrists, psychologists, speech and 





Guidelines acknowledged that there is variation in rates of identification, 
assessment criteria and practice (NICE, 2012); that there is increasing demand 
for diagnostic services (NICE, 2011); and that increased awareness of autism is 
likely to lead to a rise in people presenting for assessment (British 
Psychological Society, 2016). 
  
6.7.2 Definitions of autism 
Definitions of autism in ICD-10 and DSM-5 differed. ICD-10 took a categorical 
approach with a definition of Pervasive Development Disorders that included 
sub-diagnoses within it; whilst DSM-5 used the overarching dimensional 
concept of Autism Spectrum Disorder. Some inconsistencies were present 
related to the differences in classification in ICD-10 and DSM-5, therefore, for 
example, Rett’s Syndrome and Asperger’s Syndrome were sub-diagnoses of 
Pervasive Development Disorders in ICD-10, but were encompassed in the 
overarching diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder in DSM-5 (APA, 2013a; 
WHO, 1993). Definitions of autism in all other guidelines considered in this 
study were broadly consistent with the idea of a ‘spectrum’. 
 
Most guidelines (n=14) referred to symptom criteria from both ICD-10 and the 
(then) current version of DSM (DSM-IV up to 2012 and DSM-5 from 2013), with 
eight guidelines recommending that HCPs should use the current version of 
DSM or ICD criteria for diagnosis. Exceptions were NICE CG142, which was 
based on ICD-10, (NICE, 2012); Royal College of Speech and Language 
Therapists (RCSLT) (RCSLT, 2005), which drew on the International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICIDH-2) for general clinical 
assessment (WHO, 2001); and journal articles describing NICE guidelines 
which made no mention of DSM/ICD (n=3).  
 
Overall, therefore, the guidelines were mixed in their recommended sources for 







6.8 Narrative review of social factors 
 
We used three inter-related elements as an organising framework to describe 
the social factors identified in clinical guidelines: operational, interactional and 
contextual. These factors do not stand alone from each other, indeed, they 
appear to have a dynamic and inter-dependent relationship, however, 
organising them provides a way to map their range and scope (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14: Social factors in clinical guidelines 
 
6.8.1 Operational factors 
Operational factors included how different assessment processes impact on the 
diagnostic decision, such as which tools and processes are engaged and when; 
what constitutes an assessment; and whether the decisions take place as part 
of diagnosis or formulation. Appendix 12: Key Recommendations of Clinical 
Guidelines outlines some of these operational factors.  
 
The assessment process 
One guideline suggested that clinical practice varies greatly (Parr and 




range of potential assessment processes included. DSM-5 recommended that a 
diagnostic assessment should include gathering multiple sources of information 
from clinician's observations, caregiver history and self-report (where possible). 
National guidelines, although providing far greater detail, tended to include 
these areas and additionally suggested various other detailed assessments 
such as gathering wider functional/assessment information (SIGN, 2016); using 
documentary evidence, assessing risks, and assessment of challenging 
behaviour (NICE, 2012); assessing for co-conditions (NICE, 2012, 2011); 
physical examination (NICE, 2011); comprehensive educational assessment 
(RASDN, 2011); assessment of communication, neuropsychological 
functioning, motor and sensory skills, and adaptive functioning (SIGN, 2016). 
Professional guidelines added other factors such as comprehensive cognitive 
assessment (British Psychological Society, 2016) and impact of individual’s 
mental health (RCSLT, 2005), accounts of relationships in different settings 
(RASDN, 2011) and observation in school or another setting (Parr and 
Woodbury-Smith, 2017). Journal articles tended to reflect national guidelines 
and varied in the level of detail outlined for assessment factors. Two articles 
gave little detail of assessment processes but one referred readers directly to 
NICE guidelines for further detail (Howlett and Richman, 2011) and the other 
was aimed at community practitioners who would be more likely to be involved 
in referral than diagnosis (Reynolds, 2011). Articles also included assessment 
of co-occuring conditions (e.g. Blenner et al., 2011; Carpenter, 2012; Garland et 
al., 2013; Lai et al., 2014; Levy et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2014) and a physical 
or medical examination (e.g. Blenner et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2014). Additional 
assessment areas included assessment of specific domains such as family 
stressors and coping abilities (Garland et al., 2013). In one guideline 
(Carpenter, 2012) it was suggested that some clinicians bypass ICD/DSM 
criteria and instead undertake: 
 
…testing for specific underlying difficulties such as lack of theory of mind 
or lack of central coherence and then using these to decide the presence 
of the behavioural criteria (Carpenter, 2012, p. 125). 
 
The RCSLT guideline (RCSLT, 2005) differed from most by suggesting 




executive functioning deficits, motivation, memory and central coherence, as 
well as social interaction and communication. However, some (e.g. British 
Psychological Society, 2016) suggested cognitive or neuropsychological testing 
whilst SIGN guidelines stated that such assessments are ‘useful for individual 
profiling but are not diagnostic instruments’ (SIGN, 2016, p. 16). This anomaly 
may reflect the specialist role of SLTs in the diagnostic process.  
 
Overall, we would concur with a reflection in one guideline, which noted how the 
HCP may be faced with ‘possible uncertainty as to where to go next in their 




Recommendations about the use of diagnostic tools were mixed. One third of the 
guidelines (n=7) did not specify any particular tool for diagnostic assessment. Other 
CPGs tended to suggest the consideration of a range of tools without specifically 
recommending any particular instrument(s), although regular references were made 
to ADOS (n=13), ADI-R (n=11), DISCO (n=9) and 3di (n=6). The NICE guideline for 
children and young people emphasised use of DSM/ICD criteria rather than tools; 
the NICE guideline for adults did the opposite (NICE, 2012, 2011). Overall, findings 
concurred with Penner et al. in that guidelines varied substantially in their 
recommendations for use of diagnostic tools (Penner et al., 2017). 
 
Diagnosis and formulation 
There were differences in the way guidelines described the relationship 
between, or referred to, diagnosis, assessment, profiling, needs assessment 
and wider formulation. All guidelines encompassed the concept of a wider 
(needs related) assessment but few explicitly separated out these processes or 
discussed how this related to a diagnostic assessment. One exception to this 
was the Regional Autistic Spectrum Disorder Network (RASDN) children’s 
guideline, which separated the diagnostic from the formulation process, 






The outcome of the formulation should be to understand an individual in 
a more global holistic way rather than merely in terms of signs and 
symptoms, as in the case of diagnosis (RASDN, 2011, p. 18). 
 
The RCPsych guideline suggested that diagnosis is only one component of the 
wider multi-disciplinary exercise (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014). Some 
guidelines did not mention formulation but suggested a profile of strengths, 
abilities and weaknesses should be carried out alongside a diagnostic 
assessment (e.g. NICE, 2011; SIGN, 2016). Adult guidelines from RASDN 
separated out a diagnostic assessment from a full needs assessment (RASDN, 
2013); NICE guidelines for adults considered comprehensive assessment to 
include diagnostic, needs and risk assessment (NICE, 2012); whilst the full 
children’s guidelines similarly brought together the diagnostic and needs 
elements under ‘autism diagnostic assessment’, explaining that:   
 
..the label of autism does not constitute a complete diagnostic 
assessment and a profile of the child or young person’s strengths and 
weaknesses is also essential. This requires a multi-disciplinary team 
which has the skills to undertake the assessments necessary for profiling 
(National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011, 
p. 108). 
 
Operationally, therefore, there were contradictions between guidelines about 
what constitutes the diagnostic process, how it should be structured and which 
diagnostic tools should be used.  
 
6.8.2 Interactional factors 
Interactional factors related to how the dialogue between HCPs and between 
HCPs and families impacts on the assessment process. These include how 
consensus is reached, how disagreement is resolved and how the views of the 
person and family are integrated into the decision-making process.  
 
Multi-disciplinary assessment versus single practitioner assessment 
Where specified, all guidelines advocated for diagnosis to take place within a 
multi-disciplinary setting with various guidelines suggesting this was ‘necessary’ 
(RASDN, 2011), the ‘optimum approach’ (SIGN, 2016) or ‘ideal’ (Parr and 




appropriately trained and experienced single professional is sufficient to 
diagnose in particular cases, but to be alert for indications for a more specialist 
assessment (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014) and with access to multi-
disciplinary support if required (Carpenter, 2012).  
 
Despite this almost universal recommendation, the extended version of NICE 
children’s guidelines (and cited by SIGN (SIGN, 2016) and Carpenter 
(Carpenter, 2012)) questioned the evidence base for multi-disciplinary 
assessment reporting a study (Mahoney et al., 1998) that showed moderate 
agreement between an individual HCP and an MDT in making a diagnosis, but 
stating that it was a low quality study (National Collaborating Centre for 
Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). These guidelines also suggested in 
practice that a diagnosis can be made by a single experienced HCP but that a 
comprehensive profile of the patient requires a multi-disciplinary approach 
(National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011). SIGN 
guidelines also cited research (Moore et al., 1998) which demonstrates that 
parents value a multi-disciplinary assessment (SIGN, 2016). 
 
None of the guidelines in this review dealt with how HCPs come to a consensus 
within a multi-disciplinary context, although Northern Ireland guidelines 
recommended that training should include the promotion of collaborative and 
innovative working (RASDN, 2011) and that clinicians must understand the 
profession specific roles and responsibilities of the overall team (RASDN, 2013, 
2011). 
 
Therefore, most guidelines referred to MDTs as best practice, but lacked 
recommendations about how roles within MDTs are negotiated, how 
disagreement is resolved (other than second opinion outside the team); or how 
teams should work together, a factor that is acknowledged by NICE adults 
guideline(NICE, 2012). 
 
Interaction with the person and their family 
Many guidelines (n=9) outlined the importance of keeping the person/family 




centred approach. Some described the relationship with the person coming for 
diagnosis and their family as a partnership (e.g. NICE adult guideline (NICE, 
2012) or as person-centred (e.g. RASDN adult guideline (RASDN, 2013)). 
Some guidelines (n=6) acknowledged that the person or family may disagree 
with or be reluctant to accept a diagnosis or, alternatively desire one (Reynolds, 
2011) and be determined on a particular outcome, which can lead to misleading 
results (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014). Carpenter asserted that some 
people may begin to see diagnosis as a desirable outcome and pre-prepare 
answers based on structured interviews published on the internet (Carpenter, 
2012). The potential for disagreement or desire for diagnosis, therefore, may 
impact on the interaction with the person or their family. So, although the 
relationship with the patient/family is considered within CPGs, there is little 
guidance as to how HCPs might deal with patient/family desire or disagreement.  
 
6.8.3 Contextual factors 
There were factors related to the way in which HCPs interpret symptoms in 
different settings, how diagnostic thresholds are judged against criteria and 
included considerations around the impact and consequences of a diagnosis. 
 
Interpreting needs  
All national guidelines (n=5) outlined the requirement to consider the needs, 
preferences and values of the individual and their family and/or support them to 
communicate their needs and concerns. Most guidelines (n=17) described 
elements of diagnosis that relate to either family environment, family needs and 
concerns, circumstances, relationships, functioning, experiences in different 
settings, contextual information or level of support needs. Many guidelines 
reflected the need to consider assessment of support required. Enquiries should 
be made about how symptoms impact on function within the family, at home, 
school or work (Blenner et al., 2011; NICE, 2012, 2011; Pilling et al., 2012; 
RASDN, 2013). Overall, therefore, there was a focus not only on the 
assessment of symptoms, and the way in which these affect the daily life of the 
person and their family, but the wider environmental and social context of the 





Masking, and social context 
Some guidelines (n=6) reported the difficulties of diagnosing autism when 
compensation strategies may ‘mask’ difficulties in some contexts, particularly as 
an adult (APA, 2013a), and in girls (Lai et al., 2011) where autism may go 
unrecognised. Some suggested that individuals may come forward for diagnosis 
when their circumstances change and/or stressors increase (e.g. Howlett and 
Richman, 2011; RASDN, 2013; SIGN, 2016). Some guidelines (n=5) noted that 
cultural differences will exist in norms for social interaction or that cultural 
variations can deliver misleading signs and symptoms. DSM-5 suggested that 
the boundaries between normality and pathology differ between cultures and 
the level at which experience may become problematic may differ (APA, 
2013a).  
 
SIGN suggested that those with autism may not have met ‘normal’ adult 
milestones in work, relationships or independence and contained extensive 
information on how females can present with a different symptom profile (SIGN, 
2016). Others warned that behaviours might be the result of disruptive home 
experiences, carer illness (NICE, 2011) or complex psychosocial or child 
protection backgrounds (O’Hare, 2009).  
 
Despite research showing links between diagnostic rates and SES, there was 
very little mention of the impact of SES in CPGs. DSM-5 stated that cultural and 
socioeconomic factors may affect age at recognition or diagnosis (APA, 2013a) 
but generally guidelines failed to consider how this might be considered in 
practice, other than to be aware that ‘cultural variations can deliver misleading 
signs and symptoms’ (Howlett and Richman, 2011, p. 48) or that autism is ‘not 
restricted to particular ethnic or economic backgrounds’ (British Psychological 
Society, 2016, p. 4). RCSLT guidelines considered assessment of bilingual 
individuals (RCSLT, 2005) and some suggested that ethnicity may delay 
engagement in the diagnostic process (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014) or 





Overall, guidelines suggested it was the responsibility of the HCP to make a 
judgement about which behaviours appear to be ‘normal’ in complex social and 
family circumstances, as well as against norms for behaviour.  
 
Diagnostic uncertainty, thresholds and the role of clinical judgement  
Overall the general focus of guidelines was to outline a framework to find the 
best way to decide whether autism is present or not around a threshold of 
symptom severity. However, many guidelines problematised this, for example, 
one guideline discussed how definitions of autism have changed with DMS-5 
(Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014) and others suggested that social factors, 
such as an upbringing characterised by lack of boundaries (Howlett and 
Richman, 2011) or symptoms amplified by distress (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2014) may cause diagnostic difficulties. 
 
All national guidelines considered uncertainties around diagnosis, particularly 
with very young children or those with co-existing disorders (NICE, 2011); when 
there may be disagreement within the diagnosing team or between the team 
and the patient or family, or when there is a lack of local expertise (NICE, 2012). 
Many warned of diagnostic difficulties, or ‘obscuring’ (O’Hare, 2009; Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2014) that can take place if there is an intellectual 
disability or other complex coexisting condition and several considered the 
difficulties of overlapping diagnostic criteria (APA, 2013a; Lai et al., 2014; Levy 
et al., 2009; O’Hare, 2009). Further uncertainty was outlined when individuals 
may not reach the diagnostic threshold (NICE, 2011) or when children with 
autism score below the cut-off as determined by the diagnostic instrument (Parr 
and Woodbury-Smith, 2017).  
 
Despite this uncertainty, CPGs generally proposed a systematic approach to 
diagnosis and, in some cases, asserted that progress has been achieved in 
establishing consensus around a behavioural definition and established 
systematic clinical assessments (e.g. Lai et al., 2014) even whilst recognising 
that the ‘boundaries between disorders are more porous than originally 





Eight guidelines stressed the key role of clinical judgement in the diagnostic 
process. DSM-5 outlined that the use of diagnostic criteria should be informed 
by clinical judgement (APA, 2013a) and ICD-10 suggested that guidelines 
should be used flexibly in clinical work (WHO, 1993). The full version of NICE 
children’s guideline recommended: ‘Use information from all sources, together 
with clinical judgement, to diagnose autism based on ICD-10 or DSM-IV criteria’ 
(National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2011, p. 
113). One guideline suggested that clinicians may depend on the ‘feel’ of the 
interaction with the patient for diagnosis (Carpenter, 2012). The RCPsych 
guideline stated that: ’…much will depend on the extent of the clinician’s 
experience, their rigour in applying standard criteria and their ability to 
recognise alternative diagnoses’ (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014, p. 15). 
Uncertainty, clinical judgement and clinician experience, therefore, were all 
identified as important factors in the diagnostic process.  
 
Pragmatic outcomes and diagnostic value 
Most guidelines (n=17) discussed the need for HCPs to have knowledge of local 
support and resources available to deliver appropriate advice when required. 
The value of the diagnosis was generally described as a way to provide 
appropriate support, intervention and resources. NICE guidelines for children 
and young people clarified this:  
 
‘Diagnosis and the assessment of needs …can open doors to support 
and services…all of these can improve the lives of the child or young 
person and their family’ (NICE, 2011, p. 5).  
 
However, NICE guidelines for adults acknowledged that adults who are 
diagnosed may receive no support due to lack of services (NICE, 2012) and 
Pilling et al stated that whilst care for children and young people is generally 
well coordinated, this is not always the case for adult services (Pilling et al., 
2012). 
 
Although some guidelines acknowledged that people may not want a diagnosis 
and the label it brings with it (e.g. RASDN, 2013, 2011) or that it can be 




generally guidelines described the benefits of a diagnosis primarily as relating to 
improved quality of life, creating an opportunity to have needs met, greater 
understanding and reassurance about one’s own situation and access to 
interventions and services. Some guidelines considered that diagnosis can 
provide relief, understanding or an opportunity to move on with increased 
support (Howlett and Richman, 2011; NICE, 2011; Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2014). 
 
Many guidelines stressed the importance of early diagnosis as this enables 
early intervention which leads to improved health outcomes (e.g Blenner et al., 
2011; Lai et al., 2014; RASDN, 2011; RCSLT, 2005). However, the BMJ 
guideline asserted that the, ‘…efficacy of early intervention varies from child to 
child’ (Parr and Woodbury-Smith, 2017, p. 7), and that ‘consideration of the 
direct financial costs, indirect costs… and the impact on relationships within the 
family… must be balanced against likely and possible improvements in outcome 
for the person with ASD’ (Parr and Woodbury-Smith, 2017, p. 21), bringing 
uncertainty into the benefits of diagnosis. Furthermore, O’Hare asserted that it 
is difficult to prove that earlier intervention is more effective (O’Hare, 2009).  
 
Overall, guidelines reflected a concern about the potential impact or benefits on 
the child or adult receiving a diagnosis and considered positive factors such as 
access to support and intervention, increased understanding or relief; as well as 
potential negative impacts such as stigma. Carpenter, however, questioned the 
relationship between need and diagnosis, by asking whether diagnosis is 
influenced by what intervention the person needs or ‘…explicitly determined by 
the person’s need to have the label to access a service… rather than their fitting 
strict diagnostic criteria?’ (Carpenter, 2012, p. 124).  
 
To conclude, whilst CPGs appeared to frame a methodical and clinical 
diagnostic process, they also rehearsed a number of subjective dilemmas that 
HCPs have to negotiate along the way. Some CPGs themselves drew attention 
to social issues that muddle the process: the difficulties of establishing a clear 
threshold in a condition where symptoms are impacted by the stressors of 




mechanistic assessments or algorithms (Carpenter, 2012; Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2014); the crucial role of clinical judgement (RASDN, 2013); the 
possibility of diagnostic uncertainty through disagreement, lack of local 
expertise or when a complex coexisting condition is present (NICE, 2012); the 
complexity caused by interaction with co-occurring conditions; masking of 
autism by comorbid conditions in secondary care (Pilling et al., 2012); the 
impact of good (or poor) social support and coping strategies on how symptoms 





We found that CPGs varied in how they described the diagnostic process in 
relation to use of diagnostic tools, key elements and structure of the diagnostic 
process (for example how diagnosis related to wider needs assessment) and 
how autism was classified, defined either by current versions of DSM or ICD. In 
addition, whilst some recommendations were clear and universal, for example, 
recommendations for multi-disciplinary working, there was little guidance as to 
how this should work in practice.  
 
In addition, we found that uncertainty was central to many diagnostic decisions, 
placing a great emphasis on clinical judgement. This uncertainty included 
questions around the benefits of early intervention, the shifting nature of the 
diagnostic threshold, the difficulties of interpreting needs in different social 
contexts, the problems of interpreting ‘masking’ or coping strategies, the 
differences in presentation across age and breadth of symptoms, the inter-
relationship with co-conditions and sharing of symptoms, the impact of stressors 
on symptoms as well as interpretation of symptoms and needs in different 
cultural contexts.  
 
Overall, therefore, our narrative review found that although individual guidelines 
appeared to present a coherent and systematic assessment process, they 
varied enough in their recommendations to make the choices available to 




context of uncertainty which appeared to be central to the diagnosis of autism. 
We argue that clinical guidelines for autism diagnosis illuminate the process of 
diagnosis as social rather than straightforwardly clinical, and that judgement is 
required to consider a number of sometimes contradictory and complex social 
factors. 
 
6.9.1 Social factors in CPGs 
Organising the narrative review findings in relation to operational, interactional 
and contextual factors enabled consideration of the influence of social factors 
throughout the diagnostic process.  
 
In the wide range of inter-related assessment processes that HCPs negotiate in 
order to make the diagnostic decision, the factors considered appear to be both 
social and medical. Social factors include: how the category of ‘autism’ is 
defined and boundaried; operational and interactional factors present in the 
process of diagnosis; to the consequences of diagnosis including how diagnosis 
is valued (see Figure 14). Each of these factors had a place in clinical 
guidelines to a greater or lesser extent but in many cases they were not 
operationalised to enable a clear and transparent framework. For example, 
although there were many references to individuals masking symptoms, family 
‘scaffolding’ of social impairment and coping strategies, there was little 
guidance about how HCPs can judge the impact of these on need, behavioural 
symptoms or functioning.  
 
CPGs, therefore, tended to mask (whilst paradoxically acknowledging) the 
existence of social factors in the diagnostic process. A more explicit 
acknowledgement of social factors and how to manage them might 
problematise the nature of autism diagnosis altogether: if all these factors have 
a place in diagnosis, how do they relate to clinical factors and what does it 
mean for descriptions of symptoms? Whilst it is not our intention to undermine 
the utility of diagnostic categories in relation to access to resources or support, 
there appears to be a need for balance in CPGs between a clinical approach 




threshold; and a pragmatic or functional approach which responds to individual 
and wider needs and takes account of social factors.  
 
6.9.2 Diagnostic tools and process 
Clinical guidelines for autism varied in aspects of their key recommendations in 
operational factors. Ambiguities around which tools to use, the key elements in 
the diagnostic process and the relationship between diagnosis, assessment and 
formulation suggest that local practice may be shaped by other factors, such as 
available resources, experience and professional roles. Which tools are used, 
whether different elements of the process are considered together, sequentially 
or inconsistently, and the specific aims of each part of the assessment process 
may have an impact on diagnostic outcomes. A clearer framework would help 
HCPs to consider which elements of the process are relevant and when.  
 
6.9.3 MDT working and views of the family 
Guidance about how HCPs can reach a consensus with others in a multi-
disciplinary context or deal with patient/family disagreement or desire was 
lacking, leaving interactional factors as key to the process but largely 
unexplained. Whilst it might not appear to be in the remit of CPGs to make 
specific recommendations about how teams are organised and configured, 
particularly across different health systems, we argue that team functioning as a 
key shaping factor in diagnosis requires more attention in CPGs, to ensure 
clarity of roles and transparency for those coming for diagnosis. Similarly, as 
acknowledged by some CPGs, desire of the patient/family can influence the 
diagnostic process, therefore CPGs should offer guidance about how that might 
be managed.  
 
6.9.4 Diagnostic uncertainty and judgement 
Uncertainty about diagnostic thresholds and differences in diagnostic criteria 
make clinical judgement key to the diagnostic process and yet how this comes 
about was not clearly defined. The extent to which diagnosis should be based 
on underlying symptoms versus contextual factors such as wider needs or 
circumstances of the individual was unclear. In addition, how HCPs consider the 




although there was a strong link described between diagnosis and access to 
support.  
 
Ambiguities in CPGs suggest that guidelines have limitations in how far they are 
able to promote consistency across practice especially given the lack of a 
biomarker for autism, the reliance on observed behaviour and family narratives 
for diagnosis, and the differences across health systems. However, adults, 
children and families coming for diagnosis might expect a consistent process of 
assessment in keeping with a framework outlined in CPGs, as CPGs become a 
fixed reference point both for HCPs and the lay public. There is, therefore, a 
tension between potential expectations of those coming for diagnosis that there 
should be a uniform process; and the flexibility HCPs require to respond to 
individual need.  
 
Given the social nature of diagnosis as argued in this article, biomarker use in 
clinical practice, if and when it is successfully developed, is likely to remain only 
one aspect of an interactive diagnostic process, and therefore may not 
necessarily alleviate some of the difficulties and complexities of diagnosis that 
we describe. However, as biomarker research develops, it is likely that it will 
produce important evidence to be considered in the development of future 
CPGs. 
 
6.9.5 Building on previous work 
Whilst our narrative review differed in purpose to the systematic review 
undertaken by Penner et al (Penner et al., 2017), there were some similar 
findings across the two studies. We found, as did the authors of this previous 
review, that guidelines were inconsistent in their recommendations around 
diagnostic assessment. For example, whilst guidelines generally recommended 
MDT assessment, some suggested that a single experienced clinician could 
diagnose (Carpenter, 2012; NICE, 2011; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014) 
and there was little cited evidence for the efficacy of MDT assessment.  In 
addition, CPGs did not provide guidance as to how waiting times (where 
specified) would be achieved and we would add that they provided little 




most effective. We found, as did Penner et al, that guidelines varied 
substantially in recommended tools and personnel; and that none of the 
professional guidelines provided target waiting times for assessment (See 
Appendix 12). Whilst we did not assess guidelines for quality, we agree that 
there are multiple guidelines that HCPs might access, and that they vary in their 
level of detail and their recommendations.  
    
We built on Penner et al’s findings in a number of ways. Our review of the range 
of assessment processes that HCPs involved in autism diagnosis may 
undertake (See Appendix 12) suggested a wide range of choices in assessment 
processes. We also found that using different classification criteria (ICD-10 and 
DSM-5) further increases complexity in CPGs. Finally, we found that 
consideration of factors such as interaction with the patient and family, how 
needs might be defined and assessed, and issues of masking, social context, 
uncertainty and clinical judgement highlighted the way in which social 
processes and factors might impact on diagnostic decision-making. We also 
found that, despite the CPGs in our study operating within comparable health 
systems across the UK, CPGs did not make consistent recommendations 
around how diagnosis might release post-diagnostic resources, and what that 
means for the process of diagnosis itself.  
 
Overall we agree with Penner et al’s findings that CPGs should incorporate 
flexibility to ensure that individual needs are met. Additionally, we suggest that 
guidelines should acknowledge more explicitly the social framing of diagnosis 
and support clinicians with a framework which enables them to act 
pragmatically in the best interests of the patient. We would argue that 
inconsistencies and lack of operational guidance around social factors in CPGs 
suggests that local factors such as access to resources and HCP expertise are 
likely to shape diagnosis more than is explicitly outlined in CPGs. 
 
Unlike Penner et al, we do not think that a formal approach to decision-making 
such as the Delphi method would help HCPs in the assessment process; rather 
it might simply add another layer of complexity to a process which is already 




together in the context of an ever-increasing workload; an extra administrative 
burden may make this even more difficult. 
 
Finally, unlike Penner et al, we included in our review CPGs for adult diagnosis 
and children over six years old, which enabled us to consider factors common 
across age groups. Whilst we did not specifically look for differences between 
children’s and adult’s CPGs we are aware that the different pathways for 
children’s and adult’s assessment (Baird et al., 2011; Vllasaliu et al., 2016), may 
well impact on an individual’s ability to access diagnostic services, the process 
of assessment itself as well as potential support post-diagnosis. We would 
consider these differences as social organisational factors that may impact the 
assessment process and merit further consideration in the development of 
future CPGs.  
 
Guidelines, therefore, appear to offer a relatively linear and straightforward 
pathway towards a diagnostic decision in their presentation, with DSM-5 
asserting that criteria facilitate an objective assessment of symptom 
presentations in a variety of settings (Norbury and Sparks, 2013). However, 
comparing individual guidelines suggests inconsistencies in this framework and 
close analysis reveals a more fluid process, disrupting the apparent clinical 





Overall, there was a bewildering range of options for HCPs in the assessment 
process, and a number of different emphases in guidelines which might lead a 
clinical team one way or another. Navigating this framework in practice is, 
therefore, likely to be less systematic than the guidelines might suggest, 
allowing for, as it must, social and contextual influences. In reality, the clinical 
pathway for autism diagnosis differs across health systems and trusts across 
the UK (Vllasaliu et al., 2016) leading to the potential for a great deal of 





6.10.1 Strengths and limitations  
Although there has been a recent systematic review of clinical guidelines 
(Penner et al., 2017), we consider our narrative approach to be helpful to 
understand the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the diagnostic 
process. Methodologically, we undertook a systematic search and included a 
transparent but pragmatic selection of documents. This is, to our knowledge, 
the first review which strives to consider where social factors are considered in 
clinical guidelines for autism diagnosis. One limit was that as it was a review of 
current guidelines, changes through time were not exposed. Our review was 
limited to the UK context because health care settings vary widely in 
international contexts. In addition, we only examined the content of guidelines 
rather than how they are used. Whilst CPGs are intended to assist clinical 
decision-making by improving effectiveness and decreasing variations in clinical 
practice (Kredo et al., 2016), one review of guidelines for psychiatric diagnoses 
suggested that CPGs are not implemented enough in clinical practice due to 
either lack of agreement or ambiguity between guidelines (Saddichha and 
Chaturvedi, 2014). It is likely that there is wide variation in how CPGs are used 
in practice in autism diagnosis and we plan further studies to consider this. 
 
6.10.2 Implications and recommendations for future research 
Social factors were not only explicit in guidelines, but were central to them. 
However, an observer might be forgiven for assuming these are subsidiary 
factors in diagnosis, with the more ‘medical’ ‘symptom checklist’ at its core. 
HCPs are expected, as outlined in DSM-5, to integrate the social, psychological 
and biological in case formulation, however, greater clarity about how this 
should operate would be helpful. Our findings suggest that more detail about 
how clinical judgement should consider social factors in diagnosis would 
provide a more transparent guideline for HCPs. 
 
We would not recommend greater rigidity within CPGs when evidence for best 
diagnostic practice is inconsistent (e.g. use of diagnostic tools), and which may 
restrict HCPs in making decisions that are in the best interest of the person 
coming for diagnosis. Rather we recommend a more explicit acknowledgement 




operationalised to enable more consistency of practice and transparency for 
those coming for diagnosis.  
 
Specifically, greater clarification is required related to the sequence and timing 
of the diagnostic, assessment and formulation processes. The recognition and 
assessment of needs is both part of the assessment process and inextricably 
linked to the consequences of diagnosis; guidelines might attempt to consider 
how these might be reconciled. A greater acknowledgement of the active role of 
the patient, client or patient’s family in the diagnostic process would help to 
place potentially competing narratives into context. It would be useful to 
consider whether guidelines are culturally specific to health services and setting 
and we would recommend that further narrative reviews should be conducted to 
examine CPGs in other countries. In addition, greater clarity is required around 
how multi-disciplinary interaction might operate to support consensus decision-
making. Further research creating an evidence base on best practice for multi-
disciplinary decision-making and the use of different diagnostic tools in practice 















The narrative review in Chapter Six demonstrated that clinical guidelines varied 
in their recommendations for diagnostic practice. I identified a number of ‘social 
factors’ which complicate the straightforward notion of diagnosis as a way to 
identify underlying conditions. There appeared to be potential for ambiguity and 
significant scope for the use of clinical judgement, a term that was ill-defined. 
Building on these findings, the aim of the assessment team observation study 
was to examine how autism diagnosticians make diagnostic decisions in 
practice, given the complexity of factors as outlined in guidelines.  
 
I have talked in detail in Chapter Five: Methods and Approach about the 
conceptual shift in the project in relation to social factors. The initial concept of 
‘social factors’ as defined in Chapter Six was based on a positivist concept that 
implied that the social was a’ thing apart’ from the clinical or medical: and that 
there could be a divide between the two so that what we considered ‘social’ 
could be measured. Just as with medical classification, I struggled to see where 
these things – the clinical and the social – could be separated.  
 
In retrospect, the review of clinical guidelines demonstrates how guidelines 
themselves are constructed from social concepts of categorisation and 
classification. The study perhaps illustrates the struggle that medicine has to 
hold on to authority in classification. If there are human judgements made about 
what should and should not be in clinical guidelines (and how can there not be) 
which leads to discrepancies between them, then it illustrates how subjectivity is 
inherent in our classification systems.  
 
The following articles were written after a conceptual shift, and consider social 
‘factors’ to be inseparable from the wider context of diagnosis (in that diagnosis 
is a social process, informed and shaped by culture, society, history and the 





Eighteen assessment meetings were attended across four teams. The data was 
analysed with a hybrid thematic/discursive method (Braun and Clarke, 2013; 
Wiggins, 2017) (see Chapter Five: Methods and Approach). This chapter 
represents the thematic study.  
 
All aspects of the study were undertaken by the PhD candidate. Co-authors 
contributions were as follows:  
 
GR: research design; revision for intellectual content 
RM: revision for intellectual content 
TF: revision for intellectual content 
 
The rest of this chapter presents the published manuscript of the thematic 
analysis of clinical guidelines. It was published in Sociology of Health and 















CHAPTER SEVEN: Drawing a line in the sand: affect and 













Diagnosis of autism in the UK is generally made within a multi-disciplinary team 
(MDT) setting and is primarily based on observation and clinical interview. We 
examined how clinicians diagnose autism in practice by observing post-
assessment meetings in specialist autism teams. Eighteen meetings across four 
teams based in the south of England and covering 88 cases were audio-
recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis.  
 
We drew out two themes, related to the way in which clinicians expressed their 
specialist disciplinary knowledge to come to diagnostic consensus: Feeling 
Autism in the Encounter; and Evaluating Testimonies of Non-present Actors. 
We show how clinicians produce objective accounts through their situated 
practices and perform diagnosis as an act of interpretation, affect and 
evaluation to meet the institutional demands of the diagnostic setting. Our study 












If we think about it diagnostically, somewhere there is a line drawn in the 
sand … and where that line is, changes really, historically. 
 
Consultant Clinical Psychiatrist 
 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is diagnosed when there are persistent 
patterns of difficulty in social communication and social interaction, combined 
with restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities (APA, 
2013a). In a context of increasing prevalence rates, neurodiversity activism, 
parent advocacy, and debates around aetiology of autism, sociologists have 
considered how the category of autism has shifted and changed, examining the 
role of parent activists, genetic and genomic developments, and the broader 
issues of psychological and child development that shape the category (Evans, 
2017; Eyal et al., 2010; Fitzgerald, 2017; Hollin, 2017a; Hollin and Pilnick, 2015; 
Nadesan, 2005; C. Silverman, 2013; Singh, 2016).  
 
The condition of autism is particularly interesting for a study of diagnosis 
because it has uncertain aetiology, symptoms can be inherently ambiguous, 
and rather than being a single condition, autism is considered to comprise a 
group of heterogeneous disorders which vary widely. Furthermore, 
approximately 70% of people who are diagnosed are considered to meet criteria 
for at least one other psychiatric condition (NICE, 2011). Core symptoms are 
considered to be present in early childhood but many people are now 
diagnosed in adulthood. Diagnostic rates have increased greatly, now estimated 
at about 1.1% - 1.2% of the population (Brugha et al., 2012; Sadler et al., 2017), 
leading to debates around the broadening of diagnostic criteria (Russell et al., 
2015; Rutter, 2005); the decreasing age of diagnosis (Leonard et al., 2010); the 
conceptualisation of autism as an ‘epidemic’ (Ebben, 2018) and ultimately the 
medicalisation of behaviour through domain expansion (Conrad, 2007). 
 
Whilst there are many screening and assessment tools for autism, the most 
commonly used tool in both adults and children is the Autism Diagnostic 




such as the Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview (3di) (Skuse 
et al., 2004) or Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Le Couteur et al., 
2003). The ADOS is an activity-based standardised observation tool and the 
clinical interview is a set of standardised interview questions for caregivers 
designed to elicit developmental and behavioural information to assess the 
presence of autistic symptoms (Skuse et al., 2004). Diagnosis, therefore, is 
determined primarily through observation of behaviours and the accounts of 
informants: patients2, family members, friends or colleagues. The ‘gold 
standard’ of diagnostic decision-making is considered to be consensus 
agreement within a multi-agency team utilising appropriate diagnostic tools and 
other related assessments (Falkmer et al., 2013; Woolfenden et al., 2011). As a 
case study, therefore, there is an opportunity to consider the interaction of 
different agents within the diagnostic process: clinicians3, patients and family 
testimonies, and diagnostic tools, in the institutional context of the assessment 
meeting.   
 
There has been little direct observational work examining how clinicians 
accomplish autism diagnosis through talking about their patients together; and 
no studies to our knowledge that do so in adult assessment. This article 
explores the question of how clinicians utilise and interpret evidence together, to 
create an accountable diagnostic narrative.  
 
7.1.1 Constructing autism 
Our study is sited within a ‘sociology of diagnosis’ framework (Brown, 1995; 
Jutel, 2009) which considers the place of diagnosis in the institution of 
medicine, the social framing of disease definitions and how diagnosis confers 
authority to medicine (Jutel, 2009). Considering diagnosis as a social process 
rather than a ‘moment of clinical purity’ (Latimer, 2013) allows investigation into 
the social forces that may shape diagnosis, the cultural discourses drawn upon, 
                                            
2 There is significant debate about classifying autism as a ‘disorder’, with many preferring to use the term 
‘condition’ (NICE, 2012). We use the term ‘autism’ to embrace the spectrum of conditions as currently 
defined in the DSM-5 and International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) (WHO, 2018). 
 
3 We use the term ‘clinician’ to encompass all healthcare participants in this study, defined as members of 




the ways in which human problems and experiences become viewed and 
treated as medical – a process known as medicalisation (Conrad, 1992) – as 
well as the practices clinicians use together to resolve the challenge set by 
wider society. In this context, the category of autism can be viewed as a 
conceptual framework that proscribes varying contemporary versions of 
acceptable societal behaviour, understandings of psychiatry, as well as 
technological and genetic developments.  
 
Conrad and Schneider’s (1980) approach to medicalisation embraces 
interaction, shifting the site of medicalisation from being the responsibility of the 
medical practitioner alone, to a broad and inter-related set of practices and 
values. At micro-level, this can include non-clinical actors such as teachers and 
employers (Halfmann, 2012). The intersection of different actors (including 
commercial interests, advocacy groups, genetic technologies and institutions) 
can shift a collection of behaviours into a ‘thing’: a concrete entity which 
becomes a disease category. For autism, this process of reification transforms 
what is sometimes an inconsistent or intangible set of social behaviours into a 
concrete condition, perceived as an inherent attribute of an individual. 
Examining clinician interaction can help us to understand how social behaviours 
become medicalised through the social process of diagnosis.  
 
Social and institutional practices, therefore, enable the framing of autism as a 
condition and as a social construct for defining the normal and the pathological. 
Scholars have illustrated how social practices have reconceptualised autism. 
For example, increased forms of social surveillance of children and the 
emergence of ‘childhood’ as a research focus enabled the reframing of autism 
as a condition in the 1940s (Nadesan, 2005). Others argue that 
deinstitutionalisation from the 1960s led to a redistribution of expertise, a rise in 
parental activism, and a change in how we understand ‘mental retardation’, 
contributing to extending autism into a broader spectrum (Eyal et al., 2010). 
Evans argues that the development of autism in the UK must be seen in the 
light of major institutional transformations from the 1960s including the growth of 
new statistical and epidemiological methods for measuring childhood behaviour 




psychological development: ‘autism’ shifted from a category related to the 
inaccessible inner life of a child, to a problem of social impairment (Evans, 
2013). 
 
The reclassification of autism as a ‘spectrum’, Autistic Spectrum Disorder, in 
DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition) 
(APA, 2013a), simultaneously, and controversially, removed Asperger’s 
Syndrome (AS) as a discrete and separate sub-group. This conceptual change 
to a heterogeneous ‘continuity of severity’ rather than ‘discrete entities’ (Wing 
and Gould, 1979, p. 26) determined that autism became a single condition with 
different levels of severity rather than four separate types of pervasive 
developmental disorders as outlined in DSM-IV (APA, 1994). 
 
Some scholars argue that the development of the category of autism as broadly 
heterogeneous can be conceived as an ‘agential cut’ – a point at which autism 
became one thing to the exclusion of others (Hollin, 2017a). Hollin argues that 
the work of key cognitive researchers such Frith, Happe and Baron-Cohen in 
the 1980s and 90s shifted autism into the cognitive domain as an explanatory 
framework. Moreover it led to a stable definition of autism ‘determined by its 
indeterminacy’ (Hollin, 2017a, p. 617) as a heterogeneous condition with no two 
people being the same, and with no single cause. Whilst there has been 
extensive work undertaken on medical uncertainty (for example, see Atkinson, 
1984; Bursztajn et al., 1986; Campbell, 1985; Fox, 1957; Greenhalgh, 2013; 
Hedgecoe, 2003; McGoey, 2009; Pickersgill, 2011; Pinch, 2012; Timmermans 
et al., 2018), which we discuss elsewhere  (see Hayes et al., 2019, under 
review), here we consider Hollin’s concept of ontological indeterminacy to be 
particularly relevant for this study. Hollin argues that autism’s inherent 
heterogeneity lends it an ontological indeterminacy, meaning that exactly what 
autism is can never be known (Hollin, 2017a). Nevertheless, it still defends the 
status of object as a reified category.  
 
Finally, critical diagnostic work has explored how parent advocates and adult 
self-advocates have helped to shift public awareness of what autism is and how 




(2010) argue that a redistribution of expertise provided a new network whereby 
parents moved from being the ‘least credible’ of witnesses, for example being 
blamed as ‘refrigerator mothers’ (Bettelheim, 1967), to experts on their children. 
Parents became core to a network of expertise whereby there was a 
‘hybridisation of identities’ between medical experts and lay people (Eyal et al., 
2010, p. 8). This, they argue, means that the production of autism takes place 
relationally and outside the traditional medical field of psychiatry, instead in a 
‘space between fields’ where boundaries between lay and medical expertise are 
blurred (Eyal, 2010; Eyal et al., 2010). Combining this concept with an 
interactional approach to medicalisation, raises the question of how these 
networks of expertise work in practice, and how this might contribute towards 
defining the condition.  
 
7.1.2 Talk between healthcare professionals about diagnosis 
There has been some observational research examining autism assessment, 
for example, observation of initial assessment meetings (O’Reilly et al., 2017) 
and of multi-disciplinary team meetings (Parish, 2019). The empirical body of 
work most relevant to our study is that undertaken in the US by Turowetz and 
Maynard (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, 2017; Turowetz, 2015a, 2015b; 
Turowetz and Maynard, 2019, 2017, 2016). In their analysis of talk-in-interaction 
in autism assessments, case conferences and diagnostic feedback meetings, 
Maynard and Turowetz demonstrate how diagnostic stories are methodically 
produced through interaction between clinicians themselves and between the 
child and clinicians. This article builds on two inter-related findings from their 
work related to how clinicians ‘attend to’ different factors in the diagnostic 
process: foregrounding diagnostically salient behaviours; and disattending to 
interactional agents within the assessment.  
 
On the first point, Turowetz claim that clinicians identify and select 
diagnostically salient (story-worthy) behaviours to recount to colleagues who 
will, together, build consensus around their importance to a potential diagnosis 
(Turowetz, 2015a). Turowetz examined how interpretations of a child’s 




certain interpretive frames over others. Clinicians orient to story-worthy events, 
therefore, to create diagnostic consensus (Turowetz, 2015a). 
 
Second, and with reference to Actor Network Theory (see Latour, 2005), 
Turowetz argues that whilst behaviour in assessments is ‘interactionally-
occasioned’, clinicians cite practices in such a way that presents the assessing 
clinician as a neutral facilitator and diagnostic tools as largely passive recording 
measures (Turowetz, 2015b). This finding is extended in later work where 
Turowetz and Maynard argue that although diagnosis is an embodied, 
interactional process, clinicians ‘disattend’ to interactional agents – the clinician 
and the diagnostic tool - within assessment (Turowetz and Maynard, 2019). 
This is a necessity born of the institutional pressure for standardisation, and 
results in the behaviours being reported as an inherent feature of the child, 
rather than as an interaction between clinician, tool and child.  
 
However, a UK study by Hollin and Pilnick (2018) found that the diagnostic 
decision can shift depending on how similar types of behaviour are interpreted. 
In ADOS assessment sessions, facilitated by ADOS-trained researchers, they 
demonstrate how judgments are made about which kinds of behaviour are 
consequential for diagnosis. The authors discuss the significant level of 
interpretation required to identify and separate these kinds of behaviours with 
consistency (Hollin and Pilnick, 2018). This suggests that despite attempts at 
standardisation, interaction and interpretation play a significant part in 
assessment. 
 
Whilst Turowetz and Maynard argue that autism diagnosticians routinely ‘gloss 
over’ embodied interaction in assessment (Turowetz and Maynard, 2019, p. 
1023), other researchers have shown how affect, emotion and the expert ‘gaze’ 
are woven into the social actions of different stakeholders in the world of autism 
(e.g. Fitzgerald, 2017, 2013; Hollin and Giraud, 2017).  
 
Silverman (2013) argues that autism as a condition is characterised by expert 
knowledge, through standardised systems of measurement and description with 




families these standardisations fail to represent the emotional consequences of 
these diagnostic practices, or the messiness of real life experience (C. 
Silverman, 2013). Silverman argues that, rather than being a liability, emotion 
can be a source of committed and reliable knowledge. Fitzgerald extends this 
argument to suggest that autism neuroscientists engage in their work not simply 
as an intellectual or technical task but as an act of affective and emotional 
labour (Fitzgerald, 2017, 2013). In his interviews with neuroscientists he finds 
that they express a ‘feel’ of autism, as something distinct and knowable, as 
something we ‘recognise when we see it’ (Fitzgerald, 2017, p. 48). He argues 
that, where specificity in testing is less important than the level of impairment, 
‘epistemological space’ is given to whether autism is ‘felt’ by the clinician during 
the interaction' (Fitzgerald, 2017, p. 50). 
 
These empirical studies serve to illustrate how clinicians may navigate the 
complex process of diagnosis when heterogeneity is considered to be core to 
the condition. In this article, we focus on the way in which clinicians talk about 
diagnosis together in specialist autism assessment meetings in the UK. We 
were particularly interested in how diagnosis of autism is constructed as an 
interactive event within meetings and how this might contribute to the reification 





As part of a larger study exploring autism diagnosis, this study collected 
naturally occurring data by observing how clinicians talk together in specialist 
autism assessment teams. Using naturally occurring approaches in healthcare 
settings enables exploration of real-world practices underpinning healthcare 
(Kiyimba et al., 2019). It provides data which is local and contextually focussed 
and therefore ‘context-rich’; and minimises the active role of the researcher in 
shaping the data (Kiyimba et al., 2019; Potter, 2002).  
 
We purposively sampled teams that specialised in autism assessment and who 




and two children and young people (C&YP) assessment teams. Patients and 
families were not present at any meetings.    
 
Sites were recruited from an open call to a list of clinical contacts drawn from 
the internet and via the Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Clinical Research 
Network. All sites were National Health Service (NHS) providers. Seven teams 
were approached: two were excluded as they did not hold formal meetings, and 
one withdrew. Table 9 gives characteristics and description of each team by 
role and setting.  
 
A process of ethical approval and research governance was undertaken in line 
with NIHR Good Clinical Practice guidelines. This included full informed consent 
from participants, rights to withdraw from the study, secure storage and data 
management. Names and identifying details were changed throughout to 
protect the identity of participants and patients. Ethical approval was granted by 
University of Exeter Medical School (UEMC) ethics committee (Ref: 
Mar17/B/114) and the Health Research Authority (HRA) (Ref: 220180). 
 
7.2.1 Data collection 
Observations of meetings were carried out by the first author who audio-
recorded eighteen autism specialist team meetings in four different sites (nine 
meetings in two adult and nine in two C&YP settings). We used Malterud et al’s 
(2016) concept of ‘information power’ to assess when we had adequate data to 
meet the aims of the study. This involved consideration of quality of dialogue, 
analysis strategy, use of established theory and sample specificity.  
 
The number of cases discussed at each meeting ranged from 1 to 9, and in total 
the observations provided data related to 88 cases and documented over 19 
hours of meeting time. Thirteen cases discussed were at referral stage and 24 
were classified as administrative discussions, primarily related to booking dates 
for assessments or related actions. These two groups were excluded from 
analysis as they did not involve decision-making about diagnosis. The final 









Team details (a) Meeting Number 
Attendees                        
per meeting 







Referrals & Admin 
discussions (c) 
Adult Team 1 (d) 1 6 3 1 0 2 0 
Clinical Team Manager; Clinical Psychologists 
(x4), Assistant Clinical Psychologists (x3); Peer 
Support Worker. Meets weekly (Case Review 
Meetings) Predominantly rural area 
2 6 2 0 0 2 0 
3 5 1 0 0 1 0 
4 6 2 0 0 2 0 
5 5 3 0 0 3 0 
   11 1 0 10 0 
Adult Team 2 1 5 3 2 1 0 8 
Team Manager; Consultant Psychiatrists (x2); 
Occupational Therapist; Medical Secretary; 
Social Worker; Speciality Doctor; STS 
Psychiatrist. Meets weekly; Predominantly urban 
area 
2 4 6 2 1 3 6 
3 5 5 1 2 2 5 
4 4 2 1 0 1 5 
   16 6 4 6 24 
CYP Team 1 (d) 1 6 9 3 3 3 4 
Clinical Team Manager; Consultant Psychiatrists 
(x2); Clinical Psychologist; Senior Manager; 
Speech & Language Therapist; Educational 
Psychologist; Autism Practitioner (x2); Senior 
Administrator. Meets monthly with 'mini' 
meetings as required; Predominantly rural area 
2 5 2 2 0 0 4 
3 4 1 0 0 1 2 
4 4 6 4 0 2 1 
5 3 2 1 0 1 2 
   20 10 3 7 13 
CYP Team 2 (14+) 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Consultant Psychiatrist; Clinical Psychologist 
(x2); Clinical Psychologist; Senior Nurse; 
Foundation Doctor. Meets weekly; 
Predominantly urban area 
2 3 1 1 0 0 0 
3 4 1 1 0 0 0 
4 4 1 1 0 0 0 
   4 4 0 0 0 
TOTALS   51 21 7 23 37 
Notes: a):  Not all team members present in every meeting; visitors in italics; b): Cases were generally deferred due to team requiring further tests or information; c): Cases which came in as referrals and were allocated for assessment: or were subject to admin 
discussion; d) In these teams only selected cases were brought for presentation 
 




adults. The first author’s field notes, short case summaries written after 
fieldwork and the transcribed, anonymised audio data comprised the dataset. 
 
7.2.2 Method of analysis 
We undertook a thematic analysis which enabled identification of patterns 
across the dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2013, 2006a). Thematic analysis is 
theoretically flexible (Braun and Clarke, 2013) and we took a social 
constructionist approach which acknowledges that meaning is socially produced 
and reproduced rather than being located within the individual (Burr, 1995). This 
social constructionist approach makes the epistemological assumption that we 
create meaning collectively through our interactions and experiences of the 
world, and that our constructions of reality depend on specific cultural and 
historic factors (Burr, 1995). Knowledge is produced, therefore, by and through 
culture, language and discourse. Discourse is considered to be a social practice 
with consequences (Edwards and Potter, 1992) and by examining clinicians’ 
talk, we can examine how ‘facts’ and meaning are socially produced.  
 
Our analysis was based on a data-driven, inductive, organic approach (Clarke 
and Braun, 2018) prioritising depth of engagement. We followed Braun and 
Clarke’s six-stage process: familiarisation, coding, generating, reviewing and 
defining/naming themes, and writing up (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Throughout, 
we focussed on discursive issues as outlined by Wiggins (2017), which allowed 
the authors to consider how, through interaction, the social action of diagnosis 
is accomplished.  
 
Data were transcribed orthographically, in line with thematic analysis, and initial 
coding was undertaken by the first author across the complete dataset using 
Nvivo software. The developing analysis was conducted by the first author, 
presented at qualitative data sessions and discussed with co-authors 









Clinicians considered a range of assessment material in their meetings that 
included the results of diagnostic tests, primarily the ADOS and a clinical or 
developmental interview such as the 3di. The team discussion led either to a 
diagnostic decision – autism or not; or a deferred decision dependent on further 
testing or information (Table 9). In the process of analysis, two inter-related 
themes were identified in relation to the way in which clinicians expressed their 
specialist disciplinary knowledge in order to come to diagnostic consensus: 
Feeling Autism in the Encounter; and Evaluating Testimonies of Non-Present 
Actors.  
 
‘Feeling’ Autism in the Encounter 
We found that clinicians routinely expressed an idea that they could feel or 
sense when a person they were assessing was autistic.  
 
Cameron is a nine-year old boy. The Speech and Language Therapist (SLT) 
has undertaken the ADOS assessment and has ‘scored’ Cameron as within the 
clinical range suggesting autism. However, there is concern there may be other 
factors that might explain his score, due to a complex family history. There is an 
impasse in the discussion and the Clinical Team Manager (CTM) prompts a 




The question, framed as a statement, offers SLT an opportunity to underpin the 
ADOS report with a subjective impression. There is a shared understanding that 
this subjective account has weight in this setting; it makes the clinician doubly 
accountable for assessment, both ‘objectively’ through the diagnostic tool, and 
‘subjectively’. Our interest is not whether or how SLT ‘feels ASD’: rather what 
the expression of ‘feel’ might be doing discursively. There is invocation of two 




The use of ‘it’ rather than ‘he’ is ambiguous in relation to the location of this 
aspect of ‘feeling’; the way in which this is framed sites the feeling not in the 
child, but somewhere else, in the space between.  
 
This can be seen further in discussion about Gail, where the location of the 
feeling is ‘in the room’. Gail ‘didn’t quite reach threshold’ on the ADOS, 
suggesting not autism, but the Clinical Psychologist (CP) and an Assistant 




Here clinicians recall the experience of being ‘in the room’ with Gail and this 
appears to be a motivator for pursuing ‘some more’ (tests). The participants 
agree there is ‘something’ and this is driven by feeling and ‘what it was like’. 
Here we do not assume a cognitivist position which asserts that either AP or CP 
are experiencing emotion during this process of assessment. Neither do we 
claim that these things are not being experienced. Rather, we consider this 
expression of affect as a social action rather than a reflection of inner states. 
Here clinicians are accounting for their continued pursuit of diagnosis, despite a 
score on the ADOS that does not indicate autism, and some cynicism about the 
narrative being told by Gail and her informant. Like the ‘affective space’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 245) within which autism scientists work, here ‘feeling’ 
circulates dynamically and expansively between actors, its transitioning 
presence enabling discursive flexibility and warranting future action. 
 
‘Feeling’ can be seen to drive forward assessment. Brian is a 58-year-old man 
who was assessed by a Clinical Psychologist (CP) and was scored ‘under-
threshold’ on the ADOS, outside the clinical range for autism. However, the 







CP suggests that there is ‘something’ inherent to Brian that requires a particular 
kind of approach to ‘uncover’. This locates the source of the condition, autism, 
as embedded within Brian and asserts the special knowledge of the clinician to 
discover it. Clinicians’ stated ability to ‘know’ there is something there, a clinical 
intuition, is a kind of ‘disciplinary objectivity’ (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 
2012) – a specialised evaluative knowledge or trained judgement (Daston and 
Galison, 2007) - which can drive clinicians to seek further evidence towards a 
diagnosis or support a particular diagnostic trajectory. However, as with 
Cameron and Gail, the location ‘it’ assumes there is a ‘thing’ that has to be 
found. The CP’s analysis suggests corroboration with the second assessor with 
the use of ‘we’, thereby strengthening the account and their accountability. Here 
we can see what Fitzgerald (2014, p. 235) calls a ‘particular dynamic of 
ambiguity and presence’ in that there is a certainty and commitment embedded 
in the expression of the feel of autism, and yet the expression of it emerges 




Brian’s lack of co-operation or insight (‘not necessarily playing ball’) is invoked 
as a reason why autism may not be apparent when the clinicians believe there 
is ‘something there’. The process leads to a ‘firm conviction’ (Messer et al., 
2018, p. 268) as the final guide to diagnosis which allays any uncertainty 
previously experienced when Brian demonstrates insight into his own difficulties 
in a feedback meeting. Brian was diagnosed with autism.  






Unlike some other instances where clinicians cited various forms of evidence, 
here the clinician describes their own judgement or ‘feel’ for autism. In the 
space of the team meeting, expressions of feeling serve to drive or inhibit 
progress towards a diagnostic decision, makes diagnosis doubly accountable, 
and allows the expression of dilemmas and contradiction. It becomes a warrant 
for further exploration. Whilst the feeling resides between assessor and 
assessed, the behaviour is located in the individual being assessed. And yet, as 
noted by Hollin and Giraud (2017), affective responses are not entirely 
determined by the organism (patient) but by the ‘whole ecological setting within 
which that organism is immersed and perceived’ (Hollin and Giraud, 2017, p. 2). 
Clinicians are part of the ecology of diagnosis, not separate to it. The discursive 
accomplishment of expressing affect is to signal a shared understanding of 
what autism ‘feels like’ to clinicians who are also part of that ecology and who, 
in accepting this affective assessment, jointly make ‘feeling’ relevant to the task 
in hand. The expression of affect, therefore, enables collective ‘interactional 
progressivity’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017, p. 265) towards a decision. 
 
Evaluating Testimonies of Non-Present Actors 
Throughout the meetings clinicians cited instances of behaviour reported by 
non-present patients, their parents, partners or other informant, frequently 
drawn from a clinical interview such as ADI-R, which tacitly or explicitly linked to 
diagnostic criteria for autism. 
 
Elisha is a 15-year-old girl who has been assessed by clinical interview (3di) 
and ADOS. Elisha has ‘scored up across all domains’ on the 3di, suggesting 
that she is within the range for an autism diagnosis. The Clinical Psychologist 
suggests that she is also likely to ‘score up’ on the ADOS, which has not yet 







Firstly, CPi primes listeners to hear the upcoming talk in the context of 
abnormality by prefacing the story with ‘the other unusual thing’. ‘She would 
insist’ suggests that Elisha’s actions were undertaken in the face of opposition, 
presenting her as unreasonable. The parents then have to engage in ‘hard 
work’ which indicates significant effort required to meet Elisha’s needs. 
Together, the elements of this narrative suggest a young person whose 
behaviour is troublesome, with the speaker inviting listeners to locate symptoms 
of autism - restrictive, repetitive behaviours, interests or activities - in Elisha’s 
behaviour. Here CPi is actively constituting parental reports about Elisha’s 
behaviour as evidence of autism and drawing on ‘the importance of parents’ 
caring as a source of insights’ into their own children (C. Silverman, 2013, p. 
229). Parent testimonies are valued and reinforced by clinicians in their 
retelling, with the parents’ commitment to their child (‘went along with’, ‘hard 
work’) and parental understanding of the difficulties of Elisha’s behaviour 
invoked. Alongside the reporting of many such instances, observations made 
during the ADOS, test scores and discussion of potential complicating co-
conditions, the clinicians agree a diagnosis of autism for Elisha, on condition 
that the ADOS scores as expected.  
 
With Hayley, who is 16, the ADOS assessor, Senior Manager (SM), does not 
undertake a full scored ADOS stating, ‘I wasn’t quite sure how she [Hayley] was 
going to react’ and instead used the ADOS guidelines for a conversation with 
Hayley. SM recounts a number of descriptive incidences, both ‘tendencies’ and 
‘instantiations’ of autistic behaviours, as defined by Maynard and Turowetz 




SM presents this as mum’s narrative, with the term ‘she used to’ suggesting a 
behaviour in the past (and no longer observable, although here cited as 
developmental information towards a diagnosis); and ‘always been obsessed’ 




constitutes Hayley’s behaviour as problematic and unusual rather than as 
constituting normal childhood interests. Listing a large number of interests 
reinforces, through illustrative detail, the repetitive behaviour and adds 
rhetorical strength to the argument (Wiggins, 2017). Here SM has recounted 
stories told by both Hayley and her mum. Although the two stories seem 
apparently disconnected, they combine to enable SM to present Hayley’s 
behaviour as aligned with autism symptoms – restricted and repetitive 
behaviours - and constitute her behaviours, both past and present, from two 
different sources, as evidence, actively constituting Hayley’s behaviour as 
evidence of autism. Together, the elements of this narrative suggest a young 
person whose behaviour is unusual, with the speaker inviting listeners to locate 
symptoms of autism in Hayley’s behaviour. Hayley is diagnosed with autism. 
 
In both Elisha and Hayley’s cases, clinicians construct the accounts of patients 
and families as warranted and plausible evidence of autism. Clinicians can be 
seen to ‘narrate objectivity’, that is, to construct the behavioural accounts of 
patients and families as objective evidence (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 
2012) and use their disciplinary expertise to build those accounts as evidence of 
autism. Therefore, behaviours which might be unusual are embraced within a 
category of autism, and reproduced through talk as what autistic behaviour 
looks like.  
 
Here lay and professional expertise interact: from a lay perspective, patients 
and families understand what constitutes autistic behaviour and utilise it within 
the assessment process, whilst clinicians use their specialist disciplinary 
perspective to weight the value of this parent/patient testimony. However, in the 
process of corralling lay testimonies in the team meeting, there is a blurring of 
boundaries (Eyal, 2010) between the source and nature of that expertise. 
Whilst, as Eyal argues, the expertise of parents was once interpreted as 
‘parental coldness’, or evidence of the cause of the condition, the ‘credit-
worthiness’  (Eyal, 2010, p. 4) of that expertise now has been upgraded to be 
almost indiscernible from clinicians’ own accounts. However, as we illustrate 
here, clinicians also distance themselves from patient and family accounts as 




In some cases patients were considered by clinicians to have researched or 
rehearsed relevant behaviours, leading to them ‘perform’ autism. We return to 
Gail, who has come to assessment with a friend who has been interviewed as 





CP acknowledges that a perception that a patient is ‘invested’ in diagnosis can 
impact on how they, as clinicians, ‘feel’ about the patient and their diagnosis. 
This is further developed when the interview leads to a conclusion that the 
friend is keen for Gail to be diagnosed too and ‘sees herself as a bit more of an 
expert in autism’. The team question how much Gail and her friend have 




AP expresses mistrust of the patient/informant account, casting doubt on its 
veracity. A consideration of motivation and ‘investment’ contributes to 
judgement of the credibility of the patient’s position and consequently the weight 
clinicians give to those reported behaviours. Patient accounts that are too 
coherent (or too chaotic in other cases) raise suspicion. In Gail’s case, the lead 
clinician also felt there was ‘something’ there and the case was deferred 
pending further observation and interviewing a second informant. 
 
Finally, Nadia is a 29-year-old woman who has been assessed by the Team 
Manager (TM) whilst in hospital. TM is concerned that, despite scoring ‘quite 




dosed on heavy medication and this ‘affects a lot of your interaction with her’. 
TM then also expresses concern to the Consultant Psychiatrist (CPi) that Nadia 




TM introduces this incident as an interjection in a number of problematising 
factors about the assessment. TM prefaces this story with ‘cos she wants a 
diagnosis’ which alerts the listener to hearing the story as someone motivated 
to manipulate the assessment. ‘They’ve told her unhelpfully’ suggests that TM 
thinks that the assessment has been compromised, because a clinician has 
misinformed Nadia who then has misconceptions about the potential benefits of 
a diagnosis, leading to her attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to ‘perform’ as 
autistic in assessment.  
  
In this case a patient was perceived to be attempting to manipulate the 
assessment for secondary gain thereby alerting clinicians to question the 
credibility of the patient. Here Nadia’s account is used to construct a case 
against an autism diagnosis, constituting Nadia’s behaviour as manipulative 
rather than autistic. The result for Nadia was left open as she was still to be 
assessed through a clinical interview with the Consultant Psychiatrist.  
 
To summarise, in the cases of Hayley and Elisha, the ADOS is downplayed in 
favour of parent and patient narratives which support autistic behaviours. 
Parental accounts align with the anticipated outcome and are constituted as 
autistic behaviours both by parents and by clinicians. With Gail and Nadia, the 
ADOS is compromised or questioned due to the testimony or behaviour of the 





In these cases, clinicians use their disciplinary expertise to assess the veracity 
and value of lay expertise. Their collective knowledge determines that patients 
can manipulate assessment for secondary gain; that they can perform or 
rehearse autism if invested in diagnosis; and that lay knowledge of autism can 
help or hinder, depending on its credibility. Clinicians decide the value of 
different accounts to offer a warrant for diagnosis or not.  
 
The discursive accomplishment of co-opting patient and family accounts is to 
enhance (or diminish) the trajectory towards diagnosis. Reported speech in 
particular can serve to enhance the factuality of the account (Wiggins, 2017) 
and the extent to which the patient is presented as agentic (e.g. Elisha cannot 
help her troublesome behaviour but Nadia is motivated to adapt her behaviour 
for secondary gain) works discursively to present the patient/family as credible 





Our study builds on Turowetz and Maynard’s (2019) work examining autism 
diagnostic practices in situ. We have found, in line with these researchers, that 
clinicians foreground discussion of behaviours that are ‘story-worthy’ and these 
include both their own observations as well as harnessing informant testimony 
that contribute to the diagnostic account. We also found, in line with Hollin and 
Pilnick’s (2018) study, that, in the process of retelling the behavioural story, 
clinicians interpret that behaviour in the light of known autistic behaviours.  
 
We found that clinicians attended to the embodied impact of ‘being in the room’ 
with the patient. Like Fitzgerald (2017) and his neuroscientists, clinicians 
routinely invoked the qualitative description of ‘feeling’ an interaction as autistic. 
Clinicians directly referred, therefore, to their own interaction with the patient, 
although this was not apparently reflective of their role as an active agent 
impacting on the patient’s behaviour, rather it served to reiterate the location of 
autistic behaviours within the patient. The behaviour of the patient, however, 




assessor changes the assessment to allow for anticipated patient behaviour 
(Hayley); or when there is a recognition that other factors (e.g. medication) can 
impact on assessment. We have not found clinicians to be naïve to the social 
complexities of their job, indeed, they appear to be acutely aware of the 
difficulties, ambiguities and social consequences of their task. 
 
In this context, clinicians are permitted to draw on their disciplinary expertise 
(unlike ‘lay experts’ whose sense of ‘feel’ can only ever be opinion; or beyond 
this diagnostic space, where clinicians, socially, would not be warranted to 
‘diagnose’). It is not, therefore, that the clinician always takes for granted (and 
therefore renders invisible) their own role in the assessment process as argued 
by Turowetz and Maynard (2019). Rather, by institutional necessity, and due to 
indeterminacy, they stake their own expertise on what happens in the social 
space between patient and clinician. This serves to enable dissent from the 
‘objective’ evidence of the diagnostic tool, to bring colleagues on board with this 
dissent, and to re-align the evidence in this new embodied context. It presents 
clinicians, not as unknowing slaves to criteria, but as active agents in the 
diagnosis; as one human being in relation to another. In the space of 
indeterminacy, clinicians draw, not just on references to where symptoms can 
be seen in the patient, but on affect; to how the patient in this room, at this time, 
makes them feel.  
 
When clinicians invoke feeling they are staking out their territory. Feeling here is 
not presented as either a lack of neutrality or a call to subjectivity: it is presented 
and received as objectively important, as a different kind of objectivity. This 
assertion of an autistic presence is received as concrete and objective 
knowledge by colleagues. The specialist disciplinary understanding, or expert 
gaze (Featherstone et al., 2005) determines that there is ‘something there’ and 
is therefore treated as a source of committed and reliable knowledge. It asserts 
credibility on the part of the clinician, as the only way they can feel autism is 
through having experienced it many times.  
 
Drawing on Eyal’s exploration of networks of expertise, we found that clinicians 




achieve the function of the institution: diagnosis. In team meetings, clinicians 
draw on both their own disciplinary expertise, and that of patient and family 
actors, who are absent but discursively present (Clarke and Star, 2008), to both 
understand and shape concepts about autism. Patients and families 
(informants) are considered by clinicians to ‘know’ autism, not just from 
experience, but as ‘well-informed citizens’ (Schutz, 1946), or active agents, able 
to understand and construct a body of ‘story-worthy’ evidence for presentation. 
Informants, in their desire for diagnosis, retell their testimony knowingly. This 
form of lay expertise lies not in their experience of particular behaviours alone, 
but in the contemporary meaning society prescribes to those behaviours, and 
their access to diagnostically relevant information and cultural frames.  
 
Our study shows that in the absence of the body of the patient, the clinician 
recalls story-worthy events in their stead, their presence retold through 
descriptive instances of pertinent behaviours that can be seen as troublesome. 
Testimonies (motivated, mediated, partial, variously-informed, invested, 
interpreted and bodily absent), and how clinicians feel about them, are core to 
assessment. Here diagnosis is happening relationally, with the absent voices of 
patients and families being interpreted by the clinician. As argued by Eyal 
(2010) we can see how medical and lay expertise is blurred in the discussions 
between experts: the knowing patient narrative is re-constructed through the 
medical lens of autism. However, clinicians acknowledge together that 
informants have stake and interest, and the veracity and value of their testimony 
is judged according to the clinician’s expert understanding. Although this might 
be indicative of Eyal’s (2010) ‘space between fields’, the way in which expertise 
is drawn on is, inevitably, asymmetrical (Pilnick and Dingwall, 2011). 
 
The process of diagnosis is ‘institutionally determined’ (Gill and Maynard, 2012) 
in that the rhetorical ‘allowance’ in the clinic is, by necessity, for a diagnosis of 
autism or not: the delivery of this ultimately binary decision is the institutional 
imperative and must be the key task of the team. But diagnosis is socially 
framed in the clinic, and is subject to practices and processes of debate and 
adjudication between different forms of evidence (Latimer, 2013). Clinicians 




via discursive resources, through affective, interpretive and evaluative labour. 
Testimonies of patients and families are co-opted as evidence; diagnostic tools 
are interpreted in the light of disciplinary objectivity (and also narrated in this 
way); and disciplinary objectivity in the form of expressions of affect can serve 
to support or disrupt the diagnostic momentum.  
 
The institutional imperative across the institution of medicine is to diagnosis. We 
argue that the findings here related to autism diagnosis have broader relevance 
to understanding diagnosis more generally. As an act of affect we have 
explored the way in which clinicians translate inter-subjective feeling into a 
diagnostic outcome. A recent review of literature suggested that a ‘Praecox 
Feeling’ of ‘bizareness’ is a determinant in medical decision-making in 
schizophrenia (Gozé et al., 2019). Despite attempts at standardisation, 
therefore, affect can be seen an active presence in diagnostic deliberations - a 
signal for reflection, further exploration or testing. As an act of interpretation and 
evaluation we have considered the role of patient and family testimonies in 
diagnostic practice. This indicates how parental and family knowledge has been 
formalised and incorporated into medical knowledge through the adoption of the 
clinical interview as a standardised test. Lay expertise and the role of the family 
as ‘credible witnesses’ are central in diagnostic deliberation. Acknowledging 
and examining inter-subjectivity in diagnostic practice, therefore, seems 
extremely pertinent across conditions and medical practices, as, rather than 
constituting a linear clinical practice, it illuminates the process of diagnosis as 
relational and interactively constructed between patient, family, clinician and 
diagnostic measure.  
 
 
7.5 Strengths and Limitations 
 
This study is one of few to directly observe clinician interaction in diagnostic 
decision-making, particularly in closed team meetings. This makes the data rich 
and relevant to contemporary understandings of diagnosis. Our current analysis 
represents a broad brush-stroke of our data: interaction in assessment 




endeavour to consider key threads through the data, each of which might be 
expanded on further. There is a need to examine all stages of assessment, 
particularly those that take place in informal interactions and in the presence of 
patients and families.  
 
 
7.6 Concluding comments 
 
Our study adds to the growing literature on sociology of diagnosis by furthering 
our understanding of how diagnosis is accomplished in practice. We argue that 
autism as a condition is, in part, shaped through this clinical interaction, through 
the interpretation of behaviours as framed by patients and families; and through 
a sense of autism as a ‘thing’ that can be experienced by clinicians. Schrader 
(2010) argues that what we know cannot be separated from the way that we 
know it. Autism is an object of knowledge: it is what we know, but it is an object 
delineated by the process of knowing it. In clinicians’ talk, autism is rendered an 
object through the process of its identification by healthcare practitioners. 
Uncertainty inherent in autism’s heterogeneity of presentation and aetiological 
variation (what Hollin (2017a) refers to as autism’s ‘ontological indeterminacy’) 
is dismissed and re-interpreted in diagnosis in order to reify autism, as fixed, 
real and knowable.  
 
Reification is the institutional requirement for these diagnostic services. 
Clinicians understand that autism is a pragmatic psychiatric construct, 
underpinned by best evidence but still somewhat indeterminate, but 
nevertheless they must act to reify, as their role necessitates the assignation (or 
not) of a diagnosis. They actively constitute informant stories as evidence of 
autism and constitute symptoms through and in their deliberations. The net 
effect is to present autism as an ontologically ‘natural kind’ (Hacking, 2007; 
Verhoeff, 2012), with autism diagnosis 'validating a reality' (Jutel 2009). This 
confirms a particular kind of person as autistic and the category becomes reified 
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The thematic analysis in Chapter Seven constituted a broad sweep of the data 
and identified several themes, two of which were explored in Chapter Seven. 
The thematic analysis identified several other aspects that might have been 
explored (including belief systems about diagnosis and autism, interpreting 
ambiguity, team working). However, what was striking in the data (although 
perhaps not unsurprisingly given the variation in clinical guidelines) was the 
level of contradiction and expressions of uncertainty in diagnosticians’ talk. I 
decided to make this a focus of the discursive psychology analysis. Interaction 
between diagnosticians, in this article, is taken as a ‘social factor’ in itself, in that 
I explored how the narrative structure of interaction enabled the resolution of 
seemingly contradictory accounts. Data were regularly presented at data 
sessions and with a smaller supervisor-led data group.  
 
All aspects of the study were undertaken by the PhD candidate. Co-authors 
contributions were as follows:  
 
GR: research design; revision for intellectual content 
RM: revision suggestions; support with analysis 
TM: revision suggestions 
DP: support with analysis; revision suggestions 
 
A guide to Jefferson Transcription is at Appendix 13: Selected Jefferson 
Transcription Symbols. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Setting aside contradiction: creating 










Social science literature has documented how the concept of diagnosis can be 
seen as an interactive process, imbued with uncertainty and contradiction, 
which undermines a straightforward notion of diagnosis as a way to identify 
underlying biological problems that cause disease. We contribute to this body of 
work by examining the process of resolving uncertainty in autism diagnosis for 
adults and adolescents. Autism is a useful case study as diagnosis can be a 
complex and protracted process due to the heterogeneity of symptoms and the 
necessity to interpret behaviours that may be ambiguous. We audio-recorded 
and transcribed 18 specialist clinical assessment meetings in four teams in 
England, covering 88 cases in two adult, one child and one adolescent (14+) 
setting. We undertook a qualitative analysis of discursive processes and 
narrative case-building structure utilised by clinicians to counteract 
contradiction. 
 
This paper contributes to our understanding of practical uncertainty work in 
medicine. We identified a four-part discursive structure which allows clinicians 
to forward evidence for and against a diagnosis, facilitates their collaborative 
decision-making process and enables them to build a plausible narrative which 
accounts for the diagnostic decision. Pragmatism was found to operate as a 
strategy to help assign diagnosis within a condition which, diagnostically, is 
permeated by uncertainty and contradiction. Resolution of contradiction from 
different aspects of the assessment serves to create a narratively-coherent, 
intelligible clinical entity that is autism. We discuss the transferability of the 
findings in the context of utilising a diagnosis as a pragmatic construct, thus 
contributing to the sociology of diagnosis literature.  
  
Keywords: diagnosis; uncertainty; autism; sociology of diagnosis; discourse; 












Diagnosis is traditionally thought of as a way to identify underlying biological 
problems that cause disease. Scholars working in the field of sociology have 
problematised this, claiming diagnosis is a social process that involves multiple 
actors and is context specific (see Blaxter, 1978; Brown, 1995; Jutel, 2013, 
2009; Jutel and Nettleton, 2011). Some argue that uncertainty is central to 
medical practice (e.g. Beresford, 2006; Bursztajn et al., 1986) because 
diagnosis is an act of interpretation and involves transposing clinical research to 
the idiosyncrasies of the individual patient (Tanenbaum, 1993). Atkinson (1995) 
argues for a detailed analysis of how clinicians locate the sources and nature of 
doubt, and express them discursively, arguing that that this approach will further 
understanding about how medical knowledge is organised socially and 
produced through discourse (Atkinson, 1995). Studies of interaction can 
examine how decision-making is socially and interactionally bounded 
(Halvorsen, 2015) and woven with temporal, spatial, sequential and 
interactional aspects that challenge the concept of straightforward context-free 
cognitive decision-making processes (Boden, 1994). 
 
There is a surge of interest in the conceptualisation of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, henceforth ‘autism’, as a diagnostic category (e.g. Evans, 2013; Eyal 
et al., 2010; Fitzgerald, 2017; Nadesan, 2005; Silverman, 2013). Despite this, 
there remain few empirical studies which examine in detail how autism 
diagnosis actually comes about in practice, given autism’s widely 
heterogeneous symptoms and largely unknown aetiology. In previous work we 
examined how clinicians diagnosing autism produce objective accounts through 
their situated practices, and perform diagnosis as an act of interpretation, affect 
and evaluation (Hayes et al., 2020). This article contributes further to the 
sociology of diagnosis literature by using a discursive approach to examine 
narrative case-building in clinical assessment teams. Autism diagnosis for both 
adults and children can be a complex and protracted process due to 
heterogeneity of symptoms, the necessity of interpreting behaviours that may 




al., 2016). It is therefore an ideal case study to explore how clinicians, in their 





8.2.1 Diagnostic uncertainty 
Uncertainty and contradiction have long been important topics for medical 
sociology in relation to clinical training (e.g. Atkinson, 1984; Fox, 1957; 
Timmermans and Angell, 2001); pharmaceuticals and neuroscience (e.g. 
Fitzgerald, 2014; McGoey, 2009; Pickersgill, 2011); classification, patient/doctor 
interaction and diagnostic decision-making (e.g. Bowker and Star, 1999; 
Bursztajn et al., 1986; Hedgecoe, 2003; Star, 1989; Zayts et al., 2016); 
medically unexplained or contested diagnoses (e.g Armentor, 2017; Dumit, 
2006; Jutel, 2011; Marks et al., 2016); as well as in science more broadly (e.g. 
Campbell, 1985; Edwards, 1999; Fochler and Sigl, 2018; Pinch, 2012; Shackley 
and Wynne, 1996; Star, 2009).  
 
Particularly relevant for this study is how clinicians engage in what has been 
termed ‘practical uncertainty work’, that is, the implementation of strategies to 
overcome diagnostic uncertainty and to make scientific research or, in our case, 
diagnosis, ‘doable’ (Hollin, 2017a; Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 2014, 2011). 
From a series of interviews with neuroscientists working in the field of 
personality disorder and antisociality, Pickersgill (2011) argues that 
neuroscientists engage in practical uncertainty work to allow uncertainty and 
ambiguity to be eliminated by the mutual and reciprocal constitution of the 
concept and categorisation of a condition. Each uncertainty can be ‘set aside 
through recourse to the assumed certainty of the other’ (Pickersgill, 2011, p. 
84). In this way, conceptual concerns about ontological/taxonomic uncertainty 
(what a disorder ‘really is’); and classification concerns about 
epistemological/diagnostic uncertainty (how it can be identified) are 
sidestepped, with the effect of standardising medical discourse and practice, as 





Drawing on Atkinson’s (1985) call for analysis of how uncertainty is expressed 
discursively, we can consider the expression of uncertainty as both a social 
action and an interactional resource. For example, Timmermans and 
Buchbinder (2012) demonstrate that uncertainty is a resource for both parents 
and clinicians in newborn genetic screening. For parents, uncertainty enables 
them to maintain hope in the future of their child’s health; whilst for clinicians 
uncertainty works, in part, as a resource to alert families to possible 
unpredictable difficulties (Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2012). One study 
examining antenatal screening considers uncertainty as an interactional 
resource to support different interpretations of high risk results (Pilnick and 
Zayts, 2014). The expression of uncertainty, in this setting, becomes a 
demonstration of clinicians’ professionalism, in that they understand the limits of 
medical knowledge and, therefore, are best placed to express doubt about what 
sounds like a precise measurement (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014). Uncertainty then 
can be a strategic opportunity to enact professional judgement and assert the 
authority of the clinician (Timmermans et al., 2018). 
 
On the other hand, the resolution of contradictory evidence is explored in 
Gardner et al (2011) who examined how clinicians seek to make sense of 
potential contradiction in diagnosis of chest pain. Drawing from the work of Mol 
(2002), the authors argue that ontology is not fixed but fluid and transitory, and 
assembled through interaction between entities in the clinic. By following the 
trajectory of one patient from GP to cardiologist, they demonstrate how 
particular practices assemble information such as family background, the 
impact of exercise and the results of an ECG, that then enables the patient’s 
chest pain to become intelligible as a clinical entity (Gardner et al., 2011). 
Different (and potentially contradictory) accounts from these interactions are 
consolidated through discrediting one source of information (the ECG test) 
enabling the clinician to reframe the condition with a sense of coherence. The 
effect of this ‘patching together’ (Gardner et al., 2011, p. 849) of multiple 
accounts is to reify the notion into a ‘singular coherent body’ (Gardner et al., 
2011, p. 848). As with Latimer’s (2013) ethnographic study of dysmorphology, 





8.2.2 Diagnosis of autism  
Autism is diagnosed when persistent patterns of difficulty in social 
communication and interaction, combined with restricted and repetitive patterns 
of behaviour, interests or activities are judged to cause significant impairment in 
functioning (APA, 2013a). The most commonly used assessment measure for 
both adults and children is the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS) (Lord et al., 2000), alongside a clinical interview such as the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Le Couteur et al., 2003). The ADOS is 
an activity-based semi-structured standardised observation tool whereby the 
person performs a number of communication and interaction tasks, and is then 
scored on a range of behaviours such as emphatic or emotional gestures and 
overall quality of rapport. Clinicians may also utilise other tools such as 
questionnaires, clinical guidelines, rating scales or specialist tests alongside 
reports from other health professionals and educational reports. First-hand 
reports from the patient, and their informants (usually a family member) are 
utilised, and the impact of associated impairment on the individual and the 
family is considered. Diagnosis is undertaken, therefore, primarily on the basis 
of observation and informant accounts.  
 
Deciding where the diagnostic threshold lies can be problematic as autism 
symptoms are distributed as a continuum extending into the general population 
(Constantino, 2011; Constantino and Charman, 2016). Hollin (2017b, 2017a) 
argues that the embedded heterogeneity of autism means that the condition is 
characterised by its very uncertainty, or ontological indeterminacy. Further 
complications in assigning diagnosis arise for people considered to be near the 
threshold for diagnosis according to standardised tests; where there are co-
existing conditions; or where there are complicating environmental factors, for 
example, childhood neglect. Despite these potential ambiguities and 
contradictions, clinicians in diagnostic assessment services are compelled to 
work within a system that requires a categorical diagnosis and therefore 






8.2.3 Working in multi-disciplinary teams 
Messer and colleagues argue that one strategy to help resolve uncertainty is to 
ensure consultation with colleagues, including working within multi-disciplinary 
teams (Messer et al., 2018). Most healthcare professionals work in collaboration 
with others and it is considered especially important when dealing with complex 
or chronic health conditions (Croker et al., 2000). In autism assessment, the 
involvement of a multi-disciplinary team is generally recommended for both 
children and adults (NICE, 2012, 2011; RASDN, 2013, 2011; SIGN, 2016). 
There are, however, interactional complexities in locating decision-making 
within teams, which may problematise its potential as a way to counteract 
uncertainty. 
 
8.2.4 Narrative and autism diagnosis 
Scholars have explored narrative case-building as a mechanism by which 
clinicians deal with uncertainty (Atkinson, 1995). There is a significant body of 
work which demonstrates how narrative is shaped and purposed in medical 
settings (see Ainsworth-Vaughn, 1998; Bosk, 1992; Byrne and Long, 1976; 
Hunter, 1991; Mattingly, 1998, 1991; Mischler, 1984; Silverman, 1987) including 
conversation-analytic studies into patient-doctor communication (e.g. Heritage 
and Maynard, 2011, 2006; Maynard and Heritage, 2005; Pilnick et al., 2009). 
 
Classic studies of narrative by Labov and Waletzky (Labov, 1972; Labov and 
Waletzky, 1967) argue that, at its most basic, a narrative takes the form of two 
clauses, ‘temporally ordered’ (Labov, 1972, p. 360). Labov found that narrative 
story-telling formed a basic six-part structure: abstract, orientation, complicating 
action, evaluation, resolution and coda (Labov, 1972). Atkinson (1995) 
demonstrates how, in a haematology clinic, clinicians follow a similar narrative 
case-building process to establish a diagnostic outcome, drawing on the 
temporal facts of a case which can serve to ‘scaffold’ uncertainty within a 
framework of uncontested assertions (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Particularly relevant is a body of work exploring autism assessment in the US 
(see Maynard and Turowetz, 2019; Turowetz, 2015a, 2015b; Turowetz and 




to the narrative of diagnostic practice across social settings and historical 
periods and this takes a structural form in four parts: preface (an introductory 
narrative); possible stories (either tendency – reporting a general propensity 
towards particular patient behaviour; or instantiation – reporting a single 
instance); typifications (categorical assertions which include diagnostic 
upshots); and story recipiency (how the story is received, supported or 
facilitated by others in the room) (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2017).  
 
The researchers demonstrate how clinicians collaborate in assessment to build 
a narrative case together, which enables ‘interactional progressivity’ (Maynard 
and Turowetz, 2017, p. 265) towards diagnosis. They assert that narrative is a 
‘practical epistemological method’ (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017, p. 21) through 
which clinicians assign and adapt classification to specific individuals to rule 
diagnosis in or out and to differentiate from possible co-conditions. Rather than 
simply organising and documenting evidence, these narrative practices ‘play a 
constitutive part’ (Turowetz and Maynard, 2017, p. 20) in aligning symptoms to 
disease categories, in this case, shaping autism as they diagnose it in practice.  
 
 
8.3 The current study 
 
Other than Maynard and Turowetz’s study, there remains very little work 
observing how clinicians discuss autism diagnosis together and none that we 
know of related specifically to uncertainty in adolescent and adult diagnosis of 
autism. The current study takes a narrative focus to examine how clinicians in 
diagnostic teams make diagnostic decisions together in the light of ambiguity or 
contradiction. It builds on the work of Maynard and Turowetz by including 
analysis of diagnosis of adults and young people over the age of 14; siting the 
study in a UK context where an adult diagnostic pathway has become more 
accessible since the passing of legislation between 2009 and 2011; and 
specifically looking at how clinicians deal with contradiction in their narrative 




difficulties of autism diagnosis in the face of uncertainty, ambiguity and, in 
particular, contradiction?  
 
 
8.4 Data and Method 
 
8.4.1 Sample and Recruitment 
We purposively sampled teams that specialised in autism assessment and who 
held regular assessment meetings (two in adult assessment; one with children; 
and one with adolescents (14+). Recruitment was undertaken from an open call 
to a list of clinical contacts drawn from the internet and via the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR) Clinical Research Network. All teams were located 
in England and were National Health Service (NHS) providers. Three teams 
were multi-disciplinary with specialists from different disciplines (including 
psychiatry, clinical and educational psychology, speech and language therapy, 
nursing, social work, and occupational therapy). One team (adults) was single 
disciplinary and primarily included clinical psychologists and assistant 
psychologists. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants, and 
ethical approval was granted by the University of Exeter ethics committee and 
by the Health Research Authority (HRA). Patients and families were not present 
at any meeting.  
 
8.4.2 Data collection 
We observed and audio-recorded over 19 hours of data from 18 autism 
assessment team meetings, covering discussion of 88 cases. The purpose of 
the meetings was to discuss specific cases after assessment or referral. Audio 
data were transcribed, anonymised and entered into Nvivo for data 
management and initial coding. We used Malterud et al’s (2016) concept of 
‘information power’ to assess when we had adequate data to meet the aims of 
the study. This involved consideration of quality of dialogue, analysis strategy, 






We took a discursive psychology approach to enable an investigation of how 
participants’ talk created a case for or against diagnosis.  With this approach we 
can examine how the particular rhetorical context of the diagnostic assessment 
meeting frames the diagnostic process and gives it meaning.  
 
The process of analysis followed guidance as outlined by Wiggins (2017). As 
our research question relates to diagnostic decision-making, we identified 
‘social actions’ – things we do in talk and interaction (Wiggins, 2017) - related to 
diagnostic decision-making; for example, disagreement or consensus. These 
features of discourse were identified by using ‘discursive devises’ (e.g. hedging, 
corroboration and category entitlements) which enabled a discursive ‘lens’ to be 
shone on the data (Wiggins, 2017). Sequences of text were maintained to 
preserve narrative construction (Atkinson, 1995). Detailed transcripts were 
made using Jefferson transcription to enable analysis of how talk is delivered 
(Jefferson, 2004) (See Appendix 13: Selected Jefferson Transcription Symbols). 
Finally we returned to the complete data set and checked for instances across 
the data, further refining the analysis. The developing analysis was conducted 
by the first author, presented regularly at data analysis sessions, and discussed 
with co-authors throughout to develop and challenge emerging ideas and to 
develop consensus.  
 
8.4.4 Note on terminology 
We use the term ‘clinician’ to encompass all healthcare participants in this 




8.5 Analysis and Results 
 
Of the 88 cases recorded, 51 were diagnosis specific. Of these 51 cases, 43 
included discussion of potential or diagnosed co-conditions; 24 were child or 
adolescent cases and 27 were adults. Twenty-five cases were female, 25 were 




(15 female, 12 male; 11 adults, 16 children or adolescents) where it was 
possible to track when evidence discussed was contrary to the final diagnostic 
decision. For the purposes of this study, we only included those cases with a 
diagnostic outcome. Of these 27 cases, 21 case discussions included 
contradictory accounts (from a range of sources) and six were presented as 
largely straightforward and certain. In four cases the diagnostic decision made 
was in contradiction to the ADOS result (three cases were under-threshold on 
ADOS and diagnosed with autism: one was over-threshold and not diagnosed). 
Two of those cases – one adult and one adolescent (from 14+ team) – are 
discussed in detail here. A table at Appendix 14 gives further characteristics of 
cases by setting, including evidence discussed and diagnostic outcome 
(Appendix 14: Characteristics of Patient Cases with a Diagnostic Outcome). 
 
Four-part narrative structure 
Whilst specific details of team discussions varied according to the purpose of 
the case discussion and the participants attending, we found a four-part 
discursive structure – constraining preface, contradictory account (evidence not 
in alignment with the diagnostic decision), re-alignment, and helpfulness – 
utilised to account for and explain contradictory evidence, illustrated in Figure 
15. Within this structure, clinicians managed contradiction together through the 
use of evaluative statements to reframe and align complicating factors within a 
coherent diagnostic narrative. The re-aligning element of the discursive 
structure (Figure 15, Part 3) enabled team participants to be collaboratively 
accountable for a decision that incorporates contradictory accounts. 
 
The four-part narrative structure is discussed in detail in the analysed cases 
below. In cases where diagnosis was assigned, contradictory evidence was 
most commonly explained (Figure 15, Part 3) by 'masking' (n=13): it was 
thought that patients had developed strategies to compensate socially thereby 
making observation of autistic behaviours in assessment problematic. This was 
frequently tacitly or explicitly linked to the inadequacy of the ADOS tool to ‘pick 
up’ autistic behaviours (when masking was present), and occurred most often in 
the assessment of women and girls. The masking re-alignment was sometimes 




symptoms (n=2) or reference to a high ADOS score (n=1). For those patients 
who did not receive a diagnosis, the explanations for contradictory accounts 
were primarily that the behaviours could be better explained by a different 
condition (n=5), or that the patient/family was over-reporting (n=1). (See 
Appendix 14: Characteristics of Patient Cases with a Diagnostic Outcome). 
 
 
Figure 15: Four-part narrative structure in autism diagnostic discussions 
 
 
Case 13: Teresa, age 45 
Teresa, a 45-year-old woman, is discussed by a Consultant Psychiatrist, 
Catherine, and the Team Manager, Jo, who is an Approved Mental Health 
Practitioner and experienced diagnostician. Catherine has conducted a clinical 
interview with Teresa, and Jo an ADOS. The case discussion begins with a brief 
















Catherine immediately formulates the case (lines 1-4) and announces the 
potential outcome. Catherine’s formulation sets the agenda: the patient has 
autism but this will not be apparent on the ADOS result. Catherine presents this 
potential contradiction as normative: not scoring and being autistic is not an 
unlikely outcome. Whilst hedging (‘probably’, ‘I think’) might represent 
uncertainty, it allows space for disagreement without conflict and can be 
withdrawn or amended depending on Jo’s response (Wiggins, 2017). Jo’s 
response to Catherine’s assertion is to agree, both with the statement that that 
is what Catherine thought, and, then, with the ADOS result. This interaction 
therefore strengthens Catherine’s prefacing statement as it corroborates her 
predicted assessment, and her receipt of this is one that serves to reinforce the 
accuracy of her view (‘there we go’) and express her certainty.  
 
During the following exchange the ADOS score is introduced, which aligns with 
Catherine’s formulation, in that a score of two would be considered to be 
consistent with ‘not scoring’, i.e. under-threshold for diagnosis. The lack of 
precision around the score (‘I think she got two’) and the apparent lack of 
preparation to report the score (‘off the top of my head’) inoculates against any 
potential claims that Jo might be invested in the ADOS score (Wiggins, 2017) 
and serves to downplay its importance in the discussion. Together these actions 
serve to foreground other types of evidence that, later on, are more clearly or 




minimisation of the ADOS score, therefore, aligns with Catherine’s initial 
declarative statement.  
 
The constraining preface can be compared to the preface described by 
Turowetz and Maynard, in that it sets up the stories that follow (Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2017), flags pertinent issues and allows the teller to project the 
forthcoming story (Jefferson, 1978). Here, the preface often includes either an 
implicit or explicit prediction or judgement about the outcome; or a suggestion of 
the problematising factor. The preface therefore sets the rhetorical framework 
for the resulting discussion, and potentially undermines alternative versions or 
topics. We do not mean by this that there is intention by the opening speaker to 
constrain, rather, interactionally, it serves a ‘shaping’ role as it takes the form of 
a statement against which other evidence must align or contradict: contradicting 
is generally more difficult in interaction. The resulting interactional sequence is 
informed by this preface: in this case Jo’s alignment serves to further reinforce 
the prefacing judgement.  
 
+ Helpfulness (temporally flexible) 
 
During the discussion Jo provides a tendency story – a general propensity to a 
type of behaviour (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017) (‘she did tend to do that going 
off on a tangent on something but she was a bit sort of quite rigid too’) which 
she checks with Catherine (‘did you find that with her?); but this is not supported 
by specific instances of autistic-like behaviours. Jo then goes on to describe a 







Jo uses maximising quantifiers (‘really’, ‘massive’) which serves to upgrade an 
earlier assessment of Jo’s (‘a bit sort of’) from minimised and tentative to 
significant. The objective description of difficult emotions (line 36) further 
upgrades Jo’s assessment by illustrating Teresa’s distress about her difficulties 
as genuine. Jo’ s statement that Teresa has ‘traits’ has the effect of more 
definitively supporting Catherine’s diagnostic statement, particularly with the 
repeated use of ‘definite’, which serves to dispel uncertainty.  
 
Jo completes her turn by introducing a functional element to the potential 
diagnosis (‘it would help her’): combining a description of Teresa’s distress with 
the view that diagnosis would be helpful, which makes a pragmatic argument in 
support of diagnosis. Whilst there is no detailed discussion about how the 
diagnosis might be helpful, the suggestion provides a function for the diagnosis 
which enables the decision to ‘make moral sense’ (Leydon, 2018). In this case 
the idea of diagnosis being helpful can be seen as an account towards 
diagnosis and enables ‘interactional progressivity’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 
2017): not evidence as such but a meaningful way to create justification for a 
decision.  
 
However, in the next turn, Jo introduces a contradictory account, or 
complicating action. Labov (1972) defines a complicating action as a sequence 
of events; here it is an actual potential complication that impedes a 
straightforward conclusion to the case discussion.   
 




‘Though’ suggests a forthcoming contrastive element (Maynard and Turowetz, 
2017, p. 265) – a statement against diagnosis in contrast to the trajectory of the 
meeting, whilst enabling Jo to give an implicit explanation for the low ADOS 




person declaration of how this felt (‘not overwhelming’). A significant pause here 
suggests some difficulty in expressing this turn, perhaps due to disaffiliation with 
the general narrative towards diagnosis. Good social interaction would, 
generally, be an argument against diagnosis, as diagnosis requires ‘persistent 
impairment in reciprocal social communication and social interaction’ (APA, 
2013a). This utterance, therefore, should problematise a diagnosis of autism, 
however, Teresa’s behaviour has already been accounted for as autistic (from 
line 1) and therefore, this statement is couched within a context of evidence 
towards rather than evidence against. Jo immediately counters her ‘good social 
interaction’ assessment with a contrast term (‘except that’) and then introduces 
a behaviour that would support a diagnosis – rigidity - thereby diminishing the 
initial assessment. The close sequential order also highlights the contrast 








Catherine’s so-prefaced response attends to Jo’s problematising factor – good 
social interaction - with a potential explanation. With reference to her report and 
assessment, Catherine implies that Teresa’s behaviour could ‘look like’ good 
social interaction but is in fact adapted behaviour (masking) (line 50). Catherine 
appears to prepare to provide a further contrastive element (‘but’) (line 55); Jo, 




Here Catherine (with Jo’s corroboration) has again drawn a line under 
contradiction, not by reporting different evidence, but by re-asserting her clinical 
judgement (‘I think she does’). There is a complex interplay of epistemic 
deference (deferring to Catherine’s view) from Jo (lines 5 and 56-7) and 
epistemic entitlement (claiming the warrant to make the judgement call) from 
Catherine (lines 6, 9, 11 and 58-59). Whilst there is no apparent conflict in the 
discussion, there appears to be a hierarchy of knowledge whereby the 
psychiatrist’s judgement provides the baseline around which the discussion 
revolves and prompts displays of accountability and sense-making.  
 
This sequence serves to fit Teresa into a category of autism despite some 
behaviours that would not align with this diagnosis. Catherine and Jo 
successfully realign Teresa’s ‘non-autistic’ behaviour within a category of autism 
by suggesting she has adapted her social difficulties to the extent that her social 
interaction appears to be very good, even though she still has underlying 
autism.  
 
Further supporting accounts are cited which included tendency stories 
(specialist interests, difficulties with relationships) and one instantiation story 
(rigid behaviour in assessment) (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017) and then finally 




To summarise this case, clinicians can be seen to engage in a number of 
interactional devices to create a coherent diagnostic narrative for Teresa: 
setting the rhetorical framework for the discussion through a constraining 
opening preface; realigning contradictory accounts by discrediting one account 
(ADOS score) and invoking specialist understandings of autistic behaviours 
(adaptations); and making sense of the diagnosis by invoking the helpfulness of 




indicated by Teresa’s good social interaction is managed by a realigned 
narrative around masking, adaptation and utility of a diagnosis.  
 
Case 50: Gabrielle, age 15 
Gabrielle is a 15-year-old girl who has been assessed by two Clinical 
Psychologists, Fatima and Carol; and a Consultant Psychiatrist, Maria. The 
psychologists, who have undertaken the ADOS, identify her behaviours as 
relating primarily to anxiety, and score Gabrielle as under-threshold (suggests 
not-autistic). The psychiatrist conducted a clinical interview and has assessed 
Gabrielle as autistic. Bob is a visiting student doctor. 
 




Maria begins the discussion with an apparently neutral question (line 1) but her 
surprised response to Fatima’s negative score (lines 2-3) becomes a 
constraining statement, as it signals her difference of view. The responses to 
line 3 illustrate that this statement is not received passively. Bob aligns with 
Maria’s surprise; and Fatima’s typifying response (‘she’s very different’) enables 
interactional progressivity towards diagnosing by downgrading the stark reality 
of the ADOS score (‘not even close’) and re-aligning with a potential diagnosis. 
Through overlapping talk, as Fatima and Carol attempt to describe the 
reasoning behind the low score, Maria evaluates the contradiction by 




7-12). This opening sequence contains three aspects of our proposed structure, 
thereby serving a comprehensive constraining function: preface, contradictory 
account (low ADOS score) and initial evaluation leading to re-alignment 
(inadequacy of ADOS tool). As with Teresa, it is striking that, even without any 
detailed narrative content (either instantiation or tendency stories), there is 
already an interactional ‘pull’ towards diagnosis at this early stage. It can also 
be seen that this narrative structure provides a social function in maintaining a 
collegiate atmosphere whilst there are differences of opinion (Turowetz and 
Maynard, 2017). Maria’s expression of the ADOS as an active agent in ‘not 
picking her up’, serves to distance the psychologists from the ADOS result. 
 
The psychologists go on to provide justification for the low ADOS score by 
outlining factors which would conflict with an autism diagnosis:  
 









Fatima uses maximising quantifiers (‘really great’) to describe behaviours (lines 
18-22) not considered to be aligned with autism. These contradictory accounts 
are then contrasted with a minimised assessment (‘some’) of difficulties with 
understanding relationships and emotions (lines 22-24). On balance this 
utterance foregrounds non-autistic behaviours, and accounts for Fatima’s role in 
the ADOS assessment, whilst allowing some opportunity for discussion of 
autistic-like behaviours. The contrast term (‘but’) is introduced and the turn is 
completed by Carol who interjects with their key finding: that Gabrielle is ‘highly 
socially anxious’, upgraded and corroborated by Fatima with, ‘yeah, incredibly 
so’. Carol’s consequent explanation suggests that Gabrielle’s anxiety may be 
impacting her socially. Her repetition of the anxiety assessment strengthens the 
weight of this view by invoking a corroborative agreement with her colleague 
(‘that’s what we said’). Carol expresses uncertainty (‘we weren’t sure’) which 
sidesteps a direct disagreement with Maria’s assessment and instead, utilises 
uncertainty as an interactional resource (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014) by allowing 
space for renegotiation of the outcome. Whilst hedging and expressions of 
uncertainty may be used in part because Carol actually is uncertain, uncertainty 
markers also work to keep discussion open and flowing whilst potentially 
challenging clinicians who may have more experience or higher status roles. 
 
There follows a series of questions from Maria (e.g. ‘what about her quality of 
insight into relationships?’) and an overview of the clinical interview with 
Gabrielle’s mother, which includes a series of reported stories (both 
instantiation and tendency) from Gabrielle’s childhood, including typifying 




During the case discussion, the team considers Gabrielle’s preference for a 







Here Carol tentatively speculates on the benefit for Gabrielle of receiving a 
diagnostic label, as an explanation for why she finds ‘it’ difficult. This 
interjection, prior to a diagnostic decision, provides further justification for a 
potential positive outcome, in that the diagnosis would make meaning for the 
patient and offer her an explanation for her difficulties. Carol draws on Maria’s 
assessment (line 295) to make ‘moral sense’ of a potential diagnosis in relation 




After further discussion about the source and manifestation of Gabrielle’s 




Carol accounts for her assessment by categorising Gabrielle as ‘on the 
spectrum’ - and therefore presumably diagnosable - and immediately contrasts 
this by suggesting instead that Gabrielle may be sub-threshold (‘but…not far 
enough along it’) (line 413). This contradictory account is then clarified, with a 




again to lay the difficulty with the ADOS. The frequent pauses and hesitations 
suggest trouble (Jefferson, 1989) or the management of psychological business 
(Wiggins, 2017). Carol is attempting to summarise a diagnostic narrative 
inherent with conflict and contradiction at the same time as holding her turn to 
enable a full and nuanced account. Carol’s complex account is again translated 
by Maria (line 418) as an inadequacy of the ADOS (‘isn’t picking up on her 
difficulties’) thereby countering the suggestion that Gabrielle is not at ‘diagnosis 
point’ (line 417). The psychologists concur with this analysis (lines 435-6). Here 
the first part of the re-alignment consolidates the inadequacy of the ADOS tool. 




The second and explanatory part of the re-alignment compares Gabrielle to 
other (intelligent, high-functioning, female) patients who are able to mask 
symptoms of autism by mirroring and mimicking. Maria draws both 
psychologists into this concept of shared understanding (‘we’ve seen that 
haven’t we’). Both recipients immediately demonstrate understanding (lines 
423-4) and finally Carol suggests that despite Gabrielle’s ability to mask 
symptoms, there is still a ‘social difference’ which would therefore contribute to 
an autism diagnosis (line 435).  
 
This repeated upshot of ‘difference’ becomes the key typification around which 
the psychologists make sense of the diagnostic narrative. Here the possibility of 




understanding that the ADOS has limitations when assessing women and girls 
as it is considered that women may have ‘subtler’ manifestations of social and 






Whilst individual clinician’s views on the validity of autism as a diagnostic 
category may vary, diagnostic services, i.e. the institution, considers autism as 
an ontological reality: it is a thing that exists, and can therefore be diagnosed. 
However, within this ontological certainty, we found that clinicians expressed 
uncertainty around its identification, what Pickersgill (2011) would call 
epistemological uncertainty, in a number of ways. 
 
First, and as expected, we found that uncertainty was expressed primarily when 
a case was considered to be near threshold. This included when evidence was 
contradictory (for example, when the ADOS result did not match other 
evidence), or when diagnostic criteria were only partially met.  
 
Second, we found that clinicians expressed uncertainty during discussions in 
relation to interpretation of symptoms, for example, when symptoms were 
perceived to be overlapping with different conditions (e.g. attachment difficulties 
or anxiety); or when patient behaviour changed across settings (e.g. between 
different assessments or between school and clinic); or when environmental 
factors might have influenced behaviours (e.g. neglect). 
 
Finally, we found that uncertainty was expressed when interaction between 
clinicians or between clinicians and the patient or their family had caused 
uncertainty. This included disagreement between clinicians; when pre-
information, external professional views or previous diagnoses complicated the 
assessment; when a patient or family member was thought to be performing 




mistrust of the patient narrative; and when new information or different 
perspectives were introduced into the discussion.  
 
The study shows how clinicians bring together potential contradictory accounts 
to create a coherent narrative which then explains particular behaviours as 
autistic. We can see that contradiction caused by factors that might disrupt the 
idea of a ‘typical picture’ (Star, 1989, p. 73), such as strengths in social 
interaction; or the absence of others, such as repetitive behaviours or interests, 
are resolved by drawing on clinicians’ assumed knowledge. These suppositions 
are embedded in their clinical, practical understanding of what autism does (or 
does not) look like, and are collectively drawn on and understood, virtually 
unnoticed (Pickersgill, 2011). The resolution of epistemological uncertainty 
(commonly expressed and accepted) is possible due to the assumed 
ontological certainty that there is a ‘thing’ called autism despite ongoing 
uncertainties about aetiology, shifting definitions and lack of specificity about its 
neurobiology (Fitzgerald, 2014).  
 
If there are uncertainties related to ontology (what autism really is) then these 
uncertainties are absent in the collective context of the diagnostic team, whose 
task is to ‘find’ autism. The assumption of autism as an ontological entity (even 
an indeterminate one) must be certain despite some clinicians’ ambivalence 
towards the category and the consequences of diagnosis (see forthcoming 
article related to interviews with clinicians). Our proposed narrative framework 
(Figure 15) demonstrates how the interpretation of behaviours that ‘look like’ 
autism (or not) are managed epistemologically, enabling allocation to the 
appropriate disease category. These strategies circumvent the messiness of 
diagnosing a condition defined by indeterminacy and ambiguity, to meet the 
institutional purpose of categorising behaviours in order to ‘do diagnosis’. In 
reality, this practical uncertainty work delivers autism as an ontological certainty, 
sidestepping, by necessity, whether the term ‘autism’ can indeed denote a 
‘homogenous discrete population’ (Hollin, 2017b, p. 219). 
 
As with Maynard and Turowetz (Maynard and Turowetz, 2017; Turowetz and 




for diagnosis to be built and constricts the case as a subject for medical talk, 
establishing the boundaries of what is important. We note, as do these scholars, 
that clinicians use different story-types (e.g. instantiation and tendency stories) 
to build a case for diagnosis, however, we also have shown that the detail of 
these stories can be minimal and tacit. It is possible for team members to 
discuss the conflicting nature of ‘good social interaction’ without explicit detail of 
how this manifests in behaviours.  
 
We consider our proposed narrative structure as a potential ‘micro-insertion’ 
into Maynard and Turowetz’s model: it offers a specific detailed co-produced 
narrative framework by which contradictory accounts are managed and as a 
mechanism by which an ‘impasse’ can be resolved in interaction. Evidence 
becomes an interactional product, in that the meaning of facts and evidence 
change with their use in discourse (Måseide, 2006), through the negotiation and 
evaluation of contradictory accounts towards a coherent diagnostic narrative.  
 
Our work further adds to the sociology of diagnosis by demonstrating that 
clinicians consider an autism diagnosis, in some cases, as a pragmatic 
construct which enables them to offer patients and families a label which may 
provide understanding and (sometimes) access to support. Managing 
uncertainty and contradiction in this way enables the clinicians to ‘make moral 
sense’ (Leydon, 2018) of their decision. 
 
Further drawing from Gardner (2011), our analysis demonstrates that clinical 
entities are made intelligible by discrediting diagnostic accounts (e.g. the ADOS 
result) which enables the clinician not only to reframe the condition coherently 
but to provide an explanation for its dismissal that serves to contribute to the 
diagnostic narrative. Studies suggest that autistic women and girls may present 
better in social interaction than do boys and men because they are better able 
to mask their autistic behaviours (Attwood, 2007; Hull et al., 2019; Lai et al., 
2015; Schuck et al., 2019). Contradictory accounts (a woman with good social 
skills but other autistic-type difficulties) are explained via masking, for example, 
which become incorporated into the diagnostic narrative as a clinical unified 




typical or autistic gendered behaviour (e.g. Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-
Young, 2012). Here in the clinical settings under study, ambiguities about social 
behaviour can be explained without recourse to debates about gendered social 
behaviour more broadly, or specific quantifiers about how ‘masking’ can be 
separated from general socialised behaviours of any gender.  
 
In the autism assessment team, clinicians do not avoid or disregard uncertainty 
(Katz, 1984); the expression of doubt about the ADOS reinforces clinicians’ 
professionalism as those who understand the limitations of the tool (Pilnick and 
Zayts, 2014). We would suggest that expression of uncertainty in this setting is 
a means to deal interactionally with the inherent indeterminacy of the condition; 
to enable less experienced clinicians to raise conflicting issues; and ultimately 
achieve interactive progression towards collective accountability for the decision 
whilst maintaining a collegiate atmosphere. The structure of the assessment 
meeting, and the narrative structure within it we have identified, facilitates this 
perfectly as it provides the architecture for different clinical perspectives, 





The rhetorical framework of the assessment meeting allows for uncertainty, 
dispute, disagreement, co-existing conditions and a range of other complexities. 
This is a place where shared specialist knowledge and narrative structure 
provides ‘scaffolding’ for diagnostic deliberations, enabling progression towards 
diagnosis despite contradiction and uncertainty. We would argue that the 
‘narrative scaffolding’ utilised in this context is centred on shared knowledge of 
the contradictory and indeterminate nature of autism diagnosis, rather than 
temporal and uncontested events and decisions (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
In the process of assessment, therefore, clinicians contribute to the construction 
of autism as a biological entity rooted in the individual, and yet, at the same 
time, as a condition with symptoms that can be socially concealed (via masking, 




reporting or rehearsing for assessment). This study examining autism as a case 
study may provide insights into the production of clinical entities more broadly. It 
would be interesting to explore, in other conditions, whether the discursive 
structure that allows for the dismissal of contradiction to take place is replicated 
in diagnostic decision-making; as well as to observe the types of specialist 
knowledge that are invoked to enable realignment to the diagnostic trajectory.  
 
An individual, diagnostically, can only be autistic or not (Russell, 2014): we find 
that the achievement of this diagnostic binary is made possible through 
‘practical uncertainty work’ (Hollin, 2017a; Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 
2014, 2011) undertaken by clinicians together. We have shown how this work 
serves to counteract uncertainty, and utilises contemporary medical 
understandings of how autism can be ‘seen’ (and not seen) behaviourally within 
the clinic, and via patient and family reporting. Potential uncertainty caused by 
contradictory narratives is resolved through understanding that autism can be 
present but not seen (due to compensating or masking); seen but not present 
(due to behaviours that ‘look like’ autism, such as anxiety); or seen by some 
and not others (when patient and family member accounts conflict, for 
example). This resolution of contradiction from different aspects of the 
assessment then serves to create a narratively-coherent, intelligible clinical 














Chapters Seven and Eight explored how diagnosticians deal with contradictory 
accounts, how clinical judgement (expressed in terms of affect) helps to move 
towards diagnostic progressivity, and how patient and family testimonies are 
subsumed into the diagnostic (clinical) narrative.  
 
I was interested in how diagnosticians themselves considered some of these 
issues and undertook an interview study alongside the meeting observations. I 
used sound extracts and transcripts from the assessment meetings to prompt a 
response from clinicians within those teams. Time has not permitted a full 
analysis of this interview data therefore the analysis that is presented here is a 
preliminary thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Data were presented at 
data sessions.  
 
All aspects of the study were undertaken by the PhD candidate. Co-authors 
contributions (to date) were as follows:  
 
GR: research design; revision for intellectual content 
TF/RM: revisions 
 
Although I had hoped to observe how diagnostic guidelines were used in 
practice, in reality the guidelines were ‘invisible’ in practice, in that there was 
rarely a time when guidelines were explicitly referred to. It may be that because 
these were specialist teams there was no need to refer directly to guidelines or, 
generally, to have written criteria present, as diagnosticians were extremely 
familiar with their content. There was, however, frequent reference to ‘evidence 
in all areas’ (including RRBs, social communication and interaction, language 
development, sensory difficulties).  
 



















CHAPTER NINE: ‘Not a precise art’: clinicians’ perspectives on 












During the course of this PhD study, I undertook interviews with sixteen 
clinicians involved in the observation study. The interview study enabled me to 
gain an understanding of how healthcare professionals’ perceive the diagnostic 
process I had observed. Time has not permitted full analysis and submission to 
a journal prior to thesis submission. This chapter represents a preliminary 





Key literature for this study has been included in Chapters One to Four and 
includes a number of survey and interview studies examining the perspectives 
of autistic adults, parents of autistic children and professionals involved in 
autism diagnosis (Crane et al., 2018, 2016; Imran et al., 2011; Jones et al., 
2014; Rogers et al., 2016; Rutherford et al., 2016; Skellern et al., 2005; Taylor 
et al., 2016). A further body of work examining the views of autistic adults and 
parents of autistic children is relevant (Kapp, 2018; Kapp et al., 2019; Russell et 
al., 2019a; Russell and Norwich, 2012). I wish to draw on studies which discuss 
the views of autistic adults and parents as well as professionals, and include 
some discussion about ‘who is the expert’ in relation to lay and medical 
expertise (Crane et al., 2018).  
 
Theoretically, the analysis, as with the earlier studies (Chapters Seven and 
Eight) will be sited with a sociology of diagnosis framework and draw on 
concepts of ontological and epistemological uncertainty (Hollin, 2017b), and 
questions of emotion and affect in diagnosis, science and the autism world 
(‘feeling’ autism) (Fitzgerald, 2017; C. Silverman, 2013). Finally, the underlying 
question around how we decide who is ‘normal’ will be returned to in the light 






9.3 Method and analysis 
 
Interviews were conducted with sixteen clinicians drawn from the observation 
study. Interviews were conducted using Tape-Assisted Recall (TAR) which 
enabled direct discussion about cases discussed in meetings through re-
listening to audio recordings. A list of clinicians, their role, sex and age range is 
at Table 10.  
 
 Participant Characteristics  
Role Psychiatrists 4 
 Psychologists 6 
 Educational Psychologists 1 
 Speech and Language Therapists 1 
 Occupational Therapists 1 
 Team managers 3 
Team Adult assessment  7 
 Child and adolescent assessment 6 
 Adolescent assessment (14+) 3 
Demographics Age range 30 - 60 
 Years practiced as a clinician 2 - 30 
 Years practiced in autism diagnosis  1 - 12 
 Female 13 
 Male 3 
Note: team managers all had a clinical background 
 
Table 10: Characteristics of interview participants 
 
A thematic analysis approach was used to identify patterns and themes within 
the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006a). I took both an inductive and deductive 
approach to the analysis to enable the identification of themes that are of 
particular concern to participants. I also drew from themes arising from the 
observation data. A full outline of methods of data collection and analysis is in 
Chapter Five, Section 5.10. 
 
The study was designed to provide an explanation for some of the decisions 




assessment process, particularly the team meeting4. Because I selected audio 
extracts to play in the interviews5, I expected particular issues would arise in 
interview based on those extracts. As well as pulling out themes inductively 
from the data, I have also aimed to explore, through the views of clinicians, 
some of the specific themes that have arisen during the observation study. The 
interviews, therefore, enabled me to gather clinicians’ perspectives on these 
themes. For example, issues of ‘feeling autism’ arise in meetings (see Chapter 
Seven), and therefore one aspect of this paper is to explore what clinician 
participants might mean by ‘feel’. The preliminary analysis explores the data 
under two themes drawn inductively from the data:  
 
 Diagnosis is a collective effort 
 Diagnosis is tricky 
 
I then consider the interview data related to ‘social factors’ already identified in 
observation data, and explore:  
 
 Who is the expert? 
 Diagnosis as a pragmatic construct 





Diagnosis is a collective effort 
Clinicians expressed the importance of the role of the team meetings in their 
diagnostic decision-making. The main strength of the team meeting was 
considered to be its value as a place to bring together different specialist roles 
and experience to jointly discuss a case. This process was seen as a crucial 
mechanism for ‘teasing out’ or ‘unpicking’ what was happening for the patient 
                                            
4 These were multi-disciplinary team meetings in three teams; one team was single-disciplinary, made 
up of clinical psychologists.  
5 Audio extracts were played in most meetings: in some meetings we discussed cases without audio, 
either due to lack of audio being available due to timescale between meeting and interview; or (on one 




and to bring together the results of different assessments from practitioners with 
different roles. This combined narrative then enabled the team to feel that they 
had achieved a good assessment:  
 
I think we all bring something, a bit of difference, and just a different 
perspective… like no one’s wed to this particular outcome, you know, 
everything is discussed and considered and that’s what feels nice for me, so I 
kind of go away thinking yeah, I feel like we've done a good assessment. 
 
Participant 5: 8 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
When the assessment was uncertain, or there was contradictory evidence, the 
meeting served to resolve this:  
 
 …it was a bit of a tricky one because the ADOS didn’t score up, but the 3DI 
did, and I think what the MDT helps with is to pull that nicely into a 
formulation, like a strengths-based formulation. 
 
Participant 5: 8 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Further, the meetings helped the team to consider whether, collectively, there 
was enough evidence to diagnose:  
 
So by the end, us thinking collectively, we’re able to say, ‘yes there’s enough 
information in there’. But I think it needs all of us to do that process. 
 
Participant 6: 12 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Importantly, clinicians valued the meetings to ensure shared responsibility for 
the decision, and to feel confident about the diagnostic outcome: 
 
Actually the conversation then can be quite short, but we do still like to go 
through the process of sharing kind of the examples and the experience, I guess 
that’s to assure ourselves that yeah, it’s a shared experience, and a shared 
understanding, so that we can formulate that and put that back to the young 
person.  
 







Clinicians also described how opinions can change in a meeting, and how 
different views were reconciled:   
 
 So there was one two or three weeks ago, when [clinician A] felt quite strongly 
that they didn’t have a diagnosis, and then [clinician B] did, and then [clinician 
B] went through her report and then she kind of convinced [clinician A] and he 
was actually satisfied after he’d read … some of the information.  
 
Participant 7: 18 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Having a good rapport, and equality of view in the meeting was considered 
important.  
 
We've got a culture in the team that everyone’s opinion is important and valid.  
 
Participant 7: 18 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Although clinicians generally felt that the team allowed expression of all views, 
some clinicians expressed difficulties in challenging the diagnostic trajectory: 
 
My two colleagues were like ‘this presents yes’, and he was saying no, so ok 
what about this, this, and this? Have we thought about these factors? How do we 
explain… given you're saying this where does that fit in or can that be explained 
by attachment or is there something else? Which takes a good level of rapport to 
try and challenge that, at times, and that wasn’t the easiest thing from my 
perspective, I think I had to be gentle. 
 
Participant 11: 5 years in practice, 5 in autism diagnosis 
 
Even though I'm [senior] … the membership of the team does sometimes reflect 
or impacts how comfortable or safe you feel to be challenging … 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
Overall, whilst the meeting format was considered to be extremely important in 
the assessment process, clinicians acknowledged that decision-making could 
still sometimes be problematic. Generally, the meeting discussion was 






Diagnosis is tricky 
Many of the meetings I observed were those where more complex or 
‘borderline’ cases were discussed. Some decisions were considered 
straightforward, particularly ‘at either end of the spectrum’. Clinicians expressed 
difficulty with making diagnostic decisions in cases which might be considered 
borderline or near threshold, or where symptoms were perceived to overlap with 
other conditions.  
 
We do have these tricky ones... some that present with maybe a lot of sort of 
personality traits as well, and they might have some autistic traits, and then we 
think ‘is that going to help them?’, and in some cases it might not help them, 
they may be far more PD [personality disorder] and they need to work on that. I 
don’t know it’s very difficult... it’s tricky isn’t it? 
 
Participant 7: 18 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
In particular, clinicians voiced difficulties at finding a clear line between those 
who meet the diagnostic threshold and those who do not:  
 
We have to give a binary outcome in this clinic, but in reality, as we know, you 
know autism can be viewed as more of a spectrum. 
 
Participant 6: 12 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
And whilst clinicians considered the process of diagnosis as standardised and 
objective, they, at the same time, acknowledged its subjectivity:  
 
…which is not a precise art, it’s a difficult thing, it can be quite subjective at 
times, and it’s… that's why I think having that team discussion is crucial, you 
know, you could never do it on your own because trying to manage all those 
thoughts and make sense of it is just too much  
 
Participant 11: 5 years in practice, 5 in autism diagnosis 
 
One clinician felt that subjectivity and interpretation of behaviours could be 
shaped by the experience or ‘passion’ of clinicians in a particular area, which 






It’s hard to think about alternative psychological formations, or even if we do, 
perhaps because the team don’t have a passion or an experience in that area that 
wouldn’t necessarily be given the same kind of weight… this very similar set of 
symptoms could be understood in a slightly different way. 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
Generally, clinicians were deeply aware of the challenges of interpreting 
ambiguous behaviours. Because of the context of the assessment process, 
some clinicians considered it possible to look for autism to the exclusion of 
other ‘normal’ behaviours:  
 
I just saw him as a… you know from his history we’re reading all the school 
reports, a belligerent teenager who didn’t quite fit into school, wasn’t 
comfortable, didn’t want to be there, but he was in the pathway because 
someone said ‘well is he autistic?’… often they get the tick because they do 
some minor little… but anxious children do kind of start to… but that's a tick for 
autism. 
 
Participant 14: 30 years in practice, 5 in autism diagnosis 
 
Many clinicians expressed a worry about pressure on services and waiting lists. 
Some considered that this pressure could compromise what they considered to 
be the best assessment, either through lack of time for deep discussion, or a 
reduction in the number of observations in different settings that were possible:  
 
I mean there’s still a waiting list of a year for even… well a minimum of a year 
for people, so… whereas that commissioner pressure to get people through the 
system, which is obviously important, I think sometimes has watered down the 
time for good team discussion. 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
But interestingly, because I guess pressures of time, the school observation is 
not done as much now, you know, if it’s felt there’s enough evidence from the 
developmental and the ADOS then the diagnosis is given. But I feel less 
comfortable with that. And that might help partly explain why the sheer number 
getting the diagnosis has gone up, because we don’t have that observational 
context of the… where the child will be behaving in as much of a normal way as 
they will. 
 





Reporting back to the family with a negative outcome, after months (or years) of 
waiting can also be challenging:  
 
Well to be honest it’s easier to say you’ve got a diagnosis than not. They're the 
harder ones. I think because they’ve kind of waited for a while so they're 
expecting the diagnosis, and when you say actually no it’s not explained by that, 
they go ‘eurgh’ because that’s not… and yet actually it ought to be good news 
that it isn’t but it’s not the way it’s received usually, it’s much harder to give a 
no.  
 
Participant 12: 2 years in practice, 2 in autism diagnosis 
 
Difficulties with the process of diagnosis, therefore, included the interpretation of 
ambiguous behaviours, pressure on services, the heterogeneity of symptoms 
and the concept that a particular focus on looking for autism leads clinicians to 
look at behaviours a particular way. Finally, this might be summed up by one 
response, which seems to suggest a core difficulty with autism diagnosis:  
 
The confidence that we think we should have as clinicians is perhaps sometimes 
ahead of the science that backs it up. 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
 
Who is the expert? 
Clinicians acknowledged the potential difficulties of interacting with patients or 
parents who were actively seeking a diagnosis, or for whom the outcome was 
likely to be in opposition to their hopes. Clinicians expressed a view that 
patients or parents would foreground relevant information to support a potential 
diagnosis: 
 
If you then think of the developmental history, I'm not saying all parents, but 
there will be some parents who will skew that because they want the diagnosis, 
and information is out there, they could go on the internet and read the sorts of 
criteria that are there and what behaviours we need to tick the boxes for, so they 
will say the right things, but it doesn’t mean to say it’s real. 
 






We all kind of look to make a coherent narrative of how we see things and how 
we see the world, so it’s the same if a parent was actively not wanting a 
diagnosis, they’d discount things that didn’t fit with the idea of… well I guess 
you’ve got a view of how things are so you discount the things that go against 
that, and count the… and notice the things… 
 
Participant 3: 2 years in practice, 1 in autism diagnosis 
 
In some cases, the resistant behaviour of an individual, ironically, provided an 
argument for an autism diagnosis.  
 
I mean the patient was very helpful in a way, because she sent me a four page 
email once a week for several weeks which was kind of diagnostically 
indicative, listing all the reasons why she couldn’t be autistic, but kind of 
confirming why she was. 
 
Participant 15: 17 years in practice, 1 in autism diagnosis 
 
In some cases, the clinician felt that the clinical team had given too much weight 
to a parent’s view: 
 
Mum was happy but I felt perhaps in the end the weight of mum’s 
emotiveness…we’d given that too much weight actually, and it’s painful to say 
to a parent actually…we struggle sometimes to say no. 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
There were differences in views as to how much to take an individual’s opinion 
and desires into account. Some clinicians were very aware of the potential long-
term impact of a diagnostic label on the identity of the individual. Others were 
more ‘hardline’ about not taking this into account. Although individual clinician 
views varied, there was a strong sense of the patients’ and families’ views, 
values and desires having to be managed through the process:    
 
I understand that desire, that need, to have an identity, but as a clinician it 
doesn't really overly impact my decision, to be honest, because it's probably a bit 
mean, but actually it's the diagnostic criteria... and I've seen a number of people 
online say, oh well, of course I'm autistic, but we need to change the autistic 
criteria - well, you're not then, I'm sorry. 
 





There would be quite an incentive to say yes to certain people, certainly because 
actually the implications can be really difficult. But that's something that we sort 
of manage and we are kind of used to that, and we also know that that's an 
experience that other people working in other teams certainly have as well, and 
they face those challenges on a regular basis. So we support each other around 
that. But it is tough. 
 
Participant 13: 7 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
Clinicians appeared to be engaged in a ’resistance/acceptance’ relationship 
with (some) patients and families: resisting and accepting the family testimonies 
as credible or not, and finding ways to assert the right to make the final 
decision. Clinicians conceptualised patients and families as active agents who 
are motivated to seek or discourage a diagnosis. This motivation is something 
that required resistance and management.  
 
 
Diagnosis as a pragmatic construct 
In team meetings, clinicians often discussed how helpful a diagnosis may be for 
the individual, through enabling access to support or resources, or greater 
understanding of their own difficulties. In interview, clinicians varied in how 
much the pragmatic outcome of a diagnosis might help shape a decision in 
borderline cases:  
 
What's important is actually making sure that we're correct and that we're 
accurate, because the whole point of diagnosis is understanding, understanding 
how to support someone and understanding where to go next. 
 
Participant 2: 17 years in practice, 2 in autism diagnosis 
 
Many clinicians questioned how they could tell that a diagnosis might, or might 
not, be helpful for an individual, especially long-term:  
 
So it can be really hard to think about if they are ticking all those boxes and 
there’s functional impact and nothing else explains it, it can be quite an 
interesting discussion around ‘but should we give them a diagnosis?’ if they're 
meeting the criteria, and I think that’s something that’s developing… it can be 
really hard to know whether having a diagnosis could do harm in the future, and 
that’s quite tricky. 
 




Others suggested there were times when the outcome would vary depending on 
the utility or not of a diagnosis for the individual, or on patient preference:  
 
So especially with people that are sort of borderline … we think is that going to 
help them? …but that is an arbitrary thing as well isn’t it?... we do think about 
that, is it going to help them. Yeah. ..Only for people that are kind of borderline 
 
Participant 7: 18 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Given diagnosis does have that subjective social value judgment element to it, 
but if people don’t wish to identify with a diagnosis I think I do take a position 
that I don’t think they should have to, we shouldn’t force it upon them. 
 
Participant 1: 10 years in practice, 7 in autism diagnosis 
 
Some clinicians considered the impact of diagnosis on the patient, and how this 
might affect the decision. At the same time, however, there was concern about 
a conflict with clinical training:  
 
Actually I think its comes back a lot to what’s going to benefit the individual in 
those kinds of borderline cases …you can really see that giving the diagnosis is 
going to help them access additional support or resources or strategies which 
will have a benefit, then I almost feel it easier to give a diagnosis, whereas 
actually if I think the opposite, potentially someone is at risk of being 
stigmatised or struggling because of it, and they really don’t identify with it and 
don’t want it, then in these very grey areas it might disincline me from making a 
diagnosis. But that upsets me as a clinician because it doesn’t sit naturally with 
my preference to have an evidence-base.  
 
Participant 6: 12 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
The functional outcome of a potential diagnosis, therefore, was expressed as 
always being a consideration, but with some concerns about being able to 
predict the benefits of a diagnosis, longer term, as set against meeting criteria 









I explored the question of ‘intuition’ and ‘feel’ with participants in interview. Many 
recognised this ‘feeling’ and, whilst describing it as subjective, related the 
feeling to experience.   
 
An experienced clinician brings that they’ve done this so many times...So I think 
that’s what I mean by ‘in the room’, it’s not necessarily a… I wouldn’t say it’s 
like a psychoanalytic kind of how they make you feel, I don’t think it’s that 
level, I think it’s more about the kind of the… yeah that kind of social 
understanding of what you’d expect the young person to manage.  
 
Participant 9: 19 years in practice, 12 in autism diagnosis 
 
Getting the balance right between ‘gut instinct’ and meeting diagnostic criteria 
was expressed as another dilemma in diagnosis: 
 
There’s also a certain amount of stuff that probably isn’t recorded by clinicians, 
and I don’t know if it’s an omission or not, but it’s often how you felt, it’s a 
subjective opinion, but based on subjective opinion of someone who’s worked in 
an area for a number of years who’s developed an instinct or a… yeah your gut 
instinct about how someone makes you feel, and that’s often… you can't always 
articulate that…I think it’s valid as long as it’s done within kind of constraints 
and we’re not just wildly speculating about things.  
 
Participant 15: 17 years in practice, 1 in autism diagnosis 
 
‘Feel’ suggests an expression of many years of inculturation in clinics which 
becomes experienced as instinct or ‘clinical intuition’. Sometimes instinct or 
‘feeling’ was acknowledged, and the meeting was utilised as a mechanism for 
resolving those dilemmas:  
 
But yeah, try not to be biased by the fact that I've got a feeling, and I think what 
we try and do in MDT… we’d often talk about the fact that just because that 
young person has strengths in x, y, z, areas, doesn’t mean that they're not 
meeting criteria if they’ve also got difficulties in those areas, so it’s just trying to 
pull that apart really, rather than just going just by gut. 
 
Participant 8: 12 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Many clinicians considered feeling in relation to the interaction with the 





Sometimes with the diagnosis, it’s not just the factual and the kind of criteria 
that you're looking at but it’s also a feeling that you get with people …It’s just a 
feeling. It’s the way people make you feel I think. I don’t know. It’s really hard 
to describe, but you do get it, like I do feel now when I see people that I usually 
know within five minutes, most people, with autism, like I can kind of tell 
already. So there is subtle things in their interaction, the way they come into the 
room, the initial contact. You can just kind of tell actually.  
 
Participant 7: 18 years in practice, 3 in autism diagnosis 
 
Many clinicians were understandably cautious about over-estimating the 
emphasis on clinical intuition. Alongside assertions of meeting criteria, striving 
for accuracy and standardisation, and the benefits (or otherwise) of diagnosis, 
the way in which clinicians can ‘just kind of tell’, is a strong feature of the 
process of autism assessment. The ability to feel or recognise autism was 
considered as a factor that either had to be managed, or might provide an 
opening to further enquiry.  
 
 
9.5 Preliminary Discussion 
 
9.5.1 Overview 
To summarise the preliminary findings, clinicians expressed diagnosis as tricky 
in borderline cases, with difficulties in interpretation of behaviours, knowing 
where the threshold lies, and a pressure on services, making the diagnostic 
process time-limited and potentially restricted. Whilst clinicians expressed that 
the decision-making process was challenging at times, particularly in 
‘borderline’ cases, they also felt it was more straightforward at ‘either end’ of the 
spectrum (i.e. for those very straightforwardly not-autistic, and for those very 
severely affected). The team meeting was valued as a way to explore 
uncertainty and ambiguity, examine different accounts together, and take 
shared responsibility for making a collaborative decision. The collective work of 
the team meeting, therefore, could be considered as a way in which clinicians 






Clinicians were aware of having to manage the expectations, desires and 
motivation of patients and pay attention to how researched or prepared 
individuals may be in order either to avoid or gain a diagnosis of autism. 
Clinicians varied in how much they would take into account the desires of the 
patient and the impact of diagnosis on the patient. This ranged from those who 
considered it irrelevant, to those who believed it could shape the diagnostic 
decision. Factors considered here included issues of practical support and 
access to resources, as well as issues of identity and long-term impact of 
labelling. Overall, however, there was a strong focus on ‘personalising’ the 
patient to include discussion, not only of their behaviours, but their desires and 
motivations. There appears to be an epistemic tussle, with parents, and with 
adults coming for diagnosis, about who has the right to define autism and 
therefore ‘be’ autistic.  
 
Clinicians were deeply aware of the ambiguities and difficulties of diagnosing 
autism and took great personal responsibility in managing this process for the 
benefit of the patient and family. Concern was expressed about the long-term 
impact of diagnosis, which means that decision-making is threaded through with 
a concern for the consequences of diagnosis for the patient. Some interview 
participants expressed concern about pressure on services which they believe 
is constraining the diagnostic process and restricting time available for 
observations in ‘natural settings’ and longer, deeper assessments, for example. 
‘Feeling’ autism was described as an intuitive process based on experience and 
knowledge rather than speculation or uninformed emotion. The positioning of 
the clinician as one who has this ability through ‘day-in, day-out’ experience, 
enables them to assert epistemic authority over the knowledgeable lay person, 
as a specialist who ‘knows autism when they see it’. 
 
9.5.2 Beliefs about diagnosis 
The interview data suggests that clinicians hold contradictory beliefs about 
diagnosis, which they slip between, in order to perform the function of 





a) autism is a clinical entity that can be found through the diagnostic 
process, which is objective, standardised and evidence-based 
b) diagnosis of autism can be difficult as evidence can be ambiguous, 
decisions are not always clear cut, patients are motivated and decisions 
have a subjective element 
 
As with Russell et al’s (2016) study of educational practitioners’ views of ADHD, 
these views seem polarised but they are not considered to be mutually 
exclusive. They appear to comprise an objective medical understanding of 
autism and of diagnosis (a); but this is framed within a social understanding of 
the challenges of classification (b). The dilemma of diagnosis, therefore, is 
rooted in the ontological certainty of autism as a condition, i.e. there is a thing 
called autism. However, as suggested in previous studies, there is 
epistemological uncertainty (how to classify it), which is related to ambiguity of 
behaviours, motivation and insight of patients and families, and differences of 
view in assessment. I have shown (Chapters Seven and Eight) how these 
dilemmas are resolved through drawing on specialist knowledge, judging the 
credibility of patient and family testimonies, drawing on pragmatism, and 
building a diagnostic narrative to construct a coherent diagnostic picture.  
 
This set of interviews builds on my previous studies by demonstrating the 
importance of the collaborative decision-making process in the face of 
uncertainty. Assessments are troubled by the conflicting views of patients and 
families and questions about whether diagnosis will be helpful. Interpretations of 
clinicians’ own instinct about the person can trouble the diagnostic trajectory (if 
the feel of autism is in contradiction to test scores); but also help move towards 
a diagnostic outcome (when feel and test scores are in alignment).  
 
9.5.3 Push/pull social factors in diagnosis 
The dilemmas faced by clinicians in autism assessment can be conceptualised 
as a balancing act with pressure on both sides. The working model, represented 
in Figure 16, is based on a study by Russell and Norwich (2012) drawn from a 
set of interviews about parental decisions for pursuing or avoiding a diagnosis 




between resisting diagnosis (due to potential stigma), or accepting diagnosis 
(because of the potential for support).  
 
 
Figure 16: Working model of push/pull social factors in diagnosis 
 
In my study, there appears to be a ‘tipping point’ related to a number of social 
factors. Pressure on time is expressed as potentially restricting a full 
assessment process; individual and family desire is taken into account with 
clinicians engaging in a process of resisting or accepting the credibility of 
patient and family accounts. Clinicians suggest that it is easier to diagnose than 
not, if the individual desires a diagnosis, or if parents are desperate and have 
been waiting for a long time for an outcome. In this working model, these 
factors, as illustrated above, all have weight in the consideration of diagnosis. 
 
Clinicians, therefore, are engaged in a ‘push/pull’ relationship with the 
diagnostic decision. ‘Pull’ factors (pulling towards a diagnostic decision) may be 
stronger than ‘push’ factors (away from diagnosis). This may be because by the 
time patients reach the team, they are already in an ‘institutional funnel’ (Rossi, 
2012) leading towards diagnosis. 
 
Further analysis will explore the push/pull factors (pushing away from or pulling 
towards a diagnostic decision) as discussed by clinicians. In the context of 




them to feel confident about decisions that have been troublesome, and to 
strive for standardisation. The meeting itself is considered part of the 
‘standardisation’ procedure, as it includes a range of perspectives and 
assessments. However, as I have shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
interaction between different agents in meetings can shape the outcome of the 
meeting itself.   
 
9.5.4 Reflection and future plans 
I am aware from reviewing the interview transcripts how some voices resonate 
with what I have observed in meetings, and others describe the process in a 
more straightforward way. As I analyse the data further I plan to ensure the 
inductive element of the analysis is stronger, to ensure that clinicians’ views are 




















CHAPTER TEN: Discussion 
 
 
I never see medicine as as simply one thing rather than another. Rather it is bio one 
moment and social the next…  Critically we need to understand more how medicine 
shifts between its hybrid associations to moments of clinical purity. 
 









10.1 Overview of chapter 
 
The chapter includes a summary of the background, aims and objectives of the 
thesis and of each of the empirical studies. This is followed by a discussion of 
strengths and limitations and a summary of key findings. The chapter then goes 
on to discuss the findings and what they mean taken together as a whole, the 
contribution this thesis makes to current literature and the implications for theory 
and practice. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection on the process, 
discussion about future research and a concluding summary.  
 
 
10.2 Summary of background 
 
10.2.1 Introduction  
A child’s drawing of children on swings (Röttger and Klante, 1964) has been 
with me throughout my PhD (see Figure 17). The child on the second swing (I 
call him Jessie) behaves differently to the others: he faces in a different 
direction. In this context his behaviour is not out of place. But if Jessie were to 
turn his back in class when being spoken to, his behaviour might be considered 
problematic. If done repeatedly, it might be termed disruptive or resistant. But 
when does this behaviour shift from being ‘difficult’ to being ‘pathological’? 
When do we decide Jessie needs a label to describe his behaviour? And why?  
 
  




Exploring the concept of acceptable social behaviour has been a thread 
throughout my PhD. A passing conversation with a mentor introduced me to the 
expression ‘Normal for Fife’ (NFF); medical slang, alongside Funny Looking Kid 
(FLK) and Normal for Norfolk (NFN) which, thankfully, seems to be going out of 
favour (Fox et al., 2003)6. This conversation was particularly striking for me, not 
just because I am from Fife, or because it seemed such an unacceptable 
shorthand for a child’s situation, but because it said so much about what we 
expect normality to be. And it placed normal in context, in that, normal is one 
thing in some contexts, and apparently quite another in Fife (or Norfolk).  
 
The framework to diagnose (to consider diagnosis, to send Jessie for diagnosis, 
to make the referral, to make the assessment, to give the feedback etc.) is a 
judgement that is framed and sanctioned by society and implemented by 
clinicians. It is a classification process that frames behaviour as normal or 
pathological. It is a framework which enables someone to fit or not fit, to explain, 
to seek treatment and support within, to excuse, to give meaning to those things 
in society that seem different and can be distressing, painful or difficult. It helps 
people without the label to support those with the label, and to understand and 
to find ways to alleviate real distress and difficulty.  
 
Whilst clinicians are, generally, responsible for the diagnostic moment, for the 
labelling of a condition as one thing or another, the process of diagnosis itself is 
a social interaction and societal construct which begins long before the moment 
of referral. The shape of normal behaviour is decided before entering the 
assessment room; and although diagnosticians may have specialist expertise in 
making judgements about what those social norms of behaviour may look like, 
that expertise is based on how society defines it. As I discussed in Chapter 
Three, diseases and medical conditions have different meanings, 
understandings of aetiology and consequences depending on the historical 
period, culture, geography and environmental circumstance. As Bentall points 
out, investigators studying cross-cultural differences in depression across the 
world find that, in developing countries, depression is considered to consist of 
                                            
6 And it should be noted that I did not, ever, hear any of the healthcare practitioners in this study using 




somatic factors such as fatigue or dizziness; whereas in Western countries the 
focus is on cognitive symptoms such as low self-esteem (Bentall, 2003). 
Context does not only change behaviour, but the meaning we ascribe to it. This 
thesis has explored how clinicians navigate the borderline between ‘normal’ and 
‘pathological’ behaviours in their diagnostic deliberations.  
 
10.2.2 Background literature 
As I have described throughout this thesis, diagnosis of autism poses particular 
challenges for healthcare practitioners. There are no biomarkers regularly 
utilised in diagnostic tests (Vllasaliu et al., 2016) and the condition represents a 
heterogeneous group of disorders, with wide ranging levels of severity and 
symptom expression. Symptoms that are common to autism may occur with 
other conditions (Huerta and Lord, 2012), leading to potential ambiguity; and 
research also suggests that diagnostic procedures are not consistent across 
practice (NICE, 2012). 
 
Some studies show that social factors such as individual patient preference, 
availability of resources, or local organisational factors can shape diagnostic 
practice in, for example, heart disease (Fuat et al., 2003). Studies in autism 
have shown the existence of ‘diagnostic clusters’, where autism diagnosis is 
high, especially where there is greater availability of assessment resources (Liu 
et al., 2010a; Mazumdar et al., 2013). 
 
Whilst environmental causes for an increase in prevalence cannot be ruled out 
(for example, see Liu et al. 2010a), given the current lack of evidence of any 
organic increase in symptoms, there is significant debate about the reason for 
the increase in prevalence of autism. Research has considered the broadening 
of diagnostic criteria (Russell et al. 2015; Rutter 2005); diagnostic substitution 
(Bishop et al., 2008; Shattuck, 2006); the decreasing age of diagnosis (Leonard 
et al., 2010); information diffusion (Liu et al., 2010a); the conceptualisation of 
autism as an ‘epidemic’ (Ebben, 2018); clinicians ‘upgrading’ to autism 
diagnosis if they consider it might offer the patient access to appropriate support 
(Rogers et al., 2016; Skellern et al., 2005); and the medicalisation of behaviour 




This qualitative study was not intended to offer evidence for any direct 
relationship between clinicians’ practice and increased diagnostic rates. 
However, given the potential for inconsistencies in practice and ambiguity 
around symptoms, this phenomenon of increased diagnosis makes autism a 
particularly interesting study for examining the social framing of diagnosis.  
 
The above literature informed the design of the PhD which was intended to 
explore social factors in diagnosis within a sociology of diagnosis framework 
(see Blaxter 1978; Brown 1995; Jutel 2009, 2013; Jutel and Nettleton 2011). I 
was interested in the social framing of autism diagnosis as defined by Aronowitz 
(2008) and Jutel (2011) as the way that societies generally ‘recognise, define, 
name and categorise disease states’ (Aronowitz, 2008, p. 2). As Jutel (2011) 
notes, the delivery of diagnosis from the clinician to the lay person is not simply 
one of linear conveyance, which implies passivity and conceals the intricate 
web of relational possibilities and societal pressures inherent in the process. 
Similarly, the receipt of diagnosis need not constitute ‘passive re-identification’ 
(Jutel, 2011, p. 140), as those seeking diagnosis (or their families on their 
behalf) may drive for diagnosis, resist it, withdraw from the process or choose 
not to seek it at all. Diagnosis, rather, is relational and dynamic with the 
potential for shifting roles, responsibilities, stakes and interests.  
 
I undertook a further review of the literature and found a significant body of work 
related to uncertainty in medicine generally (e.g. Atkinson 1984; Fox 1957; 
Freidson 1970; Hedgecoe 2003; McGoey 2009; Pickersgill 2014) and in autism 
specifically (e.g. Hollin 2017a, 2017b; Hollin and Pilnick 2015, 2018; O’Reilly et 
al. 2017). I became particularly interested in how clinicians engage in ‘practical 
uncertainty work’ (Hollin, 2017b; Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 2011) which 
enables diagnosticians a means of counteracting diagnostic uncertainty to 
enable the ‘doing’ of diagnosis.  
 
I then explored further work examining the conceptualisation of autism as a 
clinical entity in both the UK and US (Evans, 2013; Eyal et al., 2010; Fitzgerald, 
2017; Nadesan, 2005; C. Silverman, 2013). This body of work traces how 




psychological development, the emergence of ‘childhood’ as a research focus 
and the deinstitutionalisation of ‘mental retardation’.  
 
There remain few empirical studies, however, which examine in detail how 
autism diagnosis comes about in situ, given the way it might be understood as 
an ‘uncertain entity’ (Hollin, 2017b). Some exceptions include an ethnographic 
study of an autism clinic (Rossi, 2012) and an exploration of multi-disciplinary 
team meetings considering autism diagnosis (Parish, 2019).  
 
I considered the work of Maynard and Turowetz to be particularly relevant for 
this PhD (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, 2017; Turowetz, 2015b, 2015a; 
Turowetz and Maynard, 2019, 2017, 2016). In a number of conversation-
analytic articles examining autism diagnosis of children in the US over two time 
spans, the authors consider how clinicians build a narrative case for diagnosis, 
including implementing strategies to enable differential diagnosis and 
foregrounding clinically relevant behaviours. They demonstrate how interaction 
in assessment serves to present assessors as neutral facilitators and diagnostic 
tools as passive recording measures.  
 
The PhD project then became framed by three intersecting bodies of work. First 
the overall framework of sociology of diagnosis which considers the process of 
diagnosis as relational and dynamic. Second, the concept of uncertainty in 
medical practice which is particularly interesting given the history of autism 
classification and the heterogeneity of autism symptoms. And finally, the body 
of empirical work by Maynard and Turowetz which examines in detail how 
clinicians work together in assessment to make a diagnosis. These three works 
of scholarship helped to frame the project as one which would directly observe 
and analyse the talk of clinicians, in order to examine how interaction 
contributes to the diagnostic process.  
 
I set out, therefore, to explore how clinicians make collaborative diagnostic 
decisions given the complexity of autism diagnosis and what this means for our 
understanding both of the condition and of diagnosis generally. I was interested 




factors’ as integrated within the clinical and found the definition of ‘social 
framing’ as outlined above more useful. My object of study, therefore, became 
more complex but arguably more interesting. Broadly, I was interested in the 
social framing of autism as a condition, and how beliefs, practices and histories, 
as well as lay/medical practices, might contribute to our understanding of 
autism. Specifically, I became interested in considering how the complexity of 
interactional and diagnostic factors led to a conclusion of ‘autism’.  
 
10.2.3 Exploring Diagnosis 
My broader understanding of autism and diagnosis has also been informed by 
being part of the wider research project, Exploring Diagnosis, a Wellcome Trust 
funded research project led by Dr Ginny Russell. Exploring Diagnosis examines 
the role that diagnosis plays in society and in medicine, using diagnosis of 
autism as a case study. Exploring Diagnosis also aims to celebrate and value 
the abilities and attributes of the neurodiverse community. My PhD study has 
both contributed to, and learnt from, this wider project in a number of ways. 
 
Exploring Diagnosis was informed by a series of research studies in autism, in 
particular examining time trends in the diagnosis of autism (Russell et al., 
2015). This broader context of diagnostic rates, social and demographic factors, 
and issues around aetiology and prevalence, shaped the project and outlined 
the social and epidemiological context within which autism as a condition could 
be examined as a case study (for example, see G. Russell et al., 2016; Russell, 
2014; Russell et al., 2014, 2012b, 2012c, 2010b, 2010a).  
 
The Exploring Diagnosis team comprises a number of researchers working on 
related projects concerned with, for example, the first-hand experiences of 
autistic people (Kapp et al., 2019; Russell et al., 2019a), first-person accounts 
of social action and autism rights in the neurodiversity movement (Kapp, 2019), 
labelling and stigmatisation (White et al., 2019), psychiatric classification, self-
diagnosis and self-identification as autistic (Lister, 2019; Sarrett and Kapp, 
2018), quality of life (Kapp, 2018), patient and public involvement in 
pharmaceutical interventions (Russell et al., 2018) and a critique of the 




breadth of these studies has provided me with an understanding of wider issues 
related to cultural and epidemiological factors in autism diagnosis which were 
not directly part of my study.  
 
One significant strand of Exploring Diagnosis includes a number of studies that 
actively seek the views and experiences of people with a diagnosis of autism. 
Whilst my own PhD study has not involved autistic people, I have learned from 
being part of a wider team for which this has been the main focus. The wider 
study has included a ‘sister’ PhD project led by Thomas Lister (Lister, 2019) that 
explores how and why people come to be labelled, or label themselves, as 
autistic in adulthood, and the consequences of doing so. This involves 
interviewing people who have been diagnosed or who self-identify as autistic in 
adulthood. Tom’s work has been a constant ‘mirror’ to my process of examining 
diagnosis from the ‘other side’ and we have had many discussions which have 
helped us both to focus on particular aspects of relevance for our individual 
studies. For example, whilst I have found that clinicians are deeply conscious of 
patients’ motivations in coming for assessment, Tom has been able to explore 
how and why people do or do not choose to go for assessment, their 
experiences of assessment and the impact on their identity as autistic.  
 
Further work from the Exploring Diagnosis team has explored aspects of autistic 
experience and behaviour which are generally regarded as ‘deficits’ but may be 
understood from an autistic perspective as advantageous. This has included an 
interview study examining strengths in autistic adults (Russell et al., 2019a) 
where participants described key strengths such as good memory and attention 
to detail, but also included strengths related to social interaction such as 
honesty and loyalty. The findings suggest that traits associated with autism 
could be experienced as either negative or positive depending on social 
context. A further study highlighted the importance of stimming (stereotyped or 
repetitive motor movements) to autistic adults as a self-soothing mechanism, or 
as a way to communicate intense emotions or thoughts (Kapp et al., 2019). This 
study reframes a behaviour generally considered to be a disadvantageous trait 
of autism, medicalised as ‘motor stereotypies’ such as ‘hand or finger flapping’ 




situations. Considering so-called ‘deficits’ from the perspective of those who 
experience them offers an expert reframing of how we understand behaviours 
that we medicalise as problematic. The authors conclude that stimming, 
because of its potential helpfulness to some autistic people, should not 
automatically be the subject of interventions which seek to eliminate it.  
 
The above outline does not do justice to the depth and breadth of the work of 
Exploring Diagnosis or reveal the continual and iterative process of knowledge 
sharing that we have enjoyed through the life of the project. This has included 
fortnightly team meetings where we presented work in progress for discussion 
and feedback, planned joint presentations and events and welcomed scholars 
and autistic advocates to present and discuss their work and ideas. At my 
instigation we regularly discussed topics in the news or media of relevance to 
diagnosis or to autism, including reports about whether computers can 
diagnose, incidents of violence against disabled people, debates about autism 
and gender, vaccination controversies, autistic representations on TV and in 
fiction, as well as reactions to challenges to diagnosis such as the Power, 
Threat, Meaning Framework (Johnstone et al., 2018) (see Appendix 15: 
Selected In The News Items). These discussions reminded me to consider my 
work in the wider arena of disability rights, changes in legislation and current 
cultural representations of autistic people.  
 
A Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) project supporting autistic artists to 
create short animated films (Exploring Diagnosis, 2019) managed by Dr Jean 
Harrington, demonstrated how creative practices can provide insight into autistic 
experiences of diagnosis and of the condition. On a practical note, the Exploring 
Diagnosis team provided support for each other in areas of expertise. For 
example, Daisy Elliott researched and supported on anonymisation of my data 
for data archiving, as well as piloting my framework for study one, along with 
Rhianna White and Ginny Russell. I also supported Rhianna on her study 
examining labelling and stigma, by helping to facilitate her experimental study in 
schools. I was also involved in early discussions around ‘diagnosing the dead’, 





The Exploring Diagnosis advisory board, made up of experts in the field 
(Appendix 16: Exploring Diagnosis Advisory Board), provided an opportunity for 
specialist discussions around particular areas of interest. Visiting scholars such 
as Chloe Silverman and Annemarie Jutel enriched our understanding and 
provided critical debate. I have been involved in an autism reading group, 
convened by Dr Steven Kapp, which has extended the breadth of my reading 
into articles advocating for a neurodiversity approach as well as examining 
biological and cognitive perspectives. I have also been a regular attender at a 
‘sociology of diagnosis’ reading group convened by PhD student Elena Sheratt 
where I have been introduced to articles which discuss social issues beyond the 
condition of autism, including dementia and chronic pain. 
 
10.2.4 Conferences, peer reviewers and Data Bee 
I have also benefitted from attending and presenting at conferences. Of 
particular value was a presentation with Ginny Russell at the Critical Autism 
Network (Russell and Hayes, 2017) where I learned a great deal about the 
neurodiversity movement and disability politics in relation to autism and 
diagnosis. In addition, feedback from a presentation at the British Sociological 
Association Medical Sociology Conference (Hayes, 2018) helped me to shape 
my study at a key stage in developing my analysis. Annual presentations at the 
University of Exeter College of Medicine and Health as part of an Annual 
Research Event to showcase student work, and a presentation at CACE 
(Conversation Analysis in Clinical Encounters) (Hayes, 2019) significantly 
helped my confidence in analysis as well as connecting me to a wider 
scholarship in healthcare services research. I have also benefitted significantly 
from anonymous peer reviewers who have taken time and trouble to help me 
reframe my second article (Hayes et al., 2020) in a way that was more 
‘sociological’ and embedded in relevant literature.  
 
Finally, with a small group of PhD colleagues, I initiated and set up ‘Data Bee’, a 
qualitative data-sharing and analysis group based in the College of Medicine 
and Health. This peer-led group has met fortnightly and been invaluable in 
supporting my own data analysis, and learning from others. In particular, 




sparked discussion which has contributed to our thinking. Data sharing with 
Daisy Parker, who is examining doctor-patient communication when dealing 
with psychological distress, has been particularly helpful in examining the 
structure of interaction in healthcare settings (Parker, 2019). In collaboration 
with Tom and Daisy, and the fourth member of our team, PhD student 
Catherine Talbot, I organised a day event for PhD students and early career 
researchers throughout the south-west of England, which enabled us to share 
our experiences of sharing data with others. 
 
To conclude this section, my specific interest during this PhD has been a focus 
on diagnostic decision-making by clinicians. However, my approach was 
grounded in wider understandings of autism research, sociology of diagnosis, 
exploration of methods, and current debates playing out in the fields of autism 
and of diagnosis more broadly. 
 
 
10.3 Aims and objectives of PhD 
 
The aims of the PhD were to explore social factors in autism diagnosis in 
secondary care; and to understand how clinicians collaboratively make 
diagnostic decisions in autism assessment. The thesis had the following 
objectives:  
 
a) To undertake a review of clinical guidelines in use in the UK and consider 
where, within those guidelines, social factors and influences are taken 
into account (study one) 
b) To document and analyse discussions made in MDT meetings (or local 
equivalent) to identify social and interactional processes (studies two and 
three) 
c) To gather views and experiences of clinicians involved in the diagnostic 
process via interviews (study four) 





I designed and implemented four inter-related studies: a review of clinical 
guidelines, a thematic analysis of observation data, a discursive analysis of 
observation data and an interview study. These are briefly summarised below.  
 
 
10.4 Summary of studies and findings 
 
10.4.1 Review of clinical guidelines (study one) 
 
Overview of study 
The preliminary study was a qualitative narrative review of clinical guidelines for 
autism diagnosis in the UK. I undertook a scoping search for similar studies and 
a systematic search of multiple databases and relevant web sources to identify 
relevant guidelines. Twenty-one documents were found and analysed. A 
process of data extraction synthesised key diagnostic elements such as 
assessment process and diagnostic tools.  
 
I found that guidelines varied in recommendations for use of diagnostic tools 
and assessment procedures. Although multi-disciplinary assessment was 
identified as the ‘ideal’ assessment, there was no guidance as to how that 
should take place. Social factors in operational, interactional and contextual 
areas added complexity to guidelines but there was little guidance as to how 
these factors impacted on assessment, or recommendations as to how they 
might be managed in day-to-day practice. Clinical practice guidelines varied in 
their recommendations, making the choices available to healthcare practitioners 
particularly complex and confusing.  
 
Strengths and limitations of study 
The strengths of this study were that a narrative approach was helpful to 
understand the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the diagnostic 
process. Methodologically, I undertook a systematic search and included a 
transparent but pragmatic selection of documents. This is, to my knowledge, the 
only review which strives to consider how the process of autism diagnosis may 




One limitation of the study was that as it was a review of current guidelines, 
changes through time were not exposed. My review was limited to the UK 
context because healthcare settings vary widely in international contexts. 
Although in this study I could only examine the content of guidelines rather than 
how they are used, it was expected that this might become possible in 
subsequent studies.  
 
How study addresses aim of PhD 
This study aimed to understand the broad context of autism diagnosis in the UK 
and, in line with the aims of the PhD, to begin the exploration of social factors in 
autism diagnosis. This study enabled me to understand that, despite clinical 
guidelines which attempt to standardise assessment, the process of diagnosis 
for autism remains ambiguous, potentially contradictory, and complex. I found 
that clinical guidelines for autism diagnosis illuminate the process of diagnosis 
as social rather than straightforwardly clinical. 
 
A focus on clinical judgement in guidelines seemed to offer a way in which 
clinicians might negotiate ambiguity and contradiction, but a lack of guidance 
about how the multi-disciplinary aspect of diagnosis should work leaves that 
process open to local forces. The study constituted an initial scoping review 
which set the context for examining social factors in situ. Uncertainty and 
ambiguity became a key concept as a result of this study which was then further 
explored in subsequent studies.   
 
 
10.4.2 Observation of assessment team meetings (studies two and three) 
 
Overview of studies 
The core study of this PhD was an observation of specialist autism assessment 
team meetings on four sites in the south of England. Eighteen meetings were 
observed in two adult and two C&YP teams. In over 19 hours of meeting time, a 
total of 88 cases were discussed, with 51 directly related to diagnosis. These 51 
cases form the cohort for this study. Meetings were audio-recorded and a dual 




up as two articles to reflect this dual approach. This enabled me both to take a 
broad overview of the themes within the data in study two (thematic analysis) 
whilst also capturing the detail of interaction on selected cases in study three 
(discursive psychology analysis). A full outline of the method is in Chapter Five. 
 
Through thematic analysis (study two) I found that, within these settings, 
expressions of uncertainty and ambiguity were common. However, 
diagnosticians employed a number of strategies based on their specialist 
disciplinary knowledge to overcome this difficulty. This included invoking the 
‘feel’ of autism in their encounter with patients; and drawing on instances of 
behaviour reported by non-present patients and their families, especially 
parents, which tacitly or explicitly linked to diagnostic criteria for autism.  
 
A discursive analysis (study three) identified a four-part structure to 
diagnosticians’ talk which was utilised to account for and explain potential 
contradictory evidence. This structure enabled diagnosticians to forward 
evidence for and against a diagnosis, facilitated a collaborative decision-making 
process and enabled them to build a plausible narrative which accounted for the 
diagnostic decision. I also found that uncertainty was used as an interactional 
resource within meetings to enable the introduction of contradictory views or 
evidence whilst retaining a collegiate atmosphere. 
 
I found that healthcare practitioners frequently vocalised the potential benefits 
or harm for the patient and family as a result of the consequences of diagnosis. 
Diagnosis in this setting can, at least in part, be considered as a pragmatic 
construct within a condition which, diagnostically, is permeated by uncertainty 
and contradiction. This resolution of contradiction from different aspects of the 
assessment then served to reify a narratively-coherent, intelligible clinical entity 
that is autism. 
 
Strengths and limitations of studies 
The main strength of these studies is the rich quality of the observational data. 
The data offers an insight into an area of diagnosis rarely seen: a ‘backstage’ 




social arena is a crucial one for shaping the diagnostic decision and, therefore, 
for shaping autism. Gaining access, building trust with clinicians and developing 
working relationships with Health Trusts to enable this access was a long 
process, with each Trust having different governance mechanisms to navigate. 
This in itself makes the data rare and valuable. To my knowledge, this is the 
first data of its kind recorded in adult autism assessment; and one of only three 
collections internationally in children’s assessment (along with Turowetz and 
Maynard, and Parish).   
 
My studies represent only one aspect of the diagnostic process, that of the post-
assessment team meeting where the diagnostic decision is made. There is, 
therefore, a need to examine all stages of assessment, particularly those that 
take place in informal interactions and in the presence of patients and families. 
As recording equipment and the researcher was present during meetings, it is 
possible that discussion was inhibited through this observation. However, it is 
likely that a requirement to focus on the task in hand (diagnosis) would alleviate 
some of this potential observer effect.  
 
Limitations of the data 
It was my intention to include data from the assessment of both adults and 
children within the observation sample for the PhD studies. As described in 
Section 5.2.1, I recruited four specialist assessment teams across C&YP and 
adult services, to facilitate a sample which included a range of ages. However, 
during the course of the observation period, the majority of cases discussed by 
the teams were adults, or young people over 14. The final sample of 51 cases, 
therefore, included only 13 children under the age of 14 (25.49%). I was 
particularly interested in exploring ‘borderline’ cases - cases considered to be 
near the diagnostic threshold - so the questions in my studies further 
determined the sample for detailed analysis. 
 
As previously noted, the disciplinary field in which my studies are located – 
interaction in autism assessment - has mainly been concerned with examining 
the diagnosis of children (e.g. Turowetz and Maynard 2017; Parish 2019). In 




research. Nevertheless it is important to note that the sample overall is skewed 
towards adults and young people. This has two main implications. 
 
Firstly, I acknowledge, that, however unintentionally, my studies may contribute 
to the bias in research identified by Russell and colleagues towards under-
inclusion of populations with Intellectual Disability (ID) in autism research 
(Russell et al., 2019b) as these individuals are more likely to been identified in 
childhood. Secondly, and more broadly, the sample is likely to be skewed 
towards individuals who are less severely affected (requiring less support) both 
because I have focussed on cases that might be considered near threshold, 
and because they were again not identified in childhood. A longer term study, 
focussing only on children’s teams, and specifically sampled for children with 
severe symptoms, would provide a sample more inclusive of children who are 
currently frequently excluded from autism research.  
 
How studies address aim of PhD 
These studies meet the aim of the PhD by directly examining how clinicians 
make collaborative decisions in autism assessment as well as considering how 
interaction, clinical judgement and pragmatism can operate as social factors in 
autism diagnosis. I show how clinicians produce objective accounts through 
their situated practices and perform diagnosis as an act of interpretation, affect 
and evaluation to meet the institutional demands of the diagnostic setting. I 
demonstrate that autism is rendered an object through the process of its 
identification by healthcare practitioners. Uncertainty inherent in autism’s 
heterogeneity of presentation and aetiological variation is ultimately dismissed 
and re-interpreted in diagnosis in order to reify autism, as required by the 
institution, as fixed, real and knowable. The interactive talk of diagnosticians is, 
in itself, a social factor in that how clinicians talk about diagnosis shapes the 








10.4.3 Interview study (study four) 
 
Overview of study 
Sixteen clinicians involved in autism assessment meetings were interviewed in 
this study. Interviews were conducted with participants drawn from the 
observation study, using Tape-Assisted Recall (TAR), which enabled direct 
discussion about cases discussed in meetings through re-listening to audio 
recordings. Interviews were transcribed and analysed with thematic analysis. 
Findings are at a preliminary stage. 
 
I found that clinicians were deeply aware of the ambiguities and difficulties of 
diagnosing autism and took great personal responsibility in managing this 
process for the benefit of the patient and family. They expressed doubt at times 
about their decision-making, but valued the forum of the team meeting to 
explore this uncertainty, examine different accounts together, and make a 
collaborative decision. Concern was expressed about the long-term impact of 
diagnosis, and decision-making was threaded through with a sense of personal 
responsibility and concern for the consequences of diagnosis for the patient. 
Clinicians were aware of having to manage the expectations, desires and 
motivation of patients and pay attention to how researched or prepared 
individuals may be in order either to avoid or gain a diagnosis of autism. There 
is a suggestion of an epistemic tussle, with parents, and with adults coming for 
diagnosis, about who has the right to define autism and therefore ‘be’ autistic. 
Some interview participants expressed concern about pressure on services 
which they believe is constraining the diagnostic process and restricting time 
available for, for example, observations in ‘natural settings’ and longer, deeper 
assessments.   
 
Strengths and limitations of study 
The method chosen enabled direct discussion about cases discussed in 
meetings, allowing a rich and free-flowing discussion in interview. The 
interviews offer an insight into how clinicians see the process witnessed by the 





As participation was limited to those involved in the observation study, there 
was no opportunity to ensure a breadth of professional roles or ages. In 
addition, there was a danger of over-directing the discussion through the 
selection of cases to discuss. However, this probably represented a more open 
approach than direct questioning about social factors might have allowed.  
 
How study addresses aim of PhD 
The interview study enabled me to explore how clinicians’ perceive the 
diagnostic process. Clinicians’ views reflected my observations of team 
meetings, in that they described the process of diagnosis as challenging, 
particularly in borderline cases. Clinicians valued working collectively to feel 
confident about decisions that have been troublesome. I found that clinicians 
are engaged in a ‘push/pull’ relationship with the diagnostic decision and that 
‘pull’ factors (pulling towards a diagnostic decision) may be stronger than ‘push’ 
factors (away from diagnosis). This may be because by the time patients reach 
the team, they are already in an ‘institutional funnel’ (Rossi, 2012) leading 
towards diagnosis. 
 
   
10.5 Overall contribution of thesis 
 
10.5.1 Introduction 
Specific findings from each study have been summarised in Section 10.4. In this 
section I consider the contribution of the PhD as a whole. I discuss the 
contribution in the context of diagnosis as an interactional product, with 
particular attendance to pragmatism and diagnostic uncertainty. I then go on to 
discuss the transferability of my findings to other settings, and my contribution 
to the sociology of diagnosis, methods and clinical practice.  
 
10.5.2 Diagnosis as an interactional product 
Findings from all four empirical studies demonstrate the importance of the multi-
disciplinary (or case review) meeting for autism diagnosis. A review of clinical 
guidelines demonstrated that guidelines consider multi-disciplinary assessment 




team meeting in order to look at evidence together, gather perspectives from a 
range of disciplines and consider these in the light of diagnostic criteria. 
Observation of team meetings found that interaction within the meeting served 
to manage uncertainty, dispel contradiction and enable individual clinicians 
within the team to feel confident about the diagnostic outcome. The team 
meeting enabled collective accountability for the decision which produces an 
outcome that shapes both the future life of an individual, and the nature of 
autism itself.  
 
Autism is an object of knowledge: it is what we know, but it is an object defined 
by the process of knowing it. I found that clinicians’ interactive practices serve to 
deliver autism as an ontological certainty, despite a tacit acceptance of the 
inherent uncertainty and contradiction present in (some) diagnostic discussions. 
In the act of resolving contradiction and uncertainty (through the feel of autism, 
through corralling patient accounts, through narrative) clinicians reify the notion 
of autism itself as a contradictory condition, that is, one where it is possible, for 
example, both to have good social skills and also to be autistic. This 
contradictory condition is one where lack of ‘insight’ can be registered as a 
‘symptom’ but also utilised to downplay a patient narrative; where ‘performing 
autism’ is possible and yet not ‘be’ autism. This contradictory condition is 
defined as being pervasive across settings, and yet, behaviour can be seen to 
change across settings and timespans. This contradictory condition is one in 
which it becomes possible to be both part of a spectrum into the general 
population, as well as categorically defined.  
 
I would argue that clinicians ‘hold’ these inherent contradictions in their 
deliberations and yet produce ontological certainty through their diagnostic 
delivery. Clinicians, as active agents in diagnosis, translate feel, testimony, 
contradiction and ambiguity into objective knowledge. Conflicting accounts are 
incorporated into the diagnostic narrative and reified into autism as a condition. 
This contradictory condition of autism, therefore, is one which is held by 
clinicians as uncertain and indeterminate, and simultaneously is produced as 
certain and determinate, by necessity of the institution of medicine. These 




to shine a specialist lens on autism and give the team a warrant to set aside lay 
testimonies, ADOS scores and the views of other professionals, when required. 
This specialist lens privileges the search for autism which is produced and 
reproduced in its own image.  
 
I found that pragmatism – the practical consequences of a diagnosis (Phillips et 
al., 2012) – is woven into the diagnostic narrative. Pragmatism represents a 
concern by clinicians that the outcome is the right one for the patient and family 
in terms of accessing appropriate support. However pragmatism also 
represents a way to alleviate an impasse in the diagnostic narrative. If a 
diagnosis can be seen to have a functional outcome, then that is one more 
good reason for assigning it. To look at this another way, there appears to be 
little to be gained in assigning a diagnosis if there can be no sense that it will, in 
some form, be helpful for the patient, at some point. The narrative case-building 
process, therefore, includes dances around epistemic authority (between 
clinicians, and between clinicians and lay accounts), the authority (or not) of 
tools such as the ADOS, and how helpful a diagnosis may or may not be.   
 
Clinician credibility and authority is asserted through expressions of uncertainty 
(knowing when the ADOS score is to be accepted and when it is to be set 
aside); through expressions of affect (utilising the feel of autism in the room, 
made possible through the experience of assessing others with similar 
behaviours); and through the ability to assess the credibility of patient and 
family testimonies. I observed that uncertainty is transformed, therefore, in the 
team discussion into something that reinforces professionalism as it 
demonstrates that the clinician is the one who knows, through experience. As 
Featherstone states, ‘personal knowledge and professional status coincide in 
the synthesis of clinical experience’  (Featherstone and Atkinson, 2012, p. 116). 
We can see in practice how the individual clinician’s reliance on ‘feel,’ or the 
‘authority of his (sic) own senses’ (Freidson, 1970, p. 170), is jointly ratified 
through shared understanding and experience within the team.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated how the push away from and pull towards 




beliefs based on clinical training and a desire to make an accurate diagnosis, sit 
alongside the inherent ambiguity and heterogeneity of autism. Diagnostic 
criteria sit alongside subjective interpretations of behaviours. Credible patient 
narratives contradict test scores. Standardisation in the form of the clinical 
interview and the ADOS sit alongside inconsistent testimonies from families, 
educationalists and colleagues. Through this tangle of accounts, clinicians 
weave a story of diagnosis: picking apart, teasing out and unravelling. Some 
argue that an over-simplistic understanding of mental illness is foisted upon 
clinicians (Whooley, 2010) and it could also be argued that the burden of 
uncertainty (Dwyer-Hemmings, 2018) (or ambiguity) of the diagnostic category 
of autism is laid at the door of the diagnostician. In my studies I observed the 
day-to-day practice of clinicians managing this ambiguity in situ. The meeting 
serves to reinforce and underpin the conventions of what we consider autistic 
behaviours to be and, importantly, what autism might become in the future.  
 
I have responded to Atkinson’s (1995) call to examine the detailed interaction of 
clinicians’ talk in order to understand the meaning and consequences of 
uncertainty. This PhD study supports other studies which find that uncertainty is 
used as an interactional resource (Pilnick and Zayts, 2014) in this case to 
smooth over potential conflict, as well as signalling doubt about the causes of 
behaviour (e.g. autism or anxiety) in practice. I therefore offer an empirical 
contribution to the nature of practical uncertainty work in healthcare.  
 
Diagnosticians are charged with the burden of indeterminacy and heterogeneity, 
and find ways to manage this dilemma to find the best outcomes for their 
patients. And whilst clinicians may readily display uncertainty in the privacy and 
relative security of the inter-clinician discussion, they are compelled to produce 
from that discussion a translation which delivers a clear and certain diagnostic 
outcome for patients, families and other professionals. The result of this 
translation from the clinic to the patient is the construction of a condition 
whereby it is possible to be both part of a spectrum as well as categorically 
defined, leading to the conceptualisation of a condition as one which is 





I would argue that the dialogic space of the assessment meeting embraces 
indeterminacy; but this in itself does not facilitate the necessary institutionally-
determined accountable diagnostic clarity. The meeting is the space in which 
the messy indeterminacy of autism assessment is shaped to fit the function of 
diagnosis. In this process of translation, diagnosticians are simultaneously able 
to work-around and to satisfy the institutional necessities of standardisation. 
 
Dealing with the indeterminacy of autism in practice, through joint working in 
assessment meetings, demonstrates how one aspect of knowledge around 
autism is produced – through clinical interaction. Highly valued experience in 
these meetings serves to replicate autism in its image, forming an experience 
‘looping’ effect. At the same time, new concepts are embraced that develop 
over time, such as the way in which women might present autistic behaviours 
differently to men. The clinic produces the image of that person through its 
assessment process. Beliefs about the efficacy of diagnosis, and conventions 
around social behaviour, frame the decision-making context and serve to 
resolve uncertainty. What is socially framed becomes objective reality in that it 
contributes to a collectively endorsed understanding of this particular condition.  
 
I return to Jessie, the boy on the swing introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter, whose behaviour, forty years ago, might have been considered 
eccentric or odd. With the expansion of diagnostic criteria, it is far more likely 
today that the behaviour of a child like Jessie might be interpreted as autistic 
and assigned a diagnostic label. 
 
10.5.3 Beyond autism 
This PhD study has focussed on the diagnosis of one condition – autism. 
Utilising autism as a case study for diagnosis is particularly interesting because 
of factors already outlined. I also argue that these findings may have 
transferability to other settings, both in other autism diagnostic teams as well as 
other conditions, and inferential and theoretical generalisation (Lewis and 
Ritchie, 2003). Theoretical generalisation in relation to sociology of diagnosis is 





Inferential generalisation concerns the question of whether the findings can be 
assumed to apply in other settings. Inferential generalisation requires 
‘congruence’ between the different research contexts which necessitates 
knowledge of both contexts (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). I am therefore limited in 
how much I can assert this kind of transferability given my knowledge is sited in 
this specific context of autism diagnosis. However, it is worth considering where 
these findings might be transferable or appropriate to consider as a potential 
‘working hypothesis’ of extrapolation for further research (Cronbach, 1975). I will 




Although I found that each team worked differently in response to local 
contexts, organisational structures and resources, the findings I have described 
in this thesis were common to all three multi-disciplinary teams. The fourth, 
single-disciplinary team, also had findings in common, however, because this 
team did not, for the most part, come to diagnostic conclusions in their 
meetings, it was not possible to judge, for example, how they dealt with 
contradictory evidence (See Chapter Eight). I would propose that it is likely that 
these findings could be transferable to other autism assessment teams in the 
UK. 
 
The findings may also be transferable to other clinical settings where clinicians 
hold meetings without the patient present, to discuss assessment. Whilst some 
of my findings appear to be specific to autism, for example because of autism’s 
heterogeneity of symptoms, research has explored the role of narrative in other 
kinds of clinical settings, suggesting that developing a narrative structure as a 
discursive device to manage particularly complex conditions is not uncommon. 
The particular way that clinicians deal with contradiction and uncertainty 
together, therefore, may be transferable to other multi-disciplinary team 
settings. Exploration of discursive practices in these settings may find similar 





The particular case of autism is also interesting due to the potential overlap of 
symptoms with other conditions, particularly psychiatric conditions and learning 
disabilities. This provides a particularly challenging task for clinicians in clearly 
deciding where one diagnostic classification begins and another ends. 
However, this is not just the case for autism, indeed, it is likely to be the case for 
a wide range of psychiatric conditions. It can be argued that psychiatric 
symptoms, as with autism, exist on a continuum into the general population 
(Phillips et al., 2012) with the resulting difficulties in separating normality from 
pathology, thereby suggesting possibilities of transferability. Therefore, it may 
be possible to extrapolate the findings to psychiatric settings where the 
threshold between conditions may be uncertain. Obervation of community 
mental health teams, for example, may identify similar dilemmas and solutions.  
Mental health teams in the UK are also under pressure in terms of access to 
resources and workload, therefore, there are similarities across contexts in 
relation to a pressure on services which may impact on diagnosis. However, I 
have found that clinicians perceive in autism diagnosis that there is a strong 
desire for patients and families to receive a diagnosis, which is strongly linked to 
clinicians’ judgement of the credibility of patient and family stories. This may 
transfer across some settings but not others.  
 
I have considered the transferability of these findings to settings for which there 
is a more ‘definitive’ biological test for a condition, such as cancer or heart 
disease. The roots of my study are in psychiatric, behavioural and neurological 
conditions. There are particular issues attached to this range of conditions 
rooted in mental distress, social difficulty and challenging behaviours which may 
not transfer to some other physical conditions. Some of those issues include, for 
example, moral judgements around behaviours, stigmatisation and significant 
emotional distress. Psychiatric conditions are subject to continual reinvention 
dependent on how society judges acceptable behaviours at any particular time 
(Whooley, 2019). Managing this uncertainty and interpreting ambiguity is core to 
the work of clinicians in psychiatric settings. However, to return to the study 
which initially framed my PhD, it has been found that social factors such as 
individual patient preference and availability of resources may impact on 




cautious about advocating for transferability of my findings to settings in 
physical health, it would be interesting to explore how clinician interaction may 
be similar in the multi-disciplinary context of heart disease, for example, or how 
context specific my findings may be in secondary care.  
 
Concepts 
I have explored several key concepts as part of this PhD study, including 
uncertainty, ‘feeling autism’, the role of the (non-present) patients, the way in 
which the condition of autism is created and reified through day-to-day clinical 
practice, and diagnosis as a pragmatic construct.  
 
Other research previously discussed shows that uncertainty in diagnosis is not 
particular to autism or to psychiatric conditions. The way in which clinicians in 
autism diagnosis deal with uncertainty and contradiction, therefore, may also 
not be particular to autism diagnosis. As I have discussed earlier, both ‘feeling’ 
that someone has a condition, and the way in which the patient narrative is 
incorporated into the clinical narrative have been explored in other conditions. 
These concepts may be transferable, therefore, particularly to other clinical 
mental health settings in secondary care. Similarly, considering diagnosis as a 
pragmatic construct may be a relevant concept for a range of conditions, 
particularly those which challenge the boundaries of classification or where 
categorisation may be uncertain. For example, my recent visit to the GP 
resulted in an uncertain diagnosis accompanied by a prescription for a steroid 
nasal spray, a pragmatic outcome in an attempt to alleviate symptoms of 
unknown aetiology. Pragmatism, therefore, may not be confined to autism or to 
psychiatric conditions or to secondary care.  
 
I have argued that autism as a clinical entity is produced and reproduced 
through day-to-day clinical practice. Clinicians’ understanding of autism through 
repeated experiences of diagnosing autism, serves to determine what autism is. 
Clinicians turn judgement into objective knowledge, which, in turn, shapes how 
wider society sees the condition (for example as something that can be 




reification throughout the medical profession and, therefore, is transferable as a 
concept that is core to diagnostic practice.  
 
10.5.4 Contribution to Sociology of Diagnosis 
As stated by Jutel, diagnosis is both a ‘pivotal tool’ for the work of medicine, and 
a ‘profoundly social act’ (Jutel, 2019, p. 3619) in the way society recognises, 
defines and names a disease and attributes it to a cause (Aronowitz, 2008; 
Jutel, 2011). Aronowitz argues that how we frame disease influences health and 
illness beliefs, perceptions of what interventions work and, important for this 
study, clinical and health practices. Whilst we must of course understand the 
reality of living with disease and disability (and not negate its impact on people’s 
lives) we can, simultaneously attempt to understand social practices that shape 
our understanding of health and illness (Brown, 1995). It is social framing that 
considers some diseases stigmatising and others noble: and it is social framing 
that interprets some behaviours as ‘disease’ and others as ‘normal’.  
 
Figure 18: Jutel’s social model of diagnosis (revised) (Jutel, 2019) 
 
In her influential book, ‘Putting a Name To It: Diagnosis in Contemporary 
Society’ (Jutel, 2011), Jutel proposed a model for the social framing of 
diagnosis which she also discussed more recently when reframing her work for 
the ‘genomic era’ (Jutel, 2019). I was interested in how my findings might 
contribute to this model. I reproduced Jutel’s model in Chapter 2, Section 2.3  
(Figure 4). Here I offer a simplified and circular social model of diagnosis based 




This model extracts the three core components of Jutel’s model, placing the 
elements in a circular and iterative ongoing relationship (A. Jutel, personal 
communication7). Here each element – category, consequence and process – 
is given equal weight. At the centre of Jutel’s original model (Figure 4) is the 
relationship between the clinician (MD) and the patient (PT) – the process of 
diagnosis. In this revised model (Figure 18) the process of diagnosis is 
embedded in this relationship more prominently to explicitly demonstrate a 
three-way inter-dependent process.  
 
Having encountered Jutel’s model early on in my PhD study, I now return to it to 
explore where my particular findings might fit.  In my study the patient is absent, 
and yet of course, still central to this part of the process of diagnosis, that of 
assessment discussions between clinicians. The patient is present as an 
‘implicated actor’ (Clarke and Star, 2008): absent and yet not only central to the 
discussion, but the actor for whom the outcome is most significant. Even in the 
absence of the patient, the patient-clinician relationship is core to the 
discussion, which is demonstrated, for example, in how clinicians incorporate 
patient testimonies in their diagnostic narrative. Patient testimonies and 
interpretation of them replace the patient and become the concrete objects of 
medical work (Måseide, 2006). I have demonstrated that the process of 
diagnosis includes interaction between clinicians and non-present patients: 
implicated or invisible actors. 
 
However, my study also demonstrates that equally important to the process of 
diagnosis is the relationship between clinicians. If the diagnostic moment itself 
is relational (Jutel, 2011) then this interactional, behavioural and relational 
moment extends beyond the instance where the patient is in the presence of 
the clinician. The complex network of actors extends to include case notes, 
diagnostic tools, educational, mental health and paediatric professionals, 
families and friends, to name a few. The actors in the process of diagnosis 
weave a complex story between them during which, in the case of autism, the 
patient is present only some of the time. Clinician interaction in this context, 
                                            
7 The concept of the model as circular came from Annemarie Jutel whilst attending an Exploring 




therefore, becomes part of a broader system of diagnosis (as a category, a 
process, an intervention, and with consequences) which helps to shift a 
collection of behaviours into a clinical entity. My study demonstrates that the 
‘process’ element of diagnosis is not restricted to the relationship between 
doctor and patient, but can encompass interaction between clinicians, 
diagnostic tools and other actors, both visible and invisible. 
 
My study, therefore, contributes a micro-analysis of that central concept of 
‘process’ in Jutel’s model. Drawing from my findings and working with Jutel’s 
social model above (Figure 18) I have mapped social actions in the process of 
diagnosis which contribute to the social framing of diagnosis of autism (Figure 
19). My findings show that social factors are not just deeply embedded within 









As can be seen from Figure 19, my PhD study demonstrates that the ‘process’ 
of diagnosis connects both to the category and consequences of diagnosis. The 
process of clinician interaction is intimately entwined with issues of 
categorisation (where is the threshold? where do symptoms begin and end? is 
there ‘enough’ to diagnose?); and simultaneously with issues of consequences 
(relief, understanding, validation, support, legitimisation).  
 
In the context of diagnostic ambiguity (Charman et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010a), 
the process of diagnosis in the shape of the specialist team discussion is 
socially framed and influenced by a number of interactional agents including 
patients and families, diagnostic tools and stretched resources. With the 
specialist team comes a particular focus on looking for autism; and the team 
creation itself both feeds and generates demand. Pragmatism, interpretations of 
ambiguous behaviours, and recourse to experience and ‘feel’, shape both the 
interaction and the outcome. My contribution to the sociology of diagnosis 
concept therefore is to demonstrate how the social framing of autism and 
autism diagnosis shapes the diagnostic process and produces autism not 
simply as a clinical entity but as the result of a complex interaction of factors.  
 
Together these factors present a picture where the ‘push and pull’ of diagnostic 
decision-making does not rely purely on objectively assessing behaviour 
against clinical symptoms. Factors such as team make-up, experience, 
pressure of targets, interpretation of diagnostic measures and the perceived 
attitudes of patients and families are all players in the assessment process. The 
institutional demand to diagnose or not – to draw a line – in a condition which is 
generally accepted to have no clear threshold, shapes the process and the 
consequences. These different pressures and social interational issues are 
brought together in the shape of the autism assessment meeting.   
 
My contribution to the social model of diagnosis is to show how the process and 
consequences of diagnosis cannot be separated and are firmly sited within the 
institution of medicine. The perceived consequences are part of the deliberation 
process; and the process itself has consequences due to its involvement of 




patient, for the clinician (personal and clinical responsibility, time pressures, 
impact on working relationships) and for the category of autism. Process, 
category and consequences, therefore, are highly interdependent. 
 
10.5.5 Contribution to method 
I have taken a novel approach to methods in the PhD, striving to ensure that the 
methods meet the research questions. For example, although a narrative 
approach to qualitative synthesis is relatively unusual (and the only one I know 
of related to clinical guidelines) it enabled the telling of a story of how diagnosis 
is framed, and allowed both a deductive and inductive approach.  
 
The dual analysis approach to analysing interaction in assessment meetings 
was designed as a staged process which allowed a thematic overview of the 
data, whilst at the same time identifying social actions for further examination 
with a discursive psychology approach. Whilst time-consuming, this approach 
resulted in a deep and rich exploration of the data. Thematic analysis is 
theoretically flexible (Braun and Clarke, 2013) therefore it is possible to combine 
this method of analysis with a social constructionist discursive approach.  
In other studies, analysis of clinical interaction has been primarily related to 
doctor-patient interaction and much less to the ‘backstage’ elements of the 
diagnostic process. This study, therefore, offers a detailed insight into a rarely 
seen aspect of diagnosis. The method of analysis elucidates the complexity of 
interaction in diagnostic decision-making that might have been lost in a purely 
thematic or content-type analysis, for example.  
 
Finally, I used Tape-Assisted Recall (TAR) for the approach to interviews, a 
method which has been used primarily in therapeutic settings (Baker et al., 
2019; Cape et al., 2010; Elliott, 1986; Elliott and Shapiro, 1988). As a 
mechanism for prompting responses to meeting interaction, it proved effective 
and is one that could be developed further in a broader range of settings.   
 
10.5.6 Clinical implications  
This thesis has demonstrated some of the constraints within which 




observations demonstrate that clinicians work within a context of significant time 
and resource constraints, increasing referral rates and an institutional system 
which is stretched. Furthermore clinicians work in a context where it appears 
difficult to share information, expertise and experiences across services (clinical 
psychiatrist, personal communication). The development of ‘assessment only’ 
services, whilst supporting specialist approaches, potentially disrupt the 
transition between assessment and post-diagnostic services with research 
showing that post-diagnostic services are the area of least satisfaction for 
parents (Crane et al., 2016). This study contributes to understanding this 
institutional pressure through illustrating the complexity of diagnosis and the 
challenge of diagnostic decision-making in autism.  
 
Overall the data suggest that: 
  
 Clinicians value the multi-disciplinary team context to enable them to 
draw from a range of disciplines and experiences to ensure the team 
comes to a conclusion that everyone feels confident in. However, each 
service devises their own team structure and operation, based on local 
resources and knowledge. This process is both time-consuming and 
leads to the effectiveness of teams being dependent on local expertise 
and resources.  
 Assessment is a lengthy process with multiple assessments to enable 
triangulation across different types of evidence, meaning that waiting 
times for assessment are lengthy and assessment can be stressful for 
patients and families. 
 Evidence for and against diagnosis is frequently contradictory, therefore, 
clinicians manage diagnosis in a context of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 Clinicians frequently refer to the limitations and difficulties of diagnostic 
tests for autism (especially for girls). 
 Diagnosis is frequently complicated by the presence of (potential) co-





 Ambiguity of symptoms can lead to the expression of uncertainty in 
assessment team meetings which can lead to extended discussions 
about diagnosis, and the implementation of further tests. 
 Clinicians build a diagnostic narrative from their own observations and 
assessments, patient and family testimonies and how the patient ‘feels’ 
in relation to social interaction, in the context of considering how helpful a 
diagnosis may be for patient and family. 
 
Multi-disciplinary team working  
As discussed in Chapter Six, clinical guidance for autism diagnosis gives little 
detail about how the multi-disciplinary aspect of specialist autism assessment 
teams should operate. This PhD study has identified that each team has carved 
a method of working from what is possible within their own diagnostic service. 
The positive aspect of this is that teams are fit for purpose locally: they draw 
from resources and personnel that are locally available and design their working 
practices to suit their local needs. This can be seen in the range of different 
disciplines available (or not) to each team, frequency of meeting, selection of 
cases for discussion and roles in meeting, for example. 
 
However, this lack of guidance also leaves space for variability in working 
practices, and therefore in outcomes and services for the patient. The team as 
formed and the way it works is only as rigorous as local resources and 
operational management allow. Even more importantly, lack of access to some 
disciplines as part of the recommended multi-disciplinary approach seems 
defined by local availability and funding rather than ideal make-up of the team. 
Each team strives both for rigour and efficiency: but in a stretched and under-
resourced NHS, allocating enough time to ensure best organisational systems 
for joint working may not be possible.  
 
With regard to interaction in team meetings, my analysis was not intended to 
provide a template for how healthcare professionals might communicate more 
effectively in team meetings or be the basis for training, as in much 




Auburn 2018). However, I suggest that some of the outcomes might be useful 
for reflective practice.   
 
Teams strive for equality of role and contribution, although team members have 
varying experience and role status. More junior or less experienced members of 
the teams feel they are listened to and their views valued. This is essential for 
good team working and decision-making. Clinical psychiatrists, in particular, feel 
they were ‘looked to’ for the lead on a diagnostic decision, and in some cases 
there was a sense that a senior member of staff (usually a psychiatrist) would 
make the ‘final call’ in the case of uncertainty or ambiguity. In interview, some 
participants expressed difficulty in challenging the decision-making process 
even if they were a senior member of the team. This may be because time 
pressure does not allow for fullness of debate, or because of concern about 
being collegiate, for example. This was also observed in team meetings where 
challenges were often accompanied by hesitation or expressions of uncertainty.  
 
Observation of teams suggests there is a complex interplay of epistemic 
authority which can be linked to discipline and role, but also to experience. The 
balance of power and hierarchy in autism assessment teams, therefore, is not a 
straightforward institutional hierarchy (Graham, 2009) but may also be shaped 
by beliefs about diagnosis and its benefits or harms, the perceived function of 
the assessment team and its targets, or the perceived limitations of the 
assessment process itself. An awareness of the difficulty of challenging the 
diagnostic trajectory (i.e. disagreeing with the prospective decision) even in 
well-established teams may help teams to develop methods for supporting 
conflicting views and debate.  
 
In relation to team make-up, some teams particularly valued the contribution of 
healthcare professionals who were not involved in the assessment (and 
therefore had not met the patient) as they could take a questioning role. In 
meetings it could be observed that this role tended to facilitate a different 
perspective on the discussion. One diagnostician however found it difficult to 
fully contribute to discussion without having had a role in assessment 




be brought to a conclusion. This notion of the assessment as a ‘snapshot’ was 
mentioned by several diagnosticians in interview: and yet this contrasts with 
concern about ‘getting the diagnosis right’ because of the lifelong impact of 
having the label of ‘autism’.  
 
I would argue that the team meeting offers a mechanism for clinicians to feel 
supported in their decision-making and comfortable with decisions made. 
However, I would caution against assumptions that the team meeting process 
inevitably aids a rigorous decision-making process. For healthy team working, 
trust-building and mutual respect between individuals of different levels of role 
and experience is essential. Good chairing of meetings, easy access to clinical 
information during the meetings, and detailed preparation is necessary. 
Disagreeing with a decision in a meeting is challenging even, at times, for 
senior clinicians. Without time dedicated to reflective practice, including ongoing 
review of practice and procedures, team meetings cannot work effectively. 
Unfortunately in a resource-restricted NHS system, time to invest in reflective 
practice is extremely limited.  
 
Pragmatism 
A key finding of this study is that diagnosticians are acutely aware of the 
complexity and ambiguity of autism diagnosis, but work in a system that is 
pressured and demands a level of output that many feel uncomfortable with in 
day-to-day practice. I have discussed in Chapter Eight the way in which 
diagnosis is considered, in part, to be a pragmatic construct to enable access to 
short-term support. There is, however, a lack of research and information on the 
long-term impact of a diagnostic label of autism. Diagnosticians are able to 
assess the short-term impact in relation to school support for example, but are 
not able to predict the outcome for someone whose developing identity 
formation will be shaped by a diagnostic label of autism. This presents a 
dilemma for clinicians whose aim is to achieve best outcomes for the patient.  
 
An important factor, therefore, is the tension between alleviating distress and 
the usefulness of the diagnosis. Clinicians can only assess on their experience 




situation, symptoms can become better or worse to the extent that someone 
might not appear to be autistic at all. This conflict between behaviours being 
situational, relational and changing, and the duty to confer a lifelong label, is a 
problematic one. 
 
What might be helpful or not, therefore, is problematised by the notion of 
‘helpfulness’ of diagnosis being subjective, relational and impossible to predict 
in the longer term. There are ‘ethical tradeoffs’ (Phillips et al., 2012, p. 13) in 
considering the utility of the diagnosis for the clinician. Diagnosis may trigger 
appropriate support in school but there is no mechanism for assessing the 
impact of a lifelong label. Diagnosis may be a problematic concept for someone 
who does not desire the label, but longer term may benefit from understanding 
their own behaviours within a diagnostic biography. The impact is not confined 
to the individual but also to parents and families, and to wider society, in relation 
to the potential for overall diagnostic rates for example, and, whilst linked to a 
label, an increasing expansion of the domain of medical disorders (Phillips et 
al., 2012).  
 
I would argue that there are difficulties attached to the concept of autism 
diagnosis conferring a ‘lifelong’ label, given the problem of predicting long-term 
outcomes for any one individual. This difficulty could be alleviated by the 
removal of this concept of lifelong-ness from diagnostic criteria and integrating a 
review process for those diagnosed. As with anxiety, therefore, autism may 
come to be seen as a difficulty which manifests in response to certain social 
environments. For some this will be a lifelong difficulty requiring support: for 
others a temporary period of difficulty after which the label can be removed. 
Importantly, for clinicians, this would offer a safety buffer, particularly when 
diagnosing children and young people without the benefits of understanding 
prognosis or long-term impact. There are, of course, resource implications to 
reviewing an individual’s diagnosis but one which may have benefits in terms of 
support required longer term.  
 
I would also argue that (overtly) focussing diagnostic decisions around 




assessment in autism, given its heterogeneity and ambiguity. Scholars and 
clinicians have advocated for this position in psychiatric diagnosis, stressing the 
importance of focussing on distress and alleviating it, rather than diagnostic 
labelling (e.g. Bentall, 2003). However, when we become patients we have a 
desire to know ‘what it is’, so that we can understand and manage it (my 
prescription of a steroid nasal spray is unsettlingly dissatisfying – and under-
used - whilst I do not know what is causing my symptoms). The diagnostic label, 
then, is not simply a clinical construct but one that patients desire and, 
occasionally, fight for. As Rose (2013) suggests, diagnosis is deeply embedded 
in our system of medical care and is therefore difficult to abandon. Therefore, in 
the current medical institution, pragmatism remains only one factor in the 
diagnostic process, but crucial to the diagnostic narrative and an important 
moral and ethical guide for clinicians in the context of ambiguity or uncertainty.  
 
Adults and children 
The study did not set out to make a comparison between child and adult 
diagnosis of autism, rather I aimed to include a range of settings. In the data, 
there were few differences in how clinicians discussed adult or child diagnosis. 
The findings outlined in this thesis – utilising patient and family testimonies, 
constructing diagnostic narratives, assessing ambiguous behaviours, drawing 
on ‘feel’ and experience as well as discussions of masking, insight and under-
reporting – all appeared in discussions within both adult and C&YP assessment. 
 
The developmental history was considered important in both adult and C&YP 
settings, however, it was frequently either unavailable or equivocal with adults. 
With the expansion of adult diagnosis, therefore, diagnosticians work out in 
daily practice how to retrospectively diagnose autism for (some) people for 
whom there is no reliable developmental information. In these adult cases, an 
increased reliance on self-report brings with it those difficulties of interpretation 
of mediated accounts and judgements around insight, memory, motivation, 
apparent compensation and perceived developmental gains.  
 
Both sets of clinicians considered the consequences and utility of a diagnosis, 




school provision or specific interventions, for example. This was often 
connected, in both teams, to the meaning of an autism diagnosis to the patient 
(or family). Across the study, consideration of consequences involved questions 
around the perceived benefits of an autism diagnosis to those concerned, as 
well as explorations of the motivations of patients and families. 
 
As previously discussed, there were some differences within teams (not specific 
to age of patient), for example, length of discussion, personnel, regularity of 
meetings, number of cases discussed and whether all or selected cases came 
to the meeting.  
 
 
10.6 Future Research 
 
10.6.1 The assessment process 
By necessity, within the limitations of a PhD, this study was able to observe only 
one aspect of the diagnostic process for autism. Throughout this PhD I have 
been curious about other stages of assessment – referral, assessing the 
patient, and delivering feedback in particular – and how they might interact to 
produce the diagnostic outcome. Observation of how these particular 
assessment conversations translate into feedback to patients and families 
would have been fascinating, particularly in relation to uncertainty and 
contradiction. Inclusion of interviews with those in receipt of diagnosis to enable 
an understanding of some of those factors raised by clinicians (motivation, 
insight, masking etc.) would provide another layer of understanding of the 
complexity and the social framing of the broader assessment process. Similarly, 
views and observations of referrers would enable an exploration of the earlier 
part of the process.  
 
I have been particularly struck by the lack of specific guidance about how MDT 
autism assessment meetings should work, and the assumptions made both 
about their effectiveness and their capacity to deliver. There is a great deal of 
scope to build on my PhD study through examining the micro-interaction of 




shape training materials to support clinicians in practice. Training materials 
could include recommendations on frequency of meetings, structure and 
organisation and how/when to review cases. Further research could develop a 
protocol for managing borderline or uncertain cases in particular8.  
 
10.6.2 Adult assessment 
The PhD study has worked broadly across both children and adult services, 
however, there is a pressing necessity to examine adult diagnosis more closely, 
given the expansion of services and the difficulties of adult diagnosis as outlined 
in this thesis. There are a number of possibilities: not simply for observing and 
analysing the diagnostic process, but to explore commonly held understandings 
of lifespan development in autism (‘losing’ a diagnosis, gaining a diagnosis in 
later life and issues of camouflaging, for example). Some clinicians suggested 
that tools which have been transferred from children’s diagnosis do not 
necessarily transfer effectively, and, in some cases, adults and young people 
object to using them because they appear childish. Furthermore, is autism the 
‘same thing’ in children who are diagnosed and in adults who are diagnosed in 
adulthood?  
 
10.6.3 Supporting clinicians in practice 
Diagnosticians noted the difficulties of predicting the long-term outcomes for 
people they had diagnosed, particularly young people and their relationship with 
identity when living with a label of autism. Whilst a diagnosis might meet the 
short-term needs of children who might be struggling at school, clinicians 
cannot predict the long-term impact. A study which examines short-term and 
long-term impact of diagnosis would help diagnosticians to understand the real-
life consequences of a lifelong diagnosis.  
 
Conversations and interviews with clinicians have raised several potential areas 
for future research which seem urgent for clinical practice. For example, there 
appears to be no comprehensive study which examines geographical or time 
differences in referral rates across the UK, and the relationship (if any) between 
                                            




referral rates and diagnostic rates. This might also be compared with the timing 
of awareness-raising of the assessment pathway within different areas (and its 
relationship to referral rates), referral routes and quality of referrals. Some 
clinicians consider less structured and rule-based school environments may 
disadvantage children and young people who struggle with social interaction. A 
study examining the nature and location of children’s difficulties would help to 
understand to what extent children would or would not present with serious 
psychiatric difficulties other than in school. 
 
 
10.7 Strengths and limitations of PhD 
 
10.7.1 Strengths 
A strength of the PhD is the range of empirical data (review of guidelines, 
observation and interview) and of analysis (narrative, thematic and discursive) 
which enables a rich exploration of the ‘hows’ as well as the ‘whats’ of autism 
assessment. Much of the debate around the social framing of autism diagnosis 
is not rooted in empirical study. I believe the data and analysis make a strong 
contribution to the field of sociology of diagnosis as well as offer insight into the 
construction of autism as a condition.  
 
The PhD study aims to develop a contribution to the field of sociology of 
diagnosis, whilst also attending to the difficulties of real-world practice of 
diagnosis. The data and analysis provide material which may be useful for 
reflection by clinicians and there are clinical implications which are discussed in 
Section 10.5.8. A strength of the study is that the data were collected across 
settings with a diversity of geography (urban and rural) and patient age (child 
and adult diagnosis). 
 
It would be inappropriate to discuss the concept of generalisability in a 
qualitative study as this concept does not fit with the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of qualitative research (Smith, 2018). As I have 
argued above (Section 10.5.5) the study has analytical generalisation, as the 




contributing new understandings to this body of literature (Lewis and Ritchie, 
2003; Smith, 2018). I would also argue that the PhD as a whole has 
‘transferability’ (Smith, 2018; Tracy, 2010) or inferential generalisation (Lewis 
and Ritchie, 2003) in that the cases discussed here will overlap with settings 
elsewhere and therefore can be applied and reflected upon and intuitively 
transferred to other clinical settings or diagnostic processes in other conditions 
where appropriate (Smith, 2018) (see Section 10.5.5).  
 
10.7.2 Limitations 
I have discussed above the commonality of findings across teams. One 
difference between settings was in the way that teams selected patients to bring 
for case discussion at meetings, with two teams bringing selected cases, and 
two teams bringing all cases. This meant that case discussions were based on 
a different set of patients (for example, those that selected cases generally 
brought more complex cases to discuss). To capture case discussions about all 
patients would have meant taking a more ethnographic approach to the whole 
PhD, to include attending clinic days to capture the discussion and outcome of 
straightforward cases as well as capturing less formal occasions for case 
discussion such as desk discussions and phone calls. Therefore a limitation of 
the study was that I was unable to observe decision-making within the wider 
context of the clinic: however, a focus on the particular interaction of one aspect 
of the clinic enabled an in-depth analysis that would not have been possible 
with a broader ethnographic study.  
 
Two teams who had initially been involved in the study (and I had been granted 
ethical approval to work with) were excluded from the study as they did not hold 
meetings where decisions were made. Inclusion of these teams would have 
offered a different insight into the assessment process which would have been 
valuable but only possible with an ethnographic-type approach. Furthermore, a 
focus on adult teams only might have strengthened my arguments about autism 
diagnosis in adults in the context of increased demand. There are, therefore, 
both limitations and strengths related to the diversity of my team selection, 
which was determined, at least in part, by issues of geography and time 






Alongside a critique of how clinicians create a story to make a diagnostic 
decision, I have been constructing a story too about how clinicians construct 
that story. Just as clinicians work within a socially constructed institution, with 
expectations, limitations and objectivities carved out of apparently objective 
tools (diagnostic tools in the case of diagnosis; rigorous methods in the case of 
research), academics, qualitative or quantitative, work within a set of ‘knowns’ 
which are created too by society. The story told is not fiction: but it is only 
possible here and now, due to particular sets of circumstances and frameworks 
available.  
 
My own story in this PhD is one of a non-clinical researcher finding out about a 
set of practices previously alien to me. As a social psychologist I’m interested in 
how people interact, how groups work and how together we make things 
happen through language. Prior to this PhD I’ve mostly experienced interaction 
in a learning or education setting. In a medical setting, relatively short 
interactions have significant consequences for the patient and family in a way 
that the outcome of other sorts of interaction might not. I do not imply that 
educational interaction cannot be equally influential, only, for the most part this 
influence happens over a longer period of time. I might have looked at other 
social factors within the diagnostic process had I not had this interest – 
economics or environmental factors or aetiology or treatment for example. 
 
As someone who has often felt they do not ‘fit’, I am intrigued by how we, as a 
society, decide what is acceptable behaviour and what is not; what we choose 
to label as a disorder and why; and why we are so drawn, as a society, to make 
judgements about those who might be different from ourselves, whether through 
behaviours, skin colour, gender, age, disability or race. Typologies are 
fundamental to so many aspects of our social world: I can understand and be 
reassured by a system which relies on diagnosis to ensure I get the treatment I 
require as a patient. At the same time it remains important to be alert to the 




the wider social and cultural implications of those changes, how diagnoses are 
conferred, and how, once made, they become ‘real’ knowledge about a person.  
 
It is important to question how we make judgements, moral in nature, about 
individual lives so that we can understand that the consequences of these 
judgements are human-made and not inevitable. How we classify and 
categorise human pain, suffering and distress has consequences. I am grateful 
to those invisible actors (patients, families and other participants) who have 
been a part of my study. It is easy to remain removed from the day-to-day 
difficulties of living with a disability or impairment if that is not your experience. It 
is easy to offend those who experience disability and who are rightly protective 
of those boundaries that guard their identity status, human rights and potential 
access to support. We live in an unequal world, and battles have been fought 
for good reason. Examining diagnosis does and should not undermine the lived 
experiences of those with disabilities or seek to replace the fight for equality and 
de-stigmatisation that can come with or without a diagnostic label.  
 
I am grateful to the healthcare professionals who have both given me their time 
and trusted me to observe their interaction within a complex and ‘tricky’ 
process. Healthcare professionals are human and doing a difficult job, with 
enormous personal responsibility. I hope that my observations are recognisable 
to my participants, and that my research might contribute further to reflective 
practice. I also hope my analysis reflects the complexity of the job they do, and 
the challenging decisions they make every day, in attempting both to alleviate 
distress for some of the most vulnerable members of our society and to 
maintain ‘accuracy’ of diagnosis for a condition that slips between and around 
categorical definition.  
 
 
10.9 Concluding comments  
 
I began this thesis with an idea of a ‘line in the sand’: a line that represents the 
threshold of diagnosis which, once crossed, is permanent and lifelong. 




line which has changed historically. Autism is no longer what it was. I have 
attempted to demonstrate how diagnosticians in contemporary autism diagnosis 
both navigate and contribute to this shifting line. The interaction of clinicians 
represents just one aspect of the long journey of assessment for each and 
every child, young person or adult. If diagnosis, as I have shown, is an 
interactional product, this entity that is autism is one shaped and framed by 
social forces, contemporary understandings and society’s deeply held beliefs 
about medicine and its consequences. The narrative of autism diagnosis is part 
of a belief system in diagnosis that we all share and contribute to in seeking 
answers for our distress, and in looking to medicine to provide them. 
 
My overall contribution to the sociology of diagnosis field is to demonstrate how 
one aspect of the process of diagnosis is managed by clinicians to meet the 
needs of the clinic, even when uncertain. I demonstrate how the process of 
diagnosis is intimately integrated with both category and consequence through 
interactional practices.  My contribution to autism research is to demonstrate 
how challenging diagnosis of autism can be in threshold cases, and how 
clinicians develop strategies to manage those troubling cases. The role of 
pragmatism, resistance (or acceptance) of patient and family narratives and the 
reliance on clinical intuition are key to diagnosis in borderline cases.  
 
As Russell (2014) points out, current criteria define research, and research 
defines the revision to criteria, leading to a circular and reciprocal underpinning 
of the meaning of autism. Circulating within the worlds of diagnostic criteria and 
society’s research-based understandings of autism, is the work of the diagnostic 
team. Diagnosticians draw on both existing criteria and research, and by 
producing the autistic subject through the clinic, frame and shape a 
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Type Age range Number of items and ratings Reference  Details and notes 
      
DIAGNOSIS BY DIRECT BEHAVIOURAL OBSERVATION 











adults (≥ 12 
months) 
Five modules of between 29 
and 34 items each, tailored to 
individual language and 
cognitive development 
(Toddler module 11 items).  
 
Ratings between 0 (no 
evidence of abnormality 
related to autism) and 3 
(definite evidence) 
(Lord et al., 
2000) 
ADOS-G included in NICE guidelines as a tool 
for adults who do or do not have a learning 
disability; and for adults for whom a more 
complex assessment is required.  
 
Considered the ‘gold standard’ of ASD 
assessment but training is not free.  
 
Standardised play and communication sessions 
are administered and observed.  
ASD-OC 
The Autism Spectrum 















23 – 65 
months 
67 items (Freeman et al., 
1978) 
 
DIAGNOSTIC INTERVIEW WITH PARENT OR CARER 














740 items (183 on 
demography, family 
background, developmental 
history, motor skills; 266 on 
autistic disorders; 291 on 
mental states relevant to 
other diagnoses) 
 
(Skuse et al., 
2004) 
Produces computer-generated report 
containing detailed quantified symptom 
profiles (Skuse, 2004) 
 





53 item computer assisted 
interview 
ABI 






Parent/carer 18 subscales each with 168 
items 




The Autism Diagnostic 











93 items, two-three hours to 
complete 
(Le Couteur et 
al., 2003) 
Included in NICE guidelines as a tool for adults 
who do or do not have a learning disability; and 
for adults for whom a more complex 
assessment is required 
ASD-DA 
The Autism Spectrum 
Disorder - Diagnosis Scale 





interview with care 
staff working with 
individual for ≥6 
months 











6 – 55 years 20 items (Gillberg et al., 
2001) 
Included in NICE guidelines a tool for adults 
who do not have a learning disability 
 
Asperger syndrome specific (Falkmer et al, 
2013) 
DISCO, DISCO-II 
The Diagnostic Interview 







All ages 362 items (Leekam, 2012; 
Wing et al., 
2002) 
Included in NICE guidelines as a tool for more 
complex assessment for adults.  
 
Dimensional scale 
DIAGNOSTIC INTERVIEW FOR ADULTS  
AAA 
The Adult Asperger 





patient and a 
≥16 years 18 plus 5 prerequisites (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2005) 
Included in NICE guidelines a tool for adults 
who do not have a learning disability 
 
Asperger syndrome specific  
 





Quotient (AQ) and the 
Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
relative or 
informant 
TOOLS USING COMBINATION OF INTERVIEW AND OBSERVATION 
CARS, CARS-2 
The Childhood Autism 






≥2 years old 15 items rating scale plus 
parent/carer interview 




Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes 
‘Theory of mind’ 
test 
Adult 25 photographs of eyes (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997) 
 
To identify subtle impairments in social 
intelligence in otherwise normally intelligent 














5-18 years 50 items (10-15 minutes)  (Myles et al., 
2000) 
Asperger syndrome specific  
ASD-DC 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
– Diagnosis for Child 








7 – 16 years 27 items (Ehlers et al., 
1999) 
Can also be completed by teacher 
AQ 
Autism-Spectrum 





10 -16 years  
50 items 
 
Short version – 10 items 

















10 items (AQ-10) 
(Allison et al., 
2012; Baron-
Cohen et al., 
2001b) 
Included in NICE guidelines as a potential 
screening tool for adults who do not have a 
learning disability, prior to a comprehensive 
assessment (if person scores above 6; or if 
autism is suspected based on clinical 
judgement) 
 


















primary health care 
provider 
questionnaire 
18 months 14 item (parent/carer) 







Caregiver tool 14-18 
months 









14 months 14 items  (Dietz et al., 
2006) 
Completed after parent interview 
ITC 
Infant Toddler Checklist 
Parent/carer 
questionnaire 
6 – 24 
months 








3 – 22 years 32 items with 8 additional 
items for parents 
(Gilliam, 2001) For professionals and parents; to discriminate 
those with AS from those with autism 
GARS-3 
Gilliam Autism Rating 
Scale 
Screening tool 3-22 years 56 items (Gilliam, 1995) For teachers, parents and clinicians, based on 
DSM-5 criteria 
M- CHAT 
Modified checklist for 









Quantitative checklist for 
autism in toddlers 
 18 – 24 
months 
25 items 
10 items (short version) 




The Ritvo Autism Asperger 











80 items (Ritvo et al., 
2011) 
Included in NICE guidelines as a tool for adults 
who do not have a learning disability 
 





























65 items (Constantino 
and Gruber, 
2012) 
Can also be completed by teacher, relative or 
friend. 
STAT 
Screening tool for autism 
in 2 year olds 
Clinician 
administered level 
two screening tool 
24 – 36 
months 
12 items and activities involve 
child interaction (20 minutes) 
(Stone et al., 
2008) 
Level two screening measure 
 
*Studies including children with all ages and abilities, for diagnosis/identification of autism or ASD, from NICE Guidelines (2011) 
 
Source: Vllasaliu et al., 2016; Lai, Lombardo, & Baron-Cohen, 2014; Falkmer, Anderson, Falkmer, & Horlin, 2013; NICE, 2011; NICE, 2012; Maljaars, Noens, Scholte, & Berckelaer-Onnes, 2011 
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AUTISM DIAGNOSIS AS SOCIAL PROCESS:  
AN EXPLORATION OF CLINICIANS’ DIAGNOSTIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS: INTERVIEWS 
VERSION NUMBER 2 (14/03/2017) 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Please read this information sheet which tells 
you about the study and take time to decide whether or not to take part.     
 
What is the aim of the project? 
The aim of the project is to explore the key issues for healthcare professionals in diagnostic decision-making 
around Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). We are interested in healthcare professionals’ beliefs, practices 
and decision-making processes when undertaking ASD assessments in secondary care. We would like to 
conduct interviews so that we can consider how healthcare professionals work in practice to pragmatically 
achieve best end results for children and adults on the autism spectrum with a view to offering our findings 
regarding best practice to be considered as part of a NICE guidelines review.  
 
Description of participants required 
We are interested in interviewing healthcare professionals who are involved in contributing to diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorders, with either children or adults, in any way, in secondary care, throughout the UK. 
We are seeking to gather the views of people with different roles in ASD diagnosis, and want to make sure 
we have a range of perspectives.  
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project you will be asked to attend an interview with the lead researcher 
or, depending on your location, be interviewed by telephone. The interview can take place in your place of 
work if you have somewhere quiet we can meet, and at a time convenient to you. The interview will take no 
longer than one hour.  
 
What data will be collected and what use will be made of it?  
This study involves an open-questioning technique where the precise nature of the questions asked have not 
been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, 
although the Medical School Research Ethics Committee is aware of the general topics to be explored in the 
interview, the Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be used. 
 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel uncomfortable, you may 
decline to answer any particular question(s).You can also withdraw from the study at any stage for any 
reason, without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
Interviews will be audio recorded, transcribed and analysed for themes. 
 
Will the data collected be confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential 
and be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Your name and personal details will be 
removed from the data so that you cannot be recognised from it. If you discuss any patient cases in interview 
this information will also be anonymised.  
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All electronic data including audio recordings and transcripts will be stored on a password protected 
University of Exeter laptop with access to the files restricted to the research team. All personal information 
will be stored separately from the interview data. Files will be backed up on a secure, encrypted server and a 
password protected external hard drive. After the project is finished, in accordance with the University of 
Exeter recommendations, the anonymised data will be held and stored in an electronic database. The 
anonymised data may be analysed by other researchers as required by the funder. 
 
Results of this project may be published but any data included will not be individually identifiable. If you wish, 
you will be sent copies of any publications resulting from research. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and benefits of taking part? 
You will not be exposed to any hazards or risks by taking part in this study. By taking part in interview you 
will have the opportunity to reflect on your own beliefs, practices and experiences as an expert clinician, 
share your views with others through publication and ultimately contribute to best end-results for children and 
adults on the autism spectrum.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will form part of a broader PhD project. The resulting thesis will be openly available 
upon completion. The results of this study will be written up in an academic paper and submitted to a journal 
as well as presented at conferences and other research events. If you wish you will be provided with copies 
of any publications resulting from the research. Please be assured that you, or any patient cases you discuss 
in interview, will not be identified in any report or publication.  
 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
The research is coordinated at the Mental Health Research Group at the University of Exeter. Jennie Hayes, 
who is a PhD student at the University of Exeter, will be leading the study. Dr Ginny Russell, Senior 
Research Fellow in Mental Health and Developmental Disorders has overall responsibility for the study. The 
project is supervised by Dr Russell, Professor Rose McCabe, Professor of Clinical Communication and 
Professor Tamsin Ford, Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry.  
 
The project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD in Medical Studies at the University of 
Exeter. The study is funded by the Wellcome Trust.  
 
What happens if you would like more information about the study?  
 
If you have any questions, either now or in the future, please contact either: 
 
Jennie Hayes:   Jennie.Hayes@exeter.ac.uk; 01392 726013  




If you have any complaints about the way in which this study has been carried out please contact the Chair 
of the University of Exeter Medical School Research Ethics Committee:- 
 
Ruth Garside, PhD            




This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter Medical School Research 
Ethics Committee 
 
UEMS REC REFERENCE NUMBER: Mar17/B/114 










AUTISM DIAGNOSIS AS SOCIAL PROCESS:  
AN EXPLORATION OF CLINICIANS’ DIAGNOSTIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS: OBSERVATION OF MDT MEETINGS 
VERSION NUMBER 2 (14/03/2017) 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Please read this information sheet which tells 
you about the study and take time to decide whether or not to take part.     
     
 
What is the aim of the project? 
The aim of the project is to explore decision-making processes in diagnosing Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD) in secondary care by observing the decision-making process in MDT meetings. It will enable 
exploration of how healthcare professionals work together to come to a consensus; to what extent 
institutional, social or psychological factors influence diagnosis and what they are; and how different voices, 
processes or influences are ‘weighted’ in decision-making. The observation will also enable an exploration of 
how guidelines and diagnostic tools are used in practice as a framework for diagnosis.  
 
Description of participants required 
We are interested in observing MDT meetings involved in the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders, with 
either children or adults, in England.  
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project we will require permission to video record up to five consecutive 
MDT meetings. Meeting attendees will be required to give demographic information (name, job title, role, 
number of years in practice and gender). We will not require access to patients or patient information and all 
references to identifying information of patients discussed in the meetings will be removed. We will require 
basic non-identifying demographic information of patients who are discussed at the MDT meeting (age, 
ethnic group, gender).  
 
What data will be collected and what use will be made of it?  
The meetings will be video recorded, uploaded to computer and transcribed by the lead researcher. Video 
recording equipment will be unobtrusive. The recordings will be analysed to explore decision-making 
processes of healthcare professionals within the teams.   
 
Will the data collected be confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential 
and be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Your name and personal details will be 
removed from the data so that you cannot be recognised from it. Data related to the discussion of patients 
within the meeting will be anonymised. If video material is presented at conferences or seminars, data will be 
anonymised by blurring faces, distorting voices and deleting identifying patient data. Only short extracts will 
be used. 
 
All electronic data including audio recordings and transcripts will be stored on a password protected 
University of Exeter laptop with access to the files restricted to the research team. All personal information 
will be stored separately from the data. Files will be backed up on a secure, encrypted server and a 
password protected external hard drive. After the project is finished, in accordance with the University of 
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Exeter recommendations, the anonymised data will be held and stored in an electronic database. The 
anonymised data may be analysed by other researchers as required by the funder. 
 
Results of this project may be published but any data included will not be individually identifiable. If you wish, 
you will be sent copies of any publications resulting from research. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and benefits of taking part? 
You will not be exposed to any hazards or risks by taking part in this study. By taking part in the project you 
will have the opportunity to reflect on your own beliefs, practices and experiences as an expert clinician, 
share your views with others through publication and ultimately contribute to best end-results for children and 
adults on the autism spectrum.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will form part of a broader PhD project. The resulting thesis will be openly available 
upon completion. The results of this study will be written up in an academic paper and submitted to a journal 
as well as presented at conferences and other research events. Please be assured that you, or any patient 
cases you discuss in the meeting, will not be identified in any report or publication. 
 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
The research is coordinated at the Mental Health Research Group at the University of Exeter. Jennie Hayes, 
who is a PhD student at the University of Exeter, will be leading the study. Dr Ginny Russell, Senior 
Research Fellow in Mental Health and Developmental Disorders has overall responsibility for the study. The 
project is supervised by Dr Russell, Professor Rose McCabe, Professor of Clinical Communication and 
Professor Tamsin Ford, Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry  
 
The project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD in Medical Studies at the University of 
Exeter and is funded by the Wellcome Trust and the University of Exeter.  
 
What happens if you would like more information about the study?  
 
If you have any questions, either now or in the future, please contact either: 
 
Jennie Hayes:  Jennie.Hayes@exeter.ac.uk; 01392 726013  




If you have any complaints about the way in which this study has been carried out please contact the Chair 
of the University of Exeter Medical School Research Ethics Committee:- 
 
Ruth Garside, PhD            












UEMS REC REFERENCE NUMBER: Mar17/B/114 
IRAS Project ID: 220180 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (Clinician Interviews) 
 




VERSION NUMBER 2 (14/03/2017) 
I have read the Information Sheet Version Number ___ dated ____ concerning this project and understand 
what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage.  
 
I know that:          please circle 
 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary   Yes / No 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage Yes / No 
 
3. The interview will be audio recorded and extracts from the transcripts Yes / No 
of the audio recording may be published. My anonymity will be preserved. 
 
4.  Data (audio recordings) will be retained in secure storage for  
5 years in accordance with University of Exeter Data Protection Policy Yes / No  
  
5. The interview will take the form of an open questioning technique Yes / No 
 
6. After the project is finished, the anonymised data will be stored in a Yes / No 
  repository and may be analysed by other researchers  
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
       
 
_______________________ ________________                   __________________ 
Name of Participant (printed) Date Signature 
 
 
_______________________ _______________ __________________ 




This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter Medical School Research 
Ethics Committee 
UEMS REC REFERENCE NUMBER:  Mar17/B/114 
IRAS Project ID: 220180 
 
 






PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (Meeting Obervation) 
 




VERSION NUMBER 2 (14/03/2017) 
 
 
I have read the Information Sheet Version Number ___ dated ____ concerning this project and understand 
what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage.  
 
I know that:          please circle 
 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary   Yes / No 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage Yes / No 
 
3. The MDT meetings I take part in will be video-recorded and extracts from Yes / No 
the resulting transcripts of the video recording may be published.  
 
4. My anonymity and that of my patients will be preserved   Yes / No 
 
5. Data (video recordings) will be retained in secure storage for 5 years in Yes / No accordance with 
University of Exeter Data Protection Policy     
 
6. After the project is finished, the anonymised data will be stored in a Yes / No 
repository and may be analysed by other researchers  
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
       
 
________________________ ___________________ ________________ 
Name of Participant (printed) Date Signature 
 
 
________________________ ___________________ _________________ 




This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter Medical School Research 
Ethics Committee. 
UEMS REC REFERENCE NUMBER: Mar17/B/114 
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Appendix 5: Meeting Attendance Sheet 
 
AUTISM DIAGNOSIS AS SOCIAL PROCESS:  




IRAS Project ID: 220180 
 
 





























Meeting date:  
 
Meeting venue:  
 
Meeting ID Number: 
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Appendix 6: Patient Data Form 
 
 
AUTISM DIAGNOSIS AS SOCIAL PROCESS:  
AN EXPLORATION OF CLINICIANS’ DIAGNOSTIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
PATIENT DEMOGRAPHIC SHEET 
VERSION NUMBER 1 (23/03/2017)  
IRAS Project ID: 220180 
 
 
Meeting date:  
 
Meeting venue:  
 
Meeting ID Number: 
 
 
(for researcher use only)  
 






    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
REFERENCE NUMBER: Mar17/B/114  IRAS Project ID:  
  
 
  380  
  
 
  381  
Appendix 7: Observation Strategy for Meetings 
 
Observation Strategy for MDT Assessment Meetings 
VERSION NUMBER 1 (23/03/2017) 
 
 
Purpose: Observation of MDT meetings will provide data on how a diagnosis is formulated and inter-
clinician decision-making processes. It will record the narrative that is created and built upon during meetings 
leading towards the diagnostic decision. It will enable exploration of how clinicians work together to come to 
a consensus; to what extent they draw on social factors and what they are; and how different voices, 
processes or influences are ‘weighted’ in relation to decision-making. The observation will enable a 
comparison to be made between what happens in clinical practice in relation to guidelines and policy 
frameworks explored in study one.  
 
Method: observe at least 20 MDT autism assessment meetings in at least four different settings (up to five 
consecutive meetings in at least two adult and two children’s assessment settings). The number of patients 
discussed at each meeting varies, but this number should allow data related to at least 50 patients. Meetings 
will be recorded on video, or on audio recorders if consent is declined, and the resulting audio will be 
transcribed and analysed using conversation analysis, enabling subtle and detailed exploration of how 
diagnostic discussion evolves through interaction and taking account of both verbal and non-verbal 
communication. Follow up discussions with clinicians involved will, where possible, explore the trajectory of 
particular cases raised in MDT meetings and elicit clinicians’ perspectives around the social/psychological 
and institutional influences on decision-making, enabling detailed exploration of the mechanisms behind 
decision-making with those taking part.  
 
Outcome: The study will be written up as a paper for publication.  
 
1. Pre-recording: contact will be made and a main contact established. Consent will be sought. 
Researcher will provide information sheet explaining right to withdraw, confidentiality and video 
recording. Main contact will seek agreement from MDT. 
 
2. Introductory meeting: prior to the study beginning, the researcher will attend an MDT meeting to 
introduce herself and the study and allow members to raise concerns and ask questions before the 
observations begin. Information sheets will be provided and consent forms signed. 
 
3. Subsequent meetings: a laminated information sheet will be left when video recorders are set up to 
explain that the session is being recorded and why. An attendance sheet will be passed round for 
completion to aid transcription. Demographics sheet (name, job title, clinical role in meeting, other 
role in meeting, number of years in practice and gender) and consent forms will be available in 
advance of subsequent meetings for any participating health professionals who did not attend 
introductory meeting. The researcher will be present at some meetings, with consent, to enable a 
richer understanding of the resulting data.  
 
4. Transcription and analysis: transcription with Jeffersonian notation (Heritage and Frankel, 2005) 
and analysed using conversation analysis 
 
5. Particular observations will be noted around: use of diagnostic tools and guidelines; how 
consensus is reached; what determines resolution; discussion of social factors and influences; views 
of the patient/parent/carer; weight of different voices/roles; meeting structure; points of 
agreement/disagreement. 
 
UEMS REC REFERENCE NUMBER: Mar17/B/114 
IRAS Project ID: 220180 
  
 









Appendix 8: Characteristics of All Patient Cases 
 
Case No Age Sex  Referred by Informant Patient/family 
desire 
Tests done ADOS 
result 
Outcome Next steps 
          
Adult Team 1 
1 36-50 Male GP Informant to 
be sought 
(mother) 
Ambivalent Screener, ADOS, 
Reading the 




In process Get informant (mum) 





Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting 





In process Get informant and do 
second assessment 




but will talk 
to Support 
Worker 





In process Extended clinician 
interview, info from 
mental health 
team/social worker 
5 36-50 Male Liaison and 
Diversion 
Team  




In process Further appointment 
and talk to social 
worker 
6 26-35 Male GP Wife Patient 
ambivalent, 






In process Further tests 
7 36-50 Female GP Friend Yes ADOS plus 3DI Under 
threshold 
In process Get informant/tests 





In process Further tests 
9 51-60 Male GP Informant to 
be sought 
(parents) 






In process Get informant/tests 
(extended interview, 
further test, talk to 
parents) 
 





10 61-70 Male GP Wife Yes, knows he 




None yet Not 
Applicable 
In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) plus talk further 
to informant 
11 18-25 Female GP Mother Mother does, 
patient wants 
answers 
ADOS plus ADI Under 
threshold 
In process Get information from 
other professionals 
(CAMHS and GP) 
Adult Team 2 
12 26-35 Female Not 
discussed 







Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting 
13 36-50 Female Not 
discussed 
Not discussed Patient will 
agree with 
diagnosis, 
thinks she has 
autism 




Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting and 
post diagnostic group 
14 18-25 Male Not 
discussed 












Not diagnosed Refer onwards 
15 51-60 Female Not 
discussed 








Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting 
16 18-25 Female Not 
discussed 
Parents Not discussed ADOS plus 3DI Meets 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting and 
post diagnostic group 







Not discussed ADOS Under 
threshold 
In process See doctor (for clinical 
interview) 
18 26-35 Male Primary 
Care Liaison 






Refer back to Primary 
Care Liaison 
 





19 26-35 Female Not 
discussed 
Not known Ambivalent ADOS plus 3DI Under 
threshold 
Not diagnosed Feedback meeting 
20 36-50 Female Not 
discussed 








In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) 






Not diagnosed Refer onwards 




Diagnosed ASC Outcome and offer 
group and reasonable 
adjustments 
23 26-35 Female Not 
discussed 
Father Yes ADOS Meets 
threshold 
In process Further tests 
(psychiatrist to see) 
24 36-50 Female Not 
discussed 




In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) 
25 26-35 Male Not 
discussed 
Not discussed Not discussed Screener Under 
threshold 
Not diagnosed Refer onwards (ADHD 
assessment) 
26 26-35 Male Not 
discussed 




Diagnosed ASC Feedback and 
reasonable 
adjustments 
27 18-25 Female Not 
discussed 




In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) 
 
C&YP Team 1 
28 5-10 Female Not 
discussed 




Not diagnosed Specialist tests then 
parental support 
29 14-18 Transgender  Not 
discussed 




In process Review potential 
diagnosis with doctor 
30 14-18 Male Other 
agency 




In process Check consent, 
safeguarding and then 
3di 
31 14-18 Female Not 
discussed 
Not discussed Not discussed ADOS Meets 
threshold 
Watch and wait CAMHS 
32 14-18 Male Not 
discussed 
Not discussed Doesn't want 
language 
disorder 
Not discussed Under 
threshold 
Not diagnosed  Negotiate outcome 
with family 
 












In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) 
34 14-18 Female GP Parents Patient 
implied (keen 
to see us) 




Diagnosed ASC Feedback meeting 
35 5-10 Male Not 
discussed 




In process Further tests (ADOS 
next) 
36 14-18 Male Not 
discussed 
Parents Patient relates 
to autism and 
wants to know 




Diagnosed ASC  Feedback and offer 
patient choice 
37 11-13 Male Parent 
adviser 
Mother Mum thinks 
autism, dad 
does not 




Diagnosed ASC Feedback and consider 
educational support 
38 5-10 Male Not 
discussed 
Parents Not discussed ADOS plus 3DI Meets 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Feedback 
39 5-10 Female Not 
discussed 




In process Get tests/info 
(awaiting paed report) 
40 5-10 Female Not 
discussed 
Mother Not discussed 
(mother 
under-reports) 
ADOS plus 3DI Meets 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Complete 
41 11-13 Female Not 
discussed 
Parents Not discussed ADOS plus 3DI Meets 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Complete 
42 5-10 Male Not 
discussed 
Mother Not discussed ADOS plus 3DI Meets 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Not discussed 
43 5-10 Male Not 
discussed 






In process autism 
and/or 
attachment 
Take to bigger MDT 
44 5-10 Male Not 
discussed 








Diagnosed ASC Report + enhanced 
transition 
45 14-18 Male Not 
discussed 




In process Take to wider MDT  
46 14-18 Female Not 
discussed 





In process Book for assessment 
 
















Diagnosed ASC Feedback 
C&YP Team 2 (primarily 14+) 
48 14-18 Female Mental 
Health 
Professional 







Diagnosed ASC Feedback + psychiatric 
review + talk to school 
49 5-10 Male CAMHS 
worker 





Diagnosed ASC Feedback and post 
diagnostic group 
50 14-18 Female Eating 
disorder 
clinic 
Parents Yes, all think 
she is autistic 
ADOS plus 3DI Under 
threshold 
Diagnosed ASC Feedback and post 
diagnostic group 
51 14-18 Female Adolescent 
mental 
health team 




Diagnosed ASC Feedback plus 
formulation (also 




Code: ASC (Autism Spectrum Condition); CAMHS (Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services); LD (Learning Disability); ADOS (Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule); 3Di (The Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview); MDT (Multi-Disciplinary); Screener (any screening tool)
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Appendix 9: Interview Topic Guide  
 
Interview strategy and Topic Guide 
 
Version number 3 (10/07/2018) 
 
Research Question: What are the social factors that drive diagnostic practice? 
 
Overview: follow up interviews with clinicians involved in MDT meetings will, where 
possible, explore the trajectory of particular cases raised in MDT meetings and elicit 
clinicians’ perspectives around specific influences on decision-making, drawn from the 
MDT data, enabling detailed exploration of the mechanisms behind decision-making with 
those taking part. 
 
Sampling: interviews will be conducted with HCPs involved in the MDTs observed, 
between 15 and 20 interviews. 
 
Method: A semi-structured approach will be used and the order of questions may vary 
depending on the progress of the interview. The first two parts of the interview comprise a 
series of questions. Part three of the interview will draw from a case which has been 
discussed at a team meeting (tape assisted recall). Where possible, a transcript of the 
meeting will be available, along with the audio recording. This case will be selected on the 
basis of an emerging social factor drawn from the data (e.g. parental/informant/patient 
desire driving process; need/functionalist approach or clinical approach; masking of 
symptoms/insight or performing autism). Where possible, extracts from the audio recording 
and/or transcript will be used as prompts during the interview. Where this is not possible, 
cases will be discussed as examples without prompts. 
 
Analysis: Interviews will be audiotaped, transcribed and analysed with thematic analysis. 
This will enable broad themes to be summarized from the data suited to informing policy 
development (Braun and Clarke, 2006b). The questions below will function as prompts for 
interview. Follow up questions and discussion will arise from the individual interview and 
may vary or develop in different directions.  
 
Outcome: The study will be written up as a paper for submission to publication.  
 
Proposed structure of interview (see table below for prompts) 
 
 Introduction and consent 
 Part one: the diagnostic process. 
 Part two: diagnostic tools and guidelines 
 Part three: case discussion  
 Thank you and debrief  
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Interview schedule 
 
Background and administrative items: interviewer explains purpose and context of 
interview, length and structure, right to withdraw, confidentiality and audio recording. 
Participant completes consent form and demographic info.  
 
Part one: the diagnostic process (10 mins approx) 
1. To start with, can you talk about the different things you take into account during 
diagnosis?  
2. How does the MDT meeting contribute to dx process?  
3. How do different roles in meetings contribute to negotiating the diagnostic decision?  
4. How do factors outside your control impact on dx: EG SES, clinician availability, 
resources, govt spending etc, waiting lists? 
5. How do you deal with that intersection between the 
social/environmental/biological/behavioural aspects of autism?  
 
Part two: using diagnostic tools and guidelines (5 mins approx) 
1. How do you use clinical guidelines? (and which ones) ICD/DSM etc and or NICE 
etc. 
2. How do you use diagnostic instruments (and which ones?)  
3. How do they contribute to dx process? 
 
Part three: case discussion drawing from MDT data – tape/transcription assisted 
recall (20 mins approx)  
1. Can you tell me a bit about NAME?  
2. Can you tell me where they were referred from?  
3. Do you know the background to them seeking a diagnosis?  
4. Specific questions to prompt based on the data extract 
5. Is there anything you’d like to add? 
 
Debrief: Interviewer will bring the interview to a close, thank participants for their 
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Appendix 10: Guidelines Review Data Extraction Framework 
 
SECTION A: document characteristics  
 
 
A1 Name of document 
A2 Author  
A3 Year of publication 
A4 Journal title/publisher 
A5 Geographical remit  
A6 Type of document (practice parameter, clinical guideline etc.) 
A7 Status of document (statutory/guidance only etc.) 
A8 Who is the guidelines target audience?  
A9 What age range (of patients) does the document encompass? 
A10 Range of diagnoses covered by document  
A11 Legal Framework on which guidance is based?  
 
 
SECTION B: Pre-diagnosis and context for diagnosis 
 
DO THE GUIDELINES OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE FOLLOWING? 
B1 Who can refer to autism team? 
B2 Which professionals can provide a diagnosis? 
B3 What training or experience of clinicians is required to diagnose? 
B6 Is there a stated or recommended age at which symptoms can be assessed/recognised?  
B4 Is there a targeted waiting time from referral to diagnosis?  
B5 Is there guidance about how to achieve any targeted waiting times? 














Appendix 11: Clinical Guidelines Characteristics 
 












Age at which symptoms 
are recognised 


































Before age of 3 years 
(childhood autism); after 
age 3 (atypical autism).  
Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders 
(Fifth Edition)  
 







All ages Autism 
Spectrum 
Disorder  
 N/A During 2nd year of life (12-
24 months) or earlier than 
12 months if 
developmental delays are 
severe 
NATIONAL CLINICAL GUIDELINES  
 









































May be uncertainty before 
24 months, or with 
developmental age of less 
than 18 months 
 
Six Steps of Autism 
Care for children and 









Health care and 
education 
professionals, 
Up to the 






NICE, SIGN, NZ 
Guidelines, NHS 
Pre-school. Language 
delay by the age of two 
years. 
 



















































































































Autism can be reliably 
diagnosed between the 
ages of 2–3.  
GUIDELINES FROM PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
 
RCSLT (Royal College 













































in adults (RCPych 
CR191) 
 















Autism ICD-10, DSM-5, 





















Both diagnostic manuals 
consider ASD indicators to 
be present by the age of 
36 months although some 
children can be identified 
under the age of 24 
months. 
 
BMJ Best Practice 
online resource 














& ICD-10.  NICE, 
SIGN, AACAP, 
AAP, NZ ASD 
guideline, AAN  
More than 80% of children 
with ASD show clear 
behavioural signs by the 
age of 24 months, some 














































































disorder in adults: 
clinical features and 


























Disorders   
 
ICD-10 and 
DSM-5, NICE  
 
To satisfy ICD-10 criteria 
for childhood autism, 
impairments must 




diagnosing autism  














Autism  NICE The core autism 
behaviours are typically 
present in early childhood; 
but features can appear 
different with age or 
change with circumstances 










Autism 2009 Levy, Mandell 
& Schultz 










Parents often aware from 
age 18 months, a diagnosis 
is often not made until 2 
years after the initial 
















































adults with autism: 
summary of NICE 
guidance  
 




childhood: a clinical 
update  
 







ICD-10, DSM-IV  N/S 
The NICE guideline 
on recognition, 
referral, diagnosis 
and management of 













































Appendix 12: Key Recommendations of Clinical Guidelines  
 
CPG Recommended tools MDT 
recommended 
MDT membership Assessment 
targets 



















No specific tool 
 
N/S  N/S  N/S Careful clinical history & summary of social, psychological & 
biological factors.  
Multiple sources of information:  
 clinician's observations 
 caregiver history 
 self-report (where possible) 
Clinical judgement 














diagnosis can be 
made by a single 
experienced HCP; 
profile of strengths 
& weaknesses is 
essential, and 
requires MDT [55] 
(full version).  
 
Autism team made up of 
Paediatrician &/or Child 
& Adolescent 
Psychiatrist, SLT, Clinical 
&/or Educational 
Psychologist & access to 
paediatrician/paediatric 




Psychologist, OT, if not in 
team. Also consider 
specialist health visitor 
 
Start the autism 
diagnostic 
assessment 
within 3 months 
of referral. Follow 
up appointment 
within 6 weeks of 
assessment. 
 
Seek report from the pre-school or school; gather additional 
health or social care information. Include in every autism 
diagnostic assessment: 
 questions about parent/carer/child's concerns 
 details of the child's experiences of home life, 
education and social care 
 developmental history, focusing on developmental 
and behavioural features  
 assessment (through interaction with and 
observation of the child or young person) of social 
and communication skills and behaviours 
 medical history, including prenatal, perinatal and 
family history, and past and current health 
conditions 
 physical examination  
 





or nurse, specialist 
teacher or social worker. 
 consideration of the differential diagnosis  
 systematic assessment for conditions that may 
coexist with autism  
 development of a profile of the child's or young 
person's strengths, skills, impairments and needs 
that can be used to create a needs-based 
management plan, taking into account family and 
educational context 





No specific tool 
 
The use of MDT 
approach is 
necessary  
Involving at least two 
disciplines: 
paediatrician;  child 
psychiatrist; SLT, OT, 
clinical psychologist; 
specialist health visitor; 
mental health 
practitioner (CAMHS); 
social worker; nurse; ed. 
psych. teacher; other 
trained professionals 
Referral screened 
within 5 days. 
Info provided 
within 4 weeks. 
13 weeks to first 
appointment. 
Feedback within 4 
weeks, report 
within 6 weeks of 
formulation.  
Step one: Initial directed conversation.  
Step two: Integrated multidisciplinary team assessment 
(leads to diagnosis/non-diagnosis) includes: 
 medical history inc: birth history, family history, & 
general medical concerns 
 developmental history focusing on developmental & 
behavioural concerns 
 observational assessment of the child/young person  
 further assessment/observations in another setting 
(school/home)  
 physical exam in some groups  
 specific assessments may be required, e.g. SLT 
assessment  
 educational assessment                                                                                                               
Step three: Integrated MDT formulation (leads to wider 
understanding of difficulties) 





10 (without LD); Brief 
assessment (with LD). 
Diagnosis and assessment: 
AAA including AQ and EQ; 
ADI-R; ADOS-G; ASDI; 
Comprehensive 
assessment should 
be team based 
(short version). At a 
minimum by a 
qualified clinician 
Specialist autism team 
made up of: Clinical 
Psychologists, Nurses, 
OTs, Psychiatrists, Social 
Workers, SLTs, Support 
Staff 
N/S During a comprehensive assessment, enquire about and 
assess the following: 
 core autism signs and symptoms that have been 
present in childhood and continuing into adulthood 
 early developmental history, where possible 
 behavioural problems 
 





RAADS-R (without LD).   
ADOS-G; ADI-R (with LD); 
DISCO, ADOS-G, ADI-R 






 functioning at home, in education or in employment  
 past and current physical and mental disorders  
 other neurodevelopmental conditions  
 hyper- and/or hypo-sensory sensitivities and 
attention to detail. 
Direct observation of core autism signs and symptoms 
especially in social situations. 
Assess for possible differential diagnoses and coexisting 
disorders  
Assess risks; Develop care plan, provide health passport, 
consider 24 hour crisis management plan; Assess challenging 
behaviour 




Screening: GADS, GARS-2, 
AASQ, ASAS, NAS, AQ-10 
History: ADI-R, DISCO, ASDI, 
RAADS-R;  
Direct assessment: ASIT, 
HSST, SSQ, Observation: 
ADOS-G 
Diagnosis must be 
team based & draw 
on a range of 
professionals. 
At least two of: clinical 
psychology (core), 
psychiatry, SLT, LD/MH 
nursing; OT, other 
appropriately trained 
professionals.  
Final report to be 
provided within 6 
weeks of 
assessment.  
As an absolute minimum, elements 2, 3 & 4 must be included 
in the assessment.  
1. Neurodevelopmental history, corroborated via 
relative/family;  
2. Direct autism specific assessment with individual;  
3. Observational recording of assessment sessions;  
4. Clinical judgement.  
May also include; standardized measure of adaptive 
functioning; assessment of language & communication skills; 





Identification: AQ-10  
Diagnosis and Assessment: 
E.g. ADI-R, DISCO, 3di, CARS, 
CARS-2, ADOS-G. NAPC and 
RCPsych guides.   
 
MDT … should be 
considered as the 
optimum approach  
Experienced 
professionals 
N/S   History taking (informant interview): prenatal, 
perinatal & developmental history; description of the 
current problems experienced; family history; 
description of who is in family; coexisting conditions 
and differential diagnoses 
 Clinical observation/assessment (individual 
assessment/interview): directly observe & assess 
the individual’s social & communication skills and 
behaviour  
 





 Contextual and functional information from a variety 
of settings and people 
 Profile of the individual’s strengths and difficulties: 
communication, cognitive, neuropsychological and 
adaptive functioning; motor and sensory skills 
 Biomedical investigations on an individual basis 
when clinically relevant 
 Assessment of mental health needs, wellbeing and 
risk should be considered 














This may include SLT, 








During assessment, consideration must be given to the triad 
of social impairments, as well as theories relating to the 
triad, for example sensory sensitivity and integration; 
intersubjectivity; executive functioning deficits; motivation; 
memory and central coherence. 
 Joint attention 
 Readiness & ability to focus & shift attention 
 Social interaction 
 Use of communicative strategies 
 Evaluation of child’s play 
 Info about learning potential 




Identification: AQ, RAADS-R. 
RPsych Guide. 
Questionnaires: ASAS, 
GARS, GARS-2, SCQ, SRS-2, 
AQ, AQ-10, RAADS-R, SCDS, 
ABC. Diagnostic interviews: 
ADI-R, ADOS-2, DISCO, 3Di, 
AAA, RPsych Guide, PDD-
MRS, ASDI, CARS-2, HBS, 
WADIC Assessment for 





be expected to 
diagnose 
straightforward 
cases & be alert to 
indications for a 
more specialist 
assessment.  
MDT usually includes 
psychology & nursing as 
core membership 
N/S   Speak with informant 
 Take neurodevelopmental history 
 Consider obtaining early health records 
 
Might include assessment for; cognitive ability, functional 
ability, coexistent neurodevelopmental disabilities, 
coexistent psychiatric disorders, mental capacity, risk of 
harm/offending, medical problems 
 
Wherever possible, it is essential that the clinician gets 
accurate accounts of relationships in different settings (e.g. 
 





AQ, EQ, SQ, Faces test, eyes 
test, Faux Pas Recognition 




 at work & at home), particularly where they might be more 
demanding for that individual.  
 
BPS (2016) e.g. ADOS, ADI, DISCO, ADI-
R 
 
It is recommended 
that assessment is 
multidisciplinary.  
At least one 
psychologist, in addition 
to other relevant 
personnel, such as OTs, 
mental health workers 





is timely.  
The taking of a developmental history with carers as well as 
observation across different settings. Information from a 
range of sources. Psychologists contribution to identification 
and assessment may include: 
 Assessment of protective factors, strengths and 
abilities 
 Assessment of associated mental health issues 
 Comprehensive developmental and family history 
 Assessment of learning styles 
 Assessment of strengths and of barriers to learning 
 Assessment of environmental conditions for learning 
 Functional behavioural assessment 
 Assessment of social communication style 
 Assessment of the needs of families. 
 Comprehensive cognitive assessment, which may 
include psychometrics if deemed necessary 
 
BMJ (2017)  Screening: CHAT, M-CHAT  
Parental questionnaires: 
SCQ, CAST, CARS; for adults, 
the SRS, ASQ. 
Diagnosis and Assessment: 
eg ADOS-G, ADI-R;  3di; 
DISCO 
Diagnosis should be 
confirmed or made 
by an appropriately 
trained 
professional, ideally 





psychologists, & other 
professionals 
 N/S A combination of: 
• neurodevelopmental history 
• standardised interview, &  
• observational assessment 
Gather information about functioning in more than one 
environment; A full neurological examination including 
measurement of head circumference is routinely performed 












Blenner et al 
(2011)  
 
Screening: CHAT, PDDST, 
STAT, CHAT-23, M-CHAT, 


















Comprehensive evaluation that includes  
 lifetime & family history 
 review of medical & educational records 
 behavioural observation 
 physical examination 
 administration of standardised instruments such as 
the autism diagnostic observation schedule 
 cognitive & adaptive assessment 
 review of established DSM or ICD diagnostic criteria 
 Assessment of specific domains, such as 
communication skills, sensory and motor problems, 
and family stressors and coping abilities 





Screening: ASDASQ, AQ and 
EQ, AAA. AQ-10, RAADS-R. 
RCPsych guide.  
Observation: PDD-MRS 
(with ID); ADOS-G. 
Interview: ADI-R, DISCO, 
3Di.  
AAA to provide structure.     
Diagnosis can be 
made by one 
clinician. Wider 
assessment 




N/S Labour intensive - 
up to 8 hours to 
make & 
document 
diagnosis.   
Three elements (judged against criteria of ICD-10 or DSM-4): 
• interview with person 
• observation  
• interview with an informant   
Some clinicians bypass the criteria & test, for example, 
theory of mind, central coherence. 
Consider possible co-morbidities 
Holistic assessments needs to be structured around: 
 Need for social support and for help with 
employment 
 Sensory and processing difficulties 
 Medical issues   
 Neuro-psychiatric conditions  
 Practical skills, including motor difficulties  
 Social interaction skills  
 Emotional understanding (of self and others) and 
personal coping strategies 
 Interests and preoccupations 
 





 Sexual interests and future desires 
 Insight and future desires and motivation 
 Psychiatric concerns  
 Other behaviours that may get person into contact 
with the law 
 Support for carers 
 
Garland et 
al (2013)  
Screening: AQ-50, AQ-10  
Diagnosis: ADI-R, ADOS=G, 
RCPsych Diagnostic 
Interview Guide  
When mental 
health difficulties 
also exist, the 
expertise of the 
wider MDT is likely 
to be engaged.  




should be set 
aside  
 History of presenting complaint 
 Psychiatric history 
 Family history 
 Medical history 
 Developmental history 
 Personal & social history 
 Mental state examination 
 Assess for comorbid disorders inc. 
neurodevelopment disorders 
 Physical assessment 
 Functional level assessment 
 Assess risk 
 Assessment of care & support needs 






No specific tool  If the local autism 
team does not have 
the skills to assess 
these children 
themselves, they 
should liaise with 
professionals who 
are able to do so 
 
Minimum, paediatrician 
&/or child & adolescent 
psychiatrist, SLT & 
clinical &/or Ed.Psych. 
Other professionals … 
specialist health visitor, 






within six weeks 
of assessment 
Should provide detailed developmental profile. Based on 
NICE guidance.  
 





Lai et al 
(2013) 
Screening: CHAT, ESAT, M-
CHAT, ITC, Q-CHAT, STAT 
(for young children); SCQ, 
SRS, SRS-2, CAST, ASSQ, AQ 
(for older children and 
adolescents); AQ, RAADS-R 
(FOR ADULTS).  Diagnosis 
and assessment: ADI-R, 
DISCO, 3Di (for structured 
interview); ADOS, ADOS-2, 






N/S N/S  Interview with the parent or caregiver  
 Interaction with the individual 
 Collection of information about behaviour in 
community settings  
 Cognitive assessments 
 Medical examination  
 Co-occurring conditions 
Levy et al 
(2009)  
SCREENING: Q-CHAT, M-
CHAT, FYI, ECI-4, CSI-4, SCQ, 
ASDS, KADI, AQ-Child, A 
(AUTISM) ABC (autism), 
PDDRS, PDD-MRS, DBC, 
DBC-ES, PDDBI, ABC 
(aberrant), CCC, SRS, RBS-R, 
SCDC.  Diagnosis and 
assessment: PIA-CV, DISCO, 
ADI-R, 3Di.  CHAT, STAT, 




The MDT should include 
clinicians skilled in 
speech & language 
therapy, occupational 
therapy, education, 
psychology, & social 
work. 
 
 Use ICD or DSM criteria 
 Core and comorbid symptoms, cognition, language, 
& adaptive, sensory, & motor skills.  
 Review of caregiver concerns, descriptions of 
behaviour, medical history, & questionnaires.  
 Include stage 1 data.  
 Observations across settings  
 Cognitive, communication, & ASD-specific 
assessment  
 Medical assessment  




Screening: M-CHAT, NAPC 
Checklist  







essential members.  
N/S  Direct clinical structured observations 
 Critical that information is gathered from different 
settings, outwith the clinic – there are structured 
questionnaires for parents/teachers 
 Physical exam and other specialist tests as required 
 
Pilling et al 
(2012)  
Identification: AQ-10.    N/S N/S N/S Inquire about & assess the following:  
 Core autism signs & symptoms 
 Early developmental history 
 





 Behavioural problems 
 Functioning at home, education, employment 
 Past & current physical & mental disorders 
 Other neurodevelopmental conditions 
 Neurological disorders (for example, epilepsy) 
 Communication difficulties 
 Hypersensory &/or hyposensory sensitivities & 
attention to detail 
 Carry out direct observation of core autism signs & 
symptoms especially in social situations 





No specific tool  N/S N/S N/S Observed behaviours with patient presenting symptoms 
from ‘Triad of Impairments’: social interaction, social 
communication, social imagination  
 
Wilson et al 
(2013)  
Identification: AQ-10 
Diagnosis and assessment: 
ADI-R; ADOS-G. AAA, ADI-R, 
ADOS-G, ASDI, RAADS-R 
(without ID). ADI-R and 
ADOS-G (with ID). DISCO, 
ADI-R, or ADOS-G. 
Should be carried 
out by MDT 
consisting of 
professionals who 
have experience in 
diagnosing autism 
(from NICE).  
 
N/S N/S A comprehensive assessment of autism should involve an 
assessment of 
 core autism signs and symptoms 
 early developmental history, where possible, 
and in the absence of an informant written 
information, such as school reports may be 
used 
 behavioural problems 
 functioning at home, in education, or in 
employment 
 past and current physical and mental disorders  
 other neurodevelopmental conditions 
 neurological disorders (e.g. epilepsy) 
 sensory processing and sensory sensitivity 
issues 
Assess coexisting mental health disorders. Risk assessment. 
Functional analysis for challenging behaviour 
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Appendix 13: Selected Jefferson Transcription Symbols 
 
[ ] Overlapping talk 
, Upward intonation 
. Falling intonation 
↑ Marked pitch rise 
:: Lengthening of preceding sound 
£ Smiley voice 
(.) Micro pause 
(0.2) Timed pause (tenths of second) 
> <  Speeded up talk 
< > Slowed down talk 
So Emphasis 
= ‘Latching’ of successive talk 
.hhh In-breath 
Bu-u- Cut off of previous sound 
°so° Quieter speech 
But Consonant produced more sharply than normal 
 
 













Appendix 14: Characteristics of Patient Cases with a Diagnostic Outcome 
 
          FOUR-PART NARRATIVE STRUCTURE     
Case 
no 
Age Sex  ADOS result Pattern 1. Preface 2. Contradictory 
evidence 
3. Re-alignment Helpfulness Co-
conditions 
Outcome 
Adult team 1 (11 cases discussed in total, 1 with outcome) 
2 51-60 Male Under 
threshold (4) 




Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
Adult team 2 (16 cases discussed in total, 10 with outcome)   








13 36-50 Female Under 
threshold (2) 
Four part Constraining Under threshold on 
ADOS 




14 18-25 Male Too difficult to 
score 
Four part Constraining Traits; social 
difficulties; variable 




Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 




Constraining n/a No contradictory 
evidence 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 




















21 36-50 Female Under 
threshold (2) 
Four part Constraining History and AQ10/RQ 




Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
22 36-50 Female Meets 
threshold (9) 
Four part Constraining Social interaction ok; 
lot of gesture 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
25 26-35 Male Under 
threshold (4) 
Four part Constraining Special interests BEDC (anxiety) Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
 















C&YP Team 1 (20 cases discussed in total, 12 with outcome   
28 5-10 Female Under 
threshold 
Four part Neutral Parental report Over-reporting Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
31 14-18 Female Meets 
threshold 
Four part Constraining Over threshold on 
ADOS; history and 
symptoms suggestive 
of ASC  
BEDC 
(depression/neglect) 
Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
32 14-18 Male Under 
threshold 





Yes Yes Not 
diagnosed 
34 14-18 Female Not discussed 
(didn’t do full 
ADOS) 




Compensating (gender) Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
36 14-18 Male Meets 
threshold 
Four part Constraining Good social manner, 
eye contact, social play 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
37 11-13 Male Meets 
threshold (9) 
Four part Constraining Other prof and one 
parent believes not-
ASC 
ADOS is clearly above 
threshold; some 
compensating 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 




Constraining n/a No contradictory 
evidence 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
40 5-10 Female Meets 
threshold 
Four part Constraining Non verbals under 




Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
41 11-13 Female Meets 
threshold 
Three part Constraining Absence of observed 
repetitive behaviours 
Subsequent report of 
repetitive behaviours; no 
other explanation No 
Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
42 5-10 Male Meets 
threshold (9) 
Four part Constraining Eye contact, non-
verbals, emotion 
recognition OK; other 
profs believe not-ASC 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
 





44 5-10 Male Meets 
threshold 
Four part Constraining Gets on well socially, 
lots of friends; 
language within normal 
limits 
Parents under reporting; 
compensating 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
47 5-10 Male Meets 
threshold 





Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
C&YP Team 2 (4 cases discussed, all outcomed) 
48 14-18 Female Meets 
threshold (not 
yet scored up) 





High 3di scores; 'enough 
there'  
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
49 5-10 Male Meets 
threshold (not 
yet scored up) 
Four part Constraining Good at recognising 
emotion, 
social/creative play; 
some gesture; socially 
motivated 
Compensating Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
50 14-18 Female Under 
threshold 
Four part Constraining Under threshold on 
ADOS; good gestures, 





complicated by anxiety 
Yes Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
51 14-18 Female Meets 
threshold (not 
yet scored up) 




Compensating No Yes Diagnosed 
ASC 
           
*Compensating includes: learned behaviours, taught strategies, training (eg in presentation skills), masking and camoflauging; putting on a show 
**BEDC Better explained by different condition 
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Appendix 15: Selected In The News Items 
 
 BBC article on Paddy McGuinness responding to his children ‘not looking disabled’ (despite 
having autism): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-50289637 
 A Thinking Person’s Guide to Autism post ‘Neurodiversity 
FAQ’: http://www.thinkingautismguide.com/p/so-youre-doing-story-about.html 
 A Guardian letter to ‘our friends who share autism success  
stories’: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/sep/28/a-letter-to-our-friends-who-
share-autism-success-stories 
 The Guardian article by Simon Baron-Cohen about Neurodiversity and 
autism: https://twitter.com/GdnSocialCare/status/1179331882565156864  
 NBC news article: Why the focus of autism research is shifting away from a search for a ‘cure’: 
more attention is on identifying children as early as possible and support for the health and 
well-being of autistic adults 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/kids-health/cure-autism-not-so-fast-n1055921 




 Guardian article ‘women ‘better than men’ in disguising autism 
symptoms: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/sep/13/women-better-than-men-at-
disguising-autism-symptoms 
 What is Autism? How the term became too broad to have meaning any more. Guardian 
article: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/26/autism-neurodiversity-
severe 
 The Telegraph article, ‘Autism now so over diagnosed it will be a meaningless condition in 10 
years’ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2019/08/21/autism-now-over-diagnosed-will-
meaningless-condition-within/ 
o NAS response:  https://www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media-centre/news/2019-
08-22-new-research-on-diagnosis.aspx 
o Paper it is based 
on: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2747847 
 BPS Psychologist article, ‘Me and Monotropism: A Unified Theory of 
Autism’: https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-32/august-2019/me-and-monotropism-
unified-theory-autism 
 Dispatches programme 29th July 2017, 9pm – Young, British and Depressed 
(trailer): https://twitter.com/C4Dispatches/status/1155523311725699072?s=20 
 Study finds psychiatric diagnosis to be ‘scientifically 
meaningless’: https://neurosciencenews.com/meaningless-psychiatric-diagnosis-14434/ 
 Spectrum Article ‘Stimming, therapeutic for autistic people, deserves 
acceptance’: https://www.spectrumnews.org/opinion/viewpoint/stimming-therapeutic-
autistic-people-deserves-acceptance/ 
 Spectrum Article ‘Autistic people with intellectual disability often excluded in 
studies’: https://www.spectrumnews.org/opinion/viewpoint/autistic-people-intellectual-
disability-often-excluded-studies/  
 Blog post ‘Autistic communication differences and how to adjust for 
them’: https://theaspergian.com/2019/06/09/autism-autistic-communication-differences/ 
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 How Asperger’s helped Greta Thunberg realise there was a climate 
crisis: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/greta-thunberg-on-how-aspergers-helped-her-
realise-there-was-a-climate-crisis-53qhhknj0 
 Spectrum article on the divisions in and between the Autistic Community and Neurodiversity 
Movement: https://www.spectrumnews.org/features/deep-dive/search-truce-autism-
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Appendix 16: Exploring Diagnosis Advisory Board 
 
Liz Pellicano Professor and director of Centre for Research 
in Autism and Education  
Ilina Singh Professor of Sociology known for her work on 
‘ADHD voices’ project. 
Katherine Runswick-Cole Disability activist, scholar and parent.  Founder 
of critical autism network. 
Stuart Murray Professor at Leeds, and parent, known for 
book ‘Representing Autism’. 
Chloe Silverman STS scholar based at Penn State University, 
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Annemarie Jutel Professor of Sociology of Diagnosis 
Denis Pereira-Gray Retired GP and former president of Royal 
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